Ketubot 100b (ק:) — the Talmud in English

Anyone who purchases from the court [

Anyone who purchases from the court],

with the understanding that it will become known

that he purchased it—

with the understanding that the sale will become known—since the court sells by public announcement, and had there been claimants against this field, they certainly would already have come forward. Therefore, he purchases it from the outset without a warranty of title.

This teaches us

that he purchases it with a warranty, and the warranty is assumed by the orphans!

We learned in the Mishna: If the court appraisers reduced the price by one-sixth or increased it by one-sixth, their sale is void.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Their sale stands; if so, of what value is the authority of the court?

The Gemara explains:

To what extent

may the court err and nevertheless have its sale stand, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said in the name of Rav Sheshet: Up to one-half

up to one-half]. That is, if they caused the seller a loss, the measure of the overreaching is one-half of the property's true price—for example, they sold property worth two hundred for one hundred. And if they caused the buyer a loss, the measure of the overreaching is half the price they collected from the buyer—for example, they sold property worth one hundred for two hundred.

It was taught likewise

in accordance with Rav Sheshet's statement:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If a court sold property worth two hundred for one hundred

and thereby caused the seller a loss,

or

sold

property worth one hundred for two hundred

and thereby caused the buyer a loss,

their sale

of the court appraisers

stands—

which indicates: up to this measure, but no more.

Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef:

A court that sold without a public announcement is considered to have erred in a matter stated in the

Mishna, and

the sale is reversed [the transaction is void]. We do not say, “What was done is done, and they must pay from their own funds”; rather, the sale is reversed.

The Gemara questions the wording

“

are considered

to have erred,” for

they certainly erred

in a matter stated in the Mishna!?

For

this

we learned

that a public announcement is required in the Mishna in tractate Arakhin:

The appraisal of orphans’ property is for thirty days—

that is, when property from the orphans’ estate must be sold in order to collect a creditor’s debt, its value must first be appraised, and an announcement is made that anyone who wishes to purchase should come and purchase it for more than this appraisal; an announcement is made concerning it for thirty days.

And the appraisal of consecrated property

by the treasurer who sells a field belonging to the Temple treasury is for

sixty days.

And announcements are made in the morning

when the laborers leave for work,

and in the evening

when the laborers return from work.

Thus, we learned in the Mishna that a public announcement is required. If so, one who does not do so has erred in a matter stated in the Mishna. Why, then, did Rav Yosef say that a court that sells without a public announcement “is considered” to have erred in a matter stated in the Mishna? They actually erred!?

And we answer:

If you derive this

from the Mishna in Arakhin,

I would have said: This applies only to an agent, but not to a court.

This teaches us

that even a court requires a public announcement.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Ameimar

from our Mishna:

If the court appraisers reduced the price by one-sixth or increased it by one-sixth, their sale is void.

This—

if the court sold

at the exact value

without reducing or increasing the price—

their sale stands.

Is it not

the case that our Mishna is discussing

where they did not make an announcement [as the Gemara proves below from the latter clause]!? Thus, a court’s sale without a public announcement stands!?

as the Gemara proves below from the latter clause]!? If so, a court's sale without an announcement is valid!?

No;

our Mishna is discussing a case

where they did make an announcement.

The Gemara challenges this:

Since the latter clause

of our Mishna

is where they did make an announcement, the first clause is where they did not make an announcement—

for if the latter clause of our Mishna concerns a case where an announcement was made, it necessarily follows that the first clause concerns a case where no announcement was made.

That is: We learned in the latter clause that if they made an announcement, their sale stands even when the error was greater than one-sixth. Necessarily, the first clause, which limits their error to one-sixth, concerns a case where they did not make an announcement!?

As the latter clause

of our Mishna teaches:

If they prepared an announcement

that is, a public announcement,

even if they sold property worth one hundred for two hundred, or property worth two hundred for one hundred, their sale stands.

Rather,

the Gemara explains the evidence from our Mishna that a court’s sale without a public announcement stands in a different manner:

Actually,

our Mishna is discussing

a case where they did not make an announcement,

as is demonstrated by the latter clause of the Mishna.

And there is no difficulty

from our Mishna for Ameimar, who said that when a court sells without a public announcement the sale is reversed, because:

Here—

in Ameimar’s statement—

the matter concerns property for which announcements are made.

Here—

in the first clause of our Mishna—

the matter concerns property for which announcements are not made,

as the Gemara now explains.

The Gemara explains:

And these are the types of property that

a court sells and

does not make announcements concerning:

Slaves, movable property, and promissory notes—

that is, they sell the orphans’ promissory notes to others.

The Gemara explains the reason for each of these:

With regard to slaves, what is the reason

that announcements are not made concerning them?

Because

perhaps they will hear

that the slaves are about to be sold

and flee!

And the reason

movable property and promissory notes

are not announced is

lest they be stolen

when the movable property and promissory notes are gathered for people to view them and purchase them.

And if you wish, say

to resolve the difficulty from our Mishna against Ameimar:

Here,

in Ameimar’s statement,

the matter concerns a time when announcements are made—

that is, there is sufficient time to make an announcement.

Here,

in our Mishna,

the matter concerns a time when announcements are not made,

as the Gemara explains: sometimes there is not enough time to make an announcement.

For the Sages of Nehardea said:

When a court sells property belonging to orphans:

a.

For the karga—

in order to pay the king the poll tax imposed on the orphans.

b.

For mezoni

of the woman, the daughters, and the orphans.

c.

And for burial

of their father or of the orphans.

We sell them without a public announcement

we sell the property without a public announcement], because there is no time and opportunity for this.

And if you wish, say:

Here,

in Ameimar’s statement,

the matter concerns a place where announcements are made.

Here,

in our Mishna,

the matter concerns a place where announcements are not made.

For Rav Naḥman said: They never made an announcement [an announcement]

an announcement]

in Nehardea

[Rav Naḥman’s city].

They thought that the listeners understood the reason for this to be

that

the court

of Nehardea was expert

in appraisals.

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said to them:

For me, it was explained by Rav Naḥman himself

[I heard it from Rav Naḥman], that the reason is:

Because he calls

the purchasers

“the consumers of property sold by announcement”

consumers of property sold by announcement]. People disparage purchasers who bought at a public announcement, because the property is sold below its value as a result of pressure from a debt. Consequently, people refrain from purchasing at a public announcement and in a publicized sale; therefore, they sell without an announcement.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

Movable property belonging to orphans

that is liable to be stolen or to spoil,

is appraised and sold immediately

near the time of their father’s death, so that it will not be lost.

Rav Ḥisda said

in the name of

Avimi:

Movable property belonging to orphans

is sold in the marketplaces—

that is, on market day.

And they do not disagree,

Shmuel and Avimi:

This—

Avimi’s statement—concerns a situation

where market day is near

market day is approaching].

This—

Shmuel’s statement—concerns, for example, a situation

where market day is far away

market day is distant].

Rav Kahana had in his possession beer belonging to Rav Mesharsheya bar Ḥilkai, an orphan [in Rav Kahana’s possession was beer deposited by Rav Mesharsheya bar Ḥilkai when Rav Mesharsheya was an orphan].

He waited

[Rav Kahana delayed selling the beer] and did not sell it

until the festival

until the pilgrimage festival [

the festival], when people needed beer in honor of the festival.

For

Rav Kahana said

:

Although

in the meantime

a

taste of

incipient souring

may have developed in the beer, nevertheless, on the festival

it brings ready cash

cash is readily received in exchange for it], because everyone needs it then and they bring cash rather than purchasing on credit. Consequently, it is beneficial for the orphans to wait until the festival before selling it.

Ravina had in his possession wine

wine]

belonging to Ravina the junior, the orphan son of his sister [in Ravina’s possession was wine deposited by Ravina the junior, the son of his sister, when Ravina the junior was an orphan].

He himself also had wine

belonging to the elder Ravina

—

his own wine [and Ravina also had his own wine].

He would transport it to Sikara,

as Ravina would take his wine to a place called Sikara in order to sell it.

He came

before

Rav Ashi,

and said

—he asked

him:

What is the ruling: May I bring it there with us

am I permitted to bring the orphan’s wine with my own in order to sell it in Sikara], or must I sell it immediately?

He said to him—

Rav Ashi said to Ravina:

Go; it is no better than your own

go and sell their wine together with yours, for the orphans’ wine is not better than your own]. Since you do this with your own wine, you are not obligated to the orphans more than you are to yourself.

Introduction:

a.

A girl who performs refusal:

A minor does not have Torah-level betrothal and marriage except through her father. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that even a minor who has no father to marry her off may be married off by her brothers or mother, or may marry on her own once she becomes fit to do so. They instituted this so that people would not treat her promiscuously, since a minor does not know how to withstand temptation.

A minor who was married without her father’s involvement and no longer wishes to remain with her husband performs mi'un toward him by verbal declaration alone and leaves him; this mi'un retroactively uproots the marriage. However, if she did not perform mi'un and her husband wished to divorce her, he gives her a get, as he does to all other women.

b.

A secondary forbidden relative:

In addition to the close relatives whom the Torah prohibits a man from marrying and for whom he incurs karet, the Sages added “secondary relatives to the forbidden relationships” and prohibited them. These are relatives of a second degree of relationship, such as his mother’s mother [his mother is the “first” degree and is prohibited by Torah law, while her mother is the “second” degree and is prohibited by rabbinic decree]. The beraita cited in the Gemara, Yevamot 21a, details all the secondary relatives to the forbidden relationships whom the Sages prohibited.

c.

A woman incapable of conception:

If she married and her husband did not know at the time of the marriage that she was incapable of conception, her betrothal is a mistaken betrothal. If he knew this at the time of the marriage, or if he learned of it and did not divorce her, she is his wife.

Our Mishna and the sugya that follows discuss the distinction between the three women mentioned above and other women, with regard to the obligations and rights that a husband has toward his wife and a wife has toward her husband, and other matters that result from marriage.

Financial obligations and rights between a husband and his wife:

a.

Sustenance, the proceeds of the woman’s labor, and her found objects:

As long as a woman is under her husband’s authority, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance. Even if he dies, she is sustained from his property, and this is one of the stipulations of the ketuba. If he divorces her, she is not sustained from his property. In return, the Sages instituted that the proceeds of her labor belong to her husband; they likewise said that her found objects belong to her husband, because of enmity.

b.

The institution concerning the produce of nikhsei melog and

“her redemption”:

A woman who brings land or other property with her from her father’s house to her husband’s house, but does not include it in her dowry, has property called nikhsei melog. By rabbinic institution, the husband consumes the produce while the principal belongs to the woman; when he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman. The Sages instituted that the husband must redeem his wife if she is taken captive [“her redemption”], and this institution is in exchange for the produce that the husband consumes; both are among the stipulations of the ketuba.

If the husband divorces his wife, he no longer consumes the produce. However, he may consume produce that is already extant at the time of the divorce.

Just as he consumes produce from a field that his wife brought to him, so too he may use anything else that she brought to him, and these uses are also called “produce.” The amoraim disagree [at the end of the sugya] whether, if she brought clothing that wears out through use, the husband has the right to wear and wear out those garments, or whether using the garments is equivalent to consuming the principal, which the husband is not permitted to do. According to the latter view, land should be purchased with them and he should consume the produce. The course of the sugya follows the opinion that the husband does not have the right to use and wear out the clothing.

c.

The ketuba and nikhsei tzon barzel:

One who marries a virgin is obligated to pay her two hundred zuz when he divorces her or dies; one who marries a widow must pay her one hundred zuz. If he wishes to add to this amount, he may add.

Similarly, in the ketuba the husband accepts responsibility for the nikhsei tzon barzel that the woman brings to him as part of her dowry. He uses them and does with them as he wishes, but accepts responsibility to return their appraised value—as it was at the time of the marriage—when he divorces her or dies.

Mishna:

A girl who performs refusal,

that is, a minor who has no father and was married by rabbinic institution, and left her husband by refusing him.

A secondary forbidden relative,

that is, a woman who is related to her husband by a second-degree relationship, such as his mother’s mother, and is prohibited to him by rabbinic law.

And a woman incapable of conception,

whose husband did not know at the time he married her that she was incapable of conception, and whose betrothal is therefore a mistaken betrothal.

All these

do not have:

a.

A ketuba,

namely, the one hundred or two hundred zuz given to other women.

A girl who performs refusal does not receive a ketuba, since she is the one who refused him; a ketuba is payable only to a woman whom the husband himself expelled.

A secondary forbidden relative: The Sages penalized her by denying her a ketuba, because she violated the prohibition of a secondary forbidden relationship.

A woman incapable of conception does not have a ketuba, because her betrothal is a mistaken betrothal.

Nor the produce,

that is, the law of produce: the husband’s obligation to redeem the woman if she is taken captive [“her redemption”], which the Sages instituted in exchange for the produce that he consumes.

A girl who performs refusal: As long as she remains under his authority, he is obligated regarding her redemption. However, if she borrowed money in order to redeem herself and then performed refusal, the husband is not obligated to repay what she borrowed.