Keritot 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Oshaya raised an objection to Shmuel:

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon say: They did not disagree concerning an act that is because of one name, for which one is liable. Concerning what did they disagree? Concerning an act that is because of two names: Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who disagrees in the Mishna with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon—

what is he saying?

It is evident from his words

that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree

concerning one who intended to gather grapes but gathered figs, or black grapes but gathered white grapes.

He intended to gather grapes and gathered figs; black grapes and gathered white grapes.

And it initially entered our minds that

grapes and figs,

and likewise

black and white grapes—what are these? Two names!

And if we say that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri interpret the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the same manner [for example, where he forgot what he was gathering and chose something else on his own], then—

this is identical to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri!

For according to their view as well, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree only concerning two names. And

what does Rabbi Yehuda come to teach us?!

Rather, is it not the case that the issue between them is an inadvertent act (mit'asek)

of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? Rabbi Yehuda heard from Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon that they interpreted the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua as referring to a case in which one forgot what he was gathering and selected something else on his own [and specifically involving two names, whereas when there is one name, everyone agrees that he is liable]. But in the case of an inadvertent act, namely, when he intended to gather these items and gathered others, everyone agrees that he is exempt [even when there is one name]. Rabbi Yehuda therefore comes to say that even when one intended to gather figs but gathered grapes, namely, in the case of an inadvertent act, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree. Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable for an inadvertent act even when there are two names, since both are forbidden labors, and it is considered an inadvertent act only when one intended to perform a permitted act and ended up performing a forbidden act. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him in the case of two names even when both acts are forbidden. It follows that,

Rabbi Yehuda holds: In the case of an inadvertent act

involving one name [when both acts are forbidden], everyone agrees that he is

liable.

For even Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him only when there are two names.

And Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds: In the case of an inadvertent act, one is exempt

according to everyone, even when there is one name.

This presents a difficulty to Shmuel from the words of Rabbi Yehuda. For Shmuel exempts one in the case of an inadvertent act even when there is one name, because this is not “calculated labor.”

And we answer:

No! In the case of an inadvertent act—

according to

everyone one is exempt! And here Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri disagree about this:

Both of them hold that the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concerns a case in which he forgot what he was gathering and selected something else on his own. However,

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon hold: If he forgot what he was gathering and selected something else on his own, when there is one name,

for example, he intended to gather these grapes, then forgot and thought that he wanted to gather other grapes adjacent to them, and his hand went to the first grapes and gathered them—

everyone agrees that he is liable!

For his request was fulfilled, and his mistaken thought also concerned that very same species.

They disagree

in the case of two names,

such as

figs and grapes.

Rabbi Yehuda holds: It makes no difference whether there is one name,

namely, black and white grapes [for we now retract the initial assumption that black and white grapes are two names; rather, they constitute one name, since they are one species. The same applies to black grapes and black grapes, but this example was chosen because it is the ordinary case],

or whether there are two names: they disagree,

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.

Rava said: The issue between them is performing the later act first

of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Yehuda. That is, he intended to gather one of these first and the other afterward, but mistakenly gathered the latter first.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon hold that if both were of one name, namely, figs and figs, everyone agrees that he is liable. For ultimately he wanted to gather both of them. Since they are of one name, it does not matter to us that they were not performed in the order he intended. They disagree in the case of two names, between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, as here too it does not matter to us that he performed the later act first; and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, since at the time he gathered each one, he had intended to gather only its counterpart, and this is considered an inadvertent act.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that they disagree even when there is one name [and, as stated, black and white grapes constitute one name].

But in the case of a genuine inadvertent act, namely, he intended to gather only this one and ultimately gathered another—everyone agrees that he is exempt, even when there is one name!

And it was taught in a beraita,

in support of Rava, for we find that performing the later act first is included in an inadvertent act:

If two lamps, lit or extinguished, were before him, and he intended to extinguish this one

unwittingly,

but extinguished that one.

Or, if both were extinguished, and he intended

to light this one but lit that one—

he is exempt,

which is an inadvertent act!

However, if one lamp was lit and the other extinguished, and he intended

to light

the extinguished one

and

afterward

to extinguish

the lit one,

and

mistakenly

extinguished

first

and

afterward

lit it,

then, if he did this

with a single breath,

he exhaled and as a result this one was extinguished and that one was lit [the flame traveled and lit the extinguished lamp],

he is liable.

For he did not perform the later act first; rather, he performed both acts simultaneously. But if he did this

with two breaths, he is exempt!

For he did not perform the acts in the order he intended, and this is considered an inadvertent act.

And we raise a difficulty concerning that which was taught:

“With a single breath, he is liable”:

What does this teach us? Is it not

obvious

that this is so?!

And we answer:

Lest you say that his thought was not fulfilled, for

he

originally intended to light first and afterward to extinguish. But when he performed the act,

he extinguished first, and ultimately lit!

That is, it is as though this were the case, since it was not done according to his wish, to light first,

and one might say that he is exempt; it therefore teaches us: Although he did not perform the earlier act first, he also did not delay the later act.

Thus, it is as though his thought was fulfilled.

The Sages taught: One who stirs coals on Shabbat,

gathering them into a vessel, thereby turning them from top to bottom and vice versa—

is liable to bring one sin-offering,

as the Gemara explains below.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok: He is liable to bring two, because he

also

extinguishes the

coals

on top,

which now descend below and are extinguished due to the weight of the upper coals,

and

also

ignites the

coals

below,

which had previously been smoldering, but now, when they rise to the top, become glowing coals.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

What are we dealing with? If he intended to extinguish and ignite,

what is the rationale of the one who exempts him

from two sin-offerings?

Rather, it is a case where he intended to extinguish but did not intend to ignite.

And if so—

what is the rationale of the one who deems him liable for two?

For with regard to the ignition, it is an inadvertent act.

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Hanina both say:

What are we dealing with here?

For example, he intended to extinguish the upper coals in order to ignite the lower coals!

He needed the extinguishing of the larger upper coals in order to use them as charcoal for his work as a smith. He did not need the ignition of the lower coals, and from his perspective this is damage to them. Nevertheless, he cannot be exempt on the grounds of an inadvertent act, since he knows that they will ignite as a result of his actions and stirred the coals with this intention. He can, however, be exempt on the grounds that he is damaging them.

For the first tanna holds: One who damages in the labor of

igniting

is exempt,

as with all the labors of Shabbat. Therefore, he is liable only for the extinguishing.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok said:

Igniting differs from all the other labors, for even one who damages

is liable [the reason is explained in Tractate Shabbat 106a]. Therefore, he is liable for two—for the extinguishing and for the ignition!

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: They taught this with regard to a smith,

as stated above, because of the issue of damaging.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Until this point,

before Rabbi Yohanan explained it—

the rationale of this halakha had not been revealed!