Ketubot 101b — the Talmud in English

For Rav Huna said: If she committed adultery, she did not forfeit ![](pamud.bmp "

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her worn-out garments

that

remain,

that is, what remained of the garments after the husband had worn them out.

A tanna taught

a beraita

before Rav Naḥman: If she committed adultery, she forfeited her worn-out garments that remain.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to that tanna:

If she committed adultery, did her garments commit adultery

are even her garments adulterous, that you cause her to forfeit them!?

Rather, thus

teach:

If she committed adultery,

she did not forfeit her worn-out garments that remain!

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This

which the tanna taught in the beraita, “If she committed adultery, she forfeited her worn-out garments that remain,”

is the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem the Anonymous

the statement of Rabbi Menaḥem is this, for many of his teachings were taught anonymously in the Mishna and in the beraita.

But the Sages say: If she committed adultery, she did not forfeit her worn-out garments that remain.

We learned in the Mishna:

If initially he married her

with the intention that she was an aylonit, she has a ketubah:

Rav Huna said:

An aylonit

is

a wife and is not a wife,

sometimes she is like his wife, and sometimes she is not like his wife.

But

a widow

who marries a High Priest in violation of the prohibition

is a complete wife

she is.

And Rav Huna explains his statement:

An aylonit is a wife and is not a wife:

If

he recognized her condition, she has a ketubah

as a complete wife, and if

he did not recognize her condition, she has no ketubah,

for she is not his wife, since it is a mistaken transaction.

A widow

to a High Priest

is a complete wife

she is:

Whether he recognized her condition

the High Priest at the time he married her, that she was a widow, or

whether he did not recognize her condition, she has a ketubah.

And

if

Rav Yehuda were to say:

Both this one and that one

both an aylonit and a widow married to a High Priest

are a wife and are not a wife: if he recognized her condition, she has a ketubah; if he did not recognize her condition, she has no ketubah,

an objection is raised

from a beraita against Rav Huna, as it is taught:

If he married

the High Priest married a widow

on the presumption that she was so, and it was found that she was so, she has a ketubah.

And the Gemara infers:

This implies, anonymously

that he did not marry her on the presumption that she was a widow,

she has no ketubah,

so it is explicitly explained in accordance with Rav Yehuda, that if he did not recognize her condition, she has no ketubah.

And we answer:

Do not say: This implies, anonymously

that he did not recognize her condition,

she has no ketubah.

Rather, say: He married her on the presumption that she was not so

that she misled him and said to him that she had never been betrothed to a man

and it was found that she was so,

then

she has no ketubah,

but if she did not mislead him, rather he misled himself, she has a ketubah.

And the Gemara expresses astonishment at the answer:

But anonymously

that she did not mislead him, but he did not recognize her condition

what is the law—is she entitled to

a ketubah!?

If so,

instead of teaching

in the latter part of that beraita: If he married her

on the presumption that she was so, and it was found that she was so, she has a ketubah—

let it teach us anonymously,

let the beraita teach us that if he married her without specification

she has a ketubah, and

we would know that

all the more so

when he married her on the presumption that she was so, she has a ketubah!?

Furthermore,

indeed

it teaches

explicitly a beraita that is not in accordance with Rav Huna:

If he married

a widow, the High Priest married a widow

with it known

that she was such

and it was found known, she has a ketubah,

If he married her without specification, she has no ketubah.

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is a refutation of Rav Huna!

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Huna was misled by the Mishna

the wording of our Mishna misled him!

He

Rav Huna

thought: Since it distinguishes with regard to an aylonit

since the Mishna distinguishes with regard to an aylonit between a case where he recognized her condition and a case where he did not recognize her condition

and does not distinguish

the Mishna

with regard to a widow

to say that she has a ketubah only if he recognized her condition,

by inference, with regard to a widow, even without specification she is also entitled to a ketubah.

But

it is not so,

this is no proof, for the wording of our Mishna is: If initially he married her with the intention that she was an aylonit, she has a ketubah, and immediately afterward we learned: A widow married to a High Priest and so on, they have ketubot. If so:

When it teaches it with regard to a widow, it stands on the dispute

on the distinction

of the aylonit

that is, “If initially he married her with that intention” also refers to the widow mentioned afterward, and only in this manner does the tanna say that the widow has a ketubah.

We have returned to you, chapter “A Widow Is Sustained”

Mishna:

One who marries a woman

who has a daughter from another man,

and stipulated with him

at the time of her marriage, when she married him,

in order [

on condition ]

that he would provide for her daughter

for

five years—

he is obligated

he

to provide for her

for

five years,

despite the fact that she is not his daughter.

Even if he divorces her mother, he is obligated to continue providing for her until the completion of five years, since he stipulated with her mother, when he married her, to provide for her for five years. And this stipulation is a monetary commitment, which has validity in every situation, even after she ceases to be his wife.

And if, after her marriage to the husband who undertook to provide for her daughter, she divorced him, and went and

married

a husband

and stipulated

also

with him,

at the time of her marriage,

that he would provide for her daughter for five years—

he is obligated

he too

to provide for her for five years.

And from now on both husbands of the girl’s mother, who undertook toward her [each separately] to provide for her daughter, are obligated in her maintenance [for five years], and each one is obligated for all of her maintenance.

And the Mishna explains how they should act:

A.

The husband may not say

the

first

who undertook to provide for the daughter

“When she comes to me

the daughter together with her mother—

I will provide for her!”

That is, he cannot exempt himself from his obligation by claiming that his undertaking was to provide for the daughter only as long as he retained her mother as his wife, but not when he divorces her, at which point she is not “his wife’s daughter,” but his divorced wife’s daughter. And the reason for this is that since he stipulated with her mother to provide for her daughter for five years, and did not limit his stipulation so that it would be valid only as long as she was married to him, his undertaking applies even after he divorces her.

Rather,

he

brings her

to his wife’s daughter

her maintenance—

to the place where her mother

is located, with the second husband, even though the second husband too undertook to provide for her.

B.

And likewise, the two may not say: “Indeed, we will provide for her together,”

that is, that each of the two will give her half of her maintenance.

Rather,

both are obligated to provide for her, each one with the full maintenance.

And therefore,

one

will

provide for her

with actual food and necessities,

and one

will

give her the monetary value of her maintenance.

C. And if

the daughter marries,

from this point her husband [who is obligated by the essential law to provide for his wife] is added to the two husbands of her mother, who are each obligated to provide her with her full maintenance by virtue of their undertakings. And therefore—

the husband gives her maintenance.

And they,

the two husbands of her mother—

give her the monetary value of her maintenance,

each one the full monetary value of the maintenance.

D. And if

they die [

the two husbands of the mother ], the daughter continues to collect their undertaking concerning her maintenance even after their deaths. And she collects this from their property, which is encumbered to her for payment of her maintenance.

And even if the husbands or their heirs sold the property to other people, she has the right to collect from them, by virtue of the property’s lien. And in this she has priority over the right to collect maintenance that the daughters of the two husbands have from their heirs—

their daughters

of the two husbands

are provided for

only

from unencumbered property,

but they cannot collect the maintenance owed them from encumbered property that was sold to other people.

But

if

she,

the daughter whom the husbands of her mother undertook to support [because she stipulated with them about this at the time of her marriage], then she is

provided for

even

from encumbered property, because she is like a creditor!

For she does not eat maintenance by virtue of an enactment of the Sages, as is the law concerning a daughter who eats maintenance by virtue of the father’s obligation to provide for his daughter. Rather, her eating is only by virtue of the renewed undertaking of the two husbands, when they married her mother.

E. But the

clever

men, when they married a woman and her daughter,

would write

in the document of stipulation their undertaking toward the mother in wording that exempted them from providing for her daughter after they divorced her. And this is what they would write:

I hereby marry you

on condition [

with the undertaking ]

that I will provide for your daughter for five years—

as long as you are with me.

Gemara:

In the discussion before us it is explained that a person can obligate himself monetarily toward his fellow through his admission that he owes him, despite the fact that it is clear to everyone that he had no debt at all toward his fellow; rather, through his very admission of the debt, he creates the debt toward his fellow.

His admission has binding validity only if it is made before two witnesses.

But if a person admits to his fellow concerning his obligation toward him without the presence of witnesses, he can say to him, “I was merely jesting with you,” and I owe you nothing. Or he can explain himself by saying that he told him this so that people would not think that he was a wealthy person, and therefore he “admitted” to him that he owed him, but in truth he owes him nothing at all.

It was stated: One who says to his fellow: “I owe you one hundred zuz!”—

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is obligated

to give him one hundred zuz.

And Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

And we raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances

of his admission? But his admission is not considered an admission unless it was before witnesses, and there is no dispute that if he admitted before witnesses he is obligated, for we learned in a Mishna in tractate Sanhedrin [29b] that if the witnesses said, “Before us he admitted to him,” he is obligated. And if so—

If,

if it is speaking of a case such as

where he said to them

the people hearing his admission

“You are my witnesses”—

what is the reason of Reish Lakish, who exempts?

But this is an admission before witnesses, and we learned in the Mishna in tractate Sanhedrin that he is obligated.

If,

and if it is speaking of a case such as

where he did not say to them

to those hearing his admission

“You are my witnesses,”

so that he did not designate them as witnesses—

what is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan, who obligates?

But we have an established ruling in tractate Sanhedrin that his admission is not considered a binding admission until he designates them as witnesses [for without designating them as witnesses, he can claim, “I was merely jesting with you”]!

And we answer:

In fact,

it is speaking here of a case such as

where he did not say to them, “You are my witnesses.”

And here, with what are we dealing?

With a case such as

where he said to him,

that is, he wrote his admission in his own handwriting,

“I owe you one hundred zuz”—

in a document,

and he handed him his admission in his own handwriting in our presence, without designating the witnesses for this, and without signing the document with his own signature.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

Since he wrote his admission in his own handwriting in a document,

he is obligated,

because

the matter of a document is powerful,

the power of words written in his own handwriting in a document is great—

as one who said

as though he said

to them,

to the people seeing the handing over of the document,

“You are witnesses,”

it is considered,

since the handing over of the document took place in the presence of witnesses—even though he did not designate them as witnesses.

But

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt,

because he holds that

the matter of a document is not powerful.

That is, his handwriting in a document, without his signature, is not considered more than an oral admission, even though he handed over the document in the presence of witnesses, since he did not designate them to be witnesses concerning his admission.

And the Gemara brings a proof from our Mishna for Rabbi Yohanan:

For

we learned: One who marries a woman, and stipulates with her to provide for her daughter for five years—

is obligated to provide for her for five years.

Is it not so that our Mishna is speaking

that our Mishna is speaking

in such a case,

in the case disputed by Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, where he writes to the woman in his own handwriting that he undertakes to provide for her daughter for five years, does not sign it, and hands it to her in the presence of witnesses without designating them as witnesses, and this document serves in her hand as testimony to his undertaking? For if he signed the document, or if he designated the witnesses for his admission, there would be no novelty in the Mishna.