Keritot 20b — the Talmud in English

Abaye bar Avin and Rav Hananya bar Avin both say:

It is always discussing

a case where he intended both to extinguish and to kindle,

and even so, according to the First Tanna, he is liable for only one sin-offering.

For the First Tanna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Kindling—

was singled out for a prohibition!

What is stated in the Torah, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwelling places on the day of Shabbat,” appears to be superfluous. For kindling is forbidden because it is included among the other labors of Shabbat. Rather, the verse came for this purpose—to remove it from the category of all the labors, so that its punishment should not be stoning and karet [and so that one should not be liable for a sin-offering for its unintentional performance], but that it should be forbidden by a prohibition alone. And since there is no sin-offering for kindling, he is liable only for the extinguishing.

And Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok follows the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who says: Kindling—

was singled out for division!

For the Torah made him liable for a separate sin-offering for it if he performed it in one lapse of awareness together with the other labors. And from it they learn concerning all the primary categories of labor, that one is liable for performing each one separately. Therefore, he is liable for two—for the extinguishing and for the kindling.

Rava said: For precedence—

that is what they differ about!

For it is discussing a case where he intended first to kindle the lower ones and afterward to extinguish the upper ones, but by mistake he kindled and extinguished them simultaneously. For the First Tanna does not make him liable for two, since his intention was not fulfilled [and nevertheless he is liable for one, because we say that he is particular about only one of the two matters—either about the precedence of the kindling or about the delay of the extinguishing—and it follows that with regard to only one of the two was his intention not fulfilled, Shita Mekubetzet, letter yod], whereas Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that it was simultaneous, and it is as though his intention was fulfilled completely, and he is liable for two.

Rav Ashi said:

Here it is discussing

a case where he intended to extinguish

the upper ones,

and the lower ones were kindled

by themselves,

without his intervention,

for he did not know beforehand that this would happen [the Arukh la-Ner raised the difficulty that if so, he is engaged in an unintended activity].

And the First Tanna follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: An unintended act is exempt;

therefore, he is not liable for the kindling.

And Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: An unintended act entails liability.

The Sages taught: One who stirs coals on Shabbat,

for he turned them over in order

to warm himself with them, and they were kindled by themselves,

and he knew that they would be kindled, but he had no need for their kindling, since the heat of the coals was sufficient for him. Therefore, this does not have the status of “an unintended act,” but rather of “a labor not required for its own purpose.”

One [teaching] taught: He is liable. And another [teaching] taught: He is exempt.

And we explain:

This one that taught “liable” holds: One is liable for a labor not required for its own purpose. And this one that taught “exempt” holds: One is exempt for a labor not required for its own purpose. 45 .

We shall return to you, chapter “If he was uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat.”

Mishna:

Blood

that issues at the time of

slaughter,

whether

from a domesticated animal

or

from a wild animal or

from

a bird, whether

they are

impure or whether

they are

pure.

And likewise

the blood of killing,

where he did not slaughter the living creature, but killed it and blood issued from it [and the tanna used the expression “killing” because the manner of killing the animal is by tearing it from the nostrils to the chest. Rashi, Chullin 17a].

And likewise

the blood of uprooting,

where he uprooted the signs, that is, the windpipe or the esophagus, and blood issued from them .

And likewise

the blood of bloodletting,

where he extracted blood from the body of a living creature,

through which the soul departs.

And the Gemara explains which blood this is [and the early authorities disputed whether the Mishna’s statement “through which the soul departs” refers to all the types of blood taught above, so that for all of them one is liable only for blood through which the soul departs, or whether it refers only to “the blood of bloodletting,” whereas for all those above one is liable in any event, since the blood issued from the signs, which are the place through which the soul departs. See Tosafot, s.v. “the blood of bloodletting,” and Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Foods, chapter 6, halakha 3, and Leḥem Mishneh there] .

For every such blood,

one is liable for it,

for eating it, karet.

The blood of the spleen ,

, the blood of the heart

of the animals mentioned above,

the blood of the testicles

of an ox or ram [another interpretation: hen’s eggs],

the blood of locusts, and the blood of runoff

that seeps and drips at the time of slaughter or afterward and is not the blood of the soul —

one is not liable for it

with karet [the blood of the spleen, heart, and testicles because they are not the blood of the soul, and likewise the blood of runoff. And the blood of locusts is excluded in the Gemara by the verse].

Rabbi Judah makes one liable

for karet

for the blood of runoff.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated,

“You shall not eat any blood.” I might understand

that

even the blood of bipeds

[people],

the blood of eggs, the blood of creeping creatures, the blood of locusts, and the blood of fish —

everything

was included

within

the prohibition?

The verse states

later in the verse,

“of birds and of animals.”

And we derive:

Just as birds and animals are distinguished

in this:

that

even when they are carrion,

they have

the possibility of becoming impure only with

minor impurity,

through the category of impurity of foods [as explained below], which is minor impurity [for impure food does not convey impurity to a person or vessels, but only to other food],

and

they have the possibility of becoming impure with

severe impurity

through the category of carrion, which is severe impurity [which conveys impurity to a person, and even when he does not touch it but merely carries it, he and his garments become impure] ,

And

likewise

they have prohibition

before slaughter

and permission

after slaughter.

And they are a type of flesh. So too, everything that has minor impurity and severe impurity, has prohibition and permission, and is a type of flesh

is included within the prohibition of eating blood.

I will exclude

from the prohibition

the blood of bipeds, for they do not have minor impurity,

since it is impossible for human flesh to become impure only as food; rather, it always conveys impurity as corpse impurity.