Keritot 24a — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages ![](pamud.bmp "

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with regard to one who designates two provisional guilt-offerings for responsibility,

so that if one of the two is lost, he will attain atonement with the one that remains and was not lost,

and he attained atonement with one of them, for

the

second

guilt-offering, which remains, does not go out into the flock, but

shall graze until it becomes blemished, it shall be sold, and its money shall fall to a freewill offering;

And we explain:

What is the reason?

For

Rabbi Meir disagreed with them only because he did not reveal his intention

when he designated a provisional guilt-offering

that his heart troubles him. For what he designated the provisional guilt-offering was only because of the doubt, for this is the law, that one who has a doubt brings a provisional guilt-offering, and this is not proof that his heart troubles him.

For he designated the asham taluy only because of the doubt, since that is the law: one who has a doubt brings an asham taluy. This is not proof that his heart was troubled.

But here,

when he designated two for responsibility for one established obligation, it is proved that his heart troubles him. For

after all, one

offering only

was he required to designate,

and

why did he designate two?

Necessarily, because

he reasoned: If one is lost [

it is lost],

I shall attain atonement with the other one, its fellow! And since he revealed his intention that his heart was troubled, therefore he completely consecrated it,

so that if the second is not lost but is offered, its value will be a freewill offering for the altar .

Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: The Sages concede to Rabbi Meir, with regard to a provisional guilt-offering

that he designated not because of his own [knowledge], but because witnesses came and testified that he had eaten doubtfully forbidden fat, and it happened

that his witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses —

that it shall go out and graze in the flock;

What is the reason? The Sages disagreed with him

only where he designated it on his own word, for we say that his heart troubles him.

But where he designated it on the word of witnesses, he was not relying on the witnesses,

for where he designated it on the word of witnesses,

he knows the truth, that he did not eat doubtfully forbidden fat. And even when they compelled him to designate an offering on the word of the witnesses, his heart does not trouble him and he does not think with certainty that he will offer it, because

he reasons: Perhaps there will come

other

witnesses and expose them as conspirators,

the false witnesses, and I shall be exempt from the offering .

Rava objected:

We learned in our Mishna:

The ox sentenced to stoning is not so,

but

if before it was stoned

it became known that it was not liable to stoning —

it shall go out and graze in the flock;

What are the circumstances?

That is, how did it happen that at first its sentence was completed for stoning and afterward it became clear that it was not liable to stoning?

If you say that two witnesses came

—witnesses—

and said: “This ox killed

a person,”

and

afterward two

witnesses

and

said: “It did not kill,”

it should be difficult:

“What did you see that you obeyed the latter ones? Obey the first ones!?”

And why does the ox go out and graze in the herd, for the matter has not emerged from the status of uncertainty!?

Rather, is it not

the case here that we are dealing

with conspiring witnesses,

whom the latter ones are believed to say, “You were with us elsewhere and did not see this matter about which you testified”; therefore the ox goes out and grazes in the herd.

And Rava inferred:

And correspondingly,

just as in the case of the ox sentenced to stoning, which we established as involving conspiring witnesses,

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering

mentioned in the Mishna, we likewise have to establish that it is dealing

with conspiring witnesses.

And

nevertheless

they disagree

the Sages with Rabbi Meir, and they hold that although he became obligated to set aside the provisional guilt-offering only because of false witnesses, and the falsity of the witnesses became clear by their being declared conspiring witnesses, nevertheless his heart troubles him; therefore the offering does not go out and graze in the herd, but grazes until it develops a blemish, and its value is assigned to a free-will offering.

Abaye said to him: Perhaps the ox sentenced to stoning

is not dealing with conspiring witnesses. Rather,

what are the circumstances? For example, when the

slain man

came on his feet,

and thereby the witnesses were contradicted.

And correspondingly,

it likewise deals

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering.

For example,

that at first he set it aside on his own initiative, and his heart troubled him, and afterward it happened

that the

second

piece

that had remained was recognized as being forbidden fat, and it became clear that the piece he had eaten was the piece of permitted fat. Only in such a case do the Sages hold that his heart troubles him and he completes the consecration of the offering even if it becomes clear that he had not sinned.

But where he set it aside as a provisional guilt-offering on the basis of witnesses,

where there is room to say that his heart does not trouble him, and he thinks that he will find witnesses to declare them conspiring,

he does not

graze until it develops a blemish; rather, it goes out and grazes in the herd.

And we say: The matter in which Rav Yehuda and Rava disagreed—whether the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir in the case of conspiring witnesses—

in a dispute

this matter was likewise disputed by Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar.

For it was stated:

A provisional guilt-offering whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses—

Rabbi Elazar says: It is like the meal-offering of jealousy

of a woman suspected of adultery whose witnesses of the warning and seclusion were declared conspiring witnesses.

For it was taught:

A woman suspected of adultery whose

witnesses were found

—those who testified that she had secluded herself with the man with whom her husband had warned her not to seclude herself, and they are

conspiring witnesses—

the designation “woman suspected of adultery” is removed from her. Therefore,

her meal-offering—

shall go out to non-sacred status!

And the same law applies to a guilt-offering: if the witnesses who obligated him in a provisional guilt-offering were declared conspiring witnesses, it goes out and grazes in the herd.

Rabbi Yohanan said: It shall graze until it develops a blemish, and it shall be sold, and its value shall fall to a free-will offering.

And we raised a difficulty:

And Rabbi Yohanan,

why does he not

compare it to the meal-offering of jealousy!?

And we answer:

It is not similar

a provisional guilt-offering to a meal-offering of jealousy. For

a meal-offering of jealousy does not come for atonement, but to clarify the sin,

whether she committed adultery or not.

But a provisional guilt-offering, which comes for atonement,

we say that

since his heart troubles him,—

he completes its consecration

even on the possibility that it will become clear that he had not sinned.

Rabbi Kruspedai said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: An ox sentenced to stoning whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses

after they had caused it to be liable for stoning—

whoever takes possession of it has acquired it. 9 .

For since its judgment was completed for stoning, it is prohibited from benefit and is ownerless,

as we assume that its owners rendered it ownerless.

Rava said: Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is plausible, for example, when

the conspiring witnesses say to him that

his ox mated with a person,

and he believes them and renders his ox ownerless.

But

if

the witnesses said

that the owner himself

made his ox mate with a person,

then

he himself certainly knows that it did not mate with a person, and he does not render it ownerless; rather, he takes pains and brings witnesses

to declare them conspiring witnesses.

And we raised a difficulty:

And how is this different from that which Rabbah bar Itai said in the name of Resh Lakish: An idolatrous city

whose entire property is prohibited from benefit and is destined for burning,

whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses—

whoever takes possession of it

of its property

acquires it!?

And why do we not say that the inhabitants of the city do not render their property ownerless, since they know the truth and will take pains to declare the conspiring witnesses conspiring witnesses?

And we answer:

An idolatrous city consists of many people, [

and the law of the city depends on the sin of the majority]; therefore

each one

of its inhabitants

says in his mind: I

indeed

did not sin,

but another person

did

indeed

sin,

and each one thinks that the witnesses’ words are indeed true

and renders his property ownerless.

But here,

in the case of the ox sentenced to stoning,

since

only

the matter depends on him,

then

he himself certainly knows that it did not mate with a person, and he does not render it ownerless

to his ox

, and he takes pains and brings witnesses

to declare them conspiring witnesses.

Resh Lakish said: One who gives a gift

of movable property

to his fellow, and the latter said,

the recipient of the gift,

“I do not want it,”

the gift, for I do not want it—

whoever takes possession of it acquires it,

for when the recipient uses such an expression, he thereby renders it ownerless; we do not say that the gift returns to the one who gave it.

And we challenge:

And how is

this law of Resh Lakish

different from that which Rabbah bar Avuha said in the name of Rav Sheshet—and some say that Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rav Sheshet: A recipient of a gift

of land

who said after

the deed of

the gift came into his hand:

According to Rashi’s version,

“Let this gift be annulled, annulled, I do not want it,”

he has said nothing.

For the meaning of this expression is that from now onward, after he has already acquired the field, he does not desire the gift. A person cannot annul his ownership by expressing unwillingness toward his ownership unless he renders his property ownerless. But this person does not render it ownerless; he expresses his present unwillingness regarding the gift.

And from here there is no difficulty against Resh Lakish. For Resh Lakish’s words concern a recipient of movable property, where the gift has already reached his hand and he now renders it ownerless. But Rav Sheshet spoke of a recipient of land by means of a deed, who does not render the land ownerless but expresses his present unwillingness regarding the gift. And once he has received the deed into his hand, he can no longer withdraw from the gift without rendering it ownerless. This will be further explained in note 12. And the difficulty against Resh Lakish is from the continuation. For it is taught:

However, if he said in wording whose meaning is a disclosure of his דעת that he did not wish to acquire the gift from the outset, such as when he said:

“It is nullified; it is not a gift”

it is so—

his words stand,

because the admission of a litigant is deemed like one hundred witnesses.