Keritot 24b — the Talmud in English

What, is it not that which we say: the recipient of a gift who says, “It is nullified”—

his words

stand—

the intention is

that it returns

the field

to its owner!

And we do not say that from the moment the giver gave the gift, it is as though he removed it from his domain, and it is ownerless. And this is difficult for Reish Lakish, who says concerning a recipient of a gift of movable property that if the recipient says, “I do not want it,” it is ownerless and does not return to the giver. [And see Rashi] .

And we answer:

No,

do not infer from it that the gift returns to its owners. Rather, this is what we are saying:

the words

of the recipient of the gift

stand.

And he,

the giver of the gift,

also does not acquire it.

Rather—

whoever takes possession of it acquires it.

And this is as Reish Lakish said.

It was raised as an objection

to Reish Lakish:

One who says to his fellow,

who is his partner in the field:

“I have neither legal claim nor dealings concerning this field.”

Or he said to him:

“I have no business in it, and my hand is removed from it”—

he has said nothing,

and he has not forfeited his share in the partnership.

And we analyze:

But

a partner who says to his fellow, “

My hand is removed from it,”

is

like “

I do not want this field,”

they are equivalent,

for in both of these expressions he neither makes it ownerless nor gives it, but merely reveals that he does not desire ownership of the matter,

and it teaches: He has said nothing!

And why did Reish Lakish say concerning a recipient of a gift that if he says, “I do not want the gift,” it is as though he made it ownerless!?

And we reject this: The case there

is different,

with a partner,

for he said

all three expressions at once. We say:

when he withdrew himself—

only

from legal claim and dealings

in the field did he withdraw himself. But

from the body of the field

itself

he did not withdraw himself.

It was raised as an objection:

A critically ill person

who writes his property to others [see Rashi],

and there were slaves among it,

and the other said,

the recipient:

“I do not want them”—

the slaves—

if their second master

the recipient

is a priest,

they eat

the slaves

teruma,

as is the law of a priest’s slave, since there is nothing in these words of his, in which he said, “I do not want them.”

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Since he said

“

I do not want them, the heirs have already acquired them,”

and he does not eat teruma.

Granted according to

the method of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

it is not difficult for Reish Lakish. For

he holds

that we say: the end proves concerning the beginning. It can be said:

when a person gives a gift, he gives it

with the understanding that they will accept it from him.

But

when they do not accept it from him,

it returns to its owner,

for he did not give it with the understanding that they would say, “We do not want to accept it.”

But according to

the method of

the first tanna,

who does not hold that the end proves concerning the beginning, it is difficult for Reish Lakish. For

if

you say that

when

the recipient of the gift says, “

I do not want them,”

whoever takes possession of them acquires them,

because he considers it an expression of making ownerless, then

here,

with a critically ill person who wrote his slaves to his fellow, the priest, where

the

recipient’s

second

the priest who received the gift of the slaves says, “

I do not want them,”

then according to Reish Lakish, who holds that it is an expression of making ownerless,

they become

the slaves

non-priestly,

and they are not the priest’s slaves,

and

it follows that according to Reish Lakish

non-priestly persons are eating teruma!

Rather, it is proven from here that the expression “I do not want it” is not an expression of making ownerless.

And we answer:

He holds: one who makes his slave ownerless

goes out

indeed

to freedom

even without a document, but

and he requires a bill of manumission from his master

so that the designation of “slave” will depart from him.

And he holds: a priest’s slave whom his priestly master made ownerless, who is

a

person awaiting a bill of manumission,

still

eats teruma,

because he continues still to be a priest’s slave, despite the fact that financially he has gone out to freedom and his master cannot enslave him.

We learned in the Mishna: One who brings a provisional guilt-offering and learns that he did not sin— Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be offered, since if it does not come for this sin, it comes for another sin. And we raised a question about it:

According to Rabbi Eliezer, why is it necessary for him

to say that it comes for another

sin?

For

did Rabbi Eliezer not say: A provisional guilt-offering is brought as a voluntary offering? As we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may voluntarily bring a provisional guilt-offering every day!

Rav Ashi said:

The intention of the tanna of our Mishna is according to

Rabbi Eliezer who was told

by Ben Buta [in the Mishna on the following page];

he

is the one whom it concerns.

For we learned: Rather, they say to him, “Wait”

before bringing a provisional guilt-offering

until you enter into the realm of doubt,

lest you transgressed, even a transgression for which there is no excision.

We learned in the Mishna:

If, after it was slaughtered,

the provisional guilt-offering, and before the blood was sprinkled,

it became known

that he had not sinned—the flesh goes out to the place of burning.

It teaches: The flesh goes out to the place of burning! Apparently, non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard

their law is

burning.

And we raise a contradiction: A definite guilt-offering is not so,

for its law is not like the law of a provisional guilt-offering, since we say concerning it that because his heart troubles him, he completely consecrates it even if he did not sin. Rather,

if, before it was slaughtered,

it became known that he had not sinned—

it goes out

to the non-sacred sphere

and it grazes among the flock.

And if

after it was slaughtered,

it became known that he had not sinned, and this is non-sacred meat slaughtered in the Temple courtyard—

this must be buried!

And why did the tanna of our Mishna say that in the case of a provisional guilt-offering it is burned?

Rabbi Elazar said: It is a contradiction; the one who taught

this Mishna did not teach that one.

Rabba said: Is it really from

a definite guilt-offering that you raise a difficulty concerning a provisional guilt-offering?

A definite guilt-offering

was consecrated in error, because he thought that he had sinned. Now, when it became clear to him that he had not sinned,

since he does not need it

at the time of its consecration, it is obvious that

he would not consecrate it,

and consecration in error is not consecration.

But

a provisional guilt-offering,

since at the time of its consecration he knew that it was possible that he had not sinned at all and did not need to bring an offering, and nevertheless he consecrated it, we attribute this to the fact that

because his heart troubles him

over the possibility that he sinned,

he completely consecrates it

so that it will be an offering even if in fact he did not sin.

Rather, if it is difficult, a definite guilt-offering concerning a definite guilt-offering is difficult.

For it teaches:

if it became known to him after the guilt-offering was slaughtered—

this must be buried.

Say the latter clause:

if it became known to him after the blood was sprinkled—

the flesh goes out to the place of burning!

And we answer:

This—

certainly is a contradiction; the one who taught this did not teach that.

Rav Ashi said: A definite guilt-offering concerning a definite guilt-offering is not difficult for you. Since it was in error, its law is burial. And what the tanna of our Mishna said—that if it became known to him after the blood was sprinkled, its law is burning—is a special decree,

because

after the sprinkling

it appears like an invalid sacrifice,

and people might err and say that the law of an invalid sacrifice is burial. Therefore, they decreed that if the knowledge came after the sprinkling of the blood, it should be burned as though it had been an invalid sacrifice.

We learned in the Mishna: One who brings a provisional guilt-offering and learns that he did not sin—if already

the blood was sprinkled—

the flesh shall be eaten.

And we raised a question about it:

And why

should the flesh be eaten?

For

he has acquired knowledge

that he did not sin, and the Torah said that a guilt-offering applies only when “he did not know”!?

Rava said: The verse states: [Leviticus 5] “

And he did not know”—

“and it shall be forgiven him.”

But he did not have knowledge at the time of forgiveness,

which is the time of the sprinkling.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yose says: Even if

he learned of it after the

blood was in the bowl—

the blood shall be sprinkled and the flesh shall be eaten.

which is the time of the sprinkling.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: Even

if he learned of it after the

blood was in the cup—the blood should be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten.

And we raised a question about it:

According to Rabbi Yose— why should the blood be sprinkled? For he had knowledge at the time of forgiveness!? Rava said: Rabbi Yose holds like Rabbi Shimon, who said: Anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had been sprinkled. And we reject this: Say that Rabbi Shimon said— with regard to something destined to be sprinkled, but this one,

when he learned that he had not sinned, it became retroactively clear that this blood

is not destined to be sprinkled!?

at all?

They said in the West: Rabbi Yose holds that the service vessels sanctify disqualified offerings initially, so that they may be offered.

And this blood, which was received in a service vessel, although it was revealed retroactively that it was not destined to be sprinkled, nevertheless became sanctified for sprinkling because of its sanctification in a service vessel.

And we reject this:

Say that Rabbi Shimon said

this with regard to something destined to be sprinkled, but this one—

when he learned that he had not sinned, it was retroactively established that this blood

was not destined to be sprinkled!?

They said in the West: Rabbi Yosei holds that sacred vessels initially sanctify a disqualified offering so that it may be sacrificed.

Although this blood was received in a sacred vessel, and it was retroactively revealed that it was not destined to be sprinkled, it was nevertheless sanctified for sprinkling through its sanctification in the sacred vessel.

We learned in the Mishna:

A definite guilt-offering is not so, etc. It was stated: When does a beheaded heifer become prohibited

according to the law of a beheaded heifer?

Rav Hamnuna said: During its lifetime,

as will be explained below.

Rabbah said: After decapitation 21 .

Granted, according to Rabbah,

it is properly prohibited only after decapitation,

from the time that an act was performed upon it.

But according to Rav Hamnuna, from when?