Ketubot 100b — the Talmud in English

Anyone who purchases from the court

[anyone who purchases from the court],

with the understanding that it will become known

that is what he purchased,

[with the understanding that public notice will go out concerning this sale], since the court sells by public announcement; and if there were claimants against this field, they certainly would already have come. Therefore, from the outset he purchases without a guarantee.

It teaches us

that he purchases with a guarantee, and his guarantee is upon the orphans!

We learned in the Mishna: If the appraisers of the judges reduced by one-sixth or increased by one-sixth, their sale is void,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

the sale is valid; if so, what force has the court?

The Gemara explains:

And up to how much

may the court err and have its sale remain valid, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet said: Up to half

[up to half]. That is: If they misled the seller, the measure of the overreaching is half the true price of the property, as, for example, if they sold something worth two hundred for one hundred; and if they misled the buyer, the measure of the overreaching is half the price they charged the buyer, as, for example, if they sold something worth one hundred for two hundred.

It was also taught so

in accordance with the words of Rav Sheshet:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: A court that sold something worth two hundred for one hundred

and overreached the seller,

or

sold

something worth one hundred for two hundred

and overreached the buyer,

their sale

of the judges

is valid, and the implication is: up to this measure, but no further.

which indicates: up to this measure, but no more.

Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef:

A court that sold without public announcement is considered as one that erred in a matter

that is taught in the

Mishna, and they return [the transaction is annulled]. One does not say, “What was done is done, and he shall pay from his own house”; rather, the transaction is returned.

the transaction is nullified]. We do not say, "What was done is done, and the court must pay from its own funds"; rather, the transaction is reversed.

The Gemara is astonished at the wording

“is considered

as one who erred,” for

they certainly erred

in a matter taught in the Mishna!?

For

this

we learned

that public announcement is required in the Mishna in Tractate Arakhin:

The appraisal of orphans’ property is for thirty days,

that is: When they need to sell property belonging to orphans in order to collect a creditor’s debt for him, they must first appraise the value of the property and announce that anyone who wishes to purchase should come and purchase for more than this appraisal, and they announce concerning it for thirty days.

And the appraisal of consecrated property

by the treasurer who sells a field belonging to consecrated property is for

sixty days.

And they announce in the morning,

which is the time when the laborers go out to their work,

and in the evening,

which is the time when the laborers return from their work.

Thus we learned in the Mishna that public announcement is required, and if so, one who did not do so has erred in a matter taught in the Mishna. If so, why did Rav Yosef say that a court that sells without public announcement “is considered” as one that erred in a matter of the Mishna, when in fact they actually erred!?

And we answer:

If from that

Mishna in Arakhin,

I would have said: This applies only to an agent, but not to a court.

It teaches us

that even the court requires public announcement.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Ameimar

from our Mishna:

If the appraisers of the judges reduced by one-sixth or increased by one-sixth, their sale is void.

This

means that if the court sold

at the exact value,

without reducing or increasing,

— their sale is valid.

Is it not

the case that our Mishna deals with

when they did not announce [as the Gemara proves below from the latter clause]!? Thus, a sale by the court without public announcement is valid!?

as the Gemara proves below from the latter clause]!? If so, a court's sale without an announcement is valid!?

No,

our Mishna deals

with when they did announce.

The Gemara is astonished at this:

Since the latter clause

of our Mishna

is when they did announce, the first clause is when they did not announce,

for if the latter clause of our Mishna deals with a case in which they announced, necessarily the first clause deals with a case without public announcement.

That is: We learned in the latter clause that if they made a public announcement, their sale is valid even with an error greater than one-sixth; necessarily, the first clause, which limits their error to one-sixth, deals with a case in which they did not announce!?

For the latter clause teaches

of our Mishna:

If they made a letter of public inspection,

that is, a public announcement,

even if they sold something worth one hundred for two hundred or something worth two hundred for one hundred, their sale is valid.

Rather,

the Gemara resolves the proof from our Mishna in another manner, that if the court sold without public announcement its sale is valid:

Actually,

our Mishna deals

with when they did not announce,

as is proven from the latter clause of the Mishna.

And there is no difficulty

from our Mishna for Ameimar, who said that a court that sold without public announcement returns the property, because:

Here—

in the words of Ameimar—

it is with regard to things concerning which they announce.

Here,

in the first clause of our Mishna,

it is with regard to things concerning which they do not announce,

as it explains and proceeds.

The Gemara explains:

And these are the things that

the court sells and

does not announce concerning:

Slaves, movable property, and documents,

for they sell the debt documents of orphans to others.

And the Gemara explains the reason for all of them:

Slaves—for what is the reason

that they do not announce concerning them?

Because

perhaps they will hear

the slaves who are standing to be sold,

and they will flee!

And the reason

for movable property and documents

that they do not announce concerning them is

perhaps they will be stolen,

the movable property and documents, when people gather to see them in order to purchase them.

And if you wish, say

to resolve the difficulty from our Mishna against Ameimar:

Here,

in the words of Ameimar,

it is at a time when they announce,

that is, when there is enough time to announce.

Here,

in our Mishna,

it is at a time when they do not announce,

as it explains and proceeds, that sometimes there is not enough time to announce.

For the Sages of Nehardea said:

When the court sells the property of orphans:

a.

For the poll tax,

in order to pay the king the poll tax of the orphans.

b.

For sustenance

of the woman, the daughters, and the orphans.

c.

And for burial

of their father or of the orphans.

We sell without a public announcement

[we sell the property without a public announcement], because there is neither time nor opportunity for this.

And if you wish, say:

Here,

in the words of Ameimar,

it is in a place where they announce.

Here,

in our Mishna,

it is in a place where they do not announce.

For Rav Naḥman said: They never made a letter of public inspection

[a public announcement]

in Nehardea

[his city of Rav Naḥman].

They thought from this:

The listeners thought that the reason for the matter was

because they were expert

the court of Nehardea

in appraisals.

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said to them:

For me, it was explained by Rav Naḥman himself

[I heard from Rav Naḥman with my own ears] that the reason is:

Because he calls them

the purchasers

children who eat the property of public announcement

[those who consume property sold by public announcement], for people disparage purchasers who bought through public announcement, because, due to the pressure of a debt, the property is sold below its price; and consequently people refrain from purchasing through announcement and publicity, and therefore they sell without public announcement.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Movable property belonging to orphans,

concerning which there is concern that perhaps it will be stolen or rot,

is appraised and sold immediately,

close to their father’s death, so that it should not be lost.

Rav Ḥisda said

in the name of

Avimi:

Movable property belonging to orphans

is sold in the marketplaces,

that is, on market day.

And they do not disagree,

Shmuel and Avimi:

This

of Avimi is in a case

where the market day is near

[the market day is close].

This

of Shmuel is, for example,

where the market day is distant

[the market day is far away].

Rav Kahana had in his possession the beer of Rav Mesharsheya bar Ḥilqai, an orphan

[in Rav Kahana’s possession was deposited beer belonging to Rav Mesharsheya bar Ḥilqai when Rav Mesharsheya was an orphan].

He delayed it

[Rav Kahana delayed the beer and did not sell it]

until the Festival

[the Festival], when people need beer for the honor of the Festival.

For

Rav Kahana said

:

Even though

in the meantime

a taste

has fallen into the beer,

close to becoming sour

[a taste close to becoming sour], nevertheless, at the Festival

it brings sharp coins

[cash is accepted in exchange for it], because everyone needs it then, and they bring cash and do not buy on credit. It follows that it is for the benefit of the orphans that he wait to sell it until the Festival.

Ravina had in his possession wine

[wine]

belonging to Ravina the junior, the orphan son of his sister

[in Ravina’s possession was deposited wine belonging to Ravina the junior, the son of his sister, when Ravina the junior was an orphan].

He also had

Ravina the elder

wine

of his own [and Ravina also had his own wine].

He was taking it up to Sikhra,

Ravina was taking his wine to a place called Sikhra in order to sell it.

He came

Ravina

before Rav Ashi and said

[he asked]

to him:

What is the ruling: May I bring it there with me

[is it permitted for me to bring the orphan’s wine with me in order to sell it in Sikhra], or perhaps I must sell it immediately?

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

Go; it is no better than yours

[go and sell their wine together with yours, for the orphans’ beer is not better than yours], that is: Since you do this with your own, you are not obligated to the orphans more than to yourself.

Introduction:

a.

The one who performs refusal:

A minor has no betrothal or marriage by Torah law except through her father. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that even a minor who has no father to marry her may be married off by her brothers and mother, or by herself once she becomes fit for this; and they instituted this so that people would not treat her as ownerless, because a minor does not know how to withstand enticement.

A minor who married not through her father and no longer wants her husband performs “refusal” toward him by mere speech and leaves him, and this refusal uproots the marriage retroactively. However, if she did not refuse him and her husband wished to divorce her, he gives her a bill of divorce, like all other women.

b.

A secondary:

Besides the close relatives whom the Torah prohibited marrying and for whom it imposed karet, the Sages added “secondary relatives to forbidden relations” and prohibited them. They are relatives of a second degree of relationship, such as his mother’s mother [his mother is “first” and is prohibited by Torah law, while her mother is “second” and is prohibited by rabbinic enactment]. In the beraita brought in the Gemara, Yevamot 21a, all the secondary relatives to forbidden relations whom the Sages prohibited are explained.

c.

A woman incapable of conception:

If she married and her husband did not know at the time of the marriage that she was incapable of conception, her betrothal is a mistaken betrothal. If he knew at the time of the marriage, or if he knew and did not divorce her, she is his wife.

Our Mishna and the discussion that follows it deal with the difference between the three women mentioned above and other women, regarding the obligations and rights that a husband has toward his wife and a wife toward her husband, and other matters that result from the marriage.

Financial obligations and rights between a husband and his wife:

a.

Sustenance, the work of the woman’s hands, and her found objects:

As long as a woman is under her husband, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance; and even if he dies, she is sustained from his property, and this is among the conditions of the ketuba. If he divorces her, she is not sustained. The Sages instituted in exchange that the work of her hands belongs to the husband, and they also said that her found objects belong to her husband, because of enmity.

b.

The enactment concerning the produce of nikhsei melog and

her redemption:

A woman who brings with her lands or other property from her father’s house to her husband’s house, but does not bring them to him as her dowry, is called “nikhsei melog.” The husband consumes the produce by rabbinic enactment, while the substance belongs to the woman; when he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman. The Sages instituted that the husband is obligated to redeem the woman if she is taken captive [“her redemption,” pirqona], and this enactment is in exchange for the produce that the husband consumes, and they are among the conditions of the ketuba.

If the husband divorces his wife, he no longer consumes the produce; but produce that is already present at the time of the divorce, the husband consumes.

Just as he consumes produce from a field that his wife brought to him, so does he use everything that she brought to him, and these uses too are called “produce.” The amoraim disagreed [at the end of the discussion] whether, if she brought him garments that wear out through being worn, the husband has the right to wear them and wear them out, or whether use of the garments is like consuming the principal, which the husband is not permitted to do. Therefore, land should be purchased with them and he should consume the produce. The course of the discussion follows the view that the husband does not have the right to use the garments and wear them out.

c.

The ketuba and iron-sheep property:

One who marries a virgin, when he divorces her or dies, is obligated to pay two hundred zuzim; and one who marries a widow, one hundred. And if he wishes to add, he adds.

Likewise, the husband accepts upon himself in the ketuba responsibility for “iron-sheep property” that the woman brought to him in her dowry. He uses it and does with it as he wishes, except that he accepts upon himself to return its appraised value—as it was at the time of the marriage—when he divorces her or dies.

Mishna:

The one who performs refusal,

she is the minor who has no father and who married through a rabbinic enactment, and she left her husband by refusing him.

The secondary,

she is the woman who is related to her husband by a second-degree relationship, such as his mother’s mother, and is prohibited to him by rabbinic law.

And the woman incapable of conception,

whom her husband did not recognize as such when he married her, and her betrothal is a mistaken betrothal.

All these

do not have:

a.

A ketuba,

which is one hundred or two hundred given to other women.

The one who performs refusal: She does not receive a ketuba, since she is the one who refused him, and a ketuba is only for one whom the husband himself removed.

The secondary: The Sages penalized her so that she would not receive her ketuba, because she transgressed the prohibition of a secondary relative.

The woman incapable of conception: She has no ketuba, because her betrothal is a mistaken betrothal.

Nor produce,

that is, the law of produce, namely, the redemption of the woman if she is taken captive [“her redemption,” pirqona], which the Sages instituted for the woman in exchange for the produce that her husband consumes.

The one who performs refusal: As long as she is under him, he is obligated to redeem her; but if she borrowed money in order to redeem herself, and then she stood and refused him, the husband is not obligated to pay what she borrowed.

And the reason for the matter is that her redemption is one of the conditions of the marriage settlement, and whoever does not have a marriage settlement does not have the conditions of the marriage settlement.

The second: her husband is not obligated to redeem her even before she was divorced, because the conditions of the marriage settlement are like the marriage settlement, and one who does not have a marriage settlement does not have a husband obligated to redeem her.

The ailonit: if she borrowed and ate in order to be redeemed, and meanwhile her husband recognized that she was an ailonit, and it became clear that the betrothal was invalid, he does not need to pay her debt, for her betrothal was a mistaken betrothal.

And not maintenance:

The memaanet: if she borrowed and ate for her maintenance, and then stood and performed miun, she does not have maintenance, because maintenance is a condition of the marriage settlement, and one who does not have a marriage settlement does not have maintenance; but as long as she is dwelling under her husband, she has maintenance from him.

The second: she does not have maintenance when her husband is with her, because she stands under “Arise and leave”; and if her husband went overseas, and she borrowed and ate, she does not have maintenance, because it is a condition of the marriage settlement, and they penalized her with regard to the conditions of her marriage settlement just as they penalized her with regard to her marriage settlement.

The ailonit: her husband is not obligated to pay her what she borrowed and ate for maintenance, when meanwhile it became clear that she was an ailonit, for the betrothal was a mistaken betrothal.

And not worn garments:

It will be explained in the Gemara which worn garments the Mishna is discussing, and the differences in the laws here between the three women in our Mishna; there the reason for this law will also be explained.

And all that we said concerning an ailonit applies only when her husband did not recognize it in her at the time he married her, and when he recognized it, he desired to divorce her; however

if she was initially married for the sake of being an ailonit,

that is, her husband recognized that she was an ailonit at the time he married her, then she

has a marriage settlement

and all the rest that were taught above.

But

a widow

who is married

to a High Priest,

and likewise

a divorcee and a woman released from levirate marriage

who are married

to an ordinary priest,

and likewise

a mamzeret and a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite,

or

an Israelite woman married to a Gibeonite or a mamzer.

All of these

have a marriage settlement.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “The memaanet and so on do not have a marriage settlement,” and so on':

Rav taught

that he would recite the Mishna, concerning a memaanet, in this wording:

“A minor who leaves by means of a bill of divorce

who did not perform miun with him

does not have a marriage settlement

and because a minor who was married is merely like one seduced, and is not included in the marriage settlement

and all the more so

if

she performs miun”

she with her husband, that she does not have a marriage settlement, since she is the one who causes her departure from her husband.

Whereas

Shmuel taught

our Mishna in this wording:

“A woman who performs miun

that is, one who performed miun and left by means of her miun

does not have a marriage settlement, but

the minor

who leaves by means of a bill of divorce

from her husband, since he is the one who removed her

has a marriage settlement,”

for even a minor is “married” rabbinically.

And Shmuel follows his own reasoning

Shmuel’s words here are in accordance with his own approach,

as Shmuel said:

A.

A woman who performs miun

is one who

does not have a marriage settlement

since she removed herself from her husband, but the minor

who leaves by means of a bill of divorce has a marriage settlement.

And Shmuel further said to distinguish between a minor who leaves by miun and a minor who leaves by a bill of divorce:

B. The minor

who performs miun does not disqualify

the husband with regard to his wife

from

as in “against”

his brothers

his, because of a brother’s wife.

And she does not disqualify [him] from the priesthood

because of a divorcee, and because this is not a divorce but rather the uprooting of the original marriage.

But the minor

who leaves by means of a bill of divorce disqualifies [him] from his brothers

because of a brother’s wife, who is prohibited even after she left her husband,

and

she disqualifies

from the priesthood

because of a divorcee. C. The minor—who is not capable of conceiving and giving birth—

who performs miun does not need to wait three months

until she marries another, and she is not like other women who are prohibited from betrothal or marriage until three months have passed, in order to distinguish between offspring from the first and offspring from the second, for the miun uproots the original marriage retroactively, and she is not married.