Keritot 19a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon exempts in this case,

because there is no certain knowledge here at the outset, before each entry into the Temple, that indeed at that time he was impure. For even after his walking along the second path, he is still not certainly impure, for perhaps the first path is the impure one, and he has already become pure from that impurity. And below, he explains the reason of the first Tanna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda exempts them all, in the name of Rabbi Shimon!

And we raise an objection:

Even in the first one

does he also exempt in the first two cases?! But there, when he did not become pure in the meantime, he had certain knowledge that he was impure before entering the Temple for the second time.

And we answer:

Rava said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where he walked along the first [path], and at the time of his walking along the second he forgot that he had walked along the first

and afterward entered the Temple. It turns out that he has only a “partial” certain knowledge that he is impure: since at the time he walked along the second [path] he had forgotten his walking along the first, when he entered the Temple, preceding his entry there was only knowledge of possible impurity and not knowledge of certain impurity.

And in this they disagree,

the first Tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda according to Rabbi Shimon:

The first Tanna holds: Partial knowledge

is considered knowledge,

for since after his walking along the second path he is certainly impure, except that he does not know this and thinks that he is only possibly impure, because he forgot his walking along the first path, this is sufficient to obligate him in an ascending-and-descending offering [and it is preferable to the case explained in the latter clause, where at the time of his walking along the second path he had already become pure from the first. For there it is “knowledge of possibility,” since he has all the knowledge and nevertheless he is only in doubt about impurity, and therefore he is exempt [according to the first Tanna according to Rabbi Shimon]; but here, if he knew everything, he would have certain knowledge, except that this knowledge is missing from him. Therefore this is “partial” certain knowledge and not knowledge of possibility].

And Rabbi Shimon

ben Yehuda

holds: Partial knowledge is not considered knowledge.

And since he does not now know that he is certainly impure, he is like one who has no knowledge at all at the outset, who is exempt from an ascending-and-descending offering.

The Master said: He walked along the first [path], entered, and sprinkled, and repeated the sprinkling, and immersed, and walked along the second [path], and entered —

he is liable.

And we examine it:

Why is he liable

according to the first Tanna of Rabbi Shimon?

He did not have knowledge

at the outset that he was certainly impure, for in each of the entries into the Temple he is only possibly impure? [And as stated, this is “knowledge of possibility” and not “partial knowledge,” since he has

all

the knowledge and nevertheless he is only in doubt about impurity].

Reish Lakish said: Whose opinion is this? —

It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require

at all

knowledge at the outset,

but the obligation of the offering for impurity of the Temple is like every sin offering, for which we do not require knowledge at the outset.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is the Rabbis’ opinion

that is intended —

Here they treated knowledge of possibility as certain knowledge

!

And we say:

It might have entered our mind

that what Rabbi Yoḥanan said,

“Here they treated [it so],” and the same is true throughout the entire Torah,

is that knowledge of possibility is considered knowledge. And if so,

there is a difficulty from Rabbi Yoḥanan to Rabbi Yoḥanan!

For in our sugya Rabbi Yoḥanan said that knowledge of possibility does not divide the sin offerings like certain knowledge, whereas here he said that throughout the entire Torah knowledge of possibility is considered knowledge. And

there is also a difficulty

from

Reish Lakish to Reish Lakish!

For in our sugya he said according to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] that knowledge of possibility divides the sin offerings like certain knowledge; and if so, why did he not answer as Rabbi Yoḥanan did, that the first Tanna of Rabbi Shimon holds like Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], that knowledge of possibility is considered knowledge?

Granted, the difficulty from Rabbi Yoḥanan to Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult.

For it can be said that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan meant:

Here,

with regard to knowledge at the outset of impurity of the Temple,

they treated

knowledge of possibility as knowledge.

But throughout the entire Torah —

they did not

treat knowledge of possibility as knowledge!

What is the reason? Here, with regard to impurity

of the Temple and its sacred things,

it is written: “And it was hidden from him —

and he is impure.”

For it implies that it is sufficient to obligate him even if there is only some concealment from him concerning the impurity. Therefore we say that

knowledge that also contains possibility is one for which Scripture obligates. But throughout the entire Torah,

that is, with regard to all sin offerings,

it is written: “Or his sin became known to him,”

which implies only that

if he has knowledge

certain [of his sin] between one concealment and another,

then he is liable

for a sin offering for each concealment separately.

But according to Reish Lakish there is a difficulty. Instead of establishing it

the latter clause concerning the two paths

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

who does not require knowledge at the outset at all,

let him establish it

according to those Tanna’im who require knowledge at the outset, but he is liable because

he holds like Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi],

that knowledge of possibility is considered knowledge?!

And we answer:

This is what Reish Lakish teaches us

—

that Rabbi Yishmael also does not require knowledge at the outset

with regard to impurity of the Temple and its sacred things! And therefore he established the words of the first Tanna of Rabbi Shimon according to Rabbi Yishmael.

And we refute this: What does he teach us?

It is the Mishna! For we learned: Rabbi Yishmael says:

It is written concerning impurity of the Temple and its sacred things:

“And it was hidden,” “and it was hidden,” twice. To obligate

both

for concealment of impurity

when he forgot that he was impure when he entered the Temple,

and

both

for concealment of the Temple

when he forgot that this was the Temple [or that this was sacred meat]. And it is explained in tractate Shevuot that one who requires knowledge at the outset derives it from these two instances of “and it was hidden.” If so, Rabbi Yishmael, for whom the verses are not superfluous for this purpose, certainly holds that he does not require knowledge at the outset.

And we answer:

It was necessary

for Reish Lakish to teach us this, for

it might have entered our mind

that Rabbi Yishmael only

from the verse

does

not have it

that knowledge at the outset is required. But

from the oral teaching,

from a halakha given to Moses at Sinai,

he does have it.

This is what Reish Lakish teaches us,

that Rabbi Yishmael does not have knowledge at the outset at all!

Mishna:

There were

forbidden fat and notar before him,

and he thought that both were permitted fat,

and he ate one of them, but he does not know which one he ate.

Or there were

his menstruating wife and his sister with him in the house, and he unwittingly transgressed with one of them,

that he had intercourse with one of them, thinking that she was his wife and that she was pure, and in the end it became known to him that she was menstruating,

but he does not know with which of them he unwittingly transgressed,

for he is uncertain whether he had intercourse with his sister.

Or

Shabbat and Yom Kippur

occurred one after the other,

and he performed labor during twilight

between them, and he thought that it was an ordinary weekday,

but he does not know on which of them he performed it,

whether on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin offering,

for in either event he certainly sinned.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

because he derives from what is written concerning a sin offering, “for the sin that he committed with it,” that he is liable only if he knows in what he sinned—whether in forbidden fat or in notar .

Rabbi Yose said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree

with regard to

concerning one who performs labor during twilight

between Shabbat and Yom Kippur,

that he is exempt

from a sin offering.

For I say: Part

of the

labor he performed today

while it was still Shabbat,

and part he performed tomorrow,

when it was already Yom Kippur, and there is no measure of labor here either on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

Over what did they disagree? Concerning one who performs labor during the day, but does not know whether he performed it on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur.

For he forgot which day it was when he performed the labor.

Or concerning one who performed [labor] but does not know the type of which labor he performed

—whether he plowed or sowed .

For Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin offering,

because in either event he sinned.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

from a sin offering because he does not know in what he sinned.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would exempt him even from a provisional guilt offering,

and the Gemara explains the reason.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree

with regard to

concerning a matter that is of one designation,

such as when two trees of the same species were before him, and he picked from one of them on Shabbat unwittingly, but does not know from which one he picked —

that he is liable

for a sin offering, since he knows in what he sinned.

Over what did they disagree? Concerning a matter that is of two designations,

such as whether he reaped or whether he ground, or whether he gathered figs or whether he gathered grapes. And likewise if he intended to perform this one and performed that one [whether with two labors or with two species of trees],

Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin offering.

And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts

from a sin offering because he expounds “for the sin that he committed with it” in two ways: he must intend to sin with it, and at the time of his knowledge he must know in what he sinned.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds that since he intended to do something that contains a sin, and at the time of his knowledge it became known to him that he sinned, this is sufficient to make him liable for a sin offering.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if he intended to gather figs and gathered grapes; grapes and gathered figs.

Or he intended to gather

black ones and gathered white ones, white ones and gathered black ones,

they also disagree. For

Rabbi Eliezer obligates a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts.

And the Gemara explains in what Rabbi Yehuda and the Tanna’im above disagree.

And Rabbi Yehuda continues:

And I am astonished

at my words:

if Rabbi Yehoshua exempted him for it

even in the case stated above?! For indeed, this is what I received from my teachers, since he intended something prohibited.

And one cannot answer that Rabbi Yehoshua must exempt even in such a case, for if we say that he obligates him,

if so, why is it stated, “for the sin that he committed with it,”

which implies specifically when he intended that same sin which he performed?

For it can be said that the verse came to say:

excluding one who is occupied with permitted activity,

who did not intend to perform any prohibited act at all, such as when he intended to cut something detached and cut something attached. But when he intended to perform [unwittingly] a prohibited labor, even though in the end he performed another labor, he is liable for a sin offering [according to the Arukh la-Ner, Rashash, and Ḥeshek Shelomo in Rashi’s opinion and that of Tosafot].

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer said: In either event

he should be liable for a sin offering when he does not know whether he ate forbidden fat or notar, and likewise in all those cases of the Mishna: for whether

he ate forbidden fat

he is

liable

for a sin offering, and whether

he ate notar

he is

liable.

And likewise, whether

he had intercourse with his menstruating wife he is liable

and whether

he had intercourse with his sister he is liable.

And likewise, whether

he performed labor on Shabbat he is liable

and whether

he performed labor on Yom Kippur he is liable?!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Behold, it says: “Or his sin became known to him,

“for the sin that he committed.”

for the sin that he committed with it.”

And we derive from the fact that it is written “with it” —

until it becomes known to him in what he sinned!

And we examine it:

And Rabbi Eliezer —

what does he do with this “with it”?

And we answer:

He requires it

to expound:

excluding one who is occupied with permitted activity!

He intended this act, but in the end performed another act; he is not liable for a sin offering.