Ketubot 100a (ק.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: An agent

is

like judges

whose sale is valid up to one-sixth.

Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that Rav Naḥman:

An agent is

like a widow

whose sale is void even for any slight error.

The Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rava said that Rav Naḥman: An agent is like judges,

and the sale is valid up to one-sixth.

What

is the reason? Just

as judges are not selling for themselves,

[they do not sell for themselves],

so too, an agent

is

not selling for himself;

he is selling.

To exclude a widow, who sells for herself

[to exclude a widow, who sells on her own behalf], that is: An agent is not comparable to a widow, who sells for herself, and she should have been precise; therefore, she is penalized by having the sale voided for even a slight overcharge.

But

Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that Rav Naḥman:

An agent is

like a widow,

and the sale is void for any amount, because of the reason that

just as a widow

is

alone,

so too, an agent

is

alone

as well.

To exclude

[to exclude]

a court, which consists of many,

that is: An agent is not comparable to judges, since they are many whereas he is alone.

And the halakha is: An agent is like a widow,

and their sale is void for any amount if he caused a loss to his principal.

The Gemara is puzzled by the ruling that an agent is like a widow:

And how is this different from that which we learned

[How is this law concerning an agent who erred different from what we learned in a Mishna in tractate Terumot]:

One who says to his agent: Go and separate teruma

from my produce:

The agent

separates teruma according to the intention of the owner of the produce,

as he knows the owner: If he is generous, he should separate one-fortieth, and if he is stingy, he should separate one-sixtieth.

And if he does not know

the

intention of the owner of the produce,

he

separates with

a

moderate

eye, which is

one-fiftieth.

And if

the agent reduced

what

ten

he was to separate one-fortieth,

or

if he

added

to what

ten

he was to separate one-sixtieth,

his teruma is teruma!?

We have learned: In a matter in which an agent is liable to err, his actions stand. Thus, we should likewise say concerning an agent who erred that up to one-sixth his sale is valid. How, then, did we rule that an agent is like a widow, and that his sale is void even for the slightest error!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of an agent who erred concerning teruma, his teruma is therefore teruma—

since there are those who separate with a stingy eye, and there are those who separate with a generous eye

[some separate with a stingy eye and some with a generous one]—

he can

say to him

—the agent can say to the owner of the produce—:

“I assessed you in this manner,”

I assessed your character as I did, and your intention is disregarded in favor of my assessment of you!

But here,

in the case of an agent who errs concerning the price, it is

an error

[it is an error that the agent made], and

he says to him

—the principal says to the agent—:

“You should not have erred”

[you had no right to err]!

The Gemara now returns to the basic law of our Mishna, which we learned: The appraisal of judges—if they reduced the value by one-sixth or increased it by one-sixth, their sale is void; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid:

Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the words of the Sages.

And we raise an objection:

A

rely

does Rav Naḥman not accept the principle, “What force does a court’s authority have,”

which is the reason Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that their sale is valid!?

But Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel:

In the case of orphans who came to divide their father’s estate, the court appoints for them

for each of the orphans

a guardian, and they select

the guardians

for them

[each guardian for his ward]

a choice portion.

And when

they come of age,

the orphans

are able

to

protest

this division and annul it.

And Rav Naḥman himself

[not citing his teacher Shmuel]

said:

Even if

they come of age,

the orphans

are not

able

to protest, for if so—

if they are able to protest—

“What force does a court’s authority have!?”

Thus Rav Naḥman himself holds according to the reasoning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says in our Mishna: “If so, what force does a court’s authority have?” Yet here it is stated in his name that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

This—

that Rav Naḥman said that the halakha is in accordance with the Sages, and we do not say, “If so, what force does a court’s authority have”—is when

they erred

and acted in this manner because of an error.

This—

that Rav Naḥman said, “If so, what force does a court’s authority have”—is when

they did not err

in the guardians’ division.

The Gemara is puzzled by this answer:

But

if they did not err,

the guardians,

in what could

the orphans protest when they come of age!?

It is necessarily the case that Rav Naḥman is also speaking of a situation in which the guardians erred, and if so, the original question returns.

And we answer: The orphans’ protest does not concern an error on the part of the guardians. Rather, their protest is

concerning the directions,

as one of them prefers a portion in a different direction from the one he received—for example, he has a field in another direction and wants his fields to be adjacent to one another.

When Rav Dimi came

—when Rav Dimi came—

he said:

It once happened that Rabbi acted in accordance with the words of the Sages

and annulled a sale made by judges who had reduced or increased the value by one-sixth or more.

Parta said before him,

who was

the son of Rabbi Elazar

ben Parta,

that is, he was

the grandson of the great Rabbi Parta:

“If so, what force does a court’s authority have!?”

And Rabbi reversed the action

because the reasoning in what we learned in our Mishna—“If so, what force does a court’s authority have?”—seemed sound to him. It turned out that he had erred concerning a matter stated in the Mishna by annulling the sale, so Rabbi reversed his action and upheld the sale.

Rav Dimi teaches the incident in this manner

as the incident occurred.

But

Rav Safra teaches it in this manner: It once happened that Rabbi sought to act in accordance with the words of the Sages.

Parta, the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Parta, the grandson of the great Rabbi Parta, said before him: “If so, what force does a court’s authority have?”

And

Rabbi did not carry out the action.

Is it not the case that they disagree concerning this,

Rav Dimi, who said that Rabbi acted and reversed the action, and Rav Safra, who said, “Rabbi sought” but did not act—

one

—Rav Dimi—

holds: A judge who

“erred regarding a matter taught in the

“erred concerning a matter stated in the

Therefore, since this error is considered an error regarding a matter taught in the Mishna, as explained, Rabbi acted correctly by reversing his decision.

Mishna reverses.”

Therefore, since this error is considered equivalent to an error concerning a matter stated in the Mishna, as explained, Rabbi acted correctly in reversing the action.

And the other

—Rav Safra—

holds: A judge who

“erred concerning a matter stated in the Mishna”

does not reverse,”

but the judge must pay from his own funds. Necessarily, Rabbi had not yet carried out the action, for had he already done so, he would not have reversed the action; rather, he would have paid the loss from his own pocket.

And we reject this:

No; everyone—

both Rav Dimi and Rav Safra—holds:

“A judge who erred concerning a matter stated in the Mishna reverses,”

and had Rabbi already carried out the action, he indeed would have reversed it because he had erred concerning a matter stated in the Mishna.

Rather,

one

—Rav Dimi—

holds: “This is how the incident occurred,”

that Rabbi acted and reversed the action.

And the other

—Rav Safra—

holds: “This is how the incident occurred,”

that Rabbi had not yet carried out the action; rather, he “sought” to carry it out.

Rav Yosef said:

A widow who sold

a field belonging to orphans for her sustenance or for her ketuba—

the responsibility

for the sale

lies with the orphans,

for if it turns out that the field was stolen or encumbered to another party, and the creditor repossessed it from the purchaser in payment of his debt, the purchaser may seek compensation from the orphans, since the widow was their agent.

And when a court sold

a field belonging to orphans to provide food for the woman and the daughters,

the responsibility

for the sale

lies with the orphans.

And we challenge this:

Is it obvious!?

And we answer: Indeed, the law of a

widow

who

sold was not necessary for him,

for it is obvious that the responsibility lies with the orphans.

What was necessary for him

for Rav Yosef to teach as a novel point was that

a court

that sold a field bears responsibility, which lies with the orphans, because

lest you say,

perhaps, if Rav Yosef had not taught this: