Keritot 19b — the Talmud in English

And we raise it:

What kind of mitasek? If it is concerning forbidden fats:

for example, there were before him pieces of forbidden fat and permitted fat, and he recognized which one was the piece of permitted fat, and intended to take it, but he turned his gaze away and inadvertently took the forbidden fat, and ate it [in contrast to an unwitting act, namely, that he intended for this very piece, but thought that it was permitted fat]],

and forbidden sexual relations:

for example, his wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he intended to have intercourse with his wife, but his wife slipped away and he did not know, and his sister came in her place [whereas an unwitting act means that he intended for his sister, but thought that she was his wife]].

It is impossible to say this! For with regard to eating forbidden fat and the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations, he is

liable

even in a case of mitasek,

since he derives benefit?!

Therefore it is considered to have been with intention. Rashi, Sanhedrin 62b, s.v. shekhen] .

And we resolve:

Rather, it is mitasek with regard to Shabbat

that he is

exempt—

this is the mitasek that is learned from “with it”!

For Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: One who is mitasek with forbidden fats and forbidden sexual relations is liable—

since he derives benefit. One who is mitasek with Shabbat—

is exempt!

What is the reason? “Deliberate workmanship” the Torah prohibited

on Shabbat, namely, that he thought about and intended for this very labor . But Rabbi Eliezer did not hold by this exposition of Rav Nahman, “deliberate workmanship,” but rather learned it from “with it.” And the Gemara brought this statement of Rav Nahman only because he explicitly said that one who is mitasek with Shabbat is exempt. Rashi on the first side].

And we explain in what manner he is considered mitasek with Shabbat:

For Rava, it can be found: for example, when he intended to cut the detached object and cut the attached object.

For Abaye, it can be found: for example, when he intended to lift the detached object and cut the attached object. It was stated: One intended to lift the detached object

that had fallen into the vegetable bed

and cut the attached object—

he is exempt. What is the reason? For he did not intend for any cutting

but only for lifting, and it is mitasek .

But when he intended

to cut the detached object and cut the attached object,

Abaye and Rava disagree concerning it.

Abaye said: He is liable, for he did intend for some cutting.

Rava said: He is exempt, for he did not intend for a prohibited cutting

but for the cutting of a detached object, which is permitted .

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yose said: They did not disagree

concerning one who performs labor during twilight, that he is exempt, for I say: he performed part of the labor today and part of it tomorrow.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yose said to them: You have examined me closely!

That is, you have defeated me!

And we explain:

What did they say to him,

the Sages—what answer did they give him, such that

he said to them,

Rabbi Yose:

You have examined me closely?!

This is what they said to him: He lifted

an object

during twilight,

between Shabbat and Yom Kippur, and took it from the private domain into the public domain, in a manner in which the object was placed at the edge of the private domain, adjacent to the public domain—

what is the law?

For now the labor is performed in a single moment, and it is impossible to say that he performed part of it today and part of it tomorrow; rather, either all of it was performed today or all of it tomorrow. If so, perhaps in such a case Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua do disagree concerning one who performs labor during twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur. Why then did you say that they did not disagree concerning twilight?!

And concerning this

he said to them: You have examined me closely!

And we object:

Let Rabbi Yose say to them

to the Sages: Even in this case it is possible that

part of the lifting was today and part of it tomorrow,

for in every performance of a thing there is a short duration?

And we answer:

This is also what he said to them: “You examined me closely”

and thought that you had defeated me,

“but you have accomplished nothing!”

for, as stated, also in this case it is possible that part of it will be done today and part of it tomorrow.

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rabbi Yosei,

even in a case where part of the labor was performed today and part tomorrow, one should be liable, according to Rabbi Eliezer, for completing the labor on the second day. For

the completion

of

the labor, we have heard him say, according to Rabbi Eliezer, that he imposes liability

even when it does not contain the measure of a complete labor. If so, Rabbi Eliezer of the Mishna, who imposes a sin-offering when he does not know for which sin he transgressed, holds that one who performs labor during twilight is liable for a sin-offering in either event, for whether the completion of the labor was on Shabbat or whether it was on Yom Kippur, he is liable. And why did Rabbi Yosei say that they did not dispute concerning twilight?

For we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning

at the beginning of weaving the fabric, or who adds

one

thread alone

to the woven fabric,

to fabric that had already been partially woven—

is liable.

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer imposes liability for the completion of a labor alone, even though it does not contain the measure.

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yosei taught the statement according to Rabbi Eliezer as follows: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning, and one who

adds in weaving

two to the woven fabric—

is liable.

For Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is not the completion of a labor; rather, the ordinary measure of weaving is only two threads. At the beginning of weaving, one must weave three threads, for with fewer than this the weaving does not endure. If so, it can still be said concerning every labor that perhaps part of it was performed today and part tomorrow, and he is not liable for it because there was not the measure of a labor on either of the two days.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Joshua would exempt him even from a provisional guilt-offering.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Joshua would exempt him even from a provisional guilt-offering. As it is stated

in the passage concerning a provisional guilt-offering: “And if a person

sins

and performs one of all the commandments of the Lord that may not be done”—

“and he did not know,”

and he is guilty.” And we interpret:

excluding one who knew that he sinned

but does not know with what he sinned, who does not bring a provisional guilt-offering.

Rabbi Shimon said to him:

On the contrary,

this is the one who brings a provisional guilt-offering!

That is, this is the essence of a provisional guilt-offering [Rabbeinu Gershom]:

as it is stated, “and he performed [“and she performed”—

“and she performed”

Rashash]

and did not know,”

which implies that he certainly performed [the act], but

this one did not know what he performed! But

one who

was uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat or was uncertain whether he did not eat—

go and ask concerning him whether he brings a provisional guilt-offering or not!

And we inquire about it:

What has been established concerning it?

Does Rabbi Shimon impose a provisional guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty whether he ate or uncertainty whether he did not eat?

Come and hear:

It was taught:

If he sinned but did not know with what he sinned,

for example, forbidden fat and notar were before him, and he unwittingly ate one of them but does not know which one he ate;

or whether he sinned or whether he did not sin,

for forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him, and he ate one of them but does not know which one—

he brings a provisional guilt-offering!

And we conclude as proof:

Whom do we hear say that one who sinned, but it is not known with what he sinned, brings a provisional guilt-offering? Rabbi Shimon

is the one.

And it teaches: Whether he sinned or whether he did not sin—

he brings a provisional guilt-offering! Infer from this that Rabbi Shimon holds: Whether he sinned or whether he did not sin, he brings a provisional guilt-offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute ... If so, what does the verse “that he sinned” come to teach?—

excluding one who is occupied [with another matter]!

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Samuel: One who is occupied with forbidden fats and illicit sexual relations is liable, since he derives pleasure. One who is occupied on Shabbat is exempt!

What is the reason?

The Torah prohibited only purposeful labor.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But the infants

as will be explained below,

who are comparable to one who is occupied. And we learned: One who had two infants

whom he must circumcise,

one to be circumcised on Shabbat and one to be circumcised after Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the

infant

of after Shabbat on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer imposes a sin-offering

for he desecrated Shabbat with this circumcision, which is not a mitzva and does not override Shabbat.

And Rabbi Joshua exempts

as he proceeds to explain.

But this circumciser is one who is “occupied”: he intended to circumcise this infant whose time had arrived, but he circumcised another infant whose time had not arrived [in contrast to an unwitting act, which is when he intended to circumcise this very infant but thought that its time had arrived].

And

Rabbi Joshua exempted only because he holds: He erred concerning a mitzva

for he thought that he was performing a mitzva with this circumcision, because he erred and thought that this was the infant whose circumcision was due today,

and

even though he

did not perform a mitzva, he is exempt

from a sin-offering.

But one who is occupied with something that is not a mitzva,

for example, he intended to pick this fig and picked another one,

even Rabbi Joshua imposes liability!

And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman in the name of Samuel, who exempts one who is occupied on Shabbat from a sin-offering?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

Set aside the infants!

For there one is liable even when occupied, because

since he performs a destructive act in causing a wound,

one who causes a wound on Shabbat in a manner in which there is no improvement but only destruction,

he is liable

for the labor of causing a wound, despite the fact that with all the labors of Shabbat one who performs a destructive act is exempt unless there is improvement in that labor [the reason is explained in Shabbat 106a]. Therefore,

one who is occupied with causing a wound

also

is liable!

That is, the exemption of both one who performs a destructive act and one who is occupied is on account of “purposeful labor,” and this exemption was not stated concerning causing a wound. [Shitah Mekubetzet, letter yod.] Circumcision [not in the place of a mitzva] likewise derives its liability from causing a wound, concerning which the exemption of “purposeful labor” was not stated.

Rav Judah challenged Samuel

who said that one who is occupied on Shabbat is exempt: We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Judah said: Even if he intended to pick figs and picked grapes, grapes and picked figs, black ones and picked white ones, white ones and picked black ones. Rabbi Eliezer imposes a sin-offering, and Rabbi Joshua exempts.

But here he is one who is occupied. And Rabbi Joshua likewise exempts only from one type to another,

for he intended for one type and in the end performed the labor with another type.

But with one type,

for example, both were black figs,

even Rabbi Joshua imposes liability

for he is not one who is occupied, since he intended to pick figs and indeed picked figs. But according to your words, even with the same type he should be exempt, since you say that the reason is “purposeful labor,” implying that he must intend for this very labor?

He said to him

Samuel to Rav Judah:

Sharp one!

[A designation for Rav Judah because he was sharp.]

Abandon the Mishna and come after me!

For I have answered you according to my method: In every case, one who is occupied is exempt according to everyone, even with one type. And the Mishna is not speaking of one who is occupied; rather,

what are we dealing with here? For example, he forgot “picking” from his mind!

He forgot what his intention had been,

for example, he intended to pick grapes, and forgot, and thought, “I seek figs”

to pick,

and his hand went to the grapes

and picked them without intention [and likewise from white ones to black ones].

For Rabbi Eliezer holds:

Even though his thought was not performed—for in practice he thought of figs at the time of picking—nevertheless

his request was fulfilled,

for he needed grapes, and from the outset he desired to pick them, and this is sufficient to make him liable for a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Joshua holds: His request was not fulfilled

either,

and

also

his thought was not fulfilled,

for both are required for liability for a sin-offering, and here his thought was not fulfilled. [Concerning this exemption of “his thought was not fulfilled,” there is indeed a distinction between one type and two types, and Rabbi Joshua will also impose liability when he forgot and his hand went to other figs of the same type; but with the exemption of “purposeful labor,” there is no distinction, and even with one type he is exempt, Tosafot, s.v. hakha].