Keritot 3a — the Talmud in English

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for his sister who is

also

his father's daughter and

also

his mother's daughter

for whom he is liable for karet, for the punishment of karet was not written concerning her in the Torah. And even though karet was already written concerning his sister who is his father's daughter, and likewise karet was already written concerning his sister who is his mother's daughter, as it is written (Leviticus 20:17): “And a man who takes his sister, his father's daughter, or [who takes his sister who is] his mother's daughter—and they shall be cut off,” and if so, it is a kal va-chomer that he should be liable for his sister who is both his father's daughter and his mother's daughter, nevertheless the Torah increased karet concerning her explicitly [from the surplus expression “he has uncovered the nakedness of his sister” at the end], in order to

say that punishments are not imposed

through a derivation

from the law

[from a kal va-chomer ]. For it would have been possible to derive the punishment of karet for his sister from his father and his mother by a kal va-chomer from his sister on only one side, and nevertheless the Torah had to write the punishment explicitly; from here we learn that this is a rule throughout the Torah that punishments are not imposed through the law .

And

if

Rabbi Yitzchak,

who learns from “his sister” at the end of the verse to make a distinction concerning his sister who is his father's sister and his mother's sister, and the verse was not superfluous, according to his position—from where does he know that one is liable for his sister who is his sister both from his father and from his mother?

He holds that punishments are imposed through the law,

and there is a punishment for her by a kal va-chomer.

Alternatively,

Rabbi Yitzchak also holds that punishments are not imposed through the law. Rather, with regard to the punishment for his sister who is from his father and his mother, he

derives the punishment,

the liability of karet,

from the warning,

from the prohibition. For in the warning the Torah increased the prohibition of a negative commandment concerning his sister from his father and his mother, as it is written in the portion of Aharei Mot (Leviticus 18:9): “The nakedness of your sister, your father's daughter or your mother's daughter, you shall not uncover their nakedness.” And we expound in tractate Makkot (14a), from the fact that it is written (there, verse 11), “She is your sister,” to include a warning concerning his sister who is also his father's daughter and his mother's daughter. And Rabbi Yitzchak holds that just as his sister from his father and his mother is included in the warning, so too she is included in the punishment of karet stated concerning his sister from his father alone or from his mother alone.

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Hoshaya said: Everywhere that you find

that there are written

two negative commandments

that are distinct,

and one karet

that includes both of them, then there is

a distinction of sin-offerings between them,

so that even if he violated both of them in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for a separate sin-offering for each one.

And what is it?

[That is to say, where do we find one karet for two negative commandments?]

The

compounder [the one who compounds oil and spices according to the formula of the anointing oil specified in the Torah],

[the apothecary who prepares oil and spices according to the formula of the anointing oil specified in the Torah],

and

the

one who anoints

a human's flesh with the anointing oil in the Temple.

They are

two negative commandments

that are distinct,

as it is written

concerning them (Exodus 30:32): “

It shall not be poured on human flesh”—this is a negative commandment not to anoint with the anointing oil. “

According to its formula

you shall not make one like it”—this is a separate negative commandment prohibiting compounding.

And it is written concerning both of them

one karet

only.

As it is written (there, verse 33): “

Whoever compounds one like it, and whoever puts some of it on an outsider—

shall be cut off from his people.”

And accordingly we raise an objection from Rabbi Hoshaya's words against what we said above, that the karet of his sister was stated to make a distinction concerning his sister who is his father's sister and his mother's sister:

And since

we find that

negative commandments

that are separate

make a distinction

in the liability for the transgression into separate sin-offerings, even though one karet was stated concerning both of them, if so,

why does the Merciful One write the karet of his sister

to make a distinction concerning his sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter and to make him liable for three sin-offerings—

why is it needed!?

For there is a separate negative commandment for each of the three forms of brotherhood, and consequently there is also a liability for three distinct sin-offerings ?

And we answered:

According to Rabbi Yitzchak—

the karet of his sister is needed

as it is fitting for him.

To teach that those liable for karet do not receive lashes, as we already said above that this is what Rabbi Yitzchak derives from the karet of his sister.

According to the Rabbis—

it is needed for them

for the verse from which they expound “his sister” at the end of the verse, to include his sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter.

To say that punishments are not imposed through the law!

[And therefore the beginning of the verse, “And a man who takes,” was written because of the end. For this is the way of the Torah: to alter a passage for the sake of a novelty that was introduced in it. Here, the verse altered the passage of liability for karet concerning his sister for the sake of a novelty introduced in it—that punishments are not imposed through the law.]

Rav Nahman bar Yitzchak said: We too have learned

in the Mishna according to Rabbi Hoshaya's statement, that negative commandments make a distinction into sin-offerings.

For we learned:

One who compounds the oil, one who compounds the incense, and one who anoints with the anointing oil!

And it can be examined:

Why is it needed that it teaches “

one who compounds the incense”

in the middle,

interrupting the compounding of the incense between one who compounds the oil and one who anoints with the oil? What—

is this not teaching us: Just as incense

has the prohibition of its compounding

as a separate negative commandment, and one is liable for it

a sin-offering

separately [if he compounded the incense and compounded the anointing oil in one lapse of awareness]—

[if he compounded the incense and compounded the anointing oil in one lapse of awareness]—

so too, compounding oil and anointing likewise,

even though one karet was written concerning them,

since they have

each of them

a separate negative commandment, one is liable for them

a sin-offering for each one

separately!

And if you would say

that the incense was not placed in the middle for this reason, but because

he wanted to teach the compoundings

of the oil and the incense

together,

and therefore he placed one who compounds the incense adjacent to one who compounds the oil.

This is not a refutation, for if it were because of that—

let us reverse it: One who compounds the incense, one who compounds the oil, and one who anoints with the anointing oil!

For in such a case the incense would not separate between one who compounds the oil and one who anoints with it. And if so, it is still difficult:

Why did he divide the oil

and interrupt it in the middle by means of the incense? What—

is this not teaching us—

that there is a distinction of sin-offerings between them !

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who has intercourse with a male.

And we inquire about it: The

tanna

who counted thirty-six karetot, which, as we said above, comes to teach that if one transgressed all the transgressions for which there is liability for a sin-offering in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each one, and altogether they are thirty-four sin-offerings—

with what

[with what person]

does he count

that it is possible for him to be liable for all of them?

If he is counting men—

remove

[from the count]

the woman who is penetrated by an animal,

which is not possible in a man,

and one is lacking from it

[and one is lacking from the count of thirty-six]

one!?

If he is counting women,

who had intercourse with her son, her husband's son, her father-in-law, her son-in-law, and so on, then—

remove from their number

the

one who has intercourse with a male and with an animal,

which does not apply to a woman,

and they are lacking

[and two are lacking from the count]

two!?

And we answered:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The tanna is always—

counting men. And

in place of the woman who is penetrated by an animal

teach it this way: One who has intercourse with a male, and who caused a male to have intercourse with him. And it is Rabbi Yishmael, who says

that one who does this in one lapse of awareness

is liable for two.

[Because he holds that there are distinct negative commandments for the active and passive partners, as we expound shortly. And we already learned above from Rabbi Hoshaya's words that everywhere there are two negative commandments, there is a distinction of sin-offerings between them.]

And we challenge this:

But since it teaches “one who blasphemes” at the end

of the Mishna,

and we establish it

below in our chapter (7a)

according to Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that one who blasphemes is liable for a sin-offering, as it is taught there in a beraita, if so,

the beginning too is Rabbi Akiva

and it does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael!?

And if you would say

that the

Mishna is Rabbi Akiva, and at the beginning,

concerning the male who is the active and passive partner,

he holds

Rabbi Akiva

like Rabbi Yishmael

and makes him liable for two.

But Rabbi Abahu said:

One person

who has intercourse with a male and

also

caused a male to have intercourse with him

in one lapse of awareness—

According to Rabbi Yishmael, who derives it

the negative commandment for the active and passive partners

from two verses: From “

You shall not lie with a male” (Leviticus 18:22)—

a warning for the active partner,

and from “

There shall not be a consecrated prostitute among the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18)—

a warning for the passive partner [and concerning the liability for karet of the passive partner, see Rashi and Tosafot ]—

he is liable for two,

because they are distinct negative commandments, and therefore there is a distinction of sin-offerings between them .

According to Rabbi Akiva -

he is liable for only one .

For both derive from one verse

for both of them. For it is written:

“You shall not lie with a male”,

and

we read

in it

also

as though it were written:

“You shall not be lain with.”

And since they are included in one prohibition, he is liable for only one sin-offering for them. If so, it is impossible to establish the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva and to make him liable in the first clause for two, on account of the male who lies and the male who is lain with! And we answer:

Rather,

the

first clause

which we established as counting one who has intercourse with the male and one who brings the male upon himself as two separate liabilities, is according to

Rabbi Ishmael. And with regard to the blasphemer, he holds

Rabbi Ishmael

like Rabbi Akiva.

And we object:

If so,

that the first clause comes according to Rabbi Ishmael,

let it also teach: One who has intercourse with an animal, and one who brings an animal upon himself

that he is liable for two! For it would have occurred to us that according to Rabbi Ishmael, one who brings an animal upon himself is also warned by “There shall not be a consecrated one” .

And we answer:

Abaye said: One who has intercourse with an animal, and one who brings an animal upon himself, even according to Rabbi Ishmael, is liable for only one.

For when the verse

“There shall not be a consecrated one”

is written concerning men

it is

written

only concerning men and not concerning an animal. For a person’s being lain with by an animal is not called “prostitution,” and consequently the one who is lain with is not called “a consecrated one.” [And the prohibition against bringing an animal upon himself is learned from the prohibition against having intercourse with an animal; therefore he brings one offering for both].

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav:

The Mishna counts the distinct liabilities concerning males. And as for what was difficult for us—that if so, it cannot count the woman lain with by an animal, and one sin-offering is missing from the count—we answer that in truth the tanna did not count the woman lain with in the count of sin-offering liabilities. Rather,

the tanna teaches thirty-three sin-offerings

alone; rather,

and he also teaches

also

three karet obligations -

the woman lain with, the Paschal offering, and circumcision,

to complete them

all the acts in which there are

karet obligations.

The Tosafot asked: If so, why does he not also teach one who brings a male upon himself and one who brings an animal upon himself?

And from where

is it evident that this is the tanna’s intention?

For he teaches in the latter clause: The Paschal offering and circumcision, among the positive commandments.

And we discussed it:

The Paschal offering and circumcision -

why does he teach them? And if you say, in order to bring a sin-offering

of

for them -

this is impossible, for

does one bring

an offering for neglecting the commandments of the Paschal offering and circumcision?

But it was taught: The entire Torah was compared

with regard to liability for a sin-offering

to

the law of the sin-offering required for

idolatry.

For it is written (Numbers 15:29–30),

“For the one who acts unintentionally there shall be one law, and the person who acts defiantly” [the reference is to the sin of idolatry], and we interpret:

“There shall be one law for you for one who acts unwittingly, and the person who acts defiantly”

and the reference is to the sin of idolatry], and we derive:

Just as idolatry

is prohibited by a negative commandment, which is a command of

“sit and do not act”

for whose intentional violation one is liable for karet and for whose unintentional violation one brings a sin-offering [as is explicit there, that he brings a sin-offering],

so too every

negative commandment that is

“sit and do not act”

for whose intentional violation there is karet, one is liable for a sin-offering for its unintentional violation.

If so, the Paschal offering and circumcision, which are not negative commandments but positive commandments of “rise and act,” do not entail a sin-offering when neglected unintentionally. Why, then, does the tanna count them?

Rather, no; learn from here: The tanna teaches thirty-three sin-offerings, and afterward teaches three karet obligations in order to complete the karet obligations.

Learn from here.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who desecrates Shabbat:

They said

rhetorically: Surely the sin-offering liabilities of

Shabbat -

are thirty-nine!

For we learned above [2b] that the tanna of the Mishna in tractate Shabbat mentioned the count of the principal categories of labor in order to teach us that if one performed them all, he is liable for thirty-nine sin-offerings. If so, it is difficult that our tanna should say that there are seventy-five karet obligations [75 = 39 + 36]!?

So wrote Rashi. And in the margin it was emended to seventy-four. For Shabbat is already counted in the Mishna as one of the thirty-six karet obligations, and the Gemara’s difficulty is that instead of counting Shabbat as one karet obligation, it should count it as thirty-nine karet obligations; if so, only thirty-eight are added.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The tanna

of the Mishna, who counted one who desecrates Shabbat as one karet obligation, spoke of

unawareness of Shabbat

[believing that the day was an ordinary weekday]

and intentionality regarding the labors

[knowing that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat],

for

in this situation

he is liable for only one

sin-offering, even if he performed all the labors. For he transgressed all of them because of one unawareness concerning the day of Shabbat, and this is only one unawareness. Since liability for a sin-offering depends on the transgressor’s unawareness, if there was one unawareness, he is liable for only one sin-offering.

The principal intention of the tanna in counting the karet obligations is to teach for what one is liable for a sin-offering. Therefore, when two acts are included in one sin-offering liability, the tanna counts them as one.

For it was taught:

It is written in the section of the sin-offering (Leviticus 4:2), “When a person sins unintentionally and does one of them.” The mem in “one of them” is superfluous, for Scripture could have said, “and does one of them.” Rather, “does” applies both to “one” and to “them,” and the verse must be read as follows: “And does from one, and does them”!

And this implies:

Sometimes one does “from one,” that is, one transgression alone, and is liable for “them,” that is, many offerings [as will be explained in the beraita below].

And sometimes one does

“them”

[many transgressions]

that are one

[all the transgressions are included in one sin-offering liability]. And in what situation do we say this? In

unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding the labors.

And we object:

Let him teach

in the Mishna a situation in which there was

intentionality regarding Shabbat

[he knew that the day was Shabbat]

and unawareness regarding the labors

[he forgot that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat],

for he is liable for thirty-nine,

and let him count seventy-four karet obligations! [See above concerning the number].

And from where do we know that in this situation he is liable for each labor separately?

For it was taught:

“And does from one of them” -

Sometimes he is liable for one for all of them,

as we expound: “them that are one” [he performs many labors, which resemble many transgressions, and is liable for only one liability for them].

And sometimes he is liable for each one and one,

as we expound: “one that is them” [when he transgressed all the labors of Shabbat, he in fact transgressed only one negative commandment, for all of them are prohibited by the one prohibition “You shall not perform any labor,” and nevertheless he is liable for many sin-offerings].

And it was taught:

How is

“one that is them”?

Intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding the labors.

And we answer:

The tanna

of the Mishna

preferred unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding the labors

to teach in the Mishna, in order to teach us the novelty

that from a sin-offering

one

at least he is not exempt

even though he acted intentionally regarding the labors.

So explained Rashi in his first explanation.

In his second explanation, he explained that the tanna preferred to state unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding the labors, for which one is liable for only one, because this is a decisive and fixed matter: one is never liable for fewer than one sin-offering—whether he was unaware of Shabbat alone or was unaware of Shabbat together with unawareness of the labors. This is not so if he were to state unawareness regarding the labors, for which he is liable for each one and one, since this law is not decisive, but applies only when he was unaware of the labors alone and acted intentionally regarding Shabbat. For if he was also unaware of Shabbat in addition to his unawareness of the labors, he is liable for only one sin-offering.

And likewise you find with regard to idolatry, for he teaches

in the Mishna one karet liability, even though it contains four forms of service for which one who performs them for idolatry is liable for each one separately: slaughtering an offering for idolatry, pouring a libation, burning an offering, and bowing. One who performs all of them with intentionality regarding idolatry and unawareness regarding the forms of service—knowing that it is prohibited to serve it, but not knowing that these forms of service are prohibited—is liable for four sin-offerings. Since the tanna in the Mishna counts idolatry as only one liability, necessarily he stated

unawareness regarding idolatry and intentionality regarding the forms of service,

for which he is liable for only one, since one unawareness caused him to transgress all of them.

And this is proof for the establishment we stated above concerning Shabbat, that the case is one of unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding the labors.

And we discussed it:

Unawareness regarding idolatry -

what are the circumstances?

If you say that he stood in a house of idolatry and thought

mistakenly that

it was a synagogue, and bowed.

The difficulty is: Why is he liable for a sin-offering for this bowing?

For his heart was directed toward Heaven,

and he did not serve idolatry at all.

Rather, if he saw an image,

a statue in the form of the king’s likeness, which had not been erected for idolatry, but people bow to it in honor of the king,

and bowed

[bowed down]

to it.

It is still difficult, for whichever way you consider it:

If he accepted it upon himself as a deity,

he himself made the image into an object of idolatry and served idolatry intentionally, and if so

he is liable to stoning

and does not bring a sin-offering.

And if he did not accept it as a deity,

then his bowing

is nothing,

since the image was not initially made for idolatry, and he too did not make it into an object of idolatry; consequently, he did not serve idolatry at all.

So explained Rashi here. It follows from his words that only with regard to an image that was not made for idolatry is one who bows to it exempt when he did not intend to serve it. But if he bowed to actual idolatry, he is liable even if he did not intend by his bowing to serve idolatry. So too wrote the Hafetz Hayim, of blessed memory, in the book Likutei Halakhot. And one must distinguish between this and what was said above regarding one who stands in a house of idolatry and bows to the Almighty. See note 35.

Rather,

the situation of unintentional idolatry is that he bowed to it while knowing that it was idolatry. But the bowing itself was not performed with the intention of serving idolatry; rather,

out of love

for a person, for he wished to please him by bowing to the idolatry,

and

likewise if he bowed to it

out of fear

of a human being . And he thought that it was permitted to bow to idolatry when he did so out of love or fear of a person. This is unawareness regarding idolatry—for he thought that there was no prohibition in this manner—and intentionality regarding the forms of service, since he intended by his bowing to bow to idolatry .

This works for Abaye, who said

that one who serves idolatry out of love and fear

is liable

for a sin-offering.

But according to Rava, who said

that one who serves idolatry out of love of a person or fear of a person

is exempt -

what can be said?

What is unawareness regarding idolatry for which one is liable for a sin-offering?