Ketubot 102b — the Talmud in English

But the second part that Rava said—that Resh Lakish holds only like Ben Nanes and not like Rabbi Yishmael—can be rejected, and one can say:

When they disagree,

it is possible that Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

and both held like him concerning a guarantor, who becomes liable even without witnesses; and they disagreed only concerning an admission of a maneh—

Rabbi Yohanan

held that his admission concerning a maneh is effective even when he did not designate witnesses for it,

as

he holds

Rabbi Yishmael,

that the guarantor’s suretyship takes effect on the basis of his admission, without witnesses testifying about it.

And Resh Lakish

held—

Until here, Rabbi Yishmael said there

that the guarantor becomes liable through his admission even when he did not designate witnesses,

but

because

a

guarantor

belongs to a Torah-based lien.

For when the guarantor acknowledged it, his lien now became a debt that already exists by Torah law; therefore, he cannot claim that he was merely feigning when he admitted that he was undertaking suretyship as a guarantor for a debt that exists by Torah law.

But here,

when before his admission he is not liable for anything, and

there is no

here

Torah-based lien,

but rather he creates the debt now through his admission, then, if he did not designate witnesses for it, he can claim: “I was merely feigning before you!”

The body of the matter: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

If the bride’s father asked the groom’s father:

How much are you giving your son?—

and he answered: an amount of

such and such.

And the groom’s father again asked the bride’s father:

And how much are you giving your daughter?—

and the bride’s father answered: an amount of

such and such.

If they subsequently

stood

on the basis of those words,

and betrothed,

they acquired

each from the other the reciprocal undertaking. And

these are the very matters acquired through verbal commitment.

Rava said: Rav’s statement stands to reason

that the father’s undertaking takes effect through verbal commitment alone,

with

one who betroths his

daughter

when she is

a na’ara [

and not a bogeret ],

because benefit comes to his hand,

since monetary benefit comes to the father of the na’ara from the betrothal of his daughter, as he is entitled to the betrothal money that the husband gives his na’ara daughter; therefore, he transfers his undertaking by virtue of the benefit he receives from her betrothal.

But

with the betrothal of a

bogeret, from whom it does not come,

since no

benefit

of money

comes to his hand,

the bride’s father’s, since her betrothal money belongs to her and not to her father—

not

did Rav say that the bride’s father becomes liable through verbal commitment alone; rather, he must perform an act of acquisition for it.

And Rava added and said: Indeed, this is what would stand to reason, but—

By God!

I swear by God that

Rav said

his ruling: the father becomes liable through his statement without an act of acquisition,

even

when his daughter is

a bogeret,

and her father has no monetary benefit from her betrothal.

And Rava proves that this is Rav’s method:

For if you do not say so,

if you do not say this, but establish Rav’s words only concerning the father of a na’ara, who has monetary benefit from her betrothal, it will be difficult for you:

the son’s father,

who also becomes liable through verbal commitment without an act of acquisition—

what benefit came to his hand!?

For no monetary benefit came to his hand, and nevertheless Rav said that he becomes liable without an act of acquisition.

Rather,

necessarily, the reciprocal undertaking does not take effect because of the benefit that came to their hands, but rather

through that benefit that they are marrying one another,

through the benefit that marital ties were formed between them,

they resolve,

they make their decision with complete resolve concerning their undertaking,

and transfer to one another,

and mutually transfer their undertaking to one another, with full resolve, without need of an act of acquisition.

He said,

he asked

Ravina to Rav Ashi:

Are

these matters

that are acquired through verbal commitment

given to be written

in a document, so that they have the force of a document, to collect the undertaking even from liened property, as is the law of collection by a document?

Or are they not given to be written,

but are only like an oral loan, which is not collected from liened property?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi to Ravina: The matters acquired through verbal commitment—

are not given to be written

in a document!

He raised an objection to him,

Ravina challenged Rav Ashi from our Mishna, in which we learned:

The astute would write

for a woman who has a daughter:

“On the condition that I will provide for your daughter for five years, all the time that you are with me!”

But the husband’s undertaking to his wife to provide sustenance for his wife’s daughter was not made through an act of acquisition, but only through verbal commitment, and it takes effect solely by virtue of the benefit of the marriage. It follows that nevertheless it was given to be written in a document, for we learned that the astute would “write” their condition.

And we answer:

What

is the meaning of the expression

“write”

stated in the Mishna?—

They say!

And we challenge:

And

when

does he call it

the tanna

“writing”

an utterance?

Yes,

indeed, the tanna uses the expression “writing” even where the matter concerns verbal commitment.

And

the proof for this is that

we learned

above, at the beginning of the ninth chapter:

“One who writes to his wife: ‘I have no claim or dealings with your property.’”

And he taught

about this in a beraita:

Rabbi Hiyya: One who says to his wife.

And the Gemara brings another proof that the matters acquired through verbal commitment may be written in a document:

Come and hear

from what we learned:

Documents of betrothal and marriage may be written only with the consent of both of them [

the husband and the wife ].

And we infer:

By the consent of both of them—

they may write.

Is it not so

that this refers to writing

“documents of stipulations”,

documents in which the matters that the two parties “stipulated” for one another as undertakings at the time of betrothal and marriage are written? And it follows that these matters were given to be written in a document.

And the Gemara rejects this:

No,

it is not documents of stipulations that are being discussed, but rather the writing of

actual documents of betrothal,

and

as in the statement of Rav Pappa and Rav Sheravya.

For it was stated:

If they

wrote

the document of betrothal [in which it is written in the document, “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” or “Your daughter is betrothed to me,” specifying the name of the man and the name of the woman]

for her sake [

for the sake of this man and this woman, and for the sake of betrothal, since if “for her sake” is lacking in the writing of the document, it is invalid like a bill of divorce not written for her sake ],

and without her consent [

but without her agreement to the writing of the document ], and he gave the document to the woman, and she agreed to become betrothed through it—

Rabba and Ravina say: She is betrothed [

because the requirement that the betrothal document be written for her sake results from the comparison of the “becoming” of betrothal to the “going out” of a bill of divorce. In a bill of divorce it is necessary to write it for her sake, but it is not necessary to write it with her consent, since she is divorced against her will; therefore, a betrothal document likewise need not be written with her consent, although she becomes betrothed only with her consent ].

Rav Pappa and Rav Sheravya say: She is not betrothed. For although the “becoming” was compared to the “going out,” this requires only that the betrothal document be written for her sake, like the bill of divorce. But concerning her consent to the writing of the document, one must derive from the comparison of the “becoming” to the “going out” that the document must be written with the woman’s consent, since she is the one who transfers herself to the husband; just as in the case of a bill of divorce, which must be written with the husband’s consent, since he is the one who removes her from himself and transfers her to herself. And so with every document: the document must be written with the consent of the one who undertakes the obligation or of the one who transfers something through this document. Therefore, in betrothal, where she transfers herself to her husband, the document must be written with her consent!

Although the “becoming” of betrothal is indeed compared to the “departure” of divorce, this comparison requires only that the betrothal document be written for her sake, like a bill of divorce. But concerning her consent to the writing of the document, one must learn from the comparison of betrothal to divorce that the document must be written with the woman’s consent, since she is the one who grants herself to the husband—just as a bill of divorce must be written with the husband’s consent, since he is the one who removes her from himself and grants her the ability to return to herself.

And so, with every document, it must be written with the consent of the person undertaking the obligation or of the person granting the property through that document. Therefore, in betrothal, where she grants herself to her husband, the document must be written with her consent!

And the Gemara brings another proof from our Mishna that documents of stipulations were given to be written:

Come and hear

from what we learned in our Mishna: If two husbands undertook to one woman to provide for her daughter, and afterward

died

the two husbands—

their daughters,

the daughters of the two husbands,

are sustained

only

from unsold property.

And

if

she,

for whom her mother’s two husbands undertook to provide sustenance for five years,

were sustained from liened property, because she is like a creditor.

And it is implied that the husband’s stipulation to the woman is given to be written in a document, since only where a document was written can one collect from liened property!

And the Gemara rejects the proof:

Here, with what are we dealing?—

With a case where he acquired from him.

They performed an act of acquisition concerning the husband’s undertaking, and this is not among the matters acquired through verbal commitment. When there is an act of acquisition, it is possible to write a document and collect through it from liened property.

And we challenge:

If so,

since, in order to reject the proof, you established our Mishna as referring to a case where they performed an act of acquisition and wrote the husband’s undertaking in a document—then

the daughters

of each and every husband

also

will be entitled to collect their sustenance from liened property! For the Gemara assumed that the husband’s act of acquisition was made concerning all the conditions that the husband and wife made between themselves, and these conditions also include the sustenance that the women’s daughters receive from their husbands.

And we answer: Our Mishna speaks

of

a case

where they acquired for this one,

only concerning the sustenance of his wife’s daughter,

but they did not acquire for this one,

concerning the sustenance of his daughter from this woman.

And perhaps you will wonder:

But what is the decisive basis?

Is it an established and absolute matter that they perform an act of acquisition only concerning the sustenance of his wife’s daughter and not concerning the sustenance of his daughter from his wife, so that the Sages taught in a definitive formulation, without noting a distinction in the acts of acquisition, that the sustenance of his wife’s daughter is collected from liened property [because certainly an act of acquisition was performed concerning this undertaking], whereas the sustenance of his daughter from his wife is collected only from unsold property [because certainly no act of acquisition was performed concerning it]?

The answer is:

She,

his wife’s daughter,

who was present at the time of the act of acquisition,

since she had already been born when her mother came to marry the husband—

it is effective

it is beneficial

for her, an act of acquisition,

since she exists in the world, and therefore it is possible to perform an act of acquisition through which the husband undertakes toward her to provide for her.

But

the daughters

of the woman,

who were not present at the time of the act of acquisition,

for they had not yet been born at the time of the marriage—

an act of acquisition is not effective for them,

that their father performs with their mother to provide for them.

And the Gemara asks:

Are we not dealing with a case where she was present at the time of the act of acquisition?

Is it not possible that his daughter from his wife existed at the time of the act of acquisition?

And what are the circumstances?

And how is this possible?—

For example, he divorced

his wife after she had already borne him a daughter,

and he took her back,

and he remarried her after her divorce, and undertook to provide for his daughter, who already existed. Yet in the Mishna we learned without qualification that sustenance for the daughters is not collected from liened property. This implies that even if he married a woman and she bore him a daughter, and he divorced his wife and then remarried her, his daughter does not collect her sustenance from liened property, although she existed at the time of the second marriage, and there was an act of acquisition concerning her father’s undertaking to provide for her, and the matter was written in a document!

And on the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts this answer and gives another distinction between the sustenance of the daughter and the sustenance of his wife’s daughter—

Rather,

this is how they must be distinguished:

She,

his wife’s daughter,

who is not

included

in a court-imposed condition,

that the Sages enacted, namely, that the father provide for his daughter—

an act of acquisition is effective for her,

the husband’s act of acquisition to undertake responsibility for her sustenance.

But

the daughters

of the husband from his wife,

who are

sustained

by a court-imposed condition—

an act of acquisition is not effective for them,

to undertake responsibility for their sustenance.

And we wonder: How is it possible that the act of acquisition itself does not help the daughters to collect from liened property? Is it because the Sages obligated him to provide for his daughters through a court-imposed condition that it

diminishes

the daughters, so that their father cannot perform an act of acquisition concerning their obligation, enabling them to collect from liened property!?

Therefore, the Gemara gives another explanation:

Rather, his daughters,

who do not collect their sustenance from liened property even if their father performed an act of acquisition to undertake responsibility—

this is the reason:

Since they are subject to a court-imposed condition—

since the father’s obligation of sustenance is a court-imposed condition—

say,

we must be concerned and say: perhaps

bundles

of money

he handed over to them,

their father gave them to his daughters to guarantee their sustenance, so that his obligation under the court-imposed condition would be fulfilled. Therefore, they cannot collect their sustenance from liened property. But in the case of a husband who undertakes to provide for his wife’s daughter, whose obligation does not arise from a court-imposed condition, we need not be concerned that he handed over bundles of money to his wife’s daughter to guarantee fulfillment of his undertaking.

We learned in the Mishna: If the first husband divorced his wife and she went and married another,

the husband shall not say

the

first

husband: “I will not provide for her daughter until she comes to me”; rather, he transports her sustenance to the place of her mother.

Rav Hisda said: This indicates,

from the fact that the Mishna stated that the husband transports his wife’s daughter’s sustenance to the place of her mother, and not to the place of her brothers—

this proves that

a daughter

who is sustained from her father’s property after her father’s death does not have brothers [who inherit the father’s property] entitled to demand that she grow up with them and that they sustain her in their home from the inheritance; rather, the daughter

is with her mother,

and they must send her sustenance to her mother’s house!

And the Gemara rejects Rav Hisda’s proof:

From where

do you know

that

even

with

a daughter

who is an adult we are dealing

that we need not be concerned that the brothers will plot against her in order to free themselves from their obligation of sustenance and from the tenth of the property that they must give her?

Perhaps,

our Mishna is only dealing

with

a

minor daughter,

who grows up in her mother’s house and not in her brothers’ house, because one must be concerned for the welfare of a minor daughter if she lives with her brothers,

and because of an incident that occurred!

But concerning an adult daughter, for whom there is no concern that they will harm her, it is possible that they can demand that she sit with them in their home, and there they will sustain her.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who dies and leaves a minor son with his mother.

If

the father’s heirs say: “Let him grow up with us,”

and we will support him.

And

if

his mother says: “Let my son grow up with me”—

They leave him with his mother, and do not leave him with

one who is

fit to inherit him,

because

there was an incident,

and they brought the young brother to the father’s heirs

and slaughtered him

immediately on

the first evening

that he stayed with them, in order to gain his share of the inheritance.

And concern for murder by the heirs applies only to a minor daughter, and not to an adult daughter.

But the Gemara challenges the rejection and upholds the proof:

If there is a distinction between an adult and a minor,

if so, let the tanna state

the law of transporting the sustenance in our Mishna in a formulation suited to this distinction, and let him say as follows: “They transport her sustenance”—

to the place where she

is found!

For this formulation implies that the adult has one separate place, and the minor has another separate place.