Ketubot 100a — the Talmud in English

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: An agent

is

like judges

whose sale is valid up to one-sixth.

Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

An agent is

like a widow

whose sale is void even for any slight error.

And the Gemara explains their reasons:

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: An agent is like judges,

and the sale is valid up to one-sixth.

What

just as

judges do not sell for themselves

—they do not sell for themselves

so too an agent

is

not for himself

that he sells.

To exclude a widow, who sells for herself

—to exclude a widow, who sells for herself—meaning: an agent is not similar to a widow, who sells for herself, and she should have been precise; therefore, she is penalized by voiding the sale for any slight overcharge.

But

Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

An agent

is like a widow,

and the sale is void for any amount, because of the reason that

just as a widow

who is

a single individual,

so too an agent

is

a single individual

he is.

To exclude

—to exclude—

a court, for they are many,

meaning: an agent is not similar to judges, since they are many whereas he is a single individual.

And the halakha is: an agent is like a widow,

and their sale is void for any amount if he caused his principal a loss.

The Gemara expresses astonishment at the ruling that an agent is like a widow:

And in what way is this different from that which we learned

—in what way is this law of an agent who erred different from that which we learned in the Mishna in Trumot:

One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma”

from my produce:

The agent

separates teruma according to the view of the owner,

as he knows the owner: if he has a generous eye, he separates one-fortieth, and if he has a stingy eye, he separates one-sixtieth.

And if he does not know

the

view of the owner,

he

separates with a

stingy

eye,

which is

one-fiftieth.

And if

the agent reduced

what

ten

—that he separated one-fortieth—

or

if

he added

what

ten

—that he separated one-sixtieth—then

his teruma is teruma!?

For we learned: in a matter in which an agent is liable to err, his actions are valid. And so we should say concerning an agent who erred: up to one-sixth his sale is valid. How, then, did we rule that an agent is like a widow, and their sale is void even for any slight error!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of an agent who erred concerning teruma, therefore his teruma is teruma—

Since there is one who separates with a stingy eye, and there is one who separates with a generous eye

—there are those who separate with a stingy eye and those who separate with a generous eye—

he is able to

say to him

—the agent to the owner—:

“I assessed you in this manner,”

I assessed your character as I did, and your view is nullified before my view, according to how I assessed you!

But here,

in the case of an agent who errs concerning the price, it is

an error

—it is an error in which the agent erred—

and he says to him

—the principal to the agent—:

“You should not have erred”

—you should not have erred!

Here the Gemara returns to the primary law of our Mishna, which we learned: the appraisal of judges—if they reduced by one-sixth or increased by one-sixth, their sale is void; Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: their sale is valid:

Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is according to the words of the Sages.

And we ask:

And

if

Rav Naḥman does not hold, “What power does a court’s authority have,”

for because of this Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that their sale is valid!?

But Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel:

Orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints for them

for each and every one of the orphans

a guardian, and they select

the guardians

for them

—each of the guardians for his own child—

a choice portion.

And when

they grow up

the orphans,

they are able

to

protest

against this division and annul it.

And Rav Naḥman himself

—not in the name of his teacher Shmuel—

said:

Even if

they grow up

the orphans,

they are not

able

to protest, for if so

—that they are able to protest—

what power does a court’s authority have!?

Thus Rav Naḥman himself holds according to the reasoning of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, who says in our Mishna: “If so, what power does a court’s authority have,” whereas here it is explained in his name that the halakha is according to the Sages!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

This

—that Rav Naḥman said that the halakha is according to the Sages, and we do not say, “If so, what power does a court’s authority have”—is when

they erred

and did this because of an error.

This

—that Rav Naḥman said, “If so, what power does a court’s authority have”—is when

they did not err

the guardians in their division.

The Gemara is astonished at the answer:

But

if they did not err

the guardians,

in what could they protest

when the orphans grew up!?

It is necessarily the case that Rav Naḥman, too, is speaking of a situation in which the guardians erred; and if so, the question returns to its place.

And we answer: the orphans’ protest is not concerning an error of the guardians. Rather, their protest is

concerning directions,

where one prefers a portion in a different direction from the one he received—for example, he has a field in another direction and wants his fields to be adjacent to one another.

When Rav Dimi came

—when Rav Dimi came—

he said:

It happened, and Rabbi acted according to the words of the Sages,

and voided the sale of judges who had reduced or increased by one-sixth or more.

Parta said before him,

who was

the son of Rabbi Eleazar

ben Parta,

that is, he was the one who said this,

the grandson of the great Rabbi Parta:

“If so, what power does a court’s authority have!?”

And Rabbi retracted the action,

because the reasoning that we learned in our Mishna, “If so, what power does a court’s authority have,” appeared sound to him. It therefore turned out that he had erred concerning a matter taught in the Mishna by voiding the sale, and Rabbi then reinstated it.

Rav Dimi teaches the incident in this manner

—the incident.

But

Rav Safra teaches it in this manner: It happened, and Rabbi sought to act according to the words of the Sages.

Parta, the son of Rabbi Eleazar ben Parta, the grandson of the great Rabbi Parta, said before him: “If so, what power does a court’s authority have?”

And

Rabbi did not carry out the action.

Is it not that they disagree over this

—Rav Dimi, who said that Rabbi acted and retracted, and Rav Safra, who said “Rabbi sought” but did not act—

one

—Rav Dimi—

holds:

a judge who

“erred concerning a matter

taught in the

Mishna retracts.”

And therefore, since this error is considered an error concerning a matter taught in the Mishna, as was explained, Rabbi acted properly by retracting the action.

And the other

—Rav Safra—

holds: a judge who erred concerning a matter taught in the Mishna

“does not retract”

;

rather, the judge must pay from his own funds. Necessarily, Rabbi had not yet carried out the action, for had he already acted, he would not have retracted the action; rather, he would have paid the loss from his own pocket.

And we reject this:

No, everyone

—both Rav Dimi and Rav Safra—holds:

“One who erred concerning a matter taught in the Mishna retracts,”

and had Rabbi already acted, indeed he would have retracted it because he had erred concerning a matter taught in the Mishna.

Rather,

one

—Rav Dimi—

holds: This is how the incident occurred,

that Rabbi acted and retracted.

And the other

—Rav Safra—

holds: This is how the incident occurred,

that Rabbi had not yet acted, but only “sought” to carry out the action.

Rav Yosef said:

A widow who sold

a field of orphans for her sustenance or for her marriage settlement—

the liability

of the sale

is upon the orphans,

if the field is found to have been stolen or encumbered to another, and the creditor seized it from the purchaser for his debt, the purchaser has recourse against the orphans, for the widow was an agent of the orphans.

And a court that sold

a field of orphans for the maintenance of the woman and the daughters,

the liability

of the sale

is upon the orphans.

And we challenge this:

Is it obvious!?

And we answer: indeed, the law of

a widow

who

sold was not needed by him,

for it is obvious that the liability is upon the orphans.

What was needed by him

for Rav Yosef to teach as a novelty is that

a court

that sold, the liability is upon the orphans, for

it might have been said,

perhaps, if Rav Yosef had not taught this novelty: