Keritot 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection:

What kind of unintentional involvement is this? If it concerns forbidden fats:

For example, there were before him pieces of forbidden fat and permitted fat, and he recognized which one was the piece of permitted fat. He intended to take that piece, but he turned his gaze away and inadvertently took the forbidden fat and ate it [as opposed to an unwitting act, meaning that he intended to take this very piece, but believed that it was permitted fat],

and forbidden sexual relations:

For example, his wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he intended to engage in intercourse with his wife. His wife slipped away without his knowledge, and his sister came in her place [whereas an unwitting act means that he intended to engage with his sister, but believed that she was his wife].

This cannot be said! For with regard to eating forbidden fat and the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations, he is

liable

even in a case of unintentional involvement,

since he derives pleasure! [Since he derives pleasure, it is considered intentional. Rashi, Sanhedrin 62b, s.v. sheken]

Therefore it is considered to have been with intention. Rashi, Sanhedrin 62b, s.v. shekhen] .

And we answer:

Rather, it is an unintentional act on Shabbat

that is

exempt—

this is the unintentional act learned from the word “in it”!

As Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: One who acts unintentionally with regard to forbidden fats and forbidden sexual relations is liable—

since he derives pleasure. One who acts unintentionally on Shabbat—

is exempt!

What is the reason? “A work of skilled craftsmanship” the Torah prohibited on Shabbat,

that is, he thought about and intended this very labor . [But Rabbi Eliezer did not accept this exposition of Rav Naḥman, “a work of skilled craftsmanship”; rather, he derives it from “in it.” The Gemara cites Rav Naḥman only because he explicitly stated that one who acts unintentionally on Shabbat is exempt. Rashi, above].

And we explain in what manner it is considered an unintentional act on Shabbat:

According to Rava, it can be found in a case such as one who intended to cut something detached but cut something attached.

According to Abaye, it can be found in a case such as one who intended to lift something detached but cut something attached. This was stated: One intended to lift the detached object

that had fallen into a vegetable bed,

but cut the attached object—

he is exempt. What is the reason? For he did not intend to cut anything at all,

but only to lift it, and therefore he is an unintentional actor .

But when he intended

to cut something detached but cut something attached,

Abaye and Rava disagree.

Abaye said: He is liable, for he did intend to cut something.

Rava said: He is exempt, for he did not intend to cut something prohibited,

but to cut something detached, which is permitted .

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei said: They did not disagree

with regard to one who performs a labor during twilight that he is exempt, as I say: He performed part of the labor today and part of it tomorrow.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei said to them: You have scrutinized me closely!

That is, you have defeated me!

And we explain:

What did they say to him,

the Sages—what answer did they give him, such

that Rabbi Yosei said to them

:

You have scrutinized me closely?!

This is what they said to him: He lifted

an object

during twilight

between Shabbat and Yom Kippur and carried it from a private domain into a public domain, in a manner in which the object was lying at the edge of the private domain, adjacent to the public domain—

what is the law?

For in this case the labor is performed in a single moment, and it is impossible to say that he performed part of it today and part of it tomorrow; rather, it was performed either entirely today or entirely tomorrow. If so, it is possible that in such a case Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua do disagree with regard to one who performs a labor during twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur. Why, then, did you say that they did not disagree with regard to twilight?!

And concerning this

he said to them: You have scrutinized me closely!

And we ask:

Let Rabbi Yosei say to them

the Sages: Even in this case it is possible that

part of the lifting was performed today and part tomorrow,

since every performance of an act involves a brief period of delay?

And we answer:

This is also what he said to them: “You examined my words closely”

and thought that you would defeat me,

“but you accomplished nothing!”

For, as stated, here too it is possible that part of it was performed today and part tomorrow.

And we challenge this:

But according to Rabbi Yosei,

even where part of the labor was performed today and part tomorrow, one should be liable according to Rabbi Eliezer for completing the labor on the second day. For

the completion

of

the labor—according to Rabbi Eliezer, we have heard him say that he is liable

even if it does not constitute the measure of a complete labor. If so, Rabbi Eliezer of the Mishna, who holds one liable to bring a sin-offering even when he does not know which transgression he committed, maintains that one who performs a labor during twilight is liable to bring a sin-offering in either case: whether the completion of the labor occurred on Shabbat or whether it occurred on Yom Kippur, he is liable. Why, then, did Rabbi Yosei say that they did not disagree concerning twilight?

As we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the outset

at the beginning of weaving the fabric, or who adds

one

thread

to the fabric,

to material that had already been partially woven—

is liable.

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for completing a labor alone, even though it does not constitute the required measure.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yosei taught the statement according to Rabbi Eliezer as follows: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the outset, and one who

adds in weaving

two to the fabric—

is liable.

The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is not that he holds one liable for completing a labor; rather, the ordinary measure of weaving is two threads. At the beginning of weaving, one must weave three threads, since the weaving does not hold together with fewer than that. If so, one may still say with regard to every labor that perhaps part of it was performed today and part tomorrow, and he is not liable for it because the measure of a labor was not performed on either of the two days.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him even from an asham talui.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him even from an asham talui. As it is stated

in the passage concerning an asham talui: “And if a person

sins

and performs one of all the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed—

and he does not know,

and he is guilty.” And we expound:

This excludes one who knew that he sinned

but does not know with what he sinned, as he does not bring an asham talui.

Rabbi Shimon said to him:

On the contrary,

this is precisely the case in which he brings an asham talui!

That is, this is the primary case of an asham talui [Rabbenu Gershom],

as it is stated: “And he performed”

“and she performed”

—Rashash—

“and he did not know,”

which indicates that he certainly performed the act, but

this one does not know what he performed! But

one who

is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat or is uncertain whether he did not eat forbidden fat—

go and ask about him whether he brings an asham talui or not!

And we inquire about this:

What was concluded

—does Rabbi Shimon hold that one who is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat or is uncertain whether he did not eat forbidden fat must bring an asham talui?

Come and hear:

It was taught in a beraita:

One sinned but did not know with what he sinned,

for example, forbidden fat and notar were before him, he unwittingly ate one of them, and he does not know which one he ate;

or, he is uncertain whether he sinned or is uncertain whether he did not sin,

for example, forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him, he ate one of them, and he does not know which one—

he brings an asham talui!

And we conclude as proof:

Whom do we hear who says that one who sinned but it is not known with what he sinned brings an asham talui? Rabbi Shimon

is the one.

And it teaches: “He is uncertain whether he sinned or is uncertain whether he did not sin”—

“he brings an asham talui”! Conclude from this that Rabbi Shimon holds: One who is uncertain whether he sinned or is uncertain whether he did not sin brings an asham talui.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not disagree ... If so, why does the verse say “that he sinned”—

to exclude one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result!

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: One who is engaged in an act involving forbidden fats or forbidden sexual relations is liable, since he derives benefit. One who is engaged in an act on Shabbat is exempt!

What is the reason?

The Torah prohibited only a constructive labor.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But the case of the infants

as it will be explained below,

is comparable to one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result. And we learned: One who had two infants,

whom he was required to circumcise,

one to circumcise on Shabbat and one to circumcise after Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the

infant

who was to be circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable to bring a sin-offering,

for he desecrated Shabbat through this circumcision, which was not a mitzva and did not override Shabbat.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him,

as will be explained.

But this circumciser is one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result: He intended to circumcise this infant, whose time had arrived, but circumcised another infant, whose time had not arrived [in contrast to an unwitting transgressor, who intended to circumcise this infant itself but mistakenly thought that the time for his circumcision had arrived].

And

Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him only because he held: He erred with regard to a mitzva

as he thought that he was performing a mitzva through this circumcision, because he mistakenly thought that this was the infant whose circumcision was due today,

and

even though he

did not perform a mitzva, he is exempt

from a sin-offering.

But one who is engaged in an act that is not a mitzva,

for example, he intended to pick this fig but picked another,

even Rabbi Yehoshua holds him liable!

This is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who said that Shmuel exempts one who is engaged in an act on Shabbat from a sin-offering.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

Set aside the case of the infants!

For there he is liable even when he is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result,

since he performs a damaging act involving an injury,

that is, he inflicts an injury on Shabbat in a manner that produces damage rather than improvement,

he is liable

for the labor of inflicting an injury, even though with regard to all the labors of Shabbat one who causes damage is exempt unless that labor also entails improvement [the reason is explained in Shabbat 106a]. Therefore,

one who is engaged in an act involving an injury

also

is liable!

That is, both the exemption of one who causes damage and the exemption of one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result are based on the principle of “constructive labor,” and this exemption does not apply to inflicting an injury. [Shita Mekubetzet, note 10.] Circumcision [when not performed as a mitzva] likewise entails liability because it inflicts an injury, and the exemption of “constructive labor” does not apply to it.

Rav Yehuda raised an objection to Shmuel,

who said that one who is engaged in an act on Shabbat is exempt: We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if he intended to pick figs but picked grapes, grapes but picked figs, black figs but picked white figs, or white figs but picked black figs, Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

But here, this is a case of one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result. And Rabbi Yehoshua likewise exempts only when he went from one species to another,

that is, he intended to perform the labor with one species but ultimately performed it with another species.

But with one species,

for example, when both were black figs,

even Rabbi Yehoshua holds him liable,

as this is not considered being engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result, since he intended to pick figs and indeed picked figs. But according to your statement, even when it is the same species he should be exempt, since you say that the reason is “constructive labor,” implying that he must intend this very labor.

He said to him

Shmuel to Rav Yehuda:

Sharp one!

This was an appellation for Rav Yehuda because he was sharp-witted.

Set aside the Mishna and come after me!

I will explain it to you according to my approach: In every case, one who is engaged in an act without intending its prohibited result is exempt according to everyone, even when it involves one species. The Mishna, however, is not speaking of such a person. Rather,

what are we dealing with here? For example, he forgot from his mind what he was picking!

He forgot what his intention had been,

for example, he intended to pick grapes, but forgot and thought, “I seek figs”

to pick,

and his hand went to the grapes

and picked them without intention [and similarly, from white figs to black figs].

Rabbi Eliezer holds:

Although his thought was not fulfilled—for in fact he was thinking of figs at the time of picking—nevertheless,

his request was fulfilled,

since he needed grapes and had wanted to pick them from the outset, and this is sufficient to make him liable to bring a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: His request was not fulfilled

either, and

his thought

also

was not fulfilled,

as both are required for liability to bring a sin-offering, and here his thought was not fulfilled. [With regard to this exemption, that “his thought was not fulfilled,” there is indeed a distinction between one species and two species, and even Rabbi Yehoshua will hold him liable when he forgot and his hand went to other figs of the same species. But with regard to the exemption based on “constructive labor,” there is no distinction, and he is exempt even with one species, Tosafot, s.v. Haka] .