Keritot 18b — the Talmud in English

And

it is Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, who says: A person may voluntarily bring a provisional guilt-offering every day,

and here there is no concern of unconsecrated animals in the Temple courtyard.

Therefore, we say to him

the second one:

Bring a provisional guilt-offering and stipulate: If the first one ate fat,

then

he ate forbidden fat,

and

let

this guilt-offering

be an atonement

to protect him meanwhile from afflictions until it becomes known to him that indeed he ate forbidden fat and he brings a sin-offering;

but if not,

rather, he ate permitted fat,

let

the guilt-offering

be a voluntary offering.

The Sages taught: If one ate uncertain forbidden fat and

afterward

it became known to him

that it was uncertain forbidden fat, and he again ate

uncertain forbidden fat and it became known to him—

Rabbi says: I say: Just as if

it became known to him at the end that both pieces which he ate were forbidden fat,

he brings a sin-offering for each one and one,

because the knowledge between one eating and the other divides them, even though it was only knowledge of uncertainty,

so [

as long as he knows only that the two pieces are uncertain forbidden fat]

he brings a provisional guilt-offering for each one and one

because of the knowledge of uncertainty in the interim, for knowledge of uncertainty also divides, with regard to a provisional guilt-offering.

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon say: He brings only one provisional guilt-offering

for the two pieces.

As it is stated

with regard to a provisional guilt-offering:

“For his error which he erred.”

And we expound:

even for many errors—

he is liable for only one [

and the same is true that knowledge of uncertainty does not divide sin-offerings according to these tannaim; Rashi in our passage. However, Tosafot in Shevuot 19b, s.v. “here,” wrote that with regard to sin-offerings these tannaim agree that knowledge of uncertainty divides, and they disagree only concerning a provisional guilt-offering] .

Rabbi Zeira said: Here Rabbi taught: Knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings!

For, as stated, Rabbi derives from a sin-offering to a provisional guilt-offering that knowledge of uncertainty divides; it follows that concerning a sin-offering Rabbi holds that knowledge of uncertainty divides [and below it will challenge: Why does he derive a guilt-offering from a sin-offering? On the contrary, a sin-offering should have been learned from a guilt-offering, since the principal case of knowledge of uncertainty is stated with regard to a provisional guilt-offering] .

Rava said: Knowledge of uncertainty does not divide sin-offerings. Rather, this is what it teaches:

Rabbi said:

Just as if he had knowledge

of

certainty

between one piece and the other,

he brings a sin-offering for each one and one, so if he had knowledge of uncertainty

between them [and even at the end it became known to him only that he ate uncertain forbidden fat]

he brings a provisional guilt-offering for each one and one.

Abaye said

to Rava:

But can you not reason that knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings?! For if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty does not divide sin-offerings, and he brings one sin-offering,

then

why

did Rabbi say concerning knowledge of uncertainty that he

brings a provisional guilt-offering for each one and one? But it was taught: The general principle is: Anyone who is divided with regard to sin-offerings

so that he brings a separate sin-offering for each one—

is divided with regard to provisional guilt-offerings

as well. And how could it be possible that according to Rabbi there is a distinction between sin-offerings and guilt-offerings?

Rava bar Hanan said to Abaye: But according to you, who say: Knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings! Now, if one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur, and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur

in one lapse of awareness,

and

behold,

Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt-offering,

for it atones for an uncertain sin and exempts from a provisional guilt-offering, would

so too

you say

that he brings two sin-offerings

after Yom Kippur, for just as knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings because it obligates a person in a provisional guilt-offering, so too the very atonement of a provisional guilt-offering—namely, Yom Kippur, which provides the atonement of a provisional guilt-offering—divides between the two olive-bulks? And how is it possible to say so?

We ate them in one lapse of awareness,

and there was not even knowledge of uncertainty in the interim?!

Abaye said to him: And who tells us that Yom Kippur atones

in place of a provisional guilt-offering

even though it did not become known to him

that he ate uncertain forbidden fat?

Perhaps

Yom Kippur atones only

when it became known to him

knowledge of uncertainty before Yom Kippur! But if he had no knowledge at all, Yom Kippur does not atone! And if so, there is no difficulty from one who ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk after Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, for in that case Yom Kippur truly does not atone.

Rava said to him: Fool!

Moron [another explanation: lazy one!] Behold,

“whether he knew or did not know,” we learned! [

in tractate Shevuot], meaning that whether he had knowledge of uncertainty or had no knowledge at all, Yom Kippur atones, for if after Yom Kippur it becomes known to him that he transgressed an uncertain sin, he is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering. The difficulty therefore returns to its place: one who ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur?

Some say: Rava bar Hanan said to Abaye: What if one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the morning on Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon on Yom Kippur

would

he indeed also be liable for two sin-offerings?!

For Yom Kippur is like knowledge of uncertainty, since it atones in place of a provisional guilt-offering; and if knowledge of uncertainty divides, the same applies to Yom Kippur.

Abaye said to him: And who tells us that Yom Kippur—

at every moment,

every moment of the day—

atones?! Perhaps, the entire day

is what atones, namely,

from the evening,

from the beginning of the night until the end of the day it atones, but part of the day does not atone. If so, when one eats an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on Yom Kippur itself, it does not atone, and consequently it does not divide with regard to sin-offerings?!

He said to him

Rava:

Fool! We learned

below [25a]:

If a case of uncertain transgression came to his attention on Yom Kippur, even at nightfall, he is exempt, for the entire day atones!

That is, every moment of the day. But the difficulty still remains: one who ate an olive-bulk in the morning and an olive-bulk in the afternoon?

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection

to Rabbi Zeira, who said that knowledge of uncertainty divides with regard to sin-offerings: We learned in tractate Yoma:

If he ate and drank

on Yom Kippur

in one lapse of awareness,

he is liable for only one sin-offering!

For drinking and eating are one category of prohibition with regard to Yom Kippur.

But between the eating and the drinking, is it possible that there was not time during the day for it to become known to him?!

That is, it was possible for him to become aware,

and

even if it did not become known to him at that time,

it atoned for him

then

Yom Kippur,

and since

Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt-offering,

it is as though he had knowledge of uncertainty at that time,

and it teaches: He is liable for only one sin-offering 18 .

And if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings—

he should be liable for two sin-offerings

for the eating and the drinking?

And we resolve:

They said: When Rabbi Zeira said

that knowledge of uncertainty divides sin-offerings, that is specifically

according to Rabbi.

But

this

Mishna—

it is according to the Rabbis!

That is, the tannaim who disagree with Rabbi in the beraita above and hold that knowledge of uncertainty does not divide with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, and the same applies to a sin-offering.

And we challenge:

But from the latter clause

of this Mishna,

it is Rabbi. For it teaches: If he drank brine [

the liquid that comes out of salted fish]

and fish sauce [

the fat of salted fish] on Yom Kippur—

he is exempt!

And we infer:

This—

if he drank

vinegar—

he is liable!

And whose opinion is it? It is Rabbi’s!

For it was taught: Vinegar does not restore the soul. Rabbi says: I say: Vinegar restores the soul.

And since the latter clause is Rabbi,

it follows that

the first clause is also Rabbi.

And it teaches in the first clause that knowledge of uncertainty does not divide sin-offerings, which is difficult for Rabbi Zeira?!

And we resolve:

They said:

This is not necessary. Rather,

the latter clause is Rabbi,

and

the first clause is according to the Rabbis.

Rava raised an objection

to Rabbi Zeira: It was taught:

If he ate today

consecrated food worth half a peruta, and

ate tomorrow

again worth half a peruta. Or

if he benefited today

from consecrated property [with something that is not food] worth half a peruta, and again

benefited tomorrow

worth half a peruta. Or

he ate today

and

benefited tomorrow,

or

benefited today

and

ate tomorrow. And even

if there was an interval

from here,

from the first eating or benefit,

until

the second—

three years, from where do we know that they join one with the other

to become liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property?

The verse says: “He commits a misuse,”

the verse expanded

the law!

And why

do they join?

Behold, Yom Kippur atoned for it

when it occurred within the three years, and it is as though he had knowledge of uncertainty in the interim. And just as according to your words knowledge of uncertainty divides, so that he becomes liable for two sin-offerings, the same applies that it divides so that the two half-measures do not join together; likewise Yom Kippur also divides. Why, then, do the eatings before Yom Kippur and after it join?

And we explain:

They say: When Yom Kippur atones

specifically

for a prohibition,

but

for monetary liability,

that is, me'ila, which is a monetary liability to the sacred property,

it does not atone.

Alternatively, you can say: When Yom Kippur atones

specifically

for the entire measure,

but

for half a measure it does not atone, and therefore the halves of the measure combine with one another, for Yom Kippur did not atone for the first half, and it is not considered an intervening awareness of doubt.

therefore, two half-measures combine, since Yom Kippur did not atone for the first half, and in the meantime this is not considered awareness of a doubt .

And so said Reish Lakish: Here Rabbi taught: Awarenesses of doubt divide for sin-offerings. Rabbi Yohanan said: Awarenesses of doubt do not divide for sin-offerings. Rather, this is how Rabbi taught it:

Rabbi:

Just as when he had awareness

of

certainty, he brings a sin-offering for each one, so too, when he had awareness of doubt, he brings a suspensive guilt-offering for each one.

And we inquire:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, this is why he makes the suspensive guilt-offering dependent on the sin-offering.

For Rabbi derives the guilt-offering from the sin-offering, since awareness of certainty concerning a sin-offering is explicitly stated in Scripture as dividing the sin-offerings, as it is written, “Or it became known to him his sin” [which implies that through the awareness he becomes liable for a sin-offering, and consequently the subsequent unintentional act is not exempted by this sin-offering], and from it they learn concerning awareness of doubt in a suspensive guilt-offering.

But according to Reish Lakish, does he need to derive the sin-offering from the guilt-offering

for Rabbi in order to make it dependent [on the guilt-offering]?! For awareness of doubt is principally stated concerning a suspensive guilt-offering, as it is written, “and he did not know,” and he should have derived from it concerning the sin-offering that awarenesses of doubt also divide in its case?!

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

And he raises a contradiction between Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yohanan, and between Reish Lakish and Reish Lakish.

There is a distinction between all the sin-offerings in the Torah and the graduated offering that comes for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things. In all the sin-offerings, even if the unintentional sinner had no awareness before the sin, but was unintentional from the outset—for example, he had never known that the forbidden fat was prohibited—even so, he brings a sin-offering when he comes to know that he sinned. But in the case of impurity of the Sanctuary, he must have “awareness at the beginning, and awareness at the end, and absence of awareness in between”; that is, only if at first he knew that he was impure and that this was the Sanctuary, or that this was sacred meat, and afterward the impurity disappeared from his awareness, or he forgot that this was the Sanctuary or that this was sacred, and he entered the Sanctuary or ate sacred meat because of the disappearance of his previous awareness, and at the end he became aware of it—then he brings a graduated offering.

As it was taught:

There were

two paths, one impure

in which a corpse was buried, so that one who passed there necessarily overshadowed it,

and one pure.

And it was not known which of them was impure.

And a person walked

a

in

the

first path, and did not enter

the Sanctuary afterward until he had also walked

in the

second, and then

entered

the Sanctuary unintentionally, having forgotten that he was impure—

he is liable

for a graduated offering, since he had awareness of certainty at the beginning that he was impure, for once he walked on both paths, one of which was impure, in any event he became impure. But if he

walked on the first,

and forgot that he had walked on it,

and entered

the Sanctuary—

he is exempt,

since he is not certainly impure.

Afterward he walked

on the second,

and forgot about the two paths on which he had walked,

and entered—

he is liable,

as above.

He walked on the first

and forgot,

and entered, and

afterward, when he remembered that he was doubtfully impure,

was sprinkled

with the ashes of the red cow on the third day,

and repeated it

with the sprinkling on the seventh day,

and immersed himself

and became completely purified from his doubtful impurity,

and

afterward

walked on the second,

and forgot,

and entered—

he is liable

for a sin-offering, since one of the two entries into the Sanctuary was certainly in a state of impurity.