Keritot 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

It is necessary for him

for his sister who is

also

his father's daughter and

also

his mother's daughter,

for whom he is liable to receive karet, although the punishment of karet for her is not written explicitly in the Torah. And even though karet has already been written for his sister who is his father's daughter, and likewise karet has already been written for his sister who is his mother's daughter, as it is written (Leviticus 20:17): “And a man who takes his sister, his father's daughter, or [who takes his sister who is] his mother's daughter—and they shall be cut off,” and if so, it would be a kal va-chomer that he should be liable for his sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter, nevertheless the Torah explicitly included karet for her

to teach that punishments are not imposed

through a derivation

from the law

from a kal va-chomer . For it would have been possible to derive the punishment of karet for his sister who is both his father's and his mother's daughter by means of a kal va-chomer from his sister on only one side, and nevertheless the Torah had to write the punishment explicitly. From here we learn that this is a general principle throughout the Torah punishments are not imposed on the basis of a derivation from the law .

And

if

Rabbi Yitzhak,

who derives from “his sister” at the end of the verse that one's sister who is also his father's sister and his mother's sister constitutes a distinct liability, and does not consider the verse superfluous according to his view—how does he know that one is liable for a sister who is also his father's daughter and his mother's daughter?

He holds that punishments may be imposed on the basis of a derivation from the law,

and there is a punishment for her derived by means of a kal va-chomer.

Alternatively,

Rabbi Yitzhak also holds that punishments are not imposed on the basis of a derivation from the law. Rather, with regard to the punishment for a sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter, he

derives the punishment,

the liability for karet,

from the warning,

from the prohibition. For with regard to the warning, the Torah expanded the prohibition against one's sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter, as it is written in the portion of Aharei Mot (Leviticus 18:9): “The nakedness of your sister, your father's daughter or your mother's daughter, you shall not uncover their nakedness.” And we expound in Tractate Makkot (14a), from the fact that it is written later (verse 11), “She is your sister,” to include a warning concerning one's sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter. Rabbi Yitzhak holds that just as one's sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter is included in the warning, so too she is included in the punishment of karet stated with regard to a sister who is solely his father's daughter or solely his mother's daughter.

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Hoshaya said: Everywhere that you find

two written

distinct prohibitions

and

one karet

that includes both of them, there is

a distinction between them with regard to sin-offerings,

so that even if he violated both in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each one.

And what is it?

[That is, where do we find one karet applying to two prohibitions?]

The

compounder

[the apothecary who prepares oil and spices according to the formula of the anointing oil specified in the Torah],

and

the

one who anoints

a person's flesh with the anointing oil from the Temple.

They are

two distinct prohibitions,

as

it is written

about them (Exodus 30:32): “

It shall not be poured on human flesh”—this is a prohibition against anointing with the anointing oil. “

According to its formula

you shall not make it like it”—this is a separate prohibition against compounding the oil.

And it is written with regard to both of them that there is

one karet

alone.

As it is written (ibid., verse 33): “

Whoever compounds anything like it, or whoever puts any of it on an outsider—

shall be cut off from his people.”

And accordingly, we challenge Rabbi Hoshaya's statement on the basis of what we said earlier, that the karet stated with regard to one's sister serves to distinguish the liability for one's sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter:

Now, since

we find that

prohibitions

that are separate

divide

the liability for the transgression into separate sin-offerings, even though one karet is stated for both of them, then

why does the Merciful One write the karet of one's sister

to distinguish the case of one's sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter and make him liable to bring three sin-offerings—

why is it necessary!?

After all, there is a separate prohibition for each of the three forms of sibling relationship, and consequently there is automatically a liability to bring three distinct sin-offerings .

And we answered:

According to Rabbi Yitzhak—

the karet of one's sister is necessary

as he holds

to teach that those liable for karet are not flogged, as we already said above, that this is what Rabbi Yitzhak derives from the karet of one's sister.

According to the Rabbis—

it is necessary for them

to derive from “his sister” at the end of the verse, to include one's sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter.

To teach that punishments are not imposed on the basis of a derivation from the law!

[And therefore the beginning of the verse, “And a man who takes,” was also written because of the end of the verse. For it is the way of the Torah to alter a passage because of a novel point introduced in it. Here, the verse altered the passage concerning liability for karet for one's sister because of the novel point introduced in it—that punishments are not imposed on the basis of a derivation from the law.]

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too have learned

in the Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Hoshaya's statement that prohibitions divide liability into separate sin-offerings.

As we learned:

One who compounds the anointing oil, one who compounds the incense, and one who anoints with the anointing oil!

And it may be inferred:

Why do I need it to teach “

one who compounds the incense”

in the middle,

interrupting the compounding of the oil between the compounder of the oil and the one who anoints with the oil? What

if not this does it teach us: Just as with the incense,

the prohibition against compounding it is

a prohibition in its own right, and one is liable for it

to bring a sin-offering

in its own right

[if he compounded the incense and compounded the anointing oil in one lapse of awareness]—

so too, the compounder of the oil and the one who anoints

even though one karet is written with regard to them,

since they each have

their own

prohibition in its own right, one is liable for them

to bring a sin-offering for each one

in its own right!

And if you would say

that the incense was not placed in the middle for this reason, but rather

because he wanted to state the two compounders

of the oil and the incense

together,

and he therefore placed the compounder of the incense next to the compounder of the oil.

This is not a valid rejection, for if that were the reason—

let us reverse the order: One who compounds the incense, one who compounds the oil, and one who anoints with the anointing oil!

In such a case the incense would not divide the compounder of the oil from the one who anoints with it. Nevertheless, the difficulty would remain:

Why did he divide the oil

and interrupt it with the incense? What

if not this does it teach us—

that there is a division between them with regard to sin-offerings !

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who has relations with a male.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it: The

tanna

who enumerated thirty-six instances of karet, which, as we said above, comes to teach that if one transgressed all the transgressions for which there is liability to bring a sin-offering in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one—and altogether there are thirty-four sin-offerings—

with regard to what

[what type of person]

is he counting

a case in which it is possible for one to be liable for all of them?

If he is counting men—

remove

[from the count]

the woman who lies with an animal,

which is not possible in the case of a man,

and one is thereby lacking

[from the count of thirty-six]

one!?

If he is counting women,

who have relations with their son, their husband's son, their father-in-law, their son-in-law, and so on, then

remove from them

the case of

one who has relations with a male and with an animal,

which does not apply to a woman,

and they are lacking

[from the count]

two!?

And we answered:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tanna is always—

counting men. And

in place of the woman who lies with an animal,

teach as follows: One who has relations with a male, and one who allows a male to have relations with him. And it is Rabbi Yishmael's

view, who says that one who does this in one lapse of awareness

is liable to bring two offerings.

[This is because he holds that there are distinct prohibitions for the active and passive partners, as we will expound shortly. And we have already learned above from Rabbi Hoshaya's statement that wherever there are two prohibitions, there is a division with regard to sin-offerings.]

And we challenged this:

But since the Mishna teaches one who blasphemes at its end,

of the Mishna,

and we establish it

below in this chapter (7a)

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that one who blasphemes is liable to bring a sin-offering, as it is taught there in a beraita, if so,

the beginning is also Rabbi Akiva's

view and does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael!?

And if you would say

that the

Mishna is Rabbi Akiva's, and at the beginning,

with regard to the active and passive partners in the case of a male,

he holds

that Rabbi Akiva agrees

with Rabbi Yishmael

and makes one liable to bring two offerings.

But did Rabbi Abbahu not say:

One person

who has relations with a male and

also

allows a male to have relations with him

in one lapse of awareness—

According to Rabbi Yishmael, who derives

the prohibition for the active and passive partners

from two verses: From “

You shall not lie with a male” (

Leviticus 18:22), which is a warning to the active partner,

and from “

There shall not be a male prostitute among the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which is a warning to the passive partner [and with regard to the liability for karet of the passive partner, see Rashi and Tosafot ]—

he is liable to bring two offerings,

because they are distinct prohibitions, and therefore there is a division between them with regard to sin-offerings .

According to Rabbi Akiva -

he is liable to bring only one .

As both are derived from one verse

for both of them. As it is written,

“You shall not lie with a male”,

and

we read

it

as applying to it

also as though it were written,

“You shall not be lain with.”

And since they are included in one prohibition, he is liable to only one sin-offering for them. If so, it is impossible to establish the first clause of the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva and make him liable to two offerings in the first case, on account of the male who lies with another male and the male who is lain with! And we answer:

Rather,

the

first clause

which we established as counting one who lies with a male and one who brings a male upon himself as two separate liabilities, follows the opinion of

Rabbi Yishmael. But with regard to the blasphemer, he holds

Rabbi Yishmael

like Rabbi Akiva.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that the first clause follows Rabbi Yishmael,

let it also teach: One who lies with an animal, and one who brings an animal upon himself

is liable to two offerings! For we might have thought that according to Rabbi Yishmael, even one who brings an animal upon himself is warned against doing so by the prohibition “There shall not be a male prostitute among the Israelites” .

And we answer:

Abaye said: One who lies with an animal and one who brings an animal upon himself, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to only one offering.

For when the verse

concerning “There shall not be a male prostitute”

is written with regard to men

it is

written

only with regard to men and not with regard to an animal, because a person’s having intercourse with an animal is not called “prostitution,” and consequently the one with whom intercourse is performed is not called a male prostitute. [The prohibition against bringing an animal upon himself is derived from the prohibition against lying with an animal; therefore, he brings one offering for both.]

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav:

The Mishna counts the separate liabilities involving males. As for our difficulty—that if so it is impossible to count the woman with whom an animal copulates, and one sin-offering is missing from the enumeration—we answer that in truth the tanna did not count a woman with whom an animal copulates among the liabilities for sin-offerings. Rather,

the tanna teaches thirty-three sin-offerings

alone; rather,

and he also teaches

also

three karet offenses -

a woman with whom an animal copulates, the Paschal offering, and circumcision,

to complete the enumeration of

all acts that involve

karet.

[Tosafot raised the difficulty: If so, why does it not also teach one who brings a male upon himself and one who brings an animal upon himself?]

And from where

is it evident that this was the tanna’s intention?

For it teaches in the latter clause: The Paschal offering and circumcision, among positive commandments.

And we ask:

The Paschal offering and circumcision -

why does it teach them? And if you say that it is to include a sin-offering

offering

for them -

that is impossible, since

does one bring

an offering for neglecting the commandments of the Paschal offering and circumcision?

And was it not taught: The entire Torah was equated

with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering

with

the law of a sin-offering brought for

idolatry.

As it is written (Numbers 15:29–30),

“There shall be one law for you for one who acts unwittingly, and the person who acts defiantly” [

“There shall be one law for you for one who acts unwittingly, and the person who acts defiantly”

and the reference is to the sin of idolatry], and we derive:

Just as idolatry

is prohibited by a negative commandment, which is a command to

refrain and not act

and one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and to a sin-offering for its unwitting violation [as is explicitly stated there, that he brings a sin-offering],

so too every

negative commandment that is

a prohibition to refrain and not act

and whose intentional violation entails karet entails a sin-offering for its unwitting violation.

If so, the Paschal offering and circumcision, which are not negative commandments but positive commandments requiring one to act, do not entail a sin-offering when neglected. Why, then, does the tanna count them?

Rather, no; learn from this: The tanna teaches thirty-three sin-offerings, and then teaches three karet offenses in order to complete the enumeration of karet offenses.

Learn from this.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who desecrates Shabbat:

They said

rhetorically: Surely the liabilities for sin-offerings concerning

Shabbat -

are thirty-nine!

For we learned above [2b] that the tanna of the Mishna in tractate Shabbat mentioned the number of primary categories of labor in order to teach us that if one performed them all, he is liable to thirty-nine sin-offerings. If so, it is difficult that the tanna of our Mishna should say that there are seventy-five karet offenses [75 = 39 + 36]!

[Rashi wrote this. In the margin, the number was emended to seventy-four. For Shabbat is already counted in the Mishna as one of the thirty-six karet offenses, and the Gemara’s difficulty is that instead of counting Shabbat as one karet offense, it should count it as thirty-nine karet offenses; consequently, only thirty-eight are added.]

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The tanna

of the Mishna, who counted one who desecrates Shabbat as one karet offense, was speaking of

unwittingness concerning Shabbat [

he thought that the day was an ordinary weekday]

and intentionality concerning the labors [

he knew that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat],

for

in this situation

he is liable to only one

sin-offering, even if he performed all the labors. For he violated all of them as a result of his unwittingness concerning the day of Shabbat, and this is only one lapse of awareness. Since liability to a sin-offering depends on the sinner’s lapse of awareness, when there was one lapse of awareness he is liable to only one sin-offering.

The tanna’s essential intention in counting the karet offenses is to teach for which acts one is liable to bring a sin-offering. Therefore, when two acts are included within one liability to a sin-offering, the tanna counts them as one.

For it was taught:

It is written in the passage concerning a sin-offering (Leviticus 4:2), “When a person sins unwittingly, and does one of them.” The letter mem in “one of them” is superfluous, since Scripture could have said, “and does one of them.” Rather, the verb “does” applies both to “one” and to “them,” and the verse should be read as follows: “And does from one, and does them”!

This teaches:

Sometimes one does “from one,” that is, only one transgression, and is liable for “them,” that is, many offerings [as will be explained in the beraita below].

And sometimes one does

“them” [

many transgressions]

which are one [

all the transgressions are included within one liability to a sin-offering]. And in what circumstance do we say this? In the case of

unwittingness concerning Shabbat and intentionality concerning the labors.

And we challenge this:

Let it teach

in the Mishna the case in which there was

intentionality concerning Shabbat [

he knew that the day was Shabbat]

and unwittingness concerning the labors [

he forgot that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat],

in which he is liable to thirty-nine

sin-offerings, and let it count seventy-four karet offenses! [See above regarding the number.]

And from where do we know that in this situation he is liable for each labor separately?

For it was taught:

“And does one of them.”

Sometimes he is liable to one for all of them,

as we derive: “them which are one” [when he performs many labors, which appear like many transgressions, he is nevertheless liable to only one liability].

And sometimes he is liable for each one individually,

as we derive: “one which is them” [when he violates all the labors of Shabbat, he has in fact violated only one negative commandment, since all of them are prohibited by the single prohibition “You shall not perform any labor,” and nevertheless he is liable to many sin-offerings].

And it was taught:

How does one understand

“one which is them”?

Intentionality concerning Shabbat and unwittingness concerning the labors.

And we answer:

The tanna

of the Mishna

preferred unwittingness concerning Shabbat and intentionality concerning the labors

to state in the Mishna, in order to teach us the novel point

that from a sin-offering

one

at least he is not exempt

even though he acted intentionally with regard to the labors.

[Rashi explained this in his first interpretation.

In his second interpretation, he explained that the tanna preferred to state unwittingness concerning Shabbat and intentionality concerning the labors, for the liability of only one sin-offering is decisive and fixed: he is never liable for fewer than one sin-offering, whether he was unwitting only concerning Shabbat or was unwitting concerning Shabbat together with the labors. This is not so if he had stated unwittingness concerning the labors, in which case he is liable for each one individually, since this law is not decisive but applies only when he was unwitting concerning the labors alone and acted intentionally with regard to Shabbat. For if he was also unwitting concerning Shabbat in addition to being unwitting concerning the labors, he is liable to only one sin-offering.]

And similarly, you find with regard to idolatry, for it teaches

in the Mishna that it entails one liability for karet, even though it includes four forms of service, for performing each of which in the service of idolatry one is liable separately: slaughtering an offering to idolatry, pouring a libation, burning an offering, and bowing. One who performs all of them with intentionality concerning idolatry and unwittingness concerning the forms of service—he knew that it is prohibited to worship it, but did not know that these forms of service are prohibited—is liable to four sin-offerings. Since the Mishna counts idolatry as only one liability, it must be that it stated the case of

unwittingness concerning idolatry and intentionality concerning the forms of service,

for which he is liable to only one, since one lapse of awareness caused him to perform all of them.

This is proof for the above establishment concerning Shabbat, that it is speaking of unwittingness concerning Shabbat and intentionality concerning the labors.

And we ask:

Unwittingness concerning idolatry -

what are the circumstances?

If you say that he stood in a house of idolatry and thought

mistakenly that it was

a synagogue, and bowed,

there is a difficulty: Why should he be liable for a sin-offering for this bowing?

His heart was directed toward Heaven,

and he did not worship idolatry at all.

Rather, if he saw a statue,

a statue in the form of the king, which had not been erected for the purpose of idolatry, but people bowed to it in honor of the king,

and bowed [

bowed]

to it.

This remains difficult, for either way -

if he accepted it as a deity,

he himself made the statue into an object of idolatry and knowingly worshipped idolatry, and if so,

he is liable to stoning

and does not bring a sin-offering.

And if he did not accept it as a deity,

then his bowing to it

is nothing,

since the statue was not originally made for idolatrous worship, nor did he make it into an object of idolatry, and it follows that he did not worship idolatry at all.

[Rashi explained the passage here in this manner. It follows from his words that only in the case of a statue, which was not made for idolatrous worship, is one who bows to it exempt when he did not intend to worship it. But if he bowed to a genuine object of idolatry, he is liable even if he did not intend by his bowing to worship idolatry. So too wrote the Hafetz Hayim, of blessed memory, in Likutei Halakhot. It is necessary to distinguish this from what was stated above concerning one who stands in a house of idolatry and bows to the Holy One, blessed be He]. See note 35.

Rather,

the circumstance of unwitting idolatry is that he bowed to it knowing that it was idolatry. But the bowing itself was not performed with the intention of worshipping idolatry; rather, it was

out of love

for a person, as he wished to please him by bowing to the idolatry,

or

he bowed to it

out of fear

of a human being . He thought that it was permitted to bow to idolatry when doing so out of love or fear of a person. This is unwittingness concerning idolatry—for he thought that there was no prohibition in this manner—and intentionality concerning the forms of service, since he intended by his bowing to bow to idolatry .

This works well according to Abaye, who said

that one who worships idolatry out of love or fear

is liable

to a sin-offering.

But according to Rava, who said

that one who worships idolatry out of love of a person or fear of a person

is exempt -

what can be said?

What is the unwittingness concerning idolatry for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering?