Keritot 20a — the Talmud in English

Rav Oshaya objected to Shmuel:

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: They did not disagree concerning a matter that is because of one name, for which he is liable. Concerning what did they disagree? Concerning a matter that is because of two names. For Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And we raised the following question concerning it:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who disagrees in the Mishna with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon—

what is he saying?

This is what is explained by his words:

that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree

concerning one who intended to gather grapes and gathered figs, or black ones and gathered white ones.

He intended to gather grapes and gathered figs; black ones and gathered white ones.

And it entered our minds that

grapes and figs

and likewise

black and white—what are they? Two names!

And if we say that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri establish the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the same manner [for example, where he forgot the act of “gathering” from his mind], then

this is Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri!

For according to their words as well, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagreed only concerning two names; and

what did Rabbi Yehuda come to teach us?!

Rather, is it not that mit’asek is the difference between them,

between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? Rabbi Yehuda heard from Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon that they established the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua where he forgot the act of gathering from his mind [and specifically concerning two names, but concerning one name everyone agrees that he is liable]. But concerning mit’asek, that is, when he intended to gather these and gathered others, everyone agrees that he is exempt [even when it is one name]. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say that even when he intended to gather figs and gathered grapes—that is, in a case of mit’asek—Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree. For Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable in a case of mit’asek even when there are two names, since both are prohibited labors, and it is not mit’asek except when he intended [to perform] something permitted and a prohibition resulted from it. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him when there are two names even when both are prohibited. And it follows that

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Mit’asek

with one name [when both are prohibited] according to everyone

is liable.

For even Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him only when there are two names.

And Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds: Mit’asek is exempt

according to everyone, even when there is one name.

And this is difficult for Shmuel from the words of Rabbi Yehuda. For Shmuel exempts one in a case of mit’asek even when there is one name, because this is not “deliberate labor”?

And we answer:

No! Mit’asek

is

exempt according to everyone! And here Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri disagree about this:

both of them hold that the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concerns one who forgot the act of gathering from his mind, but

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon hold: When he forgot the act of gathering from his mind with one name,

for example, he intended to gather these grapes, and forgot and thought that he wished to gather other grapes adjacent to them, and his hand went to the first grapes and he gathered them—

everyone agrees that he is liable!

For his request was carried out, and his mistaken thought was also concerning that same species.

When do they disagree?

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua:

concerning two names,

that is, figs and grapes.

Rabbi Yehuda holds: It makes no difference whether it is one name,

that is, black and white [for now we return from what entered our minds, that black and white are two names; rather, they are one name, since they are one species, and the same applies to black and black, but he took the ordinary case, Rashash],

or whether it is two names; they disagree

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.

Rava said: The issue of precedence is the difference between them,

between Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Yehuda. That is, he intended to gather these first and those afterward, but mistakenly gathered the latter first.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon hold that if both were of one name, that is, figs and figs, everyone agrees that he is liable. For in the end he wished to gather both. And since they are one name, we do not care that it was not done according to the order he intended. When do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? With two names. Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable to bring a sin-offering, for here too we do not care that he brought the later one forward; and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, since at the time he gathered each one, he had intended not for it but for the other, and it is mit’asek.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that they disagree even with one name [as stated, black and white are one name].

But in a true case of mit’asek, that is, he intended to gather only this one and in the end gathered another—everyone agrees that he is exempt, even when it is one name!

And it was taught in a beraita,

to support Rava, that we find that bringing the later one forward is included in mit’asek:

There were before him two burning or extinguished lamps, and he intended to extinguish this one

unintentionally,

and he extinguished that one.

Or, if both were extinguished, and he intended

to light this one, and he lit that one—

he is exempt,

that is, this is mit’asek!

But if one lamp was burning and one was extinguished, and he intended

to light

the extinguished one

and

afterward

to extinguish

the burning one,

and

by mistake

he extinguished

first

and

afterward

he lit it.

If he did this

with one breath,

for he blew, and as a result this one was extinguished and that one was lit [the flame went and lit the extinguished one, Rabbeinu Gershom],

he is liable.

For he did not bring the later one forward, but performed both at once. But if he did this

with two breaths, he is exempt!

For he did not act according to the order he intended, and this is mit’asek.

And we raised the question concerning that which it teaches,

“with one breath, he is liable”:

What does it come to teach us? For

it is obvious

that it is so?!

And we answer:

Lest you say: His thought was not carried out, for

he

initially wanted to light, and ultimately to extinguish. But when he performed the act,

he extinguished, and in the end he lit!

That is, it is as though this were the case, since it was not done according to his will, to light first,

and let us say that he is exempt; it comes to teach us: Although he did not bring the earlier one forward, he also did not delay the later one.

And this is as though his thought had been carried out.

The Sages taught: One who stirs coals on Shabbat,

that is, he gathers them into a vessel, and thereby turns them from above to below and vice versa—

is liable for one sin-offering,

as the Gemara explains below.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable for two, because he

also

extinguishes the

coals

above,

which now descend below and are extinguished because of the weight of the upper ones,

and

also

ignites the

coals

below,

which had previously been dim, and now, when they rose above, became glowing coals.

And we raised the question concerning it:

With what are we dealing? If he intended to extinguish and to ignite,

what is the reason of the one who exempts

him from two sin-offerings?

Rather, he intended to extinguish but did not intend to ignite.

And if so,

what is the reason of the one who holds him liable for two?

For with regard to igniting, he is mit’asek.

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Hanina both said:

With what are we dealing here?

For example, he intended to extinguish the upper ones in order to ignite the lower ones!

For he required the extinguishing of the larger upper ones in order to use them as charcoal for his work as a smith. But he had no need for the ignition of the lower ones, and with regard to him this is damage to them. Nevertheless, he cannot be exempted on the grounds of mit’asek, since he knows that they will ignite as a result of his actions, and for this purpose he stirred the coals. Rather, he could be exempted on the grounds of causing damage.

For the first tanna holds: Causing damage in the

labor of

igniting is exempt,

as with all the labors of Shabbat. Therefore, he is liable only for the extinguishing.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok said:

Igniting differs from all the labors, for even one who causes damage

is liable [the reason is explained in tractate Shabbat 106a]. Therefore, he is liable for two—for the extinguishing and for the igniting!

[причина объясняется в трактате Шабат, 106a]. Поэтому он обязан принести два жертвоприношения за грех — за гашение и за разжигание!

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: They taught this concerning a smith,

as stated above, on account of causing damage.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Until this point,

before Rabbi Yohanan explained it—

the reason for this halakha had not been revealed!