Keritot 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥananya bar Avin both say:

In all cases, it is dealing with

a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle,

and even so, according to the first tanna, he is liable to only one sin-offering.

As the first tanna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Kindling—

was singled out for a prohibition!

The verse stated in the Torah, “You shall not kindle fire in any of your settlements on the day of Shabbat,” appears to be superfluous, since kindling is prohibited because it is included among the other labors of Shabbat. Rather, the verse comes to exclude it from all the other labors, so that its punishment is not stoning or karet [and so that one is not liable to a sin-offering for performing it unwittingly], but that it is prohibited by a prohibition alone. And since kindling does not entail a sin-offering, he is liable only for extinguishing.

And Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok follows the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who said: Kindling—

was singled out to divide!

For the Torah renders one liable for it to a separate sin-offering if he performed it unwittingly together with the other labors. And from it they derive the rule concerning all the primary categories of labor, that one is liable for performing each one independently. Therefore, he is liable for two, for extinguishing and for kindling.

Rava said: To perform one before the other—

is the difference between them!

For it is dealing with a case where he intended first to kindle the lower ones and afterward to extinguish the upper ones, but by mistake he kindled and extinguished them simultaneously. According to the first tanna, he is not liable to two offerings, since his intention was not carried out [nevertheless, he is liable to one, because we say that he was particular about only one of the two matters, either about kindling first or about extinguishing later, and it follows that his intention was not carried out with regard to only one of them; Shita Mekubetzet]. And Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that it was done simultaneously, as though his intention had been carried out completely, and he is liable to two.

Rav Ashi said:

Here it is dealing

with a case where he intended to extinguish

the upper ones,

and the lower ones were kindled

on their own

of themselves,

as he did not know beforehand that this would happen [the Arukh LaNer raises the difficulty that, if so, he is performing an act without intention].

And the first tanna follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who performs an unintended act is exempt,

and therefore he is not liable for the kindling.

And Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: One who performs an unintended act is liable.

The Sages taught: One who stirs coals on Shabbat,

turning them over in order

to warm himself with them, and they were kindled on their own,

and he knew that they would be kindled, but he had no need for their kindling, since the heat of the coals was sufficient for him. Therefore, this is not considered an “unintended act,” but rather “a labor not needed for its own purpose.”

One beraita teaches: He is liable. And another beraita teaches: He is exempt.

And we explain:

The one that teaches that he is liable holds that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose. And the one that teaches that he is exempt holds that one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own purpose 45 .

We shall return to you, chapter “A Case of Doubt Whether He Ate Forbidden Fat.”

Mishna:

Blood

that emerges at the time of

slaughter,

whether

from a domesticated animal

or

from a wild animal or

whether

from a bird, whether

they are

impure, whether

they are

pure.

And likewise

the blood of nikhira—

when one did not slaughter the living creature but killed it, and blood emerged from it [the tanna used the expression “nikhira”—literally, killing through the nostrils—because the usual way to kill the animal was by tearing it from the nostrils to the chest. Rashi, Chullin 17a].

And likewise

the blood of ikkur,

when he tore the simanim—that is, the trachea or the esophagus—and blood emerged from them .

And likewise

the blood of bloodletting,

when blood was extracted from the body of a living creature

through which the soul departs.

The Gemara explains which blood this is [and the early authorities disagreed whether the Mishna’s statement, “through which the soul departs,” refers to all the types of blood listed above, so that one is liable in all of them only for blood through which the soul departs, or whether it refers only to “the blood of bloodletting,” whereas in all those listed above one is liable in any event, since the blood emerged from the simanim, which are the place through which the soul departs. See Tosafot, s.v. “the blood of bloodletting,” and Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 6:3, and Leḥem Mishne there] .

For every such blood

one is liable for it,

for eating it, karet.

The blood of the spleen

, the blood of the heart

of the animals listed above,

the blood of the testicles

of an ox or ram [another explanation: the eggs of a chicken],

the blood of locusts, and the exudate blood—

which is secreted and drips at the time of slaughter or afterward, and is not the blood of the soul—

one is not liable for it

with karet [the blood of the spleen, heart, and testicles, because they are not the blood of the soul, and likewise the exudate blood. As for the blood of locusts, the Gemara excludes it from the verse].

Rabbi Yehuda renders one liable

for karet

for the exudate blood.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated:

“You shall not eat any blood.” I might understand

that

even the blood of bipeds

[human beings] is included.

The blood of testicles, the blood of creeping creatures, the blood of locusts, and the blood of fish—

all

are included

in

the prohibition?

The verse states

later in the passage:

“whether of bird or of animal.”

And we interpret:

Just as bird and animal are distinguished

in this regard:

That

even when they are carcasses

they have

the possibility of imparting only

lesser impurity,

under the law of the impurity of food [as the Gemara explains below], which is lesser impurity [since impure food does not render a person or vessels impure, but only other food],

and

they have the possibility of imparting

severe impurity

under the law of a carcass, which is severe impurity [since it renders a person impure, and even when he does not touch it but merely carries it, he and his garments become impure] ,

and

likewise

they have a prohibition

before slaughter

and permission

after slaughter.

And they are a type of flesh. So too, everything that has lesser impurity and severe impurity, that has prohibition and permission, and that is a type of flesh

is included in the prohibition against eating blood.

I exclude

from the prohibition

the blood of bipeds, which have no lesser impurity,

since human flesh cannot become impure only under the category of food; rather, it always imparts the impurity of a corpse.