Ketubot 102b (קב:) — the Talmud in English

However, the second part of Rava’s statement—that Reish Lakish follows only ben Nanas and not Rabbi Yishmael—can be rejected, by saying:

When they disagree,

it is possible that Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

and that both of them agree with him that a guarantor becomes liable even without witnesses; they disagreed only with regard to an admission concerning one hundred dinars—

Rabbi Yohanan

held that his admission concerning one hundred dinars is effective even when he did not designate witnesses for it,

as

he holds,

Rabbi Yishmael,

that the guarantor’s obligation takes effect by virtue of his admission, without witnesses testifying to it.

And Reish Lakish

held:

Thus far, Rabbi Yishmael did not say there—

that the guarantor becomes liable through his admission even when he did not designate witnesses—

but

because

a

guarantor

is connected to a Torah-based lien.

For when the guarantor acknowledges his obligation, his lien now becomes an obligation that already exists by Torah law. Therefore, he cannot claim that he was merely making fun when he admitted that he was undertaking a guarantor’s obligation for a debt that exists by Torah law.

But here,

when, before his admission, he is not liable for anything, and

there is no

here

Torah-based lien,

but rather he creates the debt now through his admission, if he did not designate witnesses for it, he can claim: “I was only making fun of you”!

The body of the matter: Rav Giddel said that Rav said:

If the father of the bride asked the father of the groom:

How much are you giving your son?—

and he answered: an amount of

such and such.

And the father of the groom in turn asked the father of the bride:

And how much are you giving your daughter?—

and the father of the bride answered: an amount of

such and such.

If they subsequently

arose

from those statements,

and betrothed—

they acquired

the reciprocal commitments from one another. And

these are the matters acquired through mere declaration.

Rava said: Rav’s statement stands to reason

that the father’s commitment takes effect through a mere declaration,

with

one who betroths his

daughter

when she is a

na'ara [young woman]

and not a bogeret,

because benefit comes into his hand,

since the father of the young woman receives monetary benefit from the betrothal of his daughter, as he is entitled to the betrothal money that the husband gives for his young daughter. Therefore, he acquires his commitment by virtue of the benefit he receives from her betrothal.

But

with the betrothal of a

bogeret, because benefit does not come,

because no

benefit

of a monetary nature comes

into the hand

of the bride’s father, since her betrothal money belongs to her and not to her father—

no, Rav did not say that the father of the bride becomes liable through a mere declaration; rather, he must perform an act of acquisition concerning it.

say that the bride’s father becomes liable through speech alone. Rather, he must perform an act of acquisition for this commitment.

And Rava added and said: Although this is what would stand to reason,

By God!

I swear by God that

Rav

stated his ruling—that the father becomes liable through his declaration without an act of acquisition—

even

when his daughter is a

bogeret,

and her betrothal provides her father with no monetary benefit.

Rava proves that this is Rav’s position:

For if you do not say so,

if you do not say this, but interpret Rav’s statement as referring only to the father of a young woman, who receives monetary benefit from her betrothal, the following difficulty arises:

The father of the groom,

who likewise becomes liable through a declaration without an act of acquisition—

what benefit came into his hand!?

No monetary benefit came into his hand at all, and nevertheless Rav said that he becomes liable without an act of acquisition.

Rather,

necessarily, the reciprocal commitment does not take effect because of the benefit that came into their hands, but rather

through the benefit that they are marrying one another,

through the benefit created by the establishment of marital ties between them.

They resolve

the matter with complete resolve regarding their commitment,

and they acquire from one another,

each reciprocally acquiring the other’s commitment with full resolve, without the need for an act of acquisition.

He said—

he asked

Ravina asked Rav Ashi:

Are

these matters

that are acquired through mere declaration

capable of being put into writing

in a document, so that they have the legal force of a document and the commitment can be collected even from liened property, as is the law regarding collection by means of a document?

Or are they not capable of being put into writing,

but are merely like an oral loan, which cannot be collected from liened property?

He said to him:

The matters acquired through mere declaration

are not capable of being put into writing

in a document!

He raised an objection to him,

Ravina challenged Rav Ashi from our Mishna, in which we learned:

The clever ones would write

to a woman who had a daughter:

“On the condition that I will provide for your daughter for five years, as long as you are with me!”

But the husband’s commitment to his wife to provide sustenance for his wife’s daughter was not made through an act of acquisition, but only through a verbal declaration, and it took effect solely by virtue of the benefit of the marriage. This proves that it was nevertheless capable of being put into writing in a document, since we learned that the clever ones would “write” their stipulation.

And we answer:

What

is the meaning of the expression

“write”

stated in the Mishna?

They say!

And we challenge this:

And

when

does he call

a declaration

“writing”?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed, the tanna uses the expression “writing” even when the matter in question is a verbal declaration.

And

the proof is that

we learned:

we learned above, at the beginning of the ninth chapter:

“One who writes to his wife: ‘I have no legal claim or involvement in your property.’”

And

a beraita teaches about this:

Rabbi Hiyya: “One who says to his wife.”

The Gemara brings another proof that matters acquired through mere declaration can be put into writing in a document:

Come and hear

from what we learned:

One may write documents of betrothal and marriage only with the consent of both of them

—the husband and the wife.

And we infer:

If it is with the consent of both of them—

one may write.

Is that not

referring to the writing of

“documents of stipulation”,

documents in which the matters that the two parties stipulated to one another as commitments at the time of betrothal and marriage are written? This proves that these matters are capable of being put into writing in a document.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

it is not documents of stipulation that are under discussion, but rather the writing of

actual documents of betrothal,

and

in accordance with the opinions of Rav Pappa and Rav Sheravya.

For it was stated:

If they

wrote

the document of betrothal [in which the document states, “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” or “Your daughter is betrothed to me,” specifying the man’s name and the woman’s name]

for her sake [for the sake of this man and this woman, and for the sake of betrothal; if the document was not written lishma, it is invalid, just as a get not written lishma is invalid],

for the sake of this man and this woman, and for the sake of betrothal, since if “for her sake” is lacking in the writing of the document, it is invalid like a bill of divorce not written for her sake ],

and without her consent [but without her agreement to the writing of the document], and he gave the document to the woman, and she consented to be betrothed through it—

but without her agreement to the writing of the document ], and he gave the document to the woman, and she agreed to become betrothed through it—

Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed [because the requirement that the betrothal document be written lishma results from the equation of the “becoming” of betrothal with the “departure” of a get. A get must be written lishma, but need not be written with her consent, since she is divorced against her will. Therefore, a betrothal document likewise need not be written with her consent, despite the fact that she becomes betrothed only with her consent].

because the requirement that the betrothal document be written for her sake results from the comparison of the “becoming” of betrothal to the “going out” of a bill of divorce. In a bill of divorce it is necessary to write it for her sake, but it is not necessary to write it with her consent, since she is divorced against her will; therefore, a betrothal document likewise need not be written with her consent, although she becomes betrothed only with her consent ].

Rav Pappa and Rav Sheravya say: She is not betrothed.

Although the “becoming” was indeed equated with the “departure,” this requires only that the betrothal document be written lishma, like a get. But with regard to her consent to the writing of the document, one must derive from the equation of “becoming” and “departure” that the document must be written with the woman’s authorization, since she is the one who transfers herself to the husband, just as in the case of a get, which must be written with the husband’s authorization, since he is the one who removes her from himself and transfers her to herself.

And so it is with every document: it must be written with the authorization of the one undertaking the obligation or of the one transferring the property through that document. Therefore, in the case of betrothal, since she transfers herself to her husband, the document must be written with her authorization!

The Gemara brings another proof from our Mishna that documents of stipulation are capable of being put into writing:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna: If two husbands committed themselves to one woman to provide for her daughter, and afterward

they died,

the two husbands—

their daughters

of the two husbands

are fed

only

from unencumbered property.

And

if

she,

the daughter whom the two husbands of her mother committed themselves to support for five years,

is fed from liened property, because she has the status of a creditor.

This indicates that the husband’s stipulation to the woman is capable of being put into writing in a document, since collection from liened property is possible only when a document was written!

The Gemara rejects the proof:

Here, with what are we dealing

? With a case where he made an act of acquisition from him.

They performed an act of acquisition concerning the husband’s commitment, and this is not one of the matters acquired through mere declaration. When there is an act of acquisition, it is possible to write a document and collect through it from liened property.

And we challenge this:

If so,

since, in order to reject the proof, you interpreted our Mishna as referring to a case in which they performed an act of acquisition and wrote the husband’s commitment in a document—then

the daughters

of each husband

also

should be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property! For the Gemara assumed that the husband’s act of acquisition was performed concerning all the stipulations made between the husband and wife, and these stipulations also include the support of the daughters whom the women have from their husbands.

And we answer: Our Mishna is speaking

of

a case

where they acquired for this one,

only with regard to supporting his wife’s daughter,

but did not acquire for this one,

with regard to supporting his daughter by this woman.

And perhaps you will wonder:

But what establishes this?

Is it a definite and conclusive matter that an act of acquisition is performed only concerning support for his wife’s daughter and not concerning support for his daughter by his wife, so that the Sages taught categorically, without noting a distinction in the acts of acquisition, that support for his wife’s daughter is collected from liened property [because an act of acquisition was certainly performed concerning this commitment], whereas support for his daughter by his wife is collected only from unencumbered property [because an act of acquisition was certainly not performed concerning it]?

The answer is:

She,

his wife’s daughter,

who was present at the time of the act of acquisition,

since she had already been born when her mother came to marry the husband—

it is effective

and beneficial

for her, the act of acquisition,

because she already exists, and therefore an act of acquisition can be performed through which the husband commits himself toward her to support her.

But

the daughters

of the woman,

who were not present at the time of the act of acquisition,

since they had not yet been born at the time of the marriage—

an act of acquisition is not effective for them,

even if their father performs it with their mother in order to support them.

The Gemara asks:

Are we not dealing with a case where she was present at the time of the act of acquisition,

and is it not possible that his daughter by his wife was already in existence at the time of the act of acquisition?

And what are the circumstances

in which this is possible?

For example, he divorced

his wife after she had already borne him a daughter,

and then took her back,

and after her divorce he remarried her and committed himself to support his already existing daughter. Yet the Mishna states without qualification that support for the daughters is not collected from liened property. This implies that even if a man married a woman and she bore him a daughter, then he divorced his wife and remarried her, his daughter does not collect her support from liened property, despite the fact that she was present at the time of the second marriage, that an act of acquisition was performed concerning her father’s commitment to support her, and that the matter was written in a document!

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts this answer and offers another distinction between support for his daughter and support for his wife’s daughter—

Rather,

this is how the distinction between them should be made:

She,

his wife’s daughter,

who is not

included

in the terms of the court,

which the Sages instituted, requiring the father to support his daughter—

an act of acquisition is effective for her,

so that the husband undertakes to provide her support.

But

the daughters

of the husband by his wife,

who are

supported

by the terms of the court—

an act of acquisition is not effective for them,

to establish an additional commitment to provide their support.

And we are astonished: How can it be possible that an act of acquisition does not help the daughters themselves to collect from liened property? Is it because the Sages obligated him to support his daughters through the terms of the court that this

diminishes

the daughters’ status, so that their father cannot perform an act of acquisition establishing their obligation and enabling them to collect from liened property!?

Therefore, the Gemara offers another explanation:

Rather, his daughters

do not collect their support from liened property even if their father performed an act of acquisition obligating himself—

this is the reason:

Since they are included in the terms of the court—

since the father’s obligation of support is one of the terms of the court—

say,

we must be concerned and say: Perhaps

bundles of money

—bundles of money—

he placed in their possession,

their father gave them to his daughters to ensure their livelihood, so that his obligation under the terms of the court would be fulfilled. Therefore, they cannot collect their support from liened property. But in the case of a husband who undertakes to support his wife’s daughter, an obligation that is not imposed by the terms of the court, we need not be concerned that he placed bundles of money in his wife’s daughter’s possession to ensure fulfillment of his commitment.

We learned in the Mishna: If the first husband divorced his wife, and she went and married another man,

the husband may not say

the

first

husband: I will not support your daughter until she comes to me; rather, he sends her support to the place where her mother is.

Rav Hisda said: This indicates

that since the Mishna stated that the husband sends the support of his wife’s daughter to the place where her mother is, and not to the place where her brothers are—

this proves that

a daughter

who is supported from her father’s property after her father’s death cannot be required by her brothers [who inherit the father’s property] to grow up in their home, where they will support her from the inherited property. Rather, the daughter

is with her mother,

and they must send her support to her mother’s home!

The Gemara rejects Rav Hisda’s proof:

From where

do you know

that

even

with regard to

a daughter

we are dealing with an older daughter,

concerning whom there is no concern that the brothers might harm her in order to free themselves from their obligation to support her and from the one-tenth of the estate that they must give her?

Perhaps,

our Mishna is speaking only

of

a

minor daughter,

who grows up in her mother’s home and not in her brothers’ home, because there is concern for the welfare of a minor daughter if she lives with her brothers,

and because of an incident that occurred!

But in the case of an older daughter, whom there is no concern that they will harm, it is possible that they can demand that she live with them in their home, where they will support her.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one dies and leaves a minor son with his mother.

If

the father’s heirs say: “Let him grow up with us,”

and we will support him;

and

if

his mother says: “Let my son grow up with me”—

They leave him with his mother, and do not leave him with

the one who

is fit to inherit him,

because

there was an incident:

they brought the young brother to the father’s heirs,

and they slaughtered him

immediately on

the first evening

that he stayed with them, in order to acquire his share of the inheritance.

The concern that the heirs might murder her applies only to a minor daughter, and not to an older one.

But the Gemara challenges this rejection and upholds the proof:

If there is a distinction between an older daughter and a minor daughter,

then let

the tanna state the law of sending the support in our Mishna in wording that corresponds to this distinction, and say as follows: They send her support

to the place where she

is located!

For this wording indicates that the older daughter has one separate place, and the minor daughter has another separate place.