Keritot 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

I exclude the blood of creeping creatures, which have no severe impurity,

since creeping creatures impart impurity only through contact.

I exclude the blood of testicles, which

the eggs

are not a type of flesh

. I exclude the blood of fish

and

the blood of locusts, all of which is permitted,

since they are permitted without slaughter .

And therefore it is written

“whether of bird or of animal.”

For had it been written only “of bird,” I would say:

If so, just as a bird that does not have prohibited mixtures,

the prohibited mixture of garments, since the bird’s feathers are not considered wool and may be combined with linen,

so too an animal

would have its blood prohibited only if it

does not have prohibited mixtures

in its wool, such as an ox or a goat. But a sheep, whose wool is prohibited in a mixture, would not have its blood prohibited.

The verse states, “and of animal”—

all animals are included in the prohibition.

And had it been written only “and of animal,” I would say:

If so, just as an animal, which is not subject to “the mother with the young,”

since it has no mitzva of sending away the mother bird,

so too a bird,

specifically a bird

that is not subject to “the mother with the young,”

such as an impure bird, for which there is no sending away of the mother bird. But the blood of a pure bird would not be prohibited .

The verse states—

“whether of bird or of animal.”

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

But say: “any blood”—

a generalization; “bird and animal”—

a specification.

It follows that this is

a generalization, specification, and

we interpret:

the generalization includes only what is specified!

That is,

bird and animal, yes; anything else

no!?

And we answer: It is written afterward:

“Any person who eats any blood

—that person shall be cut off from among his people!” And through this

the verse returned

to

a generalization.

If so, this is

a generalization, specification, and generalization.

In that case, additional matters are derived from it, but

you may derive only what resembles the specification,

and the derivation excludes only something that does not generally resemble the specification.

And we challenge this:

But the latter generalization does not resemble the first generalization.

For

the first generalization,

in which it is written, “You shall not eat any blood,” entails only

a prohibition,

and does not entail karet, whereas in

the latter generalization

it is written that there is

karet.

How can we derive them as two different generalizations in a generalization, specification, and generalization? And we answer:

This

tanna is

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

.

For he maintains [in tractate Chullin 66a] that

generalizations and specifications are expounded in this manner,

in such a way,

even though the latter generalization does not resemble the first generalization.

The Master said: A generalization, specification, and generalization—

you may derive only what resembles the specification. Just as the specification explicitly refers to something that has lesser impurity and severe impurity, that has prohibition and permission, and that is a type of flesh, so too, any matter that has lesser impurity and severe impurity, etc.

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

“So too, any” as stated

in the beraita—

what does it come to include?

For there was no need to include a wild animal, since a wild animal is included under animal. What else is there to include?

And we answer:

Rav Idi bar Avin said: It comes to include the blood of a koy.

And we challenge this:

What does he hold? If he holds that a koy is a matter of uncertainty,

whether it is an animal or a wild animal, then

was a verse necessary to prohibit a matter of uncertainty?!

For in either case its blood is prohibited, whether it is an animal or whether it is a wild animal.

And we answer:

Rather, he holds: A koy is a creature unto itself,

and is neither an animal nor a wild animal; therefore, a verse was necessary to prohibit its blood.

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

We have found its blood

to be prohibited for consumption through this derivation of a generalization, specification, and generalization.

Its fat—

from where do we know

that it is prohibited? For it is not included among animals whose fat is prohibited.

And we answer: We derive it

from “any fat.” “Any” comes to include the koy.

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

Its carcass,

which you said is a creature unto itself—

—

from where do we know

that it is prohibited for consumption?

And we answer:

From “any carcass.”

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

Its sciatic nerve,

of the koy

from where do we know

that it is prohibited for consumption?

And we answer:

The Merciful One anchored it to “the spoon of the thigh,”

as it is stated: “Therefore the Children of Israel shall not eat the sciatic nerve that is on the spoon of the thigh.”

But

the koy

has a spoon of the thigh!

For the flesh upon the thighbone is rounded like a spoon.

And we raise a discussion concerning it:

Its impurity,

for its carcass imparts impurity,

and

that it requires

slaughter—from where do we know?

And we answer:

It is logical.

It is logical:

Since for every matter the Merciful One included it like an animal,

therefore, with regard to

its impurity and its slaughter, it is also like an animal.

It is.

The Master said: I exclude the blood of bipeds, which have no lesser impurity.

And we juxtapose a contradiction:

We learned in tractate Uktzin:

One who cuts

flesh

from a human being

who is alive

requires intention,

that he intend it for human consumption [by a gentile], and only then does it acquire the status of “food” so as to be susceptible to impurity. For it is not customary to eat human flesh.

And

likewise, flesh cut from a living person requires

preparation,

so that it becomes prepared to receive impurity through water being placed upon it, like any food that does not receive impurity until it has been prepared .

And we asked: Why do I need intention?

For

the act of

cutting

it

from the body of the person should itself

be intention!

The very fact that he cut the flesh from the person renders it significant, since presumably he cut it for human consumption.

And Reish Lakish said:

What are we dealing with here?

With one who cuts it

to feed it

to a dog, for intention for a dog is not considered intention!

It has still not acquired the status of food through this act.

And we challenge this:

And

is intention for a dog

not

considered intention?!

But we learned: The Sages stated a general principle concerning purity: Anything designated for human consumption

and which has acquired the status of “food”

is impure

with the impurity of food if it becomes impure. Even if it has spoiled and is no longer fit for human consumption, it remains in its state of impurity

until it becomes unfit for canine consumption

[Rambam; according to the Ra’avad, even if it has not become impure, it retains the status of “food” and can receive impurity until it becomes unfit for canine consumption]. Thus, dog food has the status of “food”; if so, why should intention for a dog alone not suffice for it to acquire the status of “food”?

And we answer:

that one—

which had already become impure. The issue there is

to remove the impurity from it

—to divest it of its impurity. Therefore we say:

since initially it was fit for human consumption

,

to remove it from impurity

, the impurity is not removed

until it becomes unfit for consumption by a dog.

But

here,

where the flesh of the person that he cut has not yet become impure, but we are considering whether

to impose impurity upon it

—so that it will become susceptible to impurity—therefore,

if it is fit for human consumption, it is not.

If it is not fit for human consumption, it is not. [According to the Raavad, the explanation is that there, since it had already been fit for human consumption and the status of food had descended upon it, making it susceptible to impurity, it does not cease to be susceptible to impurity until it becomes unfit for consumption by a dog; but here, since it had never yet been fit to become susceptible to impurity, it must specifically be fit for human consumption] .

And we conclude the refutation:

In any event, it teaches

that human flesh requires

“intention.”

And “intention”

—to designate it as food—is relevant only

to

becoming susceptible to the impurity of food, for

that is a lesser impurity.

Why, then, did the beraita say that human beings do not have lesser impurity?

And we answer:

This applies while the person is alive:

during a person’s lifetime, his flesh has only the impurity of food.

But after death—

he has severe impurity

—the impurity of a corpse.

And we challenge: If so,

similarly, with regard to an animal

, when you say that it has lesser impurity, this must likewise be

after death

, analogous to a person. But after death,

if

its flesh

of it

transmits severe impurity

like an animal carcass,

and if

its blood

likewise

transmits severe impurity

like an animal carcass, then how can it have lesser impurity?!

As we learned:

Beit Hillel hold as follows:

The blood of carcasses—

Beit Shammai deem it pure

from the impurity of an animal carcass,

and Beit Hillel deem it impure .

And we answer: It is actually speaking of after death. And

it was necessary

to state the distinction between a person and an animal

only with regard to what we learned:

The carcass of an impure animal

is not considered food

anywhere

, and even in cities, where there is a large population, no one would purchase it as food, since people are not accustomed to eating the carcass of an impure animal, as it is especially repulsive. Likewise,

the carcass of a kosher bird in villages

specifically, where there is no large population, is not generally considered something designated for consumption. [In cities, however, there will be people among the general population who would purchase it for food, and therefore in cities it is considered food.] Therefore, in both cases, it

requires intention

for the flesh to acquire the status of food and become fit to contract the impurity of food. [Later, the Gemara will ask why susceptibility to impurity is needed, since the carcass itself transmits impurity.] But it

does not require being rendered susceptible

—through having water placed upon it, nor through contact with a creeping creature. That is, even if no impurity touched them at all, they transmit the impurity of food by virtue of themselves and render other food that touched them impure. The reason is:

We derive later that anything whose eventual status is to transmit severe impurity does not require water or contact with a creeping creature in order to transmit the impurity of food by itself. A carcass has severe impurity, transmitting impurity to a person even through carrying; therefore, it transmits the impurity of food without water having been placed upon it and without its touching a creeping creature.

The carcass of a kosher animal

is considered food

anywhere

, since it is designated for consumption by gentiles.

And

likewise,

the carcass of a kosher bird, and

likewise

the milk-fat

of the carcass of a kosher animal

in marketplaces

[cities] where there are wealthy people accustomed to eating birds and fat—

do not require

either

intention or

either

being rendered susceptible

in order to transmit the impurity of food. [The carcass does not require being rendered susceptible, as stated, because its eventual status is to transmit severe impurity. The milk-fat, although it does not possess the impurity of an animal carcass [as we derive from the verse, “And the milk-fat of a carcass may be used for any work”] and requires contact with a creeping creature in order to render others impure, nevertheless does not require water to render it susceptible, since here we are speaking of the milk-fat of a slaughtered animal, which was rendered susceptible by the blood of slaughter.]

And Rav said to Rabbi Hiyya:

“Intention”

regarding the carcass of an impure animal, in order to designate it as food—

why is it necessary?

Inevitably, it is necessary

for lesser impurity.

That is,

the intention is effective for it

the intention

to make

the carcass

food

so that it will be able

to render

other food impure through

impurity transmitted by contact.

But challenge this:

Is this carcass itself not already impure?!

After all, it is a carcass and transmits impurity to others [even through carrying] without its having the status of food?!

He said to him

, Rabbi Hiyya: What are we dealing with here?

For example, there is less than a lentil-sized piece of a carcass

, which does not transmit the impurity of carcasses,

and it was joined to less than an egg-bulk of food

that is impure, for this food itself also does not transmit the impurity of food because it lacks the requisite measure,

so this and that

together

constitute an egg-bulk.

Therefore, only if he formed the intention that a person would eat the carcass does the status of “food” take effect upon it, and through this it joins with the other food to complete the measure of an egg-bulk, and they transmit the impurity of food. [According to the Rambam, the food that joins with it also does not require water or contact with a creeping creature. Tosafot in Bava Kamma 77a wrote in the name of Rashi that the food requires contact with a creeping creature, and the same applies to water rendering it susceptible. See Chazon Ish, Uktzin 5:10, who reasoned that the joining food should require being rendered susceptible, and left the Rambam’s words unresolved.]

Rav said to him:

If so

, since we are speaking of a case in which the carcass itself does not contain a lentil-sized piece—

it should also require being rendered susceptible

through contact with water and with a creeping creature. After all, one cannot say here that its eventual status is to transmit severe impurity as a carcass?!

For the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

: Regarding the law of rendering food susceptible to contract impurity by placing water upon it, it is stated: “And if any of their carcass falls

upon any sowing seed that is to be sown.”

And we expound:

Just as seeds are characterized

by the fact

that their eventual status is not to transmit severe impurity

—for food can never become a primary source of impurity and can never transmit impurity to a person or vessels—

and they require being rendered susceptible

by water and contact with something that will render them impure,

so too, anything whose eventual status is not to transmit severe impurity

alone

requires being rendered susceptible

through water and contact with impurity. But something whose eventual status is to transmit severe impurity does not require being rendered susceptible; rather, it transmits the impurity of food by virtue of itself, even before the severe impurity has descended upon it.

Why, then, does the Mishna teach that the carcass [even when it does not contain a lentil-sized piece] does not require being rendered susceptible?

He said to him,

Rabbi Hiyya:

This applies

when being rendered susceptible is required:

with ordinary food, in which there is no less-than-a-lentil-sized piece of a carcass.

But here, where there is within it

—that is, the food itself is—

less than a lentil-sized piece of a carcass, since if one were to join it

—adding to the carcass until it reached

a lentil-sized piece, it would not require being rendered susceptible, now too

when the carcass is only less than a lentil-sized piece,

it does not require being rendered susceptible [But with regard to the need for intention to designate it as food, we do not say this. Since it is less than a lentil-sized piece, it does not transmit impurity as a carcass, but only in its capacity as food. Nevertheless, it does not require being rendered susceptible, because regarding the principle that its eventual status is to transmit severe impurity, it is sufficient that if it were a lentil-sized piece it would transmit severe impurity, so that it need not now be rendered susceptible] .

And now we conclude the resolution of the earlier beraita, which teaches that an animal has lesser impurity, whereas human beings do not: It is speaking of after death, and in a case such as this, where there was less than a lentil-sized piece of a carcass and it was joined to less than an egg-bulk of food. But is it not difficult? If so, human beings too can have lesser impurity—for example, where there was less than a lentil-sized piece of flesh from a corpse, which does not transmit impurity in its capacity as a corpse, but if one formed the intention that it be eaten by a person, it would join with less than an egg-bulk of food?