Ketubot 101a — the Talmud in English

But a minor girl who

leaves by a bill of divorce —

even though she is not fit to conceive and give birth — this is

required to wait three months,

because even though she is not fit to conceive, the Sages did not distinguish in their enactment between married women.

And we raise an objection against Shmuel:

what does he teach us?

But

we learned

it

all in the Mishna, for his first distinction is explicit in our Mishna according to Shmuel’s version of our Mishna,

and in Yevamot [108a] we learned the rest!? For we learned in Yevamot:

“A girl who refuses a man”:

A.

He is permitted to her relatives,

such as her daughter and her sister, who are forbidden to him in the case of other women who were divorced; and also

she is permitted to his relatives,

such as his brother and his father, through whom she is forbidden in the case of another divorced woman. And this is what Shmuel said: she does not become disqualified from the brothers.

B.

And she does not become disqualified from the priesthood,

because of divorce, and as Shmuel said.

But if

he gave her

a man to his minor wife

a bill of divorce:

A.

He is forbidden to her relatives, and she is forbidden to his relatives,

and this is what Shmuel said: she becomes disqualified from the brothers.

B.

And she becomes disqualified from the priesthood,

because of divorce, and as Shmuel said.

And if so, what did Shmuel innovate for us that we had not heard from our Mishna and from the Mishna in Yevamot!? And we answer:

she is required to wait three months,

that is what

was necessary for him

to Shmuel to teach us,

that

this distinction in this law between one who refuses and one who is divorced

we did not learn

in the Mishna in Yevamot.

Here the Gemara returns to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel concerning the ketuba: according to Rav, she is considered merely like a seduced woman and has no ketuba, while according to Shmuel, she is considered his wife with regard to the ketuba, and only when she refused him and removed herself from her husband does she have no ketuba; and it asks:

Let us say

that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is

like the dispute between Tannaim,

for they already disputed this?

For it was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor girl is nothing.

And

therefore, if she married a man while she was a minor,

her husband is not entitled to what she finds or to the product of her labor

like other women,

nor to the nullification of her vows

which he nullifies for other women,

and he does not inherit her

when she dies,

and he may not become impure for her

when she dies, if he is a priest.

The general rule is:

she is not like his wife in every respect, but she requires refusal.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The act of a minor girl is something

She is not considered his wife in every respect; rather, she must perform refusal.

— that is, it has substance —

and her husband is entitled to what she finds, to the product of her labor, and to the nullification of her vows,

and he inherits her and may become impure for her.

The general rule is: she is like his wife in every respect, but she leaves through refusal.

,

and he inherits from her and becomes impure for her.

Let us say: Rav —

who holds that a minor wife has no ketuba, for she is like a seduced woman —

speaks in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that the act of a minor girl is nothing; and according to Rabbi Yehoshua, she indeed has a ketuba.

And Shmuel —

who holds that a minor wife has a ketuba [unless she left through refusal, by which she removed herself from her husband] —

speaks in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

who says that she is his wife in every respect, while according to Rabbi Eliezer she indeed has no ketuba?

And we reject this: Indeed,

according to Rabbi Eliezer, everyone —

Rav and Shmuel —

do not dispute

that a woman who refuses has a ketuba, and even if she leaves by a bill of divorce; and Shmuel, who holds that she has no ketuba, is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

When they dispute,

Rav and Shmuel,

according to Rabbi Yehoshua,

whether according to his words it is inevitable that even a woman who refuses has no ketuba, just as the husband is not entitled to what she finds and to the product of her labor, or perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua will concede with regard to the ketuba that she has none, as Rav holds.

: Does his statement necessarily mean that a woman who refuses also has no marriage contract, just as the husband is not entitled to what she finds or to the product of her labor, or perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua concedes with regard to the marriage contract that she has none, in accordance with Rav’s view?

Shmuel

holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

and compares the ketuba to what she finds and to the product of her labor: just as the husband receives from his wife what she finds and the product of her labor, so the woman receives from her husband a ketuba [unless she left through refusal, by which she removed herself from her husband].

And

if

Rav

would say to you:

Rabbi Yehoshua said only this there,

that she is his wife in every respect,

but

with regard to the matters that the Sages enacted

for his benefit,

that is, the husband should receive from his wife what she finds, the product of her labor, her inheritance, and likewise the nullification of her vows —

And the reason is that the Sages wanted men not to refrain from marrying her, for the entire purpose of the Sages’ enactment of marriage for a minor girl was only so that she would marry and people would not treat her promiscuously; therefore the husband receives the rights that a husband receives with regard to his wife.

But

what the Sages enacted

for her benefit

— that is, that the woman should receive from her husband, such as a ketuba —

he did not

say, and she has no ketuba.

We learned in the Mishna: “A second-degree forbidden woman, one who refuses, and a sexually undeveloped woman have no ketuba, etc.”

and not worn-out garments:

Rav Huna bar Hiyya said to Rav Kahana: You told us [you told us]

in the name of Shmuel:

They taught

that she has no worn-out garments

only

worn-out garments of

usufruct property,

which the woman brought with her as clothing to her husband’s house; and it explains further what state the clothing was in at the time the woman left, and with which of the three women we are dealing.

But

worn-out garments of

iron-flock property,

which she brought in to him and he accepted responsibility for them,

she has them [she has them when she leaves her husband], and it explains further what state the clothing was in at the time of departure, and with which of the three women these matters are stated.

Come and hear: Rav Pappa was perplexed with regard to what: regarding which of the three women with whom our Mishna deals did Shmuel say to distinguish between usufruct property and iron-flock property? If you say: a woman who refuses”? It cannot be said so, for:

she does have

[she has them when she leaves her husband]. The Gemara proceeds to clarify the condition of the clothing when she leaves and which of the three women is being discussed.

If they are present [the clothing is present], and “worn-out garments” means what remained of the clothing after the husband used it, then certainly

both this and that — both worn-out garments of usufruct property and worn-out garments of iron-flock property —

she takes,

the woman takes them with her, for we have no reason to penalize her; what is her sin?

And if they are not present [they are not present], and “worn-out garments” means what has already become worn out and perished from the clothing, then certainly

both this and that — usufruct property and iron-flock property —

she does not take [she does not take them], that is, the husband does not pay her for the wear that wore out the clothing.

Rather, say that it is

a sexually undeveloped woman;

even so it cannot be said, for:

If they are present [the clothing is present], and “worn-out garments” means what remained of the clothing after the husband used it, then certainly both this and that — both worn-out garments of usufruct property and worn-out garments of iron-flock property — she takes, the woman takes them with her. If they are not present [they are not present], and “worn-out garments” means what has already become worn out and perished from the clothing, and the reason she does not take from him the value of the wear, even though it is revealed retroactively that she was never married to him, must necessarily be that he did not have to consider the possibility that she might be found to be sexually undeveloped — if so, if you came to distinguish between iron-flock property and usufruct property, you should have said the opposite [you should have distinguished in the opposite manner], and Shmuel should have said as follows: Usufruct property, which remains in her possession [the clothing is in her possession and he has no usufruct right in it], meaning that he was not permitted to wear it out and consume it even if she had not been sexually undeveloped, because he is not permitted to consume and wear out the “principal” of the clothing [as he explains the reason further] — she has it [by law, the husband must return to the woman what he took without authorization]. But the worn-out garments of iron-flock property, which does not remain in her possession [which is not in her possession, but in the husband’s possession for him to wear], meaning that if she had not been sexually undeveloped, he would have been permitted to wear it and consume it, but he would have had to pay its value when he brought her out — she does not have it. Rather, a second-degree forbidden woman,” and specifically when they are not present, and “worn-out garments” means what became worn out and perished from the clothing:

, meaning that the woman takes them with her, since there is no reason to penalize her; what wrong did she do?

And if they are not present

[the clothing is no longer intact], and “remnants” means what has already become worn out and been consumed, then certainly

both this and that

—both property that remains the wife’s principal property and property for which the husband accepts fixed-value responsibility—

she does not take

[she does not receive payment], meaning that the husband does not pay her for the wear that consumed the clothing.

Rather, say that the statement is referring

to a sexually underdeveloped woman

, but this too cannot be said, because:

; и это также невозможно сказать, поскольку:

And by law it should have been — were it not that the Sages penalized second-degree forbidden women by uprooting the status of marriage from them — that the law would be the opposite:

The worn-out garments of usufruct property she would have, since the clothing became worn out and perished with him unlawfully, and she should have taken it.

Whereas she would not have the worn-out garments of iron-flock property.

—both the remnants of property that remains the wife’s principal property and the remnants of property for which the husband accepts fixed-value responsibility—

she takes

And

in any event, the law is the opposite: she does not have the worn-out garments of usufruct property, because

the Sages penalized

the second-degree forbidden women

for her benefit from him [her with regard to everything she would have been fit to collect from him].

That is, the Sages penalized her so that she would not receive everything that would have been due to her from him, namely: the ketuba of one hundred and two hundred zuz, sustenance, and payment for the clothing that he used unlawfully.

And

the worn-out garments of iron-flock property she does have, because they penalized

him for her benefit [him with regard to everything that would have been due to him from her]; that is, although by law she would not have been due a refund for the worn-out garments of iron-flock property, because of the penalty he is required to pay her.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Infer from Rav Kahana,

who said: Since she does not have worn-out garments of usufruct property that are no longer present because of the penalty, it follows that by law she would have been due payment for the worn-out garments. And if so, we learn from his words:

A woman who

brings a cloak

to her husband [a woman who brings a garment to her husband as usufruct property], all of it is

principal, [it is principal and not produce], and he may not wear it and continue until it wears out [the husband cannot wear it until it wears out], because using the clothing in a manner that consumes the garment is equivalent to consuming the woman’s principal; for although the use is produce, nevertheless, since it wears out the clothing, this is consumption of the principal — and therefore he purchases land with them and eats the produce. And we raise an objection:

But did Rav Nahman not say:

one who brings a cloak to her husband it is produce, and the husband may wear it!?

By law, if the Sages had not penalized secondary wives by uprooting their status as married women, the law would have been the opposite:

She would have had the remnants of property that remains the wife’s principal property, since the clothing became worn out and was consumed in his possession unlawfully, and she should have taken its value.

But she would not have had the remnants of property for which the husband accepts fixed-value responsibility.

But

, in any event, the law is the opposite: She does not have the remnants of property that remains the wife’s principal property, because

the Sages penalized

secondary wives

with regard to her claims against him

[they penalized her with regard to everything she would otherwise have been entitled to collect from him].

That is, the Sages penalized her by preventing her from receiving everything that she would otherwise have been entitled to receive from him: the basic marriage-contract payment of one hundred or two hundred dinars, support, and payment for the clothing that he used unlawfully.

And

with regard to the remnants of property for which the husband accepts fixed-value responsibility, she does have them, because he was penalized

with regard to his claims against her

[he was penalized with regard to everything he would otherwise have been entitled to receive from her]. That is, although by law she would not have been entitled to payment for the remnants of property for which the husband accepts fixed-value responsibility, because of the penalty he must pay her.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Learn from Rav Kahana

, who said that she does not have the remnants of property that remains the wife’s principal property when they are no longer present because of the penalty: It follows that by law she would have been entitled to payment for the remnants. If so, we learn from his statement:

With regard to a woman who

brings a cloak

to her husband [a woman who brings a garment to her husband as property that remains her principal property], the entire garment is

principal property

[it is principal property and not produce],

and he may not wear it continuously until it is worn out

[the husband may not wear it until it is worn out], because using clothing in a manner that wears it out is equivalent to consuming the woman’s principal property. Although use is normally considered produce, since the clothing becomes worn out, this is consumption of the principal property—

and therefore he takes land with the proceeds, while he consumes its produce. The Gemara raises an objection:

But didn’t Rav Naḥman say

: A woman who brings a cloak to her husband,

it is produce

, and the husband may wear it!?

And we answer: Indeed,

the ruling of Rav Naḥman disagrees with

Rav Kahana.

We learned in the Mishna: “The mema'enet, the secondary wife, and the aylonit” have no ketubah:

Shmuel said:

They taught

that these three women do not take a ketubah—

only the maneh

and

two hundred,

which is the principal amount of the ketubah and is from the enactment of the Sages.

But the additional amount

of the ketubah that the husband wrote for them of his own accord

they have,

for the husband gave it to her merely as a gift, because of his affection for intercourse.

It was taught likewise:

A.

Women concerning whom

the

Sages

said [here in our Mishna], in the language

“They have no ketubah,” such as the mema'enet and her companions, they do not have the maneh

and

two hundred,,

but they do have the additional amount.

B.

Women concerning whom

the

Sages

said [above, 72a], in the language

“They leave without a ketubah,” such as one who transgresses the religious law and her companions,

that is, a woman concerning whom vows or bodily defects were found, or one who curses his parents in his presence,

they do not have

even

the additional amount

of the ketubah,

and all the more so the maneh

and

two hundred,

which they do not have. C.

And the one who leaves because of an evil name

for having committed adultery,

takes what is before her

of usufruct property

and leaves.

And the Gemara says:

this supports—

what they said in the beraita: “And the one who leaves because of an evil name takes what is before her”—

in support of Rav Huna!