Keritot 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

Is that not

what we said, that when the recipient of a gift says, “It is null,”

his words stand—

the meaning is

that it returns

the field

to its owner!

And we do not say that from the moment the donor gave the gift, it is as though he removed it from his possession and it became ownerless. This is difficult for Reish Lakish, who says concerning a recipient of movable property that if the recipient says, “I do not want it,” it becomes ownerless and does not return to the donor. [See Rashi].

And we answer:

No

you cannot infer from this that the gift returns to its owners. Rather, this is what we are saying:

the words

of the recipient of the gift

stand.

And he,

the donor,

also does not acquire it.

Rather—

whoever takes possession of it acquires it.

And this is as Reish Lakish said.

The following objection was raised

against Reish Lakish:

If one says to his fellow,

who is his partner in a field:

“I have no legal claim or dealings concerning this field,”

or he said to him:

“I have no involvement with it, and my hand is withdrawn from it,”—

he has said nothing,

and he has not forfeited his share in the partnership.

And we analyze this:

But

a partner who says to his fellow,

“My hand is withdrawn from it,”

is considered

as though he said,

“I do not want this field,”

is he not?

For in both of these expressions he neither declares the field ownerless nor gives it away; he merely reveals that he does not desire ownership of the property.

And it teaches: He has said nothing!

Why, then, did Reish Lakish say concerning a recipient of a gift that if he says, “I do not want the gift,” it is as though he declared it ownerless?

And we reject this:

The case there is different,

involving a partner,

who said

all three expressions together. We say:

When he withdrew himself—

only

from legal claims and dealings

concerning the field did he withdraw himself. But

from the substance of the field

itself

he did not withdraw himself.

The following objection was raised:

A dangerously ill person

who writes his property to others

[see Rashi]

and there are slaves among it, and the recipient says,

the one who acquired them:

“I do not want them,”

the slaves—

if their second master

the recipient

is a priest—

they may eat

the slaves

teruma,

according to the law governing a priest’s slave, since his statement, “I do not want them,” has no legal effect.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once he said

that

“I do not want them,” the heirs have already acquired them,

and the slaves may not eat teruma.

Granted according to

the approach of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

there is no difficulty for Reish Lakish, for

he holds

that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the end reveals the intention at the beginning. It may be said:

When a person gives a gift, he gives it

with the intention that it be accepted by the recipient.

But

when it is not accepted by the recipient,

it returns to its owner,

for he did not give it with the intention that they would say, “We do not want to accept it.”

But according to

the approach of

the first tanna,

who does not accept that the end reveals the intention at the beginning, there is a difficulty for Reish Lakish. For

if

you say that

when

the recipient of the gift says,

“I do not want them,”

whoever takes possession of them acquires them,

because he considers this an expression of declaring them ownerless, then

here,

in the case of a dangerously ill person who wrote his slaves to his fellow, the priest, when

he says,

the

second

recipient, the priest who received the gift of the slaves,

“I do not want them,”

then according to Reish Lakish, who holds that this is an expression of declaring them ownerless,

they would become

the slaves

non-priests,

and would not be the priest’s slaves,

and

it would follow that according to Reish Lakish

non-priests are eating teruma!

Rather, it is proved from here that the expression “I do not want it” is not an expression of declaring something ownerless.

And we answer:

He holds that one who declares his slave ownerless

has gone out

indeed

to freedom,

even without a deed, but

he requires a deed of emancipation from his master

in order for the designation of slave to be removed from him.

And he holds that a priest’s slave whom his priestly master declared ownerless, who is

awaiting a deed of emancipation,

is delayed for a deed of emancipation,

still

eats teruma,

because he continues to be a priest’s slave, even though financially he has gone free and his master can no longer subject him to servitude.

We learned in the Mishna: “One who brings an asham talui and then learns that he did not sin”—

Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be offered,

since if it is not brought for this sin, it is brought for another sin.

And we inquire:

According to Rabbi Eliezer, why do I need

to say that it is brought for another

sin?

But

Rabbi Eliezer said: An asham talui is brought as a voluntary offering! For we learned in a Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may offer an asham talui every day!

Rav Ashi said:

The intention of the tanna of our Mishna was according to

Rabbi Eliezer, as they said to

Ben Buta [in the Mishna on the following page];

he

is the one to whom it refers.

For we learned in a Mishna: Rather, they say to him, “Wait”

before bringing an asham talui

until you enter into a situation of doubt,

lest you have transgressed, even a transgression that does not carry the penalty of karet.

We learned in the Mishna:

If, after it was slaughtered,

the asham talui, but before its blood was sprinkled,

he learned

that he had not sinned, the flesh is taken to the place of burning.

It teaches: “The flesh is taken to the place of burning”! Evidently, unconsecrated animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard

are subject

to burning.

And we juxtapose a contradiction: A definite asham is not so,

for its law is not the same as that of an asham talui. Regarding it we say that since his heart troubles him, he fully consecrates it even if he did not sin. Rather,

if, before it was slaughtered,

he learned that he had not sinned, it

goes out

to unconsecrated status

and shall graze among the flock.

But if

after it was slaughtered

he learned that he had not sinned, and it is therefore unconsecrated meat slaughtered in the Temple courtyard,

it must be buried!

Why, then, did the tanna of our Mishna say that an asham talui is burned?

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction; the one who taught

this Mishna

did not teach that one.

Rabba said:

Why are you comparing

a definite asham to an asham talui?

A definite asham

was consecrated in error, because he thought that he had sinned. Now, when it became clear to him that he had not sinned,

since he does not need it

at the time of its consecration, it is obvious that he

does not consecrate it,

and a consecration made in error is not a valid consecration.

But

an asham talui,

when he knew at the time of its consecration that perhaps he had not sinned at all and did not need to bring an offering, yet consecrated it in any event, we attribute this to the fact that

because his heart troubled him

over the possibility that he had sinned,

he fully consecrates it

so that it will be an offering even if he indeed had not sinned.

Rather, if there is a difficulty, it is a difficulty concerning a definite asham and another definite asham.

For it teaches:

If he learned that he had not sinned after the asham was slaughtered,

it must be buried.

Consider the latter clause:

If he learned that he had not sinned after the blood was sprinkled,

the flesh is taken to the place of burning!

And we answer:

This

is indeed a contradiction; the one who taught this did not teach that.

Rav Ashi said: There is no difficulty for you from a definite asham and another definite asham. Since it was consecrated in error, its law is burial. As for what the tanna of our Mishna said—that if he learned after the blood was sprinkled its law is burning—this is a special decree,

the blood was sprinkled—

because

after the sprinkling

it appears like an invalid sacrifice,

and people might err and say that an invalid sacrifice is subject to burial. Therefore, they decreed that if he learned after the sprinkling of the blood, it should be burned as though it were an invalid sacrifice.

We learned in the Mishna: One who brings an asham talui and learns that he did not sin—if the blood has already

been sprinkled,

the flesh may be eaten.

And we inquire:

Why

may the flesh be eaten?

But

he has acquired knowledge that he did not sin, and the Torah said that an asham offering applies only when the verse “and he did not know” applies to him!?

Rava said: The verse states:

[Leviticus 5],

“And he did not know”—

“and he shall be forgiven.”

But he had not acquired knowledge at the time of forgiveness,

which is the time of the sprinkling.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if

he learned after

the blood was already in the bowl,

the blood is sprinkled and the flesh may be eaten.

And we inquire:

According to Rabbi Yosei—

why should the blood be sprinkled

at all?

But he acquired knowledge at the time of forgiveness!?

Rava said: Rabbi Yosei follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: Anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it has already been sprinkled.

And we reject this:

You may say that Rabbi Shimon said

this with regard to something destined to be sprinkled, but this one—

when he learned that he had not sinned, it became clear retroactively that this blood

was not destined to be sprinkled!?

In the West they said: Rabbi Yosei holds that the sacred vessels sanctify an invalid offering initially, so that it may be offered.

Although this blood was received in a sacred vessel, and it was retroactively revealed that it was not destined to be sprinkled, it was nevertheless sanctified for sprinkling through its sanctification in the sacred vessel.

We learned in the Mishna:

“A definite guilt-offering is not so, etc. It was stated: When does an eglah arufah become forbidden”

according to the law of an eglah arufah?

Rav Hamnuna said: While it is still alive,

as will be explained below.

Rabba said: After decapitation 21 .

Granted, according to Rabba,

it is well that it becomes forbidden only after decapitation,

from the moment that an act has been performed upon it.

But according to Rav Hamnuna, from when?