Keritot 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

If so,

the bending

of his lips should likewise, according to the Rabbis, be considered an act in the case of one who blasphemes!?

And why, then, did the Rabbis say that a blasphemer is excluded because he does not perform an act?

Rava said: The case of a blasphemer is different, since it exists in the heart.

The essence of the transgression is the thought of blasphemy in his heart, while through speech he merely expresses what he is thinking in his heart; therefore, his speech is not considered an act. This is not so with bowing to idolatry, where the act of bowing itself is the prohibition, and therefore it is considered an act. [This is how the gloss on Rashi explains it. See additional interpretations in Rashi and in the Shita Mekubetzet on the previous page, note 38]

But in general, the bending of one’s lips is considered an act.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection:

We learned in the Sifra, based on the fact that the term “and he performs” is written with regard to liability for a sin-offering:

False witnesses are excluded,

since they are not liable to bring a sin-offering, because

there is no

act

in the case of a false witness.

And why

is the testimony of conspiring witnesses not considered an act?

But “

by the mouth of

two witnesses shall the matter be established”

is written with regard to them,

and therefore the movement of their lips should be considered an act!?

We answered:

Rava said: The case of conspiring witnesses is different, since it exists in seeing.

The essence of testimony is seeing the act and presenting the “evidence” before the court through the witnesses’ speech. The sin of conspiring witnesses lies in presenting false “evidence” before the court concerning an act that they did not see, through their false “testimony.” It follows that the punishment of conspiring witnesses is for the “sight of the eye” [which did not in fact exist!] of the conspiring witnesses, and not for their delivery of testimony. As stated, the delivery is merely the expression of their false “sight,” as they testify before the court that they “saw” it. Therefore, the testimony delivered by conspiring witnesses is not considered an act that obligates a sacrifice .

We learned in the Mishna:

One who eats forbidden fat:

The Sages taught:

It is written (Leviticus 7:23), “

You shall not eat any fat of an ox, sheep, or goat”—

the verse specified each species separately in order

to obligate

one who eats three pieces of forbidden fat, one piece from each species, to receive lashes

for each and every one!

Thus, if he ate forbidden fat from all three of these species, he is liable to receive three sets of lashes, even if he was given only one warning,

according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

And the Rabbis say: He is liable only to

one set of

lashes. Shall we say that this is the issue over which they disagree:

Rabbi Yishmael holds that one receives lashes for a general prohibition,

and for one prohibition that includes several particulars, he receives lashes for each and every one, since they are considered separate prohibitions.

And the Rabbis hold that one does not receive lashes

as separate sets

for a general prohibition,

but only one set of lashes, since all the particulars included in that prohibition are considered one prohibition .

We reject this:

Rabbi Yishmael may always hold that one does not receive lashes for a general prohibition. Here it is different, since the verses are superfluous for him

to teach that one receives lashes for each species separately.

We explain how there is a superfluous verse.

For one may ask:

Let the verse write: “

You shall not eat any fat”—“

of an ox, sheep, or goat”;

why did the Merciful One write this?

What need is there for it?

Rather,

learn from it

that the verse came

to divide

and obligate lashes for eating the fat of each of the three species separately.

And the Rabbis

say: There is no superfluity here.

If

the verse had written only, “You shall not eat any fat,” and

had not written “the fat of

an

ox, sheep, or goat,”

I would have said

that

even the fat of a wild animal is included,

and the prohibition would also apply to the fat of a wild animal.

For this reason it wrote “

ox, sheep, and goat”—

to indicate that it is the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat that is prohibited, but

the fat

of a wild animal is permitted.

We ask:

The Rabbis have answered him well!

How can Rabbi Yishmael say that the verse contains a superfluity intended to divide?

Rather, this is the reason for Rabbi Yishmael’s position:

He holds that if the verse came only to exclude the fat of a wild animal,

let it write: “

You shall not eat any fat of an ox,”

and the word “ox” would exclude the fat of a wild animal. If so,

“sheep and goat”

why is it necessary

to write them? Rather,

learn from it—

the verse came

to divide,

in order to obligate one for eating the fat of each species separately!

And the Rabbis hold

that the words “sheep and goat” are not superfluous for the purpose of dividing, because “ox” cannot be used to exclude the fat of a wild animal. On the contrary,

if the Merciful One had written “

You shall not eat any fat of an ox,”

I would have said, let us derive

through a gzera shava,

“ox”—

“ox”—

from Shabbat,

where it is written (Exodus 23:12), “so that your ox may rest”:

Just as with regard to Shabbat, wild animals and birds are likewise included,

since a person is obligated to ensure the rest of all of them, as we derive from “and all your animals,”

so too with regard to eating

the fat, eating the fat of

wild animals and birds

would be prohibited

likewise. 38 .

For this reason the Merciful One wrote “the fat of

an

ox, sheep, and goat”—

to indicate that these

fats alone

are prohibited, but

the fat of

a wild animal and a bird is permitted.

We ask:

The Rabbis have answered him well

to Rabbi Yishmael! How can he say that the verse contains a superfluity that teaches division?

Rather, this is the reason

for Rabbi Yishmael’s position:

He holds

that if the verse came only to exclude the fat of a wild animal,

let it write only

“

You shall not eat any fat of a sheep,”

alternatively, let it write “

You shall not eat any fat of a goat.” From “sheep” or “goat” we would exclude the fat of a wild animal, and there would be no basis for the presumption that one should derive through a gzera shava from Shabbat that the fat of other living creatures is prohibited. If so,

“

ox, sheep, and goat”

that the Merciful One wrote—

why is it necessary? Learn from it

from this superfluity:

to divide!

And the Rabbis hold: “Ox and goat” are not superfluous for the purpose of division, since

if it had written “

any fat of a sheep,”

I would have said

that only

the

fat of a sheep is prohibited, and

the fat of an

ox and goat is permitted.

Therefore it was necessary to write “ox and goat,” to include their fat as prohibited as well.

And if you would say: What is the superiority

of the fat

of a sheep

that would lead one to say that specifically the fat of a sheep is prohibited were it not for the writing of “ox and goat,” and why should we not derive by a binyan av from it to the other species of domesticated animals?

It is because

a sheep brought as a sacrifice was additionally included

in

the obligation to burn its

tail-fat on the altar,

unlike an ox and a goat, from which the tail-fat is not offered.

And as Rabbi Ḥananya taught: Why

did the verse repeat and

enumerate

the law of offering

the sacrificial portions of

a firstborn

ox, and

also the law of offering

the sacrificial portions of

a firstborn

sheep, and

also the law of offering

the sacrificial portions

of a firstborn

goat, as it is written (Numbers 18:17), “

But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat …

and you shall burn their fat”? Is it not sufficient for the Torah to write the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions with regard to one of them, from which we would derive it for the others?

Would it not have been sufficient to write the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions for one of them, and derive the law for the others from it?

They are all necessary—

for if it had written “ox,” I would have said that we do not derive sheep and goat from it.

The reason is

that one can refute the derivation: What is special about an ox is that

it possesses the stringency that

it was additionally included in

the greater

measure of libations

than all the other species: The libations of a bull are half a hin, whereas those of a sheep and goat are a quarter of a hin. Therefore, it is impossible to derive the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions of a sheep and goat from an ox, and so it was necessary to write them explicitly.

And perhaps you will say:

Let the Merciful One write

the law of offering the sacrificial portions

of

a firstborn

sheep, and let us derive ox and goat from the sheep?

One can refute the derivation: What is special about a sheep

is that it possesses a stringency,

since it was additionally included with regard to the tail-fat [

only the tail-fat of a sheep is offered, but not that of an ox or a goat]. Therefore, one might have concluded that only a firstborn sheep is subject to the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions, but not an ox or goat, were it not for the fact that the Torah included the sacrificial portions of an ox and goat explicitly.

It still remains difficult: There was no need to write the law of the sacrificial portions for all of them. Rather,

let the Merciful One write

the law of the sacrificial portions

of a goat, and let us derive ox and sheep from it?

One can refute the derivation: What is special about a goat is that it was additionally included with regard to idolatry,

for if an individual inadvertently committed idolatry, he brings a one-year-old female goat as a sin-offering, as explicitly stated in the passage of Shelach (Numbers 15:27). Since the goat was additionally included with regard to offerings, one might have concluded that specifically it is subject to the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions, were it not for the fact that the Torah included the sacrificial portions of an ox and a sheep as well.

Yet it is still difficult: Why is it necessary to interpret the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions as applying to all three species, given that, indeed,

from one it cannot be derived

for the others, as stated above? Nevertheless, one must still ask:

Let us write two, and derive the third from the two

, through a derivation based on the common denominator between them: They are both animal species, their fat is forbidden, and the sacrificial portions of their firstborn are offered. So too, any species that is an animal and whose fat is forbidden—the sacrificial portions of its firstborn are offered.

And the beraita answers:

Which one should be derived

[Which one should we not write, and have it derived from the common denominator]?

If we derive

the ox from the sheep and the goat, there is a refutation: What is distinctive about the sheep and the goat

? It is logical that the mitzva of burning the sacrificial portions should apply to their firstborn

because they were included in the context of the Paschal offering

—as the Paschal offering is brought from sheep or goats.

Rather,

let us not write “sheep,” and derive it from the ox and the goat. There is a refutation: What is distinctive about the ox and the goat is that they were included in the context of idolatry

—when a court errs and rules that idolatry is permitted, it brings a bull as a burnt offering [and a young male goat as a sin offering], while an individual brings a one-year-old female goat as a sin offering.

Rather,

let us not write “goat,” and derive it from the ox and the sheep. There is a refutation: What is distinctive about the ox and the sheep is that they possess an aspect of being especially represented with regard to the altar

—every offering brought from them has a special feature in its offering upon the altar: An ox has a larger quantity of libations offered upon the altar; the tail-fat of a sheep ascends upon the altar as part of its sacrificial portions. This is not so with a goat, for although it was included in this respect insofar as it is the only animal that an individual brings in the case of idolatry, nevertheless, when it is offered, it has no special feature concerning what of it ascends upon the altar.

Therefore, they cannot be derived from one another

with regard to the law of the sacrificial portions of a firstborn, because with regard to any two of them there is a rationale for saying that specifically in those two were sacrificial portions included in the law of the firstborn.

This concludes the beraita of Rabbi Ḥananya. We have thereby learned that there is a stringency with regard to a sheep, which was additionally included through the offering of its tail-fat, unlike the ox and the goat. If so, the Rabbis will answer Rabbi Yishmael that the same applies with regard to fat: Had it been written only that the fat of a sheep is forbidden, it would not have been possible to derive that the fat of an ox and a goat is forbidden, because we would refute it: What is distinctive about a sheep is that it was additionally included through its tail-fat. [And we have likewise learned that there is a stringency with regard to a goat that is not present in a sheep and an ox, and so with regard to every two of them there is a stringency that is absent from the third.] If so, with regard to fat as well, it is necessary to write all of them, and none of them is superfluous for the purpose of distinguishing between them.

And again, there is a difficulty:

The Rabbis have argued well to him

—to Rabbi Yishmael! How, then, does he say that there is a superfluous expression in the verse for the purpose of distinguishing between them?

Rather, actually, Rabbi Yishmael’s reason is as we initially said: For if so

, if the verse comes only to exclude the fat of a wild animal and to include the fat of all species of domesticated animals,

let it write

only

“all fat”

, and remain silent

; then we would know automatically that the fat of all species of domesticated animals is forbidden. It would follow that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are superfluous.

Rather,

what can you say

—that this which it wrote,

“ox, sheep, and goat,”

comes to permit the fat of a wild animal

, so that you should not say that “all fat” includes even the fat of a wild animal, and therefore there is no superfluous expression in the verse.

Your answer is:

When the verse wrote

“all fat of an ox,” it wrote it

in the context of sacrificial matters

; it is juxtaposed to that verse, “You shall not eat any fat of an ox”—“For whoever eats the fat of the animal from which one offers a fire-offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off” .

And

from now on, we derive by the rule of

a matter learned from its context

[which is one of the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded]: Since the matter of eating fat is stated adjacent to the matter of offerings, we learn from the subject of the passage that just as a wild animal is not offered upon the altar, so too, with regard to the prohibition against eating fat, the prohibition does not apply to a wild animal.

It therefore again emerges that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are superfluous, to teach us to distinguish between them, so that one receives lashes for eating the fat of each species separately.

And we ask:

Does this imply that the Rabbis hold

that

we do not derive a matter learned from its context!?

This cannot be so, since this is one of the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded!

And we answer:

No; everyone derives a matter learned from its context

.

And here they disagree about this

: What is the definition of a matter learned from its context?

For example, here, where the verse adjacent to the prohibition of fat—which is stated in the context of sacrificial matters—speaks of the punishment of karet for fat, and they wish to learn from it with regard to the prohibition of fat, by means of the rule of “a matter learned from its context.”

Rabbi Yishmael holds: We derive

a matter from its context whether

from one prohibition to another, and

whether

from a prohibition to a punishment of karet

. Although one is a prohibition and the other is karet, since both are written in the same passage, this is considered a matter learned from its context. Accordingly, we derive the prohibition of fat from the punishment of karet for fat [stated with regard to sacrificial matters] to exclude a wild animal, and the words “ox, sheep, and goat,” which were stated in the prohibition, are superfluous and come to distinguish between them, making one liable for the fat of each species separately.

And

if

the Rabbis

hold:

We derive from one prohibition to another

, for only in such a case is it a derivation of a matter learned from its context. But

we do not derive from a prohibition to karet

, because it is not considered its context, even though both are written in the same passage. Therefore, we do not derive the prohibition of fat from the punishment of karet for fat to exclude a wild animal, and the verse had to state “ox, sheep, and goat” in order to exclude a wild animal from the prohibition. Thus, there is no superfluous expression in the verse from which to derive the distinction between the species.

And if you wish, say: This is the reason for the Rabbis’ position

: They hold that the words “ox, sheep, and goat” are not superfluous, because it was necessary to write them,

as Rav Mari said to Rav Zevid: But if that is so

, since the tail-fat is called “fat” [as we say in tractate Ḥullin, page 117a],

the tail-fat of unconsecrated animals should be forbidden

for eating because of the prohibition against fat!?

He said to him

, Rav Zevid:

The verse states concerning you

:

“all the fat of an ox, a sheep, and a goat”

—to say that

we require a matter that is common to all three

in order for it to be included in the prohibition against fat,

and it is not present

in the case of tail-fat. Only the tail-fat of a sheep is called “fat,” since its tail-fat is offered as part of its sacrificial portions, but not the tail-fat of the other species, which is not offered together with their sacrificial portions. Therefore, even the tail-fat of a sheep, although it is called “fat,” is permitted, since it is not common to all three.

Therefore, when

“ox, sheep, and goat”

comes, it comes to permit the tail-fat of unconsecrated animals

, because it is not common to all three, and the verse is once again not superfluous for the purpose of distinguishing between them.

And Rabbi Yishmael could have said to you: If so

, if the verse comes only to permit the tail-fat of unconsecrated animals,

let the verse say:

“all the fat of an ox and a sheep,”

—

and that would suffice to exclude tail-fat, because we would expound that a matter common to both is required, excluding tail-fat, which is called “fat” only with regard to a sheep and not with regard to an ox. If so,

“goat,”

which the Merciful One wrote—

why do I need it?

Rather,

derive from it

—

to distinguish between them!

Rabbi Ḥanina said: Rabbi Yishmael concedes with regard to an offering

that if one ate the fat of an ox, the fat of a sheep, and the fat of a goat in one lapse of awareness, he

brings only one sin offering.

What is the reason?

Because

this prohibition does not resemble the prohibition

[this prohibition]

of forbidden sexual relations

. With regard to forbidden sexual relations, each prohibition constitutes a separate category of prohibition; therefore, they are distinguished so that one is liable to bring a sin offering for each one separately, even though a single punishment of karet is stated with regard to them. But with regard to the fat of an ox, a sheep, and a goat, although they are considered separate prohibitions—and one receives lashes for each one separately—nevertheless, they all constitute a single category, that of fat. Separate prohibitions within a single category do not distinguish between sin offerings. [This is how the Birkat HaZevach explained Rashi’s words.] And the verse “ox, sheep, and goat,” from which we derive the distinction, was stated with regard to the distinction between lashes, and not with regard to the distinction between sin offerings.

The Sages taught:

In the passage concerning liability for a sin offering, it is written (Leviticus 4:2): “When a person sins unintentionally … and he commits one of these,” and we expound the superfluous letter mem in the word “one of these” to read the verse as follows:

“And he commits one”

[he violated one prohibition],

“and he commits these”

[it is considered for him as committing many transgressions]—

to make him liable

for a sin offering

for each one and one!

If he ate

an olive-bulk of

fat, and

then ate another olive-bulk of

fat

from

the same category

, for example, both were fat upon the kidneys,

in two lapses of awareness

, such as when he became aware of his first inadvertent transgression before he committed the second inadvertent transgression, he

is liable to bring two

, because lapses of awareness distinguish between them.

Or

, if he ate two olive-bulks of fat from

two categories

, for example, an olive-bulk of fat upon the kidneys and an olive-bulk of fat upon the intestines,

in one lapse of awareness—he

is liable to bring two

, because the categories distinguish between them.

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: Granted, for one category in two lapses of awareness, he is liable to bring two

because lapses of awareness distinguish between them.

This is because liability to bring a sin offering depends on awareness of the transgression one committed, as it is written (Leviticus 4:28): “Or his sin becomes known to him.” Since he became aware of it between one transgression and the other, they are two separate inadvertent acts.

But for two categories in one lapse of awareness, why is he liable to bring two

? We require separate lapses of awareness, and there are none!

For although kidney-fat and intestinal fat are two categories of fat, nevertheless, they are included within a single prohibition against fat—the Torah did not divide them into separate prohibitions.

He said to him: Here we are dealing with a case where he ate

one olive-bulk of

the fat of leftover sacrificial meat

for which he is liable because of leftover sacrificial meat and because of fat,

which are two separate prohibitions and two separate punishments of karet.

He said to him: If so,

since the tanna counted the liabilities for fat and leftover sacrificial meat, which are two entirely different types of prohibition,

he should also be liable

to bring a guilt offering for misuse

because of

misuse of

consecrated property

, and why did the tanna mention only two sin offerings and not mention that he is also liable to bring a guilt offering?

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: This is referring to a case where he ate the fat of consecrated property

—

and it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there are two separate prohibitions: one for the fat of unconsecrated animals and one for the fat of consecrated animals. One might have thought that they are two different categories of prohibition, and that he is liable to bring two sin offerings. Accordingly, there is no difficulty as to why he did not also count a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, because that is an entirely different type of prohibition, and the tanna wished to count only prohibitions of the same type, such as the fat of unconsecrated animals and the fat of consecrated animals.

As it was taught:

One who ate the fat of a carcass,

or ate the fat of consecrated property

intentionally and after receiving a warning,

is liable to receive two

sets of lashes—because of the prohibition against fat and because of the prohibition against a carcass [in the case of the fat of a carcass], or because of the prohibition against a non-koen eating consecrated food [in the case of the fat of consecrated property].

Rabbi Yehuda says: One who eats

the

fat of consecrated property receives three sets of lashes

: two because of fat, since he holds that there are separate prohibitions for the fat of unconsecrated animals and the fat of consecrated property, and one because of consecrated property.

They laughed at this in the West

[at Rav Sheshet’s answer, which follows the beraita that makes one liable for two categories in one lapse of awareness, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda]. According to his explanation, the following difficulty arises:

Let us establish it as referring to one who ate fat

[of two of the three species]

of an ox, a sheep, and a goat

and it is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says

that if one ate from all three intentionally and after receiving a warning, he

receives three sets of lashes

, and therefore here, where he ate from two of them unintentionally, he should be liable to bring two sin offerings!?