Keritot 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages

in the case of one who designates two ashamot taluyin as replacements,

so that if one of the two is lost, he will receive atonement through the one that remains and has not been lost,

and he received atonement through one of them, since

the

second asham,

which remains, does not go out to the herd; rather,

it grazes until it develops a blemish, and it is sold, and its proceeds go to a free-will offering;

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Sages only because he did not express his intent

when he designated an asham taluy

that his heart was troubled.

For he designated the asham taluy only because of the doubt, since that is the law: one who has a doubt brings an asham taluy. This is not proof that his heart was troubled.

But here,

when he designated two animals as replacements for one established obligation, it is clear that his heart was troubled. For

after all, one

offering alone

was what he needed to designate,

and

why did he designate two?

Necessarily, it was because

he thought: If one is lost, [

it will be lost,]

I will receive atonement through the other one! And since he revealed that his heart was troubled, consequently he fully consecrated it;

so that if the second one is not lost but is sacrificed, the value of this one will be a free-will offering for the altar .

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The Sages concede to Rabbi Meir, in the case of an asham taluy

that he designated not because of his own knowledge, but because witnesses came and testified that he had eaten possible forbidden fat, and it happened

that his witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses —

that it goes out and grazes in the herd;

What is the reason? The Sages disagreed with him

only where he designated it on the basis of his own statement, saying that it should graze until it develops a blemish and its proceeds go to a free-will offering,

but only where he designated it on the basis of his own statement, for we say that his heart is troubled.

But where he designated it on the basis of witnesses, he did not rely upon the witnesses,

for he knows the truth—that he did not eat possible forbidden fat. And even when the witnesses compelled him to designate an offering on the basis of their testimony, his heart is not troubled, and he does not think with certainty that he will sacrifice it, because

he thinks: Perhaps other

witnesses will come

and expose them as conspiring witnesses,

and I will be exempt from the offering .

Rava raised an objection:

We learned in our Mishna:

A condemned ox is not so,

but

if, before it was stoned,

it became known that it was not liable to stoning —

it shall go out and graze in the herd;

what are the circumstances?

That is, how did it happen that initially its judgment was concluded for stoning and afterward it became clear that it was not liable to stoning?

If you say that two witnesses came

as witnesses and

said: “He killed

this ox a person,”

and

afterward two

more witnesses

and

said: “He did not kill him,”

one could object:

“What did you see that you followed the latter witnesses? Follow the first ones!”

And why, then, should the ox be released to graze among the herd, when the matter has not emerged from the status of uncertainty?

Rather, is it not

here referring

to conspiring witnesses,

whom the later witnesses are believed when they say, “You were with us elsewhere and did not see the matter about which you testified”? Therefore the ox is released to graze among the herd.

Rava inferred:

And similarly

with regard to the ox sentenced to stoning, which we established as referring to conspiring witnesses,

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering

mentioned in the Mishna, we must likewise establish that it is referring

to conspiring witnesses.

And

nevertheless

the Rabbis disagree

with Rabbi Meir and maintain that although he became obligated to set aside the guilt-offering only because of false witnesses, and the falsity of the witnesses was established by having them declared conspiring witnesses, nevertheless his heart troubles him. Therefore the offering is not released to graze among the herd; rather, it grazes until it becomes unfit, and its value is used for a voluntary offering.

Abaye said to him: Perhaps the ox sentenced to stoning

was not discussing conspiring witnesses. Rather,

what are the circumstances? For example, when the

murdered man

came walking on his feet,

thereby contradicting the witnesses.

And similarly,

the case

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering

is

when he initially set it aside on his own initiative, and his heart troubled him, and afterward it occurred

that the

second

piece

that remained was identified as being the forbidden fat, and it was clarified that the piece he had eaten was the piece of permitted fat. Only in such a case do the Rabbis maintain that his heart troubles him, and he completes the consecration of the offering even if it becomes clear that he did not sin.

But where he set aside the provisional guilt-offering on the basis of witnesses,

so that there is room to say that his heart does not trouble him, and he thinks that he will find witnesses to declare them conspiring witnesses,

he does not

let it graze until it becomes unfit; rather, it is released to graze among the herd.

And we say: This matter, concerning which Rav Yehuda and Rava disagreed—whether the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir in the case of conspiring witnesses—

was disputed

in a similar dispute by Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar.

As it was stated:

A provisional guilt-offering whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses—

Rabbi Elazar says: It is like the meal-offering of jealousy

of a sota whose witnesses to the warning and seclusion were declared conspiring witnesses.

As it was taught:

A sota whose

witnesses were found

—who had testified that she had secluded herself with the man whom her husband had warned her not to be secluded with—were

conspiring witnesses—

the designation “sota” is annulled for her. Therefore

her meal-offering

is released as ordinary property!

The same is true of a guilt-offering: if the witnesses who obligated him to bring a provisional guilt-offering were declared conspiring witnesses, it is released to graze among the herd.

Rabbi Yohanan said: It grazes until it becomes unfit, and it is sold, and its value is used for a voluntary offering.

And we challenged this:

And Rabbi Yohanan,

why does he not

compare it to the meal-offering of jealousy!?

And we answer:

A provisional guilt-offering is not similar

to the meal-offering of jealousy. For

the meal-offering of jealousy does not come for atonement; rather, it comes to clarify the sin,

whether she committed adultery or not.

But a provisional guilt-offering, which comes for atonement,

we say that

because his heart troubles him—he

completes the consecration of it

even in the event that it becomes clear that he did not sin.

Rabbi Kruspedai said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: An ox sentenced to stoning whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses

after they had caused it to become liable for stoning—

whoever takes possession of it acquires it. 9 .

For once its verdict has been finalized for stoning, it is prohibited from benefit and is ownerless ,

as we presume that its owners rendered it ownerless .

Rava said: Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is compelling in a case where the conspiring witnesses tell him

that

his ox mated with a person,

and he believes them and renders his ox ownerless.

But

if

the witnesses said

that the owner himself

mated with his ox,

then

he himself knows that it did not mate, and he does not render it ownerless; rather, he takes the trouble to bring witnesses

to declare them conspiring witnesses.

And we challenged this:

And how is this different from that which Rabba bar Eitai said in the name of Resh Lakish: With regard to an idolatrous city

whose entire property is prohibited from benefit and must be burned,

whose witnesses were declared conspiring witnesses—

whoever takes possession of it,

of its property,

acquires it!?

Why do we not say that the inhabitants of the city do not render their property ownerless, since they know the truth and will take the trouble to have the conspiring witnesses declared conspiring witnesses?

And we answer:

An idolatrous city belongs to many people, [and the status of the city depends on the sin of the majority]; therefore

and the city’s status depends on the sin of the majority]. Therefore,

each one

of its inhabitants

says in his mind: “I

indeed

did not sin,

but

someone else

indeed

sinned,”

and each one thinks that the witnesses’ words are true

and renders his property ownerless.

But here,

with regard to an ox sentenced to stoning,

as

only

he himself is concerned,

then

he himself knows that it did not mate, and he does not render it ownerless

his ox

, but takes the trouble to bring witnesses

to declare them conspiring witnesses.

Resh Lakish said: With regard to one who gives a gift

of movable property

to another, and the latter said,

the recipient of the gift,

“I do not want it,”

the gift, saying that he does not want it—

whoever takes possession of it acquires it,

for when the recipient uses such language, he thereby renders it ownerless; we do not say that the gift returns to the one who gave it.

And we object:

And how is

this law of Resh Lakish different

from that which Rabba bar Avuha said in the name of Rav Sheshet—and some say Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rav Sheshet: A recipient of a gift

of land

who said after

the deed of

the gift came into his hand: [According to Rashi’s version,]

“This gift should be nullified; it is nullified; I do not want it”

—

he has said nothing.

This wording means that from now on, after he has already acquired the field, he does not desire the gift. A person cannot annul his ownership by expressing his unwillingness to retain ownership unless he renders his property ownerless. Here, however, he is not rendering it ownerless; he is merely expressing his present unwillingness to retain the gift .

There is no difficulty for Resh Lakish from here. Resh Lakish’s statement concerns a recipient of movable property to whom the gift has already come, and who now renders it ownerless. Rav Sheshet, by contrast, spoke of a recipient of land who received a deed, and who does not render the land ownerless but merely expresses his present unwillingness to retain the gift. Once he has received the deed, he can no longer withdraw from the gift without rendering it ownerless. This will be explained further in note 12. The difficulty for Resh Lakish is from the continuation. For it teaches:

However, if he said something whose wording expresses his intent that he did not wish to acquire the gift from the outset, for example, if he said:

“It is void; it is not a gift”

it is—

his words stand,

because the admission of a litigant is considered like the testimony of one hundred witnesses.