Keritot 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon exempts in this case,

because before each entry into the Temple there was no definite knowledge at the outset that he was indeed impure at that time. For even after he traversed the second path, he is still not certainly impure, since perhaps the first path was the impure one, in which case he has already become pure from that impurity. And below, the Gemara explains the reasoning of the first tanna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda exempts in all of them, in the name of Rabbi Shimon!

And we raise an objection:

Even in the first case

does he also exempt him in the first two clauses? But there, when he did not become pure in the interim, he had definite knowledge that he was impure before entering the Temple for the second time.

And we answer:

Rava said: Here we are dealing with a case where he traversed the first path, and while traversing the second he forgot that he had traversed the first path,

and afterward entered the Temple. It follows that he possesses only a “partial” definite knowledge that he is impure. Since, while traversing the second path, he forgot that he had traversed the first, when he entered the Temple he had been preceded only by knowledge of a possible impurity, and not by definite knowledge of impurity.

And this is the dispute

between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, according to Rabbi Shimon:

The first tanna holds: Partial knowledge

is considered knowledge.

Since after traversing the second path he is certainly impure, except that he is unaware of this and thinks that he is only possibly impure because he forgot that he traversed the first path, this is sufficient to obligate him to bring an adjustable offering. [This is preferable to the case described in the latter clause, in which, when he traversed the second path, he had already become pure from the first one. For there he has “knowledge of a possibility,” since he possesses the entire knowledge, yet is nevertheless only possibly impure, and therefore he is exempt [according to the first tanna, in accordance with Rabbi Shimon]. Here, however, had he known everything, he would have had definite knowledge, and it is only this knowledge that is lacking. Therefore, this is “partial” definite knowledge and not knowledge of a possibility.]

And Rabbi Shimon

ben Yehuda

holds: Partial knowledge is not considered knowledge.

And since he does not now know that he is certainly impure, he is like one who had no knowledge at all at the outset, and is exempt from an adjustable offering.

The Master said: If he traversed the first path, entered, underwent sprinkling, immersed, and traversed the second path, and entered —

he is liable.

And we inquire:

Why is he liable

according to the first tanna of Rabbi Shimon?

He did not have knowledge

at the outset that he was certainly impure, since at each of his entries into the Temple he was only possibly impure. [As stated, this is “knowledge of a possibility” and not “partial knowledge,” since he possesses

all

the knowledge, yet is nevertheless only possibly impure.]

Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this? —

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require

at all

knowledge at the outset,

but the obligation to bring an offering for impurity of the Temple is like the obligation for any sin-offering, for which knowledge at the outset is not required.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is the opinion of the Rabbis;

it is —

here they deemed knowledge of a possibility equivalent to definite knowledge!

certain.

And we say:

It might have entered your mind

that when Rabbi Yoḥanan said

“here they deemed it so,” the same applies throughout the entire Torah,

that knowledge of a possibility is considered knowledge. If so,

there is a difficulty from one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan to another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan!

For in our sugya Rabbi Yoḥanan said that knowledge of a possibility does not divide the sin-offerings as definite knowledge does, whereas here he said that throughout the Torah knowledge of a possibility is considered knowledge. And there is

also a difficulty

from one statement of

Reish Lakish to another statement of Reish Lakish!

For in our sugya he said, according to Rabbi, that knowledge of a possibility does divide the sin-offerings as definite knowledge does. If so, why did he not answer as Rabbi Yoḥanan did, that the first tanna of Rabbi Shimon holds like Rabbi, namely, that knowledge of a possibility is considered knowledge?

Granted, the difficulty from Rabbi Yoḥanan to Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult.

For it may be said that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan meant:

Here,

with regard to knowledge at the outset concerning impurity of the Temple —

they deemed

knowledge of a possibility equivalent to knowledge.

But throughout the entire Torah —

they did not

deem knowledge of a possibility equivalent to knowledge.

What is the reason? Here, with regard to impurity

of the Temple and its sacred offerings,

it is written: “And it was hidden from him

and he is impure.”

This indicates that it is sufficient to obligate him even if there is only a partial concealment regarding the impurity. Therefore, we say that

knowledge that also contains a possibility is sufficient for the verse to obligate him. But throughout the entire Torah,

that is, with regard to all sin-offerings,

it is written: “Or his sin became known to him,”

which indicates only that

if he possesses knowledge

definitely between one period of unawareness and another,

he is liable

for a sin-offering for each period of unawareness separately.

But with regard to Reish Lakish there is a difficulty. Instead of interpreting it

as referring to the latter clause of the case of the two paths

in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael,

who does not require knowledge at the outset at all,

let him interpret it

in accordance with those tannaim who do require knowledge at the outset. He is liable because

he holds like Rabbi,

who maintains that knowledge of a possibility is considered knowledge!

And we answer:

This is what Reish Lakish comes to teach us:

that

Rabbi Yishmael also does not require knowledge at the outset

with regard to impurity of the Temple and its sacred offerings. Therefore, he interpreted the statement of the first tanna of Rabbi Shimon as following Rabbi Yishmael.

And we challenge this: What does he come to teach us?

It is stated explicitly in the Mishna! For we learned: Rabbi Yishmael says:

With regard to impurity of the Temple and its sacred offerings,

“And it was hidden” and “it was hidden” appear twice, to obligate

both

for concealment of the impurity,

when he forgot that he was impure when he entered the Temple,

and

both

for concealment of the Temple,

when he forgot that this was the Temple [or that this was sacred meat]. And it is explained in tractate Shevuot that the one who requires knowledge at the outset derives it from these two occurrences of “it was hidden.” If so, Rabbi Yishmael, for whom the verses are not superfluous for this purpose, certainly holds that knowledge at the outset is not required.

And we answer:

It was necessary

for Reish Lakish to teach this, for

it might have entered your mind

that Rabbi Yishmael only

from the verse

does

not have

the requirement of knowledge at the outset. But

from tradition,

from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai,

he does have it.

This is what Reish Lakish comes to teach us:

that Rabbi Yishmael does not have any requirement of knowledge at the outset at all.

Mishna:

There were

forbidden fat and notar before him,

and he thought that both were permitted fat,

and he ate one of them, but does not know which one he ate.

Or, there were

his menstruating wife and his sister with him in the house, and he unwittingly violated the prohibition with one of them,

in that he had relations with one of them, thinking that she was his wife and that she was pure, and ultimately it became known to him that she was menstruating,

but he does not know with which of them he unwittingly sinned,

as he is uncertain whether he had relations with his sister.

Or,

Shabbat and Yom Kippur

occurred one immediately after the other,

and he performed labor during twilight

between them, thinking that it was an ordinary weekday,

but he does not know on which of them he performed it,

whether on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering,

for in either event he certainly sinned.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him

because he derives from what is written concerning a sin-offering, “for the sin that he committed,” that he is liable only if he knows what sin he committed—whether he ate forbidden fat or notar.

Rabbi Yosei said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree

with regard to

one who performs labor during twilight

between Shabbat and Yom Kippur,

that he is exempt

from a sin-offering.

For I say: Part of

the

labor he performed today,

while it was still Shabbat,

and part he performed tomorrow,

when it was already Yom Kippur, and there is not the requisite measure of labor either on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who performs labor during the day, but does not know whether he performed it on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

That is, he forgot which day it was when he performed the labor.

Or with regard to one who performed labor but does not know what type of labor he performed,

whether he plowed or sowed.

For Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering,

because in either event he sinned.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him

from a sin-offering because he does not know in what manner he sinned.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him even from a provisional guilt-offering,

and the Gemara explains the reason.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree

with regard to

a matter involving one designation,

for example, there were two trees of the same species before him, and he unwittingly picked from one of them on Shabbat but does not know from which one he picked —

he is liable

to bring a sin-offering, since he knows in what manner he sinned.

With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to a matter involving two designations,

for example, he is uncertain whether he reaped or whether he ground, or whether he picked figs or whether he picked grapes. And likewise, if he intended to perform one labor but performed another [whether two different labors or two different species of trees],

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him

because he derives two requirements from “for the sin that he committed”: he must have intended to sin with that particular act, and at the time he becomes aware of his sin he must know in what manner he sinned.

Rabbi Eliezer holds that since he intended to do something that involved a sin, and at the time he became aware of it he learned that he had sinned, this is sufficient to obligate him to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if he intended to pick figs but picked grapes; or intended to pick grapes but picked figs.

Or if he intended to pick

black grapes but picked white ones, or white grapes but picked black ones,

they also disagree.

Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And the Gemara explains the issue over which Rabbi Yehuda and the tannaim mentioned above disagree.

And Rabbi Yehuda continues:

I am astonished

by my own statement:

If Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him

even in the case mentioned, although I indeed received this teaching from my teachers, since he intended to perform a prohibited act?

One cannot respond that Rabbi Yehoshua must exempt him even in such a case, for if we say that he obligates him,

why is it stated: “For the sin that he committed,”

which indicates specifically that he intended to commit the same sin that he ultimately committed?

For it may be said that the verse comes to teach:

excluding one who is merely engaged in an act

permitted in itself, who did not intend to perform any prohibited act at all—for example, he intended to cut something that had already been detached and instead cut something attached. But when he intended to perform [unwittingly] a prohibited labor, even though he ultimately performed a different labor, he is liable to bring a sin-offering [according to the Arukh la-Ner, the Rashash, and the Ḥeshek Shelomo in their understanding of Rashi and Tosafot].

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer said: In either event

he should be liable to bring a sin-offering when he does not know whether he ate forbidden fat or notar, and likewise in all the cases in the Mishna: For whether

he ate forbidden fat,

he

is liable

to bring a sin-offering, and whether

he ate notar,

he

is liable.

And likewise, whether

he had relations with his menstruating wife, he is liable,

and whether

he had relations with his sister, he is liable.

And likewise, whether

he performed labor on Shabbat, he is liable,

and whether

he performed labor on Yom Kippur, he is liable!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: It says: “Or his sin became known to him,

the sin that he committed.”

And we derive from the fact that it is written “that he committed”:

until it becomes known to him in what manner he sinned!

until he knows what sin he committed!

And we inquire:

And Rabbi Eliezer —

what does he do with this word “that”?

And we answer:

He requires it

to derive:

excluding one who is merely engaged in an act!

That is, one who intended to perform one act but ultimately performed another; he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.