Keritot 4a — the Talmud in English

If so,

the bending ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

of his lips, too, according to the Rabbis, should be considered an act in the case of one who blasphemes!?

And why did the Rabbis say that a blasphemer is excluded because he does not perform an act?

Rava said: The case of a blasphemer is different, since it exists in the heart.

For the essence of the transgression is what he thinks—the blasphemy—in his heart, while through speech he merely gives voice to the matter that he thinks in his heart; therefore the speech is not considered an act. This is not so with bowing to idolatry, where the very act of bowing is the prohibition, and therefore it is considered an act. [So explained the gloss on Rashi. See additional explanations in Rashi and in the Shita Mekubetzet on the previous page, note 38]

But in general, the bending of one’s lips is considered an act.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection:

We learned in the Sifra, from the fact that “and he performs” is written concerning liability for a sin-offering:

This excludes conspiring witnesses,

who are not liable for a sin-offering, because

there is no

act

in the case of a conspiring witness.

And why

is the testimony of conspiring witnesses not considered an act?

But “

by the word of

two witnesses a matter shall be established”

is written concerning them,

and if so, the bending of their lips should be considered an act!?

We answered:

Rava said: The case of conspiring witnesses is different, since it exists in seeing,

for the essence of testimony is seeing the act and placing the “evidence” before the court through the speech of the witnesses. The sin of conspiring witnesses is placing false “evidence” before the court concerning an act that they did not see, through the speech of the false “testimony.” It follows that the punishment of conspiring witnesses is for the “seeing of the eye” [which did not actually exist!] of the conspiring witnesses, and not for the delivery of the testimony. For, as stated, the delivery is merely the expression of their false “seeing”: they testify before the court that they “saw.” Therefore, the delivery of the testimony by conspiring witnesses is not considered an act that creates liability for a sacrifice .

We learned in the Mishna:

One who eats forbidden fat:

The Sages taught:

It is written (Leviticus 7:23), “

You shall not eat any forbidden fat of ox, sheep, or goat”—

the verse specified each species separately in order

to make liable

one who eats three pieces of forbidden fat, one piece from each species, for lashes

for each and every one!

If he ate forbidden fat from these three species, he is liable for three sets of lashes, even if they administered only one warning to him,

the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

And the Rabbis say: He is liable only for

lashes

one. Let us say that they disagree over this:

Rabbi Ishmael holds that one receives lashes for a general prohibition,

and for one prohibition that includes several details, he receives lashes for each and every one, because they are considered separate prohibitions.

And the Rabbis hold that one does not receive lashes

separate sets of lashes

for a general prohibition,

but only one set of lashes, because all the details included in that prohibition are considered one prohibition .

We reject this:

Rabbi Ishmael always holds that one does not receive lashes for a general prohibition. And here it is different, because the verses are superfluous for him

to include that he receives lashes for each one separately.

And we explain how there is a superfluous verse.

For one may ask:

Let the verse write, “

You shall not eat any forbidden fat”—“

of ox, sheep, and goat,”

which the Merciful One wrote

why do I need it?

Rather,

infer from it

that the verse came

to divide,

to make one liable for lashes for eating the forbidden fat of each of the three separately.

And the Rabbis

say: There is no superfluity here. For

if

it were written only, “You shall not eat any forbidden fat,” and

it were not written “forbidden fat

of

ox, sheep, and goat,”

I would say

that

even the forbidden fat of a wild animal is included,

and there would be a prohibition also against the forbidden fat of a wild animal.

For this reason it wrote “

ox, sheep, and goat”—

to indicate that it is the forbidden fat of ox, sheep, and goat that is prohibited, but

the forbidden fat

of a wild animal is permitted.

And we raise an objection:

The Rabbis have answered him well!

How, then, does he say that there is a superfluity in the verse to divide?

Rather, this is the reason for Rabbi Ishmael’s view: He holds that, if so,

the verse comes only to exclude the forbidden fat of a wild animal,

let it write “

You shall not eat any forbidden fat of ox,”

and from “ox” we would exclude the forbidden fat of a wild animal. If so,

sheep and goat

why do I need it to be written?

Rather,

infer from it—

the verse came

to divide,

in order to make one liable for each eating of forbidden fat from each species separately!

And the Rabbis hold

that the words “sheep and goat” are not superfluous for division, because “ox” cannot exclude the forbidden fat of a wild animal. Rather,

if the Merciful One had written “

any forbidden fat of ox,”

I would say, let us derive

by a gezerah shavah,

“ox”—

“ox”

from Shabbat,

in which it is written (Exodus 23:12), “so that your ox may rest”:

Just as concerning Shabbat, a wild animal and a bird are like them,

for a person is liable for the resting of all of them, as we derive from “and all your animals,”

so too concerning eating

of forbidden fat, the eating of the forbidden fat of

a wild animal and a bird

would be prohibited

like them 38 .

For this reason the Merciful One wrote “forbidden fat

of

ox, sheep, and goat”—

to indicate that these

forbidden fats alone

are prohibited, but

the forbidden fat

of a wild animal and a bird is permitted.

And we raise an objection:

The Rabbis have answered him well

to Rabbi Ishmael! How, then, does he say that there is a superfluity in the verse that came to teach division?

Rather, this is the reason

for Rabbi Ishmael’s view:

He holds

that if the verse comes only to exclude the forbidden fat of a wild animal,

let it write only “

any forbidden fat

of sheep you shall not eat,”

or alternatively, let it write “

any forbidden fat of goat you shall not eat,”

and from “sheep” or from “goat” we would exclude the forbidden fat of a wild animal, and there would be no basis for thinking to derive through a gezerah shavah from Shabbat the forbidden fat of the other animals. If so,

“ox, sheep, and goat”

that the Merciful One wrote,

why do I need it? Infer from it

from this superfluity—

to divide!

And the Rabbis hold: “Ox and goat” are not superfluous for division, for

“sheep and goat”

if it had written “

any forbidden fat of sheep,”

I would say

that only

the forbidden fat of sheep is prohibited, and

the forbidden fat of

ox and goat is permitted;

therefore it was necessary to write ox and goat, to include that their forbidden fat too is prohibited.

And if you would say: What is the superiority

of the forbidden fat

of sheep

that would indicate that specifically the forbidden fat of sheep is prohibited if ox and goat had not been written, and why should we not derive from it through an av binyan for the other species of animal?

Because

the sacrificial sheep

was included in

the obligation of burning

the tail-fat before the Most High,

whereas this is not so with ox and goat, from which the tail-fat is not offered.

And as Rabbi Hanania taught: Why

did the verse repeat and

enumerate

the law of offering the

fats of

the firstborn

ox, and

also the law of offering the

fats of

the firstborn

sheep, and

also the law of offering the

fats

of the firstborn

goat, as it is written (Numbers 18:17), “

But the firstborn of an ox or the firstborn of a sheep or the firstborn of a goat ... and you shall burn their fat”? Is it not enough that it should write the mitzva of offering the fats concerning one of them, and from it we would derive it for the others?

“But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat … and you shall burn their fat”?

Would it not have been sufficient to write the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions for one of them, and derive the law for the others from it?

They are necessary—

for if it had written ox, I would say that we do not derive sheep and goat from it.

Because

there is room to refute: What is so with ox? It has

a stringency, that

it was included in

the measure of the

libations

more than all the other species—the libations of a bull are half a hin, while those of a sheep and goat are a quarter of a hin. If so, it is impossible to derive the mitzva of offering the fats of sheep and goat from ox, and therefore it was necessary to write them explicitly.

And perhaps you will say:

Let the Merciful One write

the law of offering the fats

of

the firstborn

sheep, and let us derive ox and goat from sheep?

There is room to refute: What is so with sheep,

which has a stringency,

that it was included through the tail-fat [

for only in the case of a sheep is the tail-fat offered, but not in the case of ox or goat]; therefore it could enter your mind that only in the firstborn of a sheep there is a mitzva to offer the fats, but not in ox and goat, had the Torah not included the fats of ox and sheep explicitly.

And it is still difficult that it should not have needed to write the law of the fats in all of them. Rather,

let the Merciful One write

the law of the fats

of goat, and let us derive ox and sheep from it?

There is room to refute: What is so with goat, for it was included concerning idolatry,

for if an individual sinned unwittingly with idolatry, he brings a yearling goat as a sin-offering, as explicitly stated in the section of Shelach (Numbers 15:27). Since the goat was included in offering, it could enter your mind that specifically in its case there is a mitzva to offer the fats, had the Torah not included the fats of ox and sheep.

And it is still difficult: why is it necessary to interpret the mitzva of the sacrificial fats with regard to all three species, for although

from one we cannot derive the others as above, one must still ask:

for the others, as stated above? Nevertheless, one must still ask:

Let us write two, and derive one from two,

through a derivation based on the common side shared by both: that they are animal species, their fat is forbidden, and the sacrificial fats of their firstborn are offered; so too, anything that is an animal species and whose fat is forbidden—the sacrificial fats of its firstborn are offered.

And the beraita answers:

Which one shall we derive [

which one shall we not write, and it will be learned from the common side?]

If we derive

ox from sheep and goat, they have a refutation: What is distinctive about sheep and goat

is that it is fitting that there be a mitzva of burning the sacrificial fats in their firstborn,

for they were increased with regard to the Passover offering—

for the Passover offering is brought from sheep or from goats.

Rather,

let us not write sheep, and derive it from ox and goat. They have a refutation: What is distinctive about ox and goat, for they were increased with regard to idolatry—

for a court that erred and instructed that idolatry is permitted brings an ox as an olah [and a goat as a chatat], while an individual brings a one-year-old female goat as a chatat.

Rather,

let us not write goat, and derive it from ox and sheep. They have a refutation: What is distinctive about ox and sheep, for they possess an aspect of increase with regard to the altar—

for in every offering brought from them there is a special increase in its offering upon the altar: an ox has abundant libations upon the altar; a sheep has its tail rising upon the altar among its sacrificial fats. This is not so with a goat, for although it was increased in that only it is brought by an individual in the case of idolatry, nevertheless, when it is offered, it has no special increase in what rises from it upon the altar.

Therefore, they cannot be derived from one another

with regard to the law of the sacrificial fats of a firstborn, because with regard to each two of them there is a rationale for saying that specifically in them the sacrificial fats of a firstborn were increased.

This concludes the beraita of Rabbi Hanania. And we have found that there is a stringency in sheep, which was increased with the offering of its tail, unlike ox and goat. If so, the Rabbis will answer Rabbi Ishmael that also with regard to fat, if it had been written only that the fat of sheep is forbidden, it would be impossible to derive that the fat of ox and goat is forbidden, for we would refute: What is distinctive about sheep, for it was increased with a tail? [And we have likewise learned that there is a stringency in goat that is absent from sheep and ox, and likewise in each two of them there is a stringency absent from the third.] If so, also with regard to fat it is necessary to write them all, and none of them is superfluous for making a division.

And again there is a difficulty:

The Rabbis have spoken properly to him

—to Rabbi Yishmael! How, then, does he say that there is a superfluous expression in the verse for the purpose of distinguishing between them?

the Rabbis to Rabbi Ishmael! How, then, does he say that there is a superfluity in the verse for making a division? Rather, actually, Rabbi Ishmael’s reason is as we said initially: For if so,

if the verse comes only to exclude the fat of an animal and to include the fat of all the species of domesticated animals,

let it write

only

“all fat”, and let it be silent,

, and remain silent

and automatically we would know that the fat of every species of domesticated animal is forbidden. It follows that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are superfluous.

Rather,

what do you say—

this that it wrote “

ox, sheep, and goat”

comes to permit the fat of an animal,

for one should not say that “all fat” includes even the fat of an animal, and therefore there is no superfluity in the verse.

Your answer is:

When the verse wrote “

all the fat of an ox”

in the context of sacrificial matters,

it wrote it, for it is adjacent to this verse: “You shall not eat any fat of an ox” (Leviticus 7:25): “For whoever eats the fat of the animal from which one offers a fire-offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off” .

And

from now we shall learn by the measure of

a matter learned from its context,

[which is one of the thirteen measures by which the Torah is expounded]: Since the matter of eating fat is stated adjacent to the matter of offerings, we have to learn from the subject of the passage: just as an animal is not offered upon the altar, so too, the prohibition of eating fat does not apply to an animal.

And again it follows that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are superfluous, to teach us to make a division, that one is flogged for each eating of fat of each species separately.

And we ask:

Does it follow that the Rabbis hold

that

we do not derive a matter learned from its context!?

And this cannot be, for this is one of the thirteen measures by which the Torah is expounded!

And we answer:

No! Everyone derives a matter learned from its context.

And here they disagree about this:

what is the definition of a matter learned from its context?

For example, here: the verse adjacent to the prohibition of the negative commandment of fat, which deals with sacrificial matters, speaks of karet for fat, and from it they wish to learn with regard to the negative commandment of fat, by means of “a matter learned from its context.”

For at first the prohibition of the negative commandment is written: “You shall not eat any fat,” and afterward it says: “For whoever eats the fat of the animal from which one offers a fire-offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off.” This is as though one is learning a matter that is a negative commandment from a context in which there is karet.

Rabbi Ishmael holds: We learn

a matter from its context both

from a negative commandment from a negative commandment, and

both

a negative commandment from karet.

For although this is a negative commandment and that is karet, since both are written in the same passage, this is considered a matter learned from its context. If so, we learn the negative commandment of fat from the karet of fat [stated with regard to sacrificial matters], to exclude an animal; and the words “ox, sheep, and goat,” which were stated in the prohibition of the negative commandment, are superfluous and came to make a division and obligate one for the fat of each species separately.

And

if

the Rabbis

hold:

we derive a negative commandment from a negative commandment,

for only in such a manner is it a derivation of a matter learned from its context. But

we do not derive a negative commandment from karet,

because it is not its context, even though both are written in the same passage. Therefore, we do not learn the negative commandment of fat from the karet of fat to exclude an animal; and the verse had to say “ox, sheep, and goat” in order to exclude an animal from the prohibition of the negative commandment, and there is no superfluity in the verse from which to learn to make a division.

And if you wish, say: This is the reason of the Rabbis,

who hold that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are not superfluous, because it was necessary to write them,

as Rav Mari said to Rav Zevid: But from now,

since the tail is called “fat” [as we say in tractate Hullin, page 117],

the tail of non-sacred animals should be forbidden

for eating because of the prohibition of fat!?

He said to him,

Rav Zevid:

The verse says concerning you: “

:

All the fat of ox, sheep, and goat”—

to say that

we require a matter that is common to all three

in order that it be included in the prohibition of fat,

and there is none

such in the tail. Only the tail of a sheep is called “fat,” since its tail is offered among its sacrificial fats, but not the tails of the other species, which are not offered with their sacrificial fats. Therefore, even the tail of a sheep, although it is called “fat,” is permitted, since it is not common to all three.

Therefore, when it came, “

ox, sheep, and goat,”

it came to permit the tail of non-sacred animals,

because it is not common to all three, and the verse was again not left superfluous for making a division.

And Rabbi Ishmael could say to you: If so,

if the verse came only to permit the tail of non-sacred animals,

let the verse say: “

All the fat of ox and sheep,” ,

—

and this would suffice to exclude the tail, for we would expound that we require a matter common to both, excluding the tail, which is called “fat” only in a sheep and not in an ox. If so, “

goat,”

which the Merciful One wrote—

why do I need it? Rather,

is it not

learn from this—

—

to make a division!

Rabbi Hanina said: Rabbi Ishmael agrees with regard to an offering,

that if one ate the fat of an ox, the fat of a sheep, and the fat of a goat in one lapse of awareness—

he brings only one chatat.

What is the reason?

Because

this negative commandment does not resemble

[this negative commandment]

the negative commandment of forbidden sexual relations.

For in forbidden sexual relations, every negative commandment is a prohibition-name in its own right, and therefore they are divided, obligating a chatat for each one separately, even though one karet is stated concerning them. But with the fat of ox, sheep, and goat, although they are considered separate negative commandments—and one is flogged for each one separately—nevertheless, they all have one name: fat. And separate negative commandments belonging to one name do not divide the chatat offerings. [This is how the book Birkat HaZevach explained Rashi’s words.] And the verse “ox, sheep, and goat,” from which we increase the division, was stated with regard to dividing lashes, and not with regard to dividing chatat offerings .

The Sages taught:

It is written in the passage concerning liability for a chatat (Leviticus 4:2): “When a person sins unwittingly ... and he does one of these,” and we expound from the superfluous letter mem in “of these” that the verse should be read as follows:

And he does one

[that he violated one prohibition],

and he does these

[that it is considered for him as doing many transgressions]—

to obligate

a chatat

for each and every one!

If he ate

an olive-sized portion of

fat, and

then ate another olive-sized portion of

fat

from

one name,

for example, both were fat covering the kidneys,

in two lapses of awareness,

for example, he became aware of his first unwitting transgression before he transgressed unwittingly a second time—

he is liable for two.

Because lapses of awareness divide .

Or

if he ate two olive-sized portions of fat from

two names,

for example, an olive-sized portion of fat covering the kidneys and an olive-sized portion of fat covering the intestines,

in one lapse of awareness—

he is liable for two.

Because the names divide.

Rami bar Hama said to Rav Hisda: Granted, for one name in two lapses of awareness he is liable for two—

because lapses of awareness divide.

For liability for a chatat depends upon awareness of the transgression that he committed, as it is written (Leviticus 4:28): “Or his sin becomes known to him”; and since he became aware between one transgression and the other, they are two separate unwitting acts.

But for two names in one lapse of awareness, why is he liable for two—

do we not require divided lapses of awareness, and there are none!?

For although kidney fat and intestinal fat are two names of fat, nevertheless they are included in one negative commandment of the prohibition of fat—the Torah did not divide them into separate prohibitions.

He said to him: Here, with what are we dealing? For example, he ate

one olive-sized portion of

fat of leftover sacrificial meat.

For he is liable because of leftover sacrificial meat and because of fat,

which are two separate negative commandments and two separate karet penalties.

He said to him: If so,

since the tanney counted the liability for fat and leftover sacrificial meat, which are two entirely different types of prohibition,

let him also be liable

for a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property

because of

misuse of

consecrated property,

and why did the tanney mention only two chatat offerings and not mention that he is also liable for a guilt-offering?

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: For example, he ate the fat of consecrated property—

and it is Rabbi Judah’s [opinion],

who holds that there are two separate negative commandments, for the fat of non-sacred property and for the fat of consecrated property. And it might have entered your mind that they are two different prohibition-names, and he is liable for two chatat offerings . And according to this, it is not difficult that he should also count a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, because that is an entirely different type of prohibition, and the tanney wished to count only prohibitions of the same type, such as the fat of non-sacred property and the fat of consecrated property.

For it was taught:

He ate the fat of an animal carcass

or he ate the fat of consecrated property

intentionally and after warning,

he is liable for two

lashes—for the negative commandment of fat and for the negative commandment of an animal carcass [with the fat of an animal carcass], or for the negative commandment concerning a non-kohein who eats consecrated property [with the fat of consecrated property].

Rabbi Judah says:

One who eats

the fat of consecrated property is flogged three times:

twice because of fat, because he holds that there are separate negative commandments for the fat of non-sacred property and the fat of consecrated property, and once because of consecrated property.

They laughed at it in the West [at this answer of Rav Sheshet, according to which this beraita, which obligates for two names in one lapse of awareness, follows Rabbi Judah]. For according to his words, this is difficult:

Let us establish it as a case where he ate fat

[of two of the three species]

of ox, sheep, and goat—

and it is Rabbi Ishmael’s [opinion], who said

that if he ate from all three intentionally and after warning,

he is flogged three times,

and therefore here, when he ate two of them unwittingly, he is liable for two chatat offerings!

, and therefore here, where he ate from two of them unintentionally, he should be liable to bring two sin offerings!?