Keritot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

the inadvertent violation of idol worship for which one is liable to bring an offering can be found

in the case of

one who says: “It is permitted,”

who is mistaken regarding the prohibition itself, as he believes that it is permitted to worship idols

. This is inadvertent idol worship as well as inadvertent violation of the forms of worship, since he knows neither the fundamental prohibition of idol worship nor the prohibition against the various forms of worship. In the language of the Gemara, this is called “both matters were forgotten from him.”

And although in tractate Shabbat (70a) Rava was uncertain what the law is when both matters were forgotten from him, this does not contradict our explanation here.

For Rava asked Rav Naḥman only

in a case in which he had both inadvertent violation of Shabbat and inadvertent violation of the categories of labor,

whether one

sin-offering

is required, or whether two

sin-offerings

are required.

But

he did not ask him

whether he is entirely exempt—

he did not ask him that,

as it is obvious that he is liable to bring at least one sin-offering.

According to this version, it is difficult: Why did Rava not resolve his uncertainty from the Mishna? The Mishna lists idol worship as only one liability, and if it is referring to a case in which both matters were forgotten, it follows that when both matters were forgotten one is liable to bring only one offering. The Shita Mekubetzet, in the omissions, letter alef, cites a version in which the Gemara explicitly raises this question. Rav Pappa’s explanation below is the answer to this difficulty; see below for an explanation of the answer.

Rav Pappa said: The Mishna can be found

to be referring to inadvertent idol worship and intentional violation of the forms of worship [and therefore he is liable to bring only one offering]

in the case of a child captured among gentiles,

who subsequently learned that it is prohibited to worship idols. His error, however, was that he saw the local inhabitants worshipping a particular idol of theirs and believed that it was not an idol, and therefore worshipped it. It follows

that he knew it was prohibited

to worship

idols

through each of the four forms of worship—slaughtering, burning incense, pouring a libation, and bowing ,

but

his only inadvertence was that

these idols,

which the inhabitants of the place where he was captured worshipped,

he did not know were prohibited.

This is how the Sefer Birkat Ha-Zevah and Likkutei Halakhot explained Rashi’s position. And the Birkat Ha-Zevah added that Rav Pappa needed to say that he knew the fundamental prohibition of idolatry so that he would not be considered one who says, “It is permitted,” because Rav Pappa holds that one who says, “It is permitted,” is considered coerced and is entirely exempt. And he disagrees with Rava, cited above, for whom it was obvious that one who says, “It is permitted,” is considered inadvertent and liable; he was uncertain only concerning how many offerings he is liable to bring.

The Shita Mekubetzet, in the novellae, letter alef, explained that Rav Pappa’s words are the answer to the question of whether Rava’s uncertainty concerning a case in which both matters were forgotten can be resolved from here. According to Rav Pappa’s explanation, this is not a case in which both matters were forgotten, but rather inadvertent idol worship—he believes that this is not an idol—and intentional violation of the forms of worship—he knows that anything considered an idol may not be worshipped through these four forms.

And if you wish, say:

Even if you say that the Mishna is not dealing with a child captured among gentiles, but rather

with

a

mature

person,

and it is a case in which he erred concerning this verse

(Exodus 20:20), “

You shall not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold.”

And in his error

he thought that bowing is prohibited

only to an idol made of silver and gold,

and that alone is prohibited,

but

an

idol of other types is permitted,

and he worshipped an idol made of other types—

that is inadvertent idol worship,

as he believed that there is no prohibition against worshipping idols made of other types,

while it is intentional violation of the forms of worship,

since he knows that wherever idol worship is prohibited, these four forms of worship are prohibited.

We return to the earlier difficulty: Why did the tanna not list the liabilities for Shabbat as thirty-nine?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said in the name of Rav Bibi, son of Abaye:

In truth, the case may even involve intentional violation of Shabbat and inadvertent violation of the categories of labor, for which one is liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. Similarly, concerning idol worship, the case involves intentional idol worship and inadvertent violation of the forms of worship, for which one is liable to bring four offerings. And concerning the objection that there would then be more than thirty-six offerings, we answer:

The tanna

“

the category of Shabbat”

and “the category of idol worship”

alone

does he teach,

even though each one includes several liabilities. This is because the tanna wishes to enumerate only the number of mitzvot for which one is liable to receive karet, and not the number of sin-offerings.

So explained Rashi. However, it apparently follows that he did not even wish to enumerate all the mitzvot for which one is liable to receive karet, as we say below: He did not mention his daughter or the daughter of his daughter born from a woman whom he raped, because he included her under the category of “his wife’s daughter,” even though she is prohibited by a separate prohibition of its own. Rather, the tanna enumerated categories of prohibitions for which one is liable to receive karet, including several similar prohibitions under one category, even though they are distinct prohibitions.

From where

is it evident that this is the tanna’s intention?

From the fact that he teaches: “One who has intercourse with a woman and her daughter”

[one who properly betrothed a woman and had intercourse with her daughter, for which he is liable on account of his wife’s daughter],

“and with a married woman”!

And we infer:

But there is also his daughter

who was born to him not from his wife, but

from a woman whom he raped,

whom he did not betroth as a wife, and for whom he is independently liable on account of his daughter,

and he does not teach it!

It must be, then, that he does not enumerate her because he includes her under the category of “a woman and her daughter.” If so, the same applies to Shabbat and idol worship: several liabilities are included under one category.

They said:

This is no proof. For even if we say that he enumerated the number of sin-offering liabilities, it is nevertheless properly the case that he did not mention his daughter born from a woman whom he raped, because only the prohibitions

that are written

explicitly in the Torah

does he teach

in the Mishna. But prohibitions

that are not written

explicitly in the Torah

he does not teach.

His daughter born from a woman whom he raped is not written explicitly in the Torah; rather, it is derived through the gezerah shavah “here” and “here,” “lewdness” and “lewdness,” as stated at the end of the first chapter of Hagiga (11a).

And we answer: Rather, from here you can infer that he teaches the number of categories of prohibitions and not the number of sin-offerings:

and

there is

the daughter of his daughter

[born from a woman whom he raped]

and the daughter of his son

[of his wife]

that are written

explicitly in the Torah, in the passage of forbidden relationships (Leviticus 18:10, 17),

and he does not teach

them!

Rather,

this proves that

the category of “a woman and her daughter”

is what he teaches.

And if so,

here too,

“

the category of Shabbat”

and “

the category of idol worship”

is what he teaches.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raised an objection from his own statement

[from the words of Rav Bibi, son of Abaye, here]

against his own statement

[against the words of Rav Bibi, son of Abaye elsewhere]: Is it true that

Rav Bibi, son of Abaye, said this—that “

the category of Shabbat”

is taught and

“

the category of idol worship”

is taught?

But it was stated: “One who brings up the inner sacrificial parts

[the parts of an offering slaughtered in the Temple courtyard]

outside

the courtyard

is liable

for bringing an offering up outside. And similarly, one who brings up

the outer sacrificial parts

[the parts of an offering slaughtered outside the courtyard]

outside

is liable.”

And this was difficult for Rav Bibi, son of Abaye:

Since there are two forms of liability for bringing an offering up outside,

if so,

it is difficult that

we learned: “Thirty-six cases involving karet in the Torah.”

For there are

thirty-seven,

as there is one who brings up

the inner sacrificial parts outside

and one who brings up

the outer sacrificial parts outside!?

And according to Rav Bibi, son of Abaye, here, who says that “the category of Shabbat” and “the category of idol worship” is taught,

what difficulty did he have

concerning bringing an offering up outside?

Let him teach that “

the category of

bringing an offering up”

is taught!”

And we answer:

Are bringing an offering up outside

comparable to Shabbat and idol worship?

Shabbat and idol worship

have already

had their numbers taught

—the number of their liabilities—

in their respective places,

in their proper contexts. In tractate Shabbat, the tanna taught the number of categories of labor, and in tractate Sanhedrin, he taught the number of forms of worship for which one is liable in the case of idol worship. Therefore, here,

with regard to the cases involving karet, where they are discussed

again, the tanna did not teach them in order to enumerate them, but only to mention them in the count of mitzvot for which one is liable to receive karet. Consequently,

Rav Bibi answered

that the tanna did not specify the number of sin-offering liabilities, but rather

“

the category of Shabbat”

is taught

and “

the category of idol worship”

is taught.

But with regard to bringing an offering up outside—

was its number taught in its proper place in a manner that differs like this?

[Did we teach the number of the liabilities for bringing an offering up outside in its proper context, so that we could answer that here the tanna included them under one “category of bringing an offering up”? That is, since the tanna did not specify the number of their liabilities elsewhere, he should not have refrained from specifying them here.]

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:

If one violates, during one lapse of awareness, two different prohibitions concerning which

two instances of karet

are stated, and

they have

only

one prohibition

in common,

what is

the halakha? Should we say that the instances of karet divide the liabilities, so that there is a separate sin-offering for each instance of karet, just as we said above concerning two prohibitions and one instance of karet, that the prohibitions divide them and one is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each prohibition?

He said to him:

Rabbi Zeira said: Did you mean these two instances of karet:

one who slaughters

an offering outside the courtyard

and brings it up

[offers it] outside,

is that what you are saying? Concerning these, two distinct instances of karet are stated. Regarding slaughtering sacrificial animals outside, it is written (Leviticus 17:1–2): “Any man who slaughters … and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and it shall be cut off,” and there (verses 9–10), regarding bringing an offering up outside, it is written: “Whoever brings up a burnt-offering or sacrifice and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, shall be cut off.” And they have only one prohibition, since concerning bringing an offering up it is written (Deuteronomy 12:13): “Beware for yourself lest you bring up your burnt-offerings in every place”; and wherever the Torah says “beware,” “lest,” or “do not,” this is a prohibition. But concerning slaughtering, there is no explicit prohibition in the Torah.

Two separate liabilities involving karet are stated concerning them. Regarding slaughtering consecrated animals outside, it is written: “Any man who slaughters ... and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting ... shall be cut off,” and regarding offering outside it is written: “Whoever offers an elevation-offering or a sacrifice and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting ... shall be cut off.” Yet they have only one prohibition, since regarding offering outside it is written: “Beware lest you offer your elevation-offerings in any place,” and wherever the Torah says “beware,” “lest,” or “do not,” it is a prohibition. But concerning slaughtering outside, there is no explicit prohibition in the Torah.

For what is written in the passage concerning slaughtering outside (Leviticus 17:7), “They shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices,” is not a prohibition against slaughtering outside, but rather against slaughtering an animal for Mercury. As stated in Zevahim (106a).

This is not considered two instances of karet and one prohibition. For in any event,

these—

two prohibitions

are distinct

ones,

and it is obvious that he is liable to bring two offerings for them. For according to everyone, they are two separate prohibitions and two separate instances of karet; the dispute in the Gemara in tractate Zevahim (there) concerns only how this is derived:

According to the one who derives it by means of a gezerah shavah: It says here,

with regard to slaughtering outside,

“bringing”

“and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and it says elsewhere,

with regard to bringing an offering up,

“bringing”

“and he shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.”

Just as there,

with regard to bringing an offering up,

the Torah did not punish

with karet

unless it warned,

as an explicit prohibition is written concerning bringing an offering up,

so too here,

with regard to slaughtering, we learn that the Torah

did not punish unless it warned

with a prohibition.

According to the one who derives it through a juxtaposition: The verse says

(Deuteronomy 12:14), “

There you shall bring up

[that is, bringing an offering up],

and there you shall perform

[that is, slaughtering].”

This juxtaposes slaughtering to bringing an offering up: Just as concerning bringing an offering up the Torah did not punish

the person

unless it warned

him,

so too concerning slaughtering the Torah did not punish

the person

unless it warned

concerning slaughtering.

According to everyone, then, it is as though a special prohibition concerning slaughtering had been written explicitly. If so, this is not considered two instances of karet and one prohibition, and this was not what Rabbi Yirmeya was asking about when he was uncertain whether he is liable to bring one offering or two!

Perhaps you meant two death penalties and one prohibition,

where the question is whether the two death penalties stated concerning it divide the liability for the one prohibition into two sin-offerings!?

And what is that?

Is it

a medium and a yideoni,

both of which are included in one prohibition, as it is written (Leviticus 19:31): “Do not turn to the mediums or to the yideonim.” If he performs them intentionally without having been forewarned, he is liable to receive karet for them, as it is written (ibid. 20:6): “And the soul that turns to the mediums and to the yideonim, I shall cut off that soul from among its people.” Consequently, if he performs them inadvertently, it is inadvertent violation of a prohibition whose punishment is karet, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for them. There are also two death penalties for them when performed intentionally, as it is stated (ibid. 20:27): “And a man or a woman in whom there is a medium or a yideoni—they shall surely be put to death.” The word “or” comes to divide them, so that the matter is considered two distinct death liabilities. This was Rabbi Yirmeya’s uncertainty: Although they are not divided with regard to either karet or the prohibition, perhaps since they are divided with regard to death, the division with regard to death also divides them so that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings.

He said to him: Yes!

He said to him: Here,

we have found

a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish,

who disagreed in explaining the view of the tanna of our Mishna, who did not include yideoni among the count of those liable to karet. It is evident from the words of both of them that one who transgresses the prohibitions of ov and yideoni in a single lapse of awareness is liable to only one sin-offering.

As we learned with regard to those liable to stoning (

Sanhedrin 65a):

“One who performs the practice of an ov or a yideoni,”

who, in addition to violating a prohibition and being liable to karet, are also liable to stoning, as explained above.

And we found it difficult: What is different with regard to those liable to stoning

that

it taught

also

a yideoni, and

whereas

with regard to those liable to karet it did not teach a yideoni,

but only one who performs the practice of an ov? After all, there is also liability to karet for a yideoni.

In resolving this difficulty,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Since both of them were stated in a single prohibition,

therefore, there is no differentiation between them with regard to sin-offerings. As was already explained at the beginning of the discussion (2b), the tanna counted the prohibitions carrying karet because of the number of sin-offerings associated with them. He mentioned the number of thirty-six prohibitions carrying karet in order to teach that if one performed all of them during a single lapse of awareness, he is liable to a sin-offering for each one. Therefore, whenever there is no differentiation between them with regard to sin-offerings, he did not count them separately.

It is evident from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words that one who transgresses only the prohibition of ov, or only that of yideoni, is liable to a sin-offering. However, the tanna did not count both of them because there is no differentiation between their sin-offerings when one performs both during a single lapse of awareness.

Accordingly, we raise the following difficulty: Since there is liability to a sin-offering both for ov and for yideoni, why did the tanna specifically count one who performs the practice of an ov and not a yideoni? He could have stated the opposite—

“and let us say: a yideoni, and let us not say one who performs the practice of an ov”!?

We answered:

He holds: Since the verse begins with an ov,

as it is written: “And the person who turns to the ovot and to the yideonim,” he counted the ov, which is mentioned first in the verse.

And Reish Lakish said:

The reason that the tanna of our Mishna did not mention yideoni is

that there is no action involved in it,

and therefore there is no liability to a sin-offering for it at all, even when one performs it by itself, since whenever an offense involves no action, there is no liability to a sin-offering. In contrast, the practice of an ov involves an action.

A yideoni is one who places in his mouth the bone of an animal called a “yadu’a” and speaks, and this is not considered an action, because when he places the bone in his mouth nothing happens; after he places the bone there, it speaks on its own. This is unlike an ov, who strikes his arms and speaks from his armpits, and therefore it is considered an action. This is how Rashi explained the matter in Sanhedrin. It follows that in the case of an ov one must strike his arms while speaking, and it is considered an action only for that reason.

It follows that although Rabbi Yirmeya was uncertain about ov and yideoni, the uncertainty is resolved by the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. According to Reish Lakish, there is no liability to a sin-offering at all for a yideoni, because it involves no action. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, one is liable for a yideoni when one performs it by itself; nevertheless, if one transgresses both ov and yideoni during a single lapse of awareness, one is liable to only one sin-offering, since different modes of execution do not create a differentiation.

We analyze this matter:

And according to Reish Lakish, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan?

Rav Pappa said: For these are differentiated by their modes of execution!

Reish Lakish holds that logically it would be appropriate to say that different modes of execution create a differentiation with regard to sin-offerings. Had one been liable to a sin-offering for a yideoni, one would have been liable for it separately, despite the fact that it was stated in the same prohibition as the ov. Therefore, he was compelled to say that there is no liability to a sin-offering for it at all. Accordingly, in practice, there is no case in which different modes of execution create a differentiation with regard to sin-offerings. For there are no two modes of execution in the Torah for which it would be appropriate to impose liability to a sin-offering for both, while both are prohibited by a single prohibition.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who holds that one is liable to a sin-offering for a yideoni, but is not liable for it separately when one performs it together with an ov during a single lapse of awareness,

would say to you: Differentiation by prohibition does create a differentiation,

as we said above (on the first side): Wherever you find two prohibitions and one karet liability, there is a differentiation between them with regard to sin-offerings.

But

differentiation by mode of execution does not create a differentiation.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who exempts one entirely from a sin-offering for yideoni, because it involves no action?

He holds: Who is the

who is the

tanna

who taught here the Mishna of

Keritot—

it is Rabbi Akiva, who says (

below, 4a):

We do not require an action

in order to impose liability to a sin-offering, as the tanna of the Mishna imposes liability to a sin-offering for blasphemy, even though it involves no action.

And Reish Lakish

exempts one for yideoni even according to Rabbi Akiva, because

although Rabbi Akiva does not require a

substantial

action, as is evident from the fact that he imposes liability for blasphemy, he does require

a “minor”

action,

and

there is not even a “minor” action in the case of a yideoni.

It follows that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Rabbi Akiva imposes liability to a sin-offering even for an offense involving no action at all. It is only the Sages, who exempt one for blasphemy, who require an action. Reish Lakish holds that even according to Rabbi Akiva an action is required; however, according to Rabbi Akiva a minor action suffices, whereas according to the Sages a substantial action is required.

And according to Reish Lakish, who said that everyone requires at least a minor action, we ask:

The one who performs the practice of an ov,

for which Rabbi Akiva imposes liability to a sin-offering in our Mishna—

what action

of the minor kind

is there in it?

And we explain:

The striking of his arms,

by which he raises the dead person through sorcery beneath his armpits by striking his arms, and the dead person speaks—

that is an action.

We ask further:

Blasphemy—

what action is there in it?

And we explain:

The movement of his lips is an action.

But in the case of a yideoni there is not even movement of the lips; rather, the bone speaks on its own.

According to this answer,

it might have entered your mind that, according to Reish Lakish, the striking of his arms is a

substantial action

even according to the Sages.

For the Sages disagree and exempt one for blasphemy because it involves no action, but they do not disagree in the case of an ov. This proves that striking one’s arms is considered a substantial action, which imposes liability even according to the Sages.

Meytivi

from that which was taught in a

beraita:

With regard to idolatry, one is never liable to a

sacrifice except for an act that involves an action,

such as slaughtering an offering, burning incense, pouring a libation, or bowing.

And we found a difficulty

in the words of the beraita, which said that one is liable only for an act involving an action:

Bowing does not involve an action,

so why does the beraita impose liability?

And Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this?

It is Rabbi Akiva’s, who says that we do not require a substantial action,

but a minor action is required. When the tanna said that one is liable only for an act involving an action, he meant a minor action. Bowing is considered a minor action, and therefore one is liable.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say

that the beraita is in accordance with the opinion of

the Sages;

nevertheless, one is liable for bowing, because

bending one’s body is an action.

Now we infer from the fact that Reish Lakish interprets the beraita specifically according to Rabbi Akiva:

By inference, Reish Lakish holds

that

according to the Sages, bending one’s body is not an action.

If so, this presents a difficulty:

Now,

according to

Reish Lakish, bending one’s body is not an action according to the Sages,

so how can it be said that according to the Sages

striking one’s arms is an action?!

And we conclude:

Rather, when Reish Lakish said

that

striking one’s arms is an action, he said this according to Rabbi Akiva;

he meant it

, but according to the Sages it is not an action.

And we raise an objection:

If so, why did it teach

in the Mishna, in the statement of the Sages,

“Blasphemy is excluded, since it involves no action,”—

let it teach:

“Blasphemy and the practice of an ov are excluded,”

for bending one’s body is no less an action than striking one’s arms. If the Sages, who exempt one for blasphemy, also exempt one for bowing, all the more so they should exempt one for the practice of an ov!?

We answer: In truth, the Sages disagree and exempt one in the case of an ov as well. And the Mishna mentioned the exemption for blasphemy

as one of two examples.

And we ask:

Let it teach

“Blasphemy is excluded,”

and let it not teach

“Blasphemy is excluded,”

but rather the practice of an ov is excluded!?

We answer:

It was necessary for it to teach about blasphemy

in order to inform us that one is exempt. For

it might have entered your mind to say: Since it is written

that its

karet liability is in the midst of

[within the section of]

the section concerning the sacrifice

within the section concerning the sin-offering—at the end of the section of Beha’alotekha there is the section concerning a sin-offering brought for unintentional idolatry, and at the end of that section the karet liability for a blasphemer is written, as it is stated: “It is the Lord whom he blasphemes, and that person shall be cut off”—and since the karet liability for blasphemy was written within the section concerning liability to a sin-offering,

say that the Sages concede

to

Rabbi Akiva

that one is liable to bring a sacrifice for blasphemy even though it involves no action.

It therefore teaches us that this is not so!

Ulla said: The practice of an ov that it taught

in the Mishna refers to one who is

burning incense to a demon

[the prince of the demons], and this is certainly a complete action, for which one is liable even according to the Sages. Therefore, the Mishna did not say that the Sages exempt one in the case of an ov as well.

Rava raised an objection to this: If so,

if the case is one who burns incense—

that is idolatry!

Why does the tanna count one who worships idolatry and one who performs the practice of an ov as two separate liabilities?

Rather, Rava said:

The Mishna is discussing one who is

burning incense to a demon in order to join it to him,

so that it will join him and assist him in the sorcery he is performing. He does not intend to accept it as a deity and worship it, and therefore this is not idolatry.

Abaye said to him: If so, that is “

one who joins charms,”

which carries neither karet nor a mode of execution, but merely a prohibition, as it is written (Deuteronomy 18:10–11): “There shall not be found among you … one who joins charms.” Why, then, is it counted in our Mishna?!

He said to him: The Torah said

that

“one who joins charms,” such as this one

who burns incense to the prince of the demons, is

liable to stoning

when he performs the act intentionally in the presence of witnesses who warned him; and if he performs it intentionally without such a warning, he is liable to karet.

Rather, “

one who joins charms”

as a prohibition—

which one

is it?

What is it?

He said to him, as it was taught in a beraita: “One who joins charms”—

whether one who joins large

animals by means of sorcery,

or one who joins small

animals by means of incantation and sorcery,

and even one who joins snakes and scorpions,

which are insignificant,

is liable

to lashes. This is how Rashi explained it here: the novelty concerning snakes and scorpions is that this prohibition applies even though they are insignificant. In Sanhedrin 65a, Rashi explained that the novelty is that it is prohibited even when one joins and gathers them in order to prevent them from causing harm—for example, by joining them so that they provoke one another, or by bringing them to an uninhabited place.

Abaye said: One who wishes to bring together

[to join together]

a bee

[a bee]

and a scorpion—

it is prohibited

because of the prohibition against joining charms.

But if they are pursuing him

[running after him],

it is permitted,

because of preservation of life.

This is also explained by Rashi in Sanhedrin 65a, s.v. “It is prohibited.” Tosafot here raised the difficulty that if the case involves preservation of life, this is obvious, since nothing takes precedence over preservation of life.

Now we analyze Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that bending one’s body is an action according to the Sages

that imposes liability because of idolatry,