Keritot 3b — the Talmud in English

Rather,

the inadvertence of idolatry for which one is liable to bring an offering can be found

in"

one who says: It is permitted"

who is mistaken regarding the prohibition itself, in that he thinks it is permitted to serve idolatry.

And this is inadvertence regarding idolatry and also inadvertence regarding forms of service, since he knows neither the fundamental prohibition of idolatry nor the prohibition of the forms of service. It is called in the language of the Gemara, “both matters are forgotten by him.”

And although in tractate Shabbat (70a) Rava was uncertain about the law when both matters are forgotten by him, this is not a contradiction to our establishment here. Because

until here did Rava ask Rav Naḥman

in a case where he had both inadvertence regarding Shabbat and inadvertence regarding forms of labor,

only: whether one

sin-offering

is required, or whether two

sin-offerings

are required.

But

whether there is a possibility of saying that he is

entirely exempt—

he did not ask him,

since it is obvious that he is liable to at least one sin-offering.

And according to this version, it is difficult: Why did Rava not resolve his uncertainty from the Mishna? For the Mishna counts idolatry as only one liability, and if it is speaking of a case where both matters are forgotten, it follows that it is proven that when both matters are forgotten he is liable only one. The Shita Mekubetzet, in the omissions, letter aleph, brought a version in which the Gemara asks this explicitly. And Rav Pappa’s establishment below is the answer to this difficulty; see below for an explanation of the answer.

Rav Pappa said: One can find it

in the Mishna in a case of inadvertence regarding idolatry and intentionality regarding forms of service [and therefore he is liable only one]

in the case of a child captured among gentiles,

and it became known to him that it is prohibited to serve idolatry. But his mistake was that he saw the people of the place serving a particular idolatry of theirs and thought that it was not idolatry, and therefore served it. It follows

that he knew that it was prohibited

to serve

idolatry

through each of the four forms of service—slaughtering, burning incense, libation, and bowing ,

but

all that his inadvertence consisted of was that

these idolatries,

which the people of the place among whom he had been captured served,

he did not know that they were prohibited.

This is how the Sefer Birkat Ha-Zevah and Likkutei Halakhot explained Rashi’s position. And the Birkat Ha-Zevah added that Rav Pappa needed to say that he knew the fundamental prohibition of idolatry so that he would not be considered one who says, “It is permitted,” because Rav Pappa holds that one who says, “It is permitted,” is considered coerced and is entirely exempt. And he disagrees with Rava, cited above, for whom it was obvious that one who says, “It is permitted,” is considered inadvertent and liable; he was uncertain only concerning how many offerings he is liable to bring.

The Shita Mekubetzet, in its novellae, letter aleph, explained that Rav Pappa’s words are the answer to the difficulty that we should resolve from here Rava’s uncertainty when both matters are forgotten by him. For according to Rav Pappa’s establishment, this is not a case where both matters are forgotten, but rather inadvertence regarding idolatry—he thinks that this is not idolatry—and intentionality regarding forms of service—he knows that anything considered idolatry is prohibited to serve through these four forms of service.

And if you wish, say:

even if you say that the Mishna is speaking not of a child captured among gentiles but

of

a

mature

person. And

for example, he is mistaken regarding this verse (Exodus 20:20): “

Do not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold.” And in his mistake

“You shall not make with Me gods of silver or gods of gold.”

he

thought that bowing is prohibited—

to an idolatry of silver and gold

alone is what is prohibited,

but

idolatry

of other types is permitted,

and he served idolatry of other types—

that is inadvertence regarding idolatry,

for he thought that there is no prohibition against idolatry of other types,

and intentionality regarding forms of service,

for he knows that where there is a prohibition of idolatry, these four forms of service are prohibited.

And we return to the earlier difficulty: Why did he not teach the liabilities for Shabbat as thirty-nine less one?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said in the name of Rav Bibi bar Abaye:

In truth, it is speaking even of intentionality regarding Shabbat and inadvertence regarding forms of labor, in which case he is liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. And likewise, regarding idolatry, it is speaking of intentionality regarding idolatry and inadvertence regarding forms of service, in which case he is liable to bring four offerings. And concerning our difficulty that if so there are more than thirty-six sin-offerings, we answer:

A tanna

taught “the category of Shabbat”

and “

the category of idolatry”

alone

he teaches,

although there are several liabilities in each one. For the tanna wishes to count only the number of mitzvot for which one is liable to karet, and not the number of sin-offerings.

This is how Rashi explained it. However, seemingly it is proven that he did not even wish to count all the mitzvot for which one is liable to karet, as we say shortly: he did not count his daughter or his daughter’s daughter from a woman whom he had raped, because he included her under the category “the daughter of his wife,” even though she has a separate prohibition of her own. Rather, the tanna counted names of groups of prohibitions for which one is liable to karet, and included several similar prohibitions under one name, even though they are separate prohibitions.

From where

is it proven that this is the tanna’s intention?

From the fact that he teaches: One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter [who married a woman lawfully and had intercourse with her daughter, and is liable on account of the daughter of his wife],

[meaning that he properly married a woman and had intercourse with her daughter, for which he is liable because she is his wife’s daughter],

and with a married woman!

And we infer:

But there is his daughter

who was born to him not from his wife but

from a woman whom he had raped,

whom he did not marry, and for whom he is separately liable on account of his daughter,

and he does not teach it!

It necessarily follows that he does not count her because he includes her under the name “a woman and her daughter.” If so, the same applies to Shabbat and idolatry: he includes several liabilities under one name.

They said:

This is no proof. For even if we say that he counted the number of sin-offering liabilities, nevertheless it is properly the case that he did not count his daughter from a woman whom he had raped. For only prohibitions

that are written

explicitly in the Torah

does he teach

in the Mishna. But prohibitions

that are not written

explicitly in the Torah

he does not teach.

And his daughter from a woman whom he had raped is not written explicitly in the Torah; rather, we derive it by a gzera shava, “here, here; lewdness, lewdness,” as stated at the end of the first chapter of Hagiga (11a).

And we answer: Rather, from here you can infer precisely that he teaches the number of names of prohibitions and not the number of sin-offerings:

and

behold,

there is the daughter of his daughter [

from a woman whom he had raped]

and the daughter of his son [

of his wife]

which is written

explicitly in the Torah, in the passage of Aharei Mot (Leviticus 18:10, 17),

and he does not teach

them!

Rather,

this proves that he teaches “

the category of a woman and her daughter”

he teaches.

And if so,

here too he teaches “

the category of Shabbat”

and “

the category of idolatry”

he teaches.

is what he teaches.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised a difficulty from one of his statements [

from Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s words here]

against another of his statements [

against Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s words elsewhere]: Is it true that

Rav Bibi bar Abaye said this—that “

the category of Shabbat

” he teaches and “

the category of idolatry”

he teaches?

For it was stated: One who brings up the inner limbs [

limbs of an offering slaughtered in the Temple courtyard]

[the limbs of an offering slaughtered in the Temple courtyard]

outside

the courtyard

is liable

on account of bringing up outside. And likewise, one who brings up

outer limbs [

limbs of an offering slaughtered outside the courtyard]

outside—

is liable.

And Rav Bibi bar Abaye found this difficult:

Since there are two manners of liability for bringing up outside,

if so,

there is a difficulty with

that which we learned: Thirty-six instances of karet in the Torah.

For

there are thirty-seven,

for there is the one who brings up

inner limbs outside

and the one who brings up

outer limbs outside!?

And according to Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s words here, that he teaches the category of Shabbat and the category of idolatry, if so

what difficulty did he have

for Rav Bibi concerning bringing up?

Let him teach that “

the category of

bringing up”

he teaches!?

And we answer:

Are the bringing up outside

of Shabbat and idolatry comparable?

Shabbat and idolatry

have already

had them taught

their number of liabilities

in their places,

in their respective places. For he taught in tractate Shabbat the number of the primary categories of labor, and he taught in tractate Sanhedrin the number of forms of service for which one is liable regarding idolatry. Therefore, here,

concerning instances of karet, which he discusses

again, the tanna did not teach them in order to count them, but only to mention them in the count of the mitzvot for which one is liable to karet. Therefore

Rav Bibi answered that the tanna did not detail the number of sin-offering liabilities, but rather “

that the tanna did not specify the number of sin-offering liabilities, but rather

the category of Shabbat”

he teaches

and “

the category of idolatry”

he teaches.

But

concerning bringing up—

were they taught in their places in such a manner? [

Did we teach the number of liabilities for bringing up outside in their place, so that we could answer that here he included them under one “category of bringing up”? That is, since the tanna did not detail their liabilities elsewhere, the tanna should not have refrained from detailing them here.]

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:

One who transgresses, during one lapse of awareness, two different transgressions concerning which

two different instances of karet

are stated

and

which contain

only one negative commandment

alone—

what is the law?

Should we say that the instances of karet divide the liability, and there is a separate sin-offering for each karet, just as we said above concerning two negative commandments and one instance of karet, that the negative commandments divide the liabilities and he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each negative commandment?

He said to him:

Rabbi Zeira: To which two instances of karet did you refer? Did you refer to

one who slaughters

an offering outside the courtyard

and brings it up [

burns it] outside

you mean?

For two separate instances of karet were stated concerning them. Regarding slaughtering consecrated animals outside, it is written (Leviticus 17:1–2): “Any man who slaughters, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and he shall be cut off”; and there (verses 9–10), regarding bringing up outside, it is written: “That brings up a burnt-offering or a sacrifice, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and he shall be cut off.” And there is only one negative commandment concerning them, for regarding bringing up it is written (Deuteronomy 12:13), “Take heed for yourself lest you bring up your burnt-offerings in every place,” and everywhere that “take heed,” “lest,” or “do not” is stated, this is a negative commandment. But concerning slaughtering there is no explicit negative commandment in the Torah.

For that which is written in the passage of slaughtering outside (Leviticus 17:7), “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices,” is not a negative commandment against one who slaughters outside, but against one who slaughters an animal for Mercurius. As is stated in Zevaḥim (106a).

This is not considered two instances of karet and one negative commandment. For in any event,

these—

are two

separate

negative commandments,

and it is obvious that he is liable two. For according to everyone, they are two separate negative commandments and two separate instances of karet; they disagreed only concerning this in the Gemara, in tractate Zevaḥim (there), how we derive it:

If according to the one who derives it by a gzera shava: It is stated here

concerning one who slaughters outside

“bringing”: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

“and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and it is stated there

concerning bringing up

“bringing”: “And he shall not bring it.”

“and he shall not bring it.”

Just as there

concerning bringing up

he did not punish

with karet

unless he first warned,

for an explicit negative commandment is written concerning bringing up,

so here,

concerning slaughtering, we learn that

he did not punish unless he first warned

with a negative commandment.

If according to the one who derives it by juxtaposition: The verse says (Deuteronomy 12:14): “

“There you shall offer”

There you shall bring up [

that is, bringing up],

and there you shall perform [

that is, slaughtering]”—

it juxtaposes slaughtering with bringing up: just as concerning bringing up the verse did not punish

the act

unless he first warned

him,

so concerning slaughtering the verse did not punish

the act

unless he first warned

concerning the slaughtering.

According to everyone, this is as though a special negative commandment concerning slaughtering had been written explicitly. If so, this is not considered two instances of karet and one negative commandment, and this was not what Rabbi Yirmeya was uncertain about—whether he is liable one or two!

Perhaps you meant two death penalties and one negative commandment,

that there is uncertainty whether the two death penalties stated concerning it divide the liability for the one negative commandment into two sin-offerings!?

And what is it?

Is it

a medium and a necromancer,

both of which were stated under one negative commandment, as it is written (Leviticus 19:31), “Do not turn to the mediums or to the necromancers.” And if he performed them intentionally without warning, he is liable to karet for them, as it is written (ibid. 20:6), “And the soul that turns to the mediums and to the necromancers, I shall cut him off from among his people.” Therefore, when he performed them inadvertently, it is inadvertence concerning karet and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for them. And they also have two death penalties when performed intentionally, as it is stated (ibid. 20:27): “And a man or a woman in whom there is a medium or a necromancer shall surely be put to death.” And the word “or” comes to divide, so that the matter is considered two separate death liabilities. And this was Rabbi Yirmeya’s uncertainty: although they are not divided either with regard to karet or with regard to the negative commandment, perhaps since they are divided with regard to the death penalties, the division in death also divides them, so that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings.

He said to him: Yes!

He said to him: This

we have found in this matter

a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish,

who disagreed concerning the explanation of the opinion of the tan­nah of our Mishna, who did not count yidoni among the number of those liable to excision; and from the words of both of them it is clear that one who transgresses with ov and yidoni in one lapse of awareness is liable for only one sin-offering.

For we learned concerning those liable to stoning (Sanhedrin 65a):

Sanhedrin 65

“One who possesses an ov and a yidoni,”

for besides the prohibition and excision, one is also liable to stoning for them, as explained above.

And it is difficult for us: What is different concerning those liable to stoning

that

he taught

among them also

a yidoni, and

if

concerning those liable to excision he did not teach a yidoni

but only one who possesses an ov? Yet there is also excision for a yidoni!

And in resolving this difficulty,

Rabbi Yohanan said: Since both of them were stated in one prohibition,

and therefore there is no division of sin-offerings between them. And it has already been explained at the beginning of the sugya (2b) that the tanna counted those liable to excision because of the number of sin-offerings that apply to them: for this is why he mentioned the number of thirty-six liable to excision, to teach that if one performed them in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to a sin-offering for each and every one. Therefore, whenever there is no division with regard to sin-offerings, he did not count them separately.

And it is clear from Rabbi Yohanan’s words that one who transgresses with an ov alone or with a yidoni alone is liable for a sin-offering; rather, the tanna did not count both of them because there is no division of sin-offerings between them when he performs both of them in one lapse of awareness.

And accordingly we ask: Since there is liability for a sin-offering both for an ov and for a yidoni, why did the tanna count specifically one who possesses an ov, and not a yidoni, so that he should say the opposite

—and let him say “a yidoni,” and not say “one who possesses an ov”!?

And we answered:

He holds: Since Scripture began with one who possesses an ov,

as it is written: “And the person who turns to the ovot and to the yidonim,” therefore he counted one who possesses an ov, who is mentioned first in the verse.

And Reish Lakish said:

The reason that the tanna of our Mishna did not mention a yidoni is

that it has no act

and therefore there is no liability for a sin-offering at all for it, even if he performed it by itself, for anything that has no act carries no liability for a sin-offering. But possessing an ov involves an act.

[A yidoni means that one inserts into his mouth the bone of an animal whose name is “yadua” and speaks, and this is not considered an act, because when he inserts the bone into his mouth nothing occurs, and after he inserts the bone it speaks on its own. This is unlike an ov, in which he knocks with his arms and speaks from his armpits, and therefore it is considered an act—so Rashi explained in Sanhedrin. It follows that with an ov he must knock with his arms while he speaks, and only for this reason is it considered an act.]

And it follows that although Rabbi Yirmeya was uncertain concerning an ov and a yidoni, the uncertainty is resolved from the words of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. According to Reish Lakish, there is no liability for a sin-offering at all for a yidoni, because it has no act. And according to Rabbi Yohanan, one is liable for a yidoni if he performed it by itself; nevertheless, if he transgressed with an ov and a yidoni in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one, for different forms of execution do not divide [the sin-offerings].

And we inquire into it:

And Reish Lakish, what is the reason that he did not say in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan?

Rav Pappa said: For they are divided with regard to executions!

And Reish Lakish holds that logically it would have been proper to say that different executions divide with regard to sin-offerings. And if one were liable for a sin-offering for a yidoni, he would be liable for it separately, despite the fact that it was stated in the same prohibition as one who possesses an ov. Therefore he was compelled to say that there is no liability for a sin-offering for it at all. [Accordingly, in practice no case is found in which different executions divide with regard to sin-offerings. For there are no two executions in the Torah for which it would be appropriate to impose a sin-offering for both, and concerning which one is warned in a single prohibition.]

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that one is liable for a sin-offering for a yidoni, but is not liable for it separately when he performed it together with one who possesses an ov, in one lapse of awareness,

would say to you: Division of prohibitions is division,

as we said above (on 3a): Wherever you find two prohibitions and one excision, there is division of sin-offerings between them.

But

division by execution is not division.

And Rabbi Yohanan, what is the reason that he did not say in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who exempts completely from a sin-offering for a yidoni because it has no act?

He holds: Who is the

who is the

tanna

who taught here the Mishna of

Keretot—

it is Rabbi Akiva, who said (below, 4a):

(below, 4):

we do not require an act

in order to impose liability for a sin-offering, for the tanna of the Mishna imposes liability for a sin-offering for one who blasphemes, even though it has no act.

And Reish Lakish

exempts for a yidoni even according to Rabbi Akiva, because

although Rabbi Akiva does not require a

great

act, as he imposes liability for one who blasphemes, nevertheless

he does require a “minor”

[act],

and

in a yidoni there is not even a “minor act.”

And it follows, according to Rabbi Yohanan, that Rabbi Akiva imposes liability for a sin-offering even for a transgression that has no act at all. Only the Sages, who exempt in the case of one who blasphemes, require an act. And Reish Lakish holds that even according to Rabbi Akiva an act is required, except that according to Rabbi Akiva a minor act is sufficient, while according to the Sages a great act is required.

And we ask according to Reish Lakish, who said that according to everyone at least a minor act is required:

One who possesses an ov

for whom Rabbi Akiva imposes liability for a sin-offering in our Mishna—

what act

minor

is there in it?

And we explain:

The knocking of his arms,

by which he raises the dead person through sorcery beneath his armpit by means of knocking his arms, and the dead person speaks—

this is an act.

And furthermore we ask:

One who blasphemes—

what act is there in it?

And we explain:

The movement of his lips is an act.

But in a yidoni there is not even movement of the lips; rather, the bone speaks on its own.

And according to this answer,

it might have entered your mind that the knocking of his arms, according to Reish Lakish, is a

great act

even according to the Sages.

For the Sages disagree and exempt in the case of one who blasphemes because there is no act in it, but they do not disagree in the case of one who possesses an ov; and it is proven from this that the knocking of his arms is considered a great act, which imposes liability even according to the Sages.

He raised an objection

from what was taught in a beraita:

With regard to idolatry, one is never liable

for a sacrifice

except for something that has an act,

such as one who slaughtered, burned incense, poured a libation, or bowed down.

And it is difficult for us

in the words of the beraita, which said that one is liable only for something that has an act:

Bowing down has no act,

so why does the beraita impose liability?

And Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this?—

It is Rabbi Akiva, who said: We do not require a great act,

but a minor act is required. And what the tanna said—that one is liable only for something that has an act—means a minor act. And bowing down is considered a minor act, and therefore he is liable.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if you say

that the beraita is according to the words of

the Sages,

nevertheless he is liable for bowing down, because

the bending of his stature is an act.

And now we infer from the fact that Reish Lakish establishes it specifically according to Rabbi Akiva:

By implication, Reish Lakish holds

that

according to the Sages, the bending of his stature is not an act.

And if so, it is difficult:

now,

according

to Reish Lakish, the bending of his stature according to the Sages is not an act,

so how is it possible to say that according to the Sages

the knocking of his arms is an act?!

And we conclude:

Rather, when Reish Lakish said

that

the knocking of his arms is an act according to Rabbi Akiva,

he said it

, but according to the Sages it is not an act.

And we wonder:

If so, why did he teach

in our Mishna, in the words of the Sages,

“one who blasphemes, who has no act, is excluded”—

let him teach

“one who blasphemes and one who possesses an ov are excluded,”

for the bending of his stature is no less an act than the knocking of his arms. And if the Sages, who exempt in the case of one who blasphemes, also exempt in the case of bowing down, all the more so they exempt in the case of one who possesses an ov!?

And we answer: In truth, the Sages disagree and exempt also in the case of one who possesses an ov, and the reason they mentioned the exemption in the case of one who blasphemes is—

he teaches one of two.

And we wonder:

And let him teach

“one who is excluded,

one who possesses an ov, and let him not teach

“one who is excluded,

one who blasphemes”!

And we answer:

It was necessary for him to teach about one who blasphemes

in order to inform us that he is exempt. For

it might have entered your mind: Since it is written

the liability of

his excision in the place [within]

[within the section of]

the section of the sin-offering

[at the end of the section of Shallah is written the section of the sin-offering brought for unwitting idolatry. And at the end of that section the liability of excision for one who blasphemes is written, as it is stated (there, verse 30): “It is the Lord whom he blasphemes, and that person shall be cut off.”] And since the excision of one who blasphemes was written within a section concerning liability for a sin-offering,

say that they agree with him

the Sages

with Rabbi Akiva,

that he should be liable for a sacrifice in the case of one who blasphemes even though it has no act—

it teaches us that this is not so!

Ulla said: The one who possesses an ov that he teaches

in the Mishna refers to one who is

burning incense to a demon [to the prince of demons], and this is certainly a complete act, and he is liable even according to the Sages. Therefore they did not say in the Mishna that the Sages exempt also in the case of one who possesses an ov.

[the chief of the demons], and this is certainly a complete action, making him liable even according to the Sages. Therefore, the Mishna did not say that the Sages exempt one even in the case of a medium.

Rava challenged this: If so,

if it is dealing with one who burns incense—

this is one who worships idolatry!

And why does the tanna count one who worships idolatry and one who possesses an ov as two separate liabilities?

Rather, Rava said:

The Mishna is dealing with one who

burns incense to a demon in order to join it to him,

so that it will join him and assist him in the sorcery that he performs; he does not intend to accept it upon himself as a deity and worship it, and therefore this is not idolatry.

Abaye said to him: If so, this is

“one who joins companions,”

, who has neither excision nor execution, but merely a prohibition. For it is written (Deuteronomy 18:10–11): “There shall not be found among you … one who joins companions.” And why is he counted in our Mishna?!

He said to him: The Torah said that

that

“one who joins companions” is one such as this,

who burns incense to the prince of the demons; he is

liable to stoning,

when he did it intentionally and after a warning; and if he did it intentionally without a warning, he is liable to excision.

But then,

“one who joins companions”

which is merely a prohibition—

which one

is it?

What is it?

He said to him, as it was taught in a beraita: “And one who joins companions”—

both a great companion,

who joins large animals through sorcery,

and a small companion,

who joins small animals through an incantation and sorcery,

and even one who joins snakes and scorpions,

which are not significant,

is liable

for lashes. [So Rashi explained here: the novelty concerning snakes and scorpions is that even though they are not significant, he is liable. And in Sanhedrin (65a) Rashi explained that the novelty is that even if he joins and gathers them in order that they should not cause harm—such as when by joining them he incites them against one another, or brings them out to an uninhabited place—it is also prohibited.]

Abaye said: One who wishes to bring together [to join together]

[to join together]

a bee [bee]

[a bee]

and a scorpion—

it is prohibited

because of “one who joins companions.”

And if they come after him [run after him],

[running after him],

it is permitted,

because of preservation of life.

[Rashi explains this in Sanhedrin 65a, s.v. “It is prohibited.” And Tosafot here asked: If this is referring to preservation of life, it is obvious, for there is nothing that stands before preservation of life.]

And now we inquire into Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

According to Rabbi Yohanan, who said that the bending of his stature is an act according to the Sages

that imposes liability because of idolatry,