Keritot 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

And we raise the following question concerning the words of the tanna, who emphasized that the number of prohibitions punishable by karet is thirty-six:

Why do I need the enumeration?

After all, it would have sufficed for him to mention the names of the prohibitions that involve karet, and we could count them ourselves?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

To teach us

that

even

if he performed them all,

all the transgressions enumerated in the Mishna,

in a single lapse of awareness—

that is, he was mistaken concerning all of them during the same period of time, believing that they were all permitted, and consequently transgressed them unwittingly, without realizing between one transgression and the next that he had sinned—

he is liable

to bring a separate sin-offering

for each and every one,

since they are distinct transgressions.

“A lapse of awareness” refers to a state in which one is unaware of the prohibition. This may mean that he was unaware of the law—that he did not know that the Torah prohibited the matter [in circumstances in which the rule that one who says, “It is permitted,” is considered an accidental offender rather than one forced by circumstances does not apply, as explained in the notes]—or that he was unaware of the facts—for example, he believed that this woman was his wife and had relations with her, and it turned out that she was his sister.

They said that even if he performed them “in a single lapse of awareness,” because it is specifically in the case of a single lapse of awareness that we need to be taught that he is liable to bring separate sin-offerings. But in the case of separate lapses of awareness—for example, after he transgressed one prohibition, he learned that he had transgressed, and afterward he erred and transgressed the second prohibition— \-

there is no novelty in this. One who transgresses during separate lapses of awareness is liable to bring a sin-offering for each act separately, even when the transgression is of the same prohibition. For example, he erred once and transgressed, afterward learned of the prohibition, and then again erred and transgressed it. All the more so is this true of distinct transgressions that he performed during separate lapses of awareness.

And although in truth there is no liability to bring a sin-offering for all thirty-six of the prohibitions punishable by karet, since one who neglects the Paschal offering or the mitzva of circumcision is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as these are positive commandments, the tanna emphasized the number in order to teach us that if one transgressed, during a single lapse of awareness, all the prohibitions for which there is liability to bring a sin-offering, he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each and every one.

Furthermore,

we raise the following question:

As we learned [in tractate Shabbat, page 73a]:

[Shabbat 73a]:

The primary categories of labor

of Shabbat

are forty minus one—

why do I need the enumeration?

And we explain: The tanna emphasized the number in order to teach us

that if he performed them all,

all thirty-nine primary categories of labor of Shabbat,

in a single lapse of awareness,

he is liable

to bring a separate sin-offering

for each and every one.

And although all the labors are prohibited on account of the same prohibition—from the negative commandment, “You shall not perform any labor”—nevertheless, as will be derived below from a verse, there is a separate liability for each primary category of labor in its own right. [The later authorities discussed at length whether each labor on Shabbat has the status of a prohibition in its own right, or whether the multiplicity expressed by the verse refers only to the division of sin-offerings. See the book Tosefet Ḥayyim].

And

further,

we raise the following question:

As we learned (below, page 8a):

(below, 8a):

Four

are lacking atonement [people—men or women—who were impure and became pure, but are still not sufficiently pure to eat consecrated food until they bring the offerings prescribed for them, as immersion and sunset alone do not suffice for them as they do for other impure persons. They are: a zav, a zava, a woman who gave birth, and a leper. The designation “those lacking atonement” is borrowed terminology, since they are not lacking atonement but rather “lacking purification”: they have not yet become fit to eat consecrated food or enter the Temple]—

are those who were ritually impure and became pure, but are not yet permitted to eat consecrated food until they offer the offerings prescribed for them. Immersion and sunset are not sufficient for them, as they are for other impure people. They are: a man with a discharge, a woman with a discharge, a woman after childbirth, and a leper. The name “those who lack atonement” is borrowed terminology, since they do not actually lack atonement but rather “lack completion of purity”; they have not yet become fit to eat consecrated food or enter the Temple—

why do I need

the number

four?

And we explain: In order

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who said: There are five

who are lacking atonement

indeed!

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: A convert

who converted, although he has already been circumcised and immersed, is considered

one lacking atonement,

and he is prohibited from eating consecrated food

until the blood is sprinkled upon him

of his offering [which he is required to bring as a burnt-offering when he converts]. For it is written (Numbers 15:15), “As you are, so shall the convert be,” and we derive from this verse (below, page 9a): Just as your ancestors entered the covenant only through circumcision, immersion, and the bringing of an offering, as stated at the end of the portion of Mishpatim, so too converts enter the covenant only through circumcision, immersion, and the bringing of an offering.

And the first tanna wished to teach us that he does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, and

that is why the tanna stated

the number

four,

to teach us that a convert is not considered one lacking atonement. Had he not mentioned a number in his statement, we could have said that he does hold in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, and that a convert is indeed one lacking atonement, although he did not mention him, since the tanna did not intend to enumerate all those lacking atonement, but only some of them, leaving other cases of those lacking atonement unmentioned. But now that the tanna stated the number “four,” he is saying that there are only this number of those lacking atonement, and no more.

The reason of the first tanna is explained below (page 8b): A convert is not included among those lacking atonement because the offering he brings serves to permit him to enter the Jewish people, and not to permit him to eat consecrated food or enter the Temple.

Furthermore,

we ask:

As we learned (below, page 8b):

(below, 8b):

Four bring an offering

for intentional acts

as they do for unwitting acts—

why do I need the enumeration?

And we explain: In order

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

according to whom only three bring an offering for an intentional act as they do for an unwitting act.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: The oath concerning a deposit [the case of one whom another demanded to return a deposit entrusted to him, but he denied that it was in his possession and swore falsely concerning his denial; his law is that he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for the oath by which he denied possessing the deposit]—

[this refers to a person who was demanded to return a deposit entrusted to him, denied that it was in his possession, and swore falsely concerning his denial; he must bring a guilt-offering for the oath by which he denied possessing the deposit]—

its intentional violation cannot be atoned for,

and therefore it is atoned for by a guilt-offering only when he violated it unwittingly!

That is why the tanna stated four,

who bring an offering for an intentional act as they do for an unwitting act, in order to include among them the guilt-offering for the oath concerning a deposit when the oath was taken intentionally.

Furthermore,

we ask:

As we learned (below, page 9a):

(below, 9a):

Five bring one offering for many transgressions—

why do I need the enumeration?

And we explain:

Because he wished to teach in the latter clause: A nazirite

who became impure brings only one offering of a nazirite who became impure, even

if he became impure many times.

A nazirite is prohibited from becoming impure through contact with the dead, and if he becomes impure, he invalidates the count of the days he had counted initially. He must purify himself from his impurity by having the ashes of the red heifer sprinkled upon him on the third and seventh days and immersing on the seventh day, as is done by all those impure through contact with the dead. On the seventh day he also shaves his head. On the eighth day he brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons—one as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering—and a sheep as a guilt-offering, and begins counting the days of his naziriteship anew. If he became impure many times, he brings one offering for all of them, as will be explained later.

And you find this case

in which he is liable to bring only one offering for many episodes of impurity

when,

he became impure once, purified himself from his impurity, shaved on the seventh day as required, and on that same day it happened

that he became impure on the seventh day,

and again counted seven days with sprinkling, immersion, and shaving,

and once again became impure on the seventh day,

so that despite having become impure three times, he brings only one offering.

And who is

the tanna of the Mishna?

It is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

As he says: The naziriteship of purity,

which the nazirite begins to count anew after becoming pure,

takes effect upon him from

the

seventh day

[after he has undergone sprinkling, immersed, and shaved],

that is when it takes effect upon him.

Therefore, the episodes of impurity are considered many, since he became impure again after he had already begun, on the seventh day, to count his naziriteship of purity.

For on the seventh day of his purification, since he has already become pure from the essential impurity, after counting seven days, undergoing sprinkling, and immersing, he is no longer a primary source of ritual impurity but rather one who immersed that day, who is prohibited only from eating teruma until the stars emerge.

Nevertheless, he brings only one offering for all the episodes of impurity, since when he became impure a second time [and should have become liable to bring an additional offering on account of the second impurity], the time had still not arrived for him to bring his offerings for the first impurity, which is the eighth day. Therefore, one offering fulfills his obligation for all the episodes of impurity. [See Tosafot in Nazir, page 18 … and it appears that Rashi’s wording here should likewise be interpreted along these lines].

[The reason they said, “He once again became impure and once again became impure,” is that he wished to explain the expression “many episodes of impurity,” which implies at least three episodes of impurity—Rashi].

For if you were to say

that this Mishna is in accordance with

Rabbi,

who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

then, since

Rabbi holds

that the naziriteship of purity does not take effect until

the

eighth day

[the day on which he brings his offerings],

how does it occur

that he would be liable to bring only one offering for many episodes of impurity

in that case?

a case in which he is liable to bring only one offering for many instances of impurity?

If he became impure on the seventh day

[the day of his shaving]

and once again became impure on the seventh day,

then in this situation it is considered as though

it is all one extended impurity,

since he became impure again at a time when his naziriteship of purity had not yet taken effect anew. It is not considered one offering for many episodes of impurity, but rather one offering for a single impurity.

And if he became impure on the eighth day

[the day on which he brings his offerings] and became pure,

and

again

once again became impure on the eighth day,

then

since he had passed

the eighth day

at the time fit for bringing an offering

for his previous impurity, and had already become liable to bring the offering of a nazirite who became impure on its account, and only afterward became impure again, the previous impurity does not combine with the new impurity. Therefore,

he is liable

to bring an offering

for each and every one!

Rather, conclude from this: It is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

Therefore, the tanna mentioned the number five for those who bring one offering for several liabilities, so that we would know that a nazirite is included, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. It was not sufficient that he explicitly mentioned a nazirite, because had he not emphasized the number five, we could have said that the Mishna follows Rabbi, and we would have thought that “a nazirite” should not be read in the Mishna.

What is the opinion of Rabbi, and what is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda?

As it was taught:

It is written concerning a nazirite who became impure and then became pure (Numbers 6:11), “

And he shall consecrate his head

[when he begins counting the days of his naziriteship of purity anew]

on that day,” and

we derive:

On the day he brings his offerings,

which is the eighth day of his purification, he begins the count of the days of his new nazirite crown,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: On the day of his shaving,

which is the seventh day of his purification, he begins the new count of the days of his naziriteship.

Furthermore,

we raise the following question concerning

that which we learned (below, page 9a):

(below, 9a):

Five bring an offering

[a sin-offering]

of variable value.

They are: (a) one who takes an oath of testimony [when another person administered an oath to him to come testify on his behalf, but he denied under oath and claimed that he did not know testimony on behalf of his fellow, and was found to have lied].

(b) One who takes an oath of utterance [by which he prohibited something to himself under oath or accepted upon himself under oath to perform some act, and violated his oath].

(c) One who is impure and enters the Temple or eats consecrated food.

(d) and (e) A woman who gave birth and a leper, when they become pure from their impurities. [It is called an offering of variable value because its law varies according to whether one is wealthy or poor: a wealthy person brings an animal whose value is high, while a poor person brings a bird whose value is lower].

The enumeration

of these five who bring an offering of variable value—

why do I need it?

In order to understand the Gemara’s answer, several principles concerning liability to bring a sin-offering must be introduced.

In the portion of Vayikra, several sections concerning the sin-offering are written. Among them are the fixed sin-offering of an ordinary individual, the sin-offering of a ruler [the king], and the bull brought for an erroneous ruling concerning a matter hidden from the community. Likewise, there is the sin-offering of variable value, brought for an oath of testimony, an oath of utterance, or by one who was impure and entered the Temple or ate consecrated food. [There are also other offerings of variable value, those of a woman who gave birth and of a leper, which are explained in the portions of Tazria and Metzora].

The “fixed sin-offering of an ordinary individual” is the sin-offering brought for most unwitting transgressions, which the individual sinner brings for his sin in the form of a female sheep or female goat. It is called a “fixed” sin-offering because it does not vary between a wealthy person and a poor person.

The “sin-offering of a ruler” is brought by a ruler who unwittingly transgressed one of those prohibitions for which an ordinary individual brings a female sheep or female goat. The ruler, however, brings a male goat as a sin-offering in place of the female goat brought by an ordinary individual, and it is called “the ruler’s goat.”

When the court erred in its ruling and instructed that one of the prohibitions for whose unwitting violation an individual brings a female sheep or female goat is permitted, they bring a bull as a sin-offering. This is what is called “the bull for an erroneous ruling concerning a matter hidden from the community.”

The “offering of variable value” comes to atone for one who enters the Temple or eats consecrated food while impure [and although these are unwitting violations of prohibitions whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, their law differs from that of other unwitting violations punishable by karet, for which one brings a fixed sin-offering].

Likewise, the sin-offering of variable value atones for one who violates an oath of utterance or an oath of testimony [for which there is no karet]. It is called an offering of variable value because its law varies according to whether one is wealthy or poor: a wealthy person brings a female sheep or female goat; one who cannot afford an animal brings a bird as a burnt-offering; and one who cannot afford even a bird brings a sinner’s meal-offering.

And we learned in the Mishna in tractate Horayot (page 8b) that when the court erred and permitted one of the transgressions for which an individual is liable to bring an offering of variable value, they are not liable to bring a bull for an erroneous ruling concerning a matter hidden from the community, because that bull is brought only for an erroneous ruling concerning prohibitions for which an individual brings a fixed sin-offering.

And the tanna’im there disagreed concerning the law of a ruler:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that a ruler is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for all those transgressions for which an ordinary individual is liable to bring an offering of variable value. His reason is that in the passage concerning an offering of variable value it is written (Leviticus 5:7–11), “And if he cannot afford,” and likewise, “And if he cannot afford.” Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives: It is one who may become poor who brings an offering of variable value; this excludes a ruler, who is wealthy and can never become poor.

Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Shimon say that a ruler is liable to bring an offering of variable value, like an ordinary individual.

And Rabbi Eliezer distinguishes between impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, for which one is liable to karet, and oaths, for which there is no karet. The ruler’s goat is brought for every unwitting violation punishable by karet, including those for which an individual brings an offering of variable value. Therefore, he brings a goat as a sin-offering even for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, since their intentional violation is punishable by karet.

But concerning an oath of testimony and an oath of utterance, which are not punishable by karet, the law of a ruler is the same as that of an ordinary individual: he brings an offering of variable value.

Accordingly, we answer that the tanna stated the enumeration of “five who are liable to bring an offering of variable value”

because he teaches in the latter clause

of the Mishna in tractate Horayot:

A ruler—

is like them!

His law is like that of the Great Sanhedrin. That is, just as the Great Sanhedrin brings a bull for an erroneous ruling concerning a matter hidden from the community only when it ruled that a prohibition for which an individual brings a fixed sin-offering is permitted, and not for prohibitions for which an individual is liable to bring an offering of variable value, so too a ruler does not bring a goat for these transgressions.

And Rabbi Eliezer disagrees there and maintains that a ruler brings a goat even for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, as he does for the other sins, despite the fact that an individual brings an offering of variable value for them.

Therefore,

teach

in the Mishna below, in this tractate, the number

five,

to teach that every person who brings an offering for one of these five matters—including a ruler who became liable to bring a sin-offering for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, which is punishable by karet—brings specifically an offering of variable value, and no one brings a fixed sin-offering for them. And

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: A ruler brings

for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects

a goat.

For had the tanna not stated the number “five,” we would have thought to emend the Mishna and establish it as referring to only four, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. We would have removed impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects from it, since not everyone brings an offering of variable value for it—for example, a ruler, according to Rabbi Eliezer. According to Rabbi Eliezer, a ruler is liable to bring a goat for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, and not an offering of variable value.

Rather, this Mishna follows either Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who maintains that a ruler is entirely exempt from all offerings for which an ordinary individual is liable to bring an offering of variable value, or Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Shimon, who maintain that a ruler brings an offering of variable value [and not a goat] even for impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, whose intentional violation is punishable by karet. Therefore, it properly teaches “five,” because all those liable to bring an offering for each of these five transgressions are liable to bring an offering of variable value for it.

Furthermore,

we raise the following question concerning

that which we learned (in Bava Kamma, page 2a):

(in Bava Kamma 2a):

Four primary categories of damage—

why do I need the enumeration?

To exclude the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya.

As he said (there, page 4a):

(there, 4b):

There are thirteen primary categories of damage. [Although the designation “primary category” is generally given to a law that has derivative cases, whereas the primary categories of Rabbi Oshaya have no derivatives, they are nevertheless called primary categories because their law is like that of the four primary categories—that one pays from the choicest of his land].

[Although the term “primary category” is generally given to a legal category that has derivative cases, while Rabbi Oshaya’s primary categories have no derivatives, they are nevertheless called primary categories because their law is the same as that of the four primary categories: one pays from the choicest of his real property].

And according to Rabbi Oshaya—

why do I need

his

enumeration?

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya.

As he said (

there):

twenty-four primary categories of damage.

And according to Rabbi Ḥiyya—

why do I need the enumeration?

To exclude a moser,

who informed against another to gentiles, thereby causing him financial loss.

And one who renders an offering piggul,

a koen who slaughtered an offering belonging to an Israelite with the intention of eating it beyond its appointed time, thereby invalidating it and causing the owner to lose his offering.

We return to explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words:

The Master said

[Rabbi Yoḥanan]: The tanna included an enumeration in order to teach

that if he performed all of them during a single lapse of awareness,

that

he is liable for each one individually.

And we raised a difficulty:

Granted,

that he would be

entirely exempt

from a sin-offering when he performed all of them unwittingly during a single lapse of awareness,

you cannot say that.

As it is written (

Leviticus 18:29): “

For anyone who commits any of all these abominations

shall be cut off,” and since karet is written regarding all of them when performed intentionally, it follows that when performed unwittingly this is an unwitting violation punishable by karet, for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering. [This is how the Rashbam explains it; see the Shita Mekubetzet in the omissions, letter 14.]

Rather,

the difficulty is as follows:

Say

that if he

transgressed one, he is liable for one,

but even if he

transgressed

one of

all of them during a single lapse of awareness,

also

he is liable for only one,

for from where do we know that he does not discharge his obligation with a single sin-offering for all of them together? [The Hafetz Hayim, of blessed memory, wrote in Likkutei Halakhot that the question applies only to forbidden sexual relations, since the Torah included all of them under a single karet at the end of Parashat Aharei Mot. But regarding other prohibitions, where karet is written separately for each one, it is obvious that he is liable for each one individually, and the following exposition is not needed for that. Nevertheless, earlier, at the beginning of the Gemara, it appears that there is a novel point regarding all those liable for karet: that one is liable for each of them individually. This is why the tanna enumerated thirty-six cases liable for karet. The same is implied by Maimonides, chapter 4 of the Laws of Unintentional Offerings, halakha 1.]

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For this reason karet was stated with regard to his sister—

although for all forbidden sexual relations one karet is written that includes them all together, as it is written in Parashat Aharei Mot, “and the souls that perform them shall be cut off,” nevertheless the Torah wrote a separate karet regarding the forbidden relation with one’s sister.

For it is written in Parashat Kedoshim (Leviticus 20:17): “And a man who takes his sister—he shall be cut off before the eyes of the members of his people.”

And why was the case of one’s sister singled out from the general category, with karet written for it separately? In order

to divide

and teach that for each and every one of the transgressions punishable by karet among the forbidden sexual relations, one brings a separate sin-offering, even if he performed them during a single lapse of awareness.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye challenged this: Say

that only with regard to

his sister, which the verse singled out

in

the verse

with a special karet,

he should be liable for one

separate sin-offering for it when he performed it together with the others.

But

if he performed

all of them,

which were not each assigned a separate karet but were included under a single karet, let us say:

since

he performed them

during a single lapse of awareness, he should be liable for only one—for they were all included under a single karet.

We are astonished at Rav Bibi’s question:

And according to Rav Bibi bar Abaye,

does he not accept

that which was taught in a beraita: Anything that was included in a general category and then singled out from the general category in order to teach—

it did not emerge to teach about itself

alone; it

emerged to teach about the entire general category!?

This is, after all, one of the Thirteen Principles by Which the Torah Is Expounded!

How:

it is written (Leviticus 7:20), “

And the person who eats the flesh

of the sacrifice of the peace-offering that belongs to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off from his people.” And this is difficult: Why is a special verse necessary with regard to peace-offerings to make one who eats them in a state of ritual impurity liable to karet?

Were peace-offerings not included among all the sacred offerings

for which karet is stated for eating them in a state of ritual impurity

already?

For it is written in Parashat Emor (Leviticus 22:3): “Say to them for your generations: Any man of all your offspring who approaches the sacred offerings that the Children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him—that person shall be cut off from before Me!”

If so, the question arises:

Why were they singled out

to have karet written for them separately?

Rather, the verse comes

to compare them

and teach:

Just as peace-offerings, which are offerings of the altar, and for which one is liable

to karet if he eats them in a state of ritual impurity,

so too, all offerings that are offerings of the altar, one is liable for them

to karet.

This excludes offerings for the maintenance of the Temple,

for one who eats them while in a state of bodily impurity is not liable to karet.

If so, with regard to one’s sister as well, we should say that she was singled out from the general category to teach about the entire category, as follows: Just as one’s sister, for whom there is karet and for whom one is liable separately, so too, for every relation punishable by karet one is liable separately. Why, then, did Rav Bibi challenge that there would be a separate liability only for one’s sister?

And we answered:

Rav Bibi bar Abaye can say to you—

and from it,

from that very beraita with which you challenge me, \-

I will bring proof for my position!

Did you not say there,

with regard to peace-offerings:

This excludes offerings for the maintenance of the Temple! [The fact that peace-offerings were singled out from the general category in order to teach about the entire category—that one is liable to karet for them—applies only to offerings resembling peace-offerings, namely offerings of the altar, but not to offerings for the maintenance of the Temple.] If so,

here too

we should say that the karet stated with regard to one’s sister teaches only about the category resembling it, and derive as follows:

Just as one’s sister,

for whom the Torah specified a separate liability, is

unique

in that

she is a forbidden relation that cannot become permitted during the lifetime of the one who prohibits her,

as there is no possibility that she could become permitted to her brother,

so too, every

forbidden relation entails a separate liability only if it is a forbidden relation

that cannot become permitted during the lifetime of the one who prohibits her.

This excludes a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of her husband,

for he is the one who renders her forbidden to the entire world through the marriage with which he betrothed her, and he can permit her by divorcing her with a bill of divorce. Since she does not resemble the forbidden relation with one’s sister, she is excluded, so that one is not liable for her separately when he transgressed against her and the other forbidden relations during a single lapse of awareness.

On this basis Rav Bibi bar Abaye challenged that one should not be liable separately for a married woman, because one’s sister, who was singled out from the general category, does not teach about a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who prohibits her. [The Rashbam added that a menstruant woman can also become permitted and therefore cannot be derived from one’s sister.] Thus, Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s question remains!

And we answered:

Rabbi Yona said, and some say Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: The verse says

in the section of forbidden sexual relations at the end of Parashat Aharei Mot (Leviticus 18:29), “

For anyone who commits any of these abominations

shall be cut off”—

all the forbidden sexual relations were compared to one’s sister,

for “all the abominations” includes all the forbidden sexual relations: one’s sister, a married woman, a menstruant woman, and all the others.

To teach us:

Just as one’s sister entails a separate liability

even if he transgressed with regard to her together with the others—for this division is learned from the fact that one’s sister was singled out separately—

so too, every

forbidden sexual relation, including a married woman,

entails a separate liability.

And we challenge this:

And according to Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says:

all the forbidden sexual relations that are

liable for karet

were included

under one karet

already [that is, they were all included in that one karet, as it is written (Leviticus 18:29), “For anyone who commits—and the souls that commit them shall be cut off”],

why was karet stated with regard to one’s sister,

only in order

to adjudicate it

as one whose punishment is

karet and not lashes?

His intention is to disagree with the tanna of the Mishna in tractate Makkot (23b), who said that anyone who violates a negative commandment punishable by karet is liable to lashes like all other negative commandments, and once he receives lashes he is exempt from karet. Rabbi Yitzḥak comes to expound from the fact that one’s sister was singled out with a separate karet that for a negative commandment punishable by karet, karet is the sole punishment for the negative commandment, and there are no lashes, even if witnesses warned him. Since he derives that the karet of one’s sister was stated for this purpose,

from where does he derive the division of liabilities?

And we answered:

He derives it from “

And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation you shall not approach” (Leviticus 18:19). The words “and to a woman” are superfluous, since the verse could have said, “You shall not approach a menstruant woman.” This superfluity comes

to divide liability for each and every woman, [that is, to establish a separate sin-offering for each distinct prohibition in the section of forbidden sexual relations.]

And according to this we challenge:

And

according to

the Rabbis as well, let them derive

the division of liabilities

from “

and to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation,” and why did they need to derive it from the fact that the karet of “one’s sister” was singled out?

And we answered:

Indeed, that is so;

in truth, the Rabbis too derive the division of liabilities from “and to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation,” and not from the karet of one’s sister.

Rather, the karet of one’s sister—

what does it come for? It is needed to divide liability for one’s sister, one’s paternal aunt, and one’s maternal aunt,

so that you should not say: Since all three are prohibited on account of kinship, they should be considered a single category of prohibition, and if he transgressed against all of them during a single lapse of awareness he should be liable for only one sin-offering. Therefore, one’s sister was singled out to divide the liabilities and establish a separate liability for each one.

And we challenge this:

These

three forbidden relations based on kinship—

why

is it

necessary for them

that the case of one’s sister be singled out in order

to divide liability?

After all,

they have

distinct names

of prohibition,

which are divided,

for although all three are prohibited as relations of kinship, nevertheless each one is prohibited under a distinct name of forbidden relation and through a distinct negative commandment [as it is written (Leviticus 18:9), “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your sister”; and there (verse 12), “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s sister”; and there (verse 13), “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister.”]

And after all,

they are also distinct

bodies

of forbidden relations,

which are divided.

Since these are different women, each prohibited by a different negative commandment, it is obvious that he is liable separately for each one, just as with all the prohibitions that we derive from “and to a woman,” namely, that if he performed them during a single lapse of awareness he is liable separately for each one.

Rather, say

that one’s sister was singled out with a separate karet in order

to divide liability for one’s sister, who is

also

his paternal aunt, and who is

also

his maternal aunt, teaching that if he had relations with her unwittingly, he is liable for three sin-offerings. [This is possible only in the case of a wicked son of a wicked man: one man had relations with his mother and she bore him two daughters; he had relations with one of them and she bore a son; and this son had relations with the other daughter, who was his paternal half-sister, his maternal aunt, and his paternal aunt (through his mother).]

In such a case, there are distinct names of prohibition applying to a single person, and one might have thought that he is liable for only one, since perhaps what we learned from “and to a woman”—that one is liable for each one—applies only when he performed three separate acts with three different persons under three distinct names of prohibition. Therefore, the Torah wrote an extra karet with regard to one’s sister, to include the case where he transgressed all three prohibitions of kinship in a single act involving a single person, establishing that he is liable separately for each one.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak,

who derives from the karet of one’s sister that those liable for karet are exempt from lashes,

this matter,

the division of liability in the case of one’s sister who is also his paternal aunt and maternal aunt, establishing liability for three sin-offerings—

from where does he derive it?

For according to his view, the karet of one’s sister is not superfluous for teaching this law.

He derives it from “

his sister”

at the end of the verse

[this is the version of the Shita Mekubetzet].

As it is written

at the end of the verse, “And a man who takes his sister shall be cut off before the eyes of the members of his people”—“

He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister.”

That is, the karet written at the beginning of the verse with regard to the sister mentioned in its first clause also applies to the sister mentioned in its latter clause. It follows that the sister in the latter clause was singled out to subject her to a superfluous karet, in order to divide liability in the case of one’s sister who is also his paternal aunt and maternal aunt.

And the Rabbis, who hold that those liable for karet receive lashes and derive from the karet written in the first clause of the verse the division of liability in the case of one’s sister who is also his paternal aunt and maternal aunt—if so, “

his sister”

at the end of the verse—

what do they do with it?