Keritot 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

And

it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: A person may volunteer an asham talui every day,

so there is no concern here of bringing unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard.

Therefore, we say to him

the second person:

Bring an asham talui and stipulate: If the first person ate forbidden fat,

then

he ate forbidden fat,

and

let

this asham

be an atonement

to protect him in the interim from suffering, until it becomes known to him that indeed he ate forbidden fat and he brings a sin offering;

but if not,

rather, he ate permitted fat,

let

the asham

be a voluntary offering.

The Sages taught: If one ate

afterward

it became known to him

that it was uncertain forbidden fat, and then he again ate

uncertain forbidden fat and it became known to him—

Rabbi says: I say: Just as if

it ultimately became known to him that both pieces he ate were forbidden fat,

he brings a sin offering for each one and one,

because the knowledge that came between one eating and the other separates them, even though it was only knowledge of an uncertainty,

so [as long as he knows only that both pieces were possibly forbidden fat]

as long as he knows only that both pieces were possibly forbidden fat]

he brings an asham talui for each one and one

because of the intervening knowledge of the uncertainty, for knowledge of an uncertainty likewise separates them with regard to an asham talui.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, say: He brings only one asham talui

for the two pieces.

As it is stated

with regard to an asham talui:

“For his unwitting act in which he acted unwittingly.”

And we expound this:

Even for many unwitting acts—

he is liable for only one [and the same is true: according to these tannaim, knowledge of an uncertainty does not separate the sin offerings; Rashi in our sugya. However, Tosafot in Shevuot 19b, s.v. kan, wrote that with regard to sin offerings these tannaim agree that knowledge of an uncertainty does separate them, and they disagree only concerning an asham talui].

and the same is true: according to these conditions, knowledge of an uncertainty does not divide sin-offerings; Rashi, in this passage. However, Tosafot in Shevuot 19b, s.v. kan, write that with regard to sin-offerings these תנאים agree that knowledge of an uncertainty does divide them; they disagree only with regard to a guilt-offering for uncertain transgression] .

Rabbi Zeira said: Here Rabbi taught: Knowledge of an uncertainty separates sin offerings!

For, as stated, Rabbi derives from the law of a sin offering the law of an asham talui, that knowledge of an uncertainty separates them. Thus, with regard to a sin offering Rabbi holds that knowledge of an uncertainty separates them. [And below the Gemara challenges: Why does he derive the law of an asham from a sin offering? On the contrary, he should derive the law of a sin offering from an asham, since the primary law of knowledge of an uncertainty is stated with regard to an asham talui].

Rava said: Knowledge of an uncertainty does not separate sin offerings. Rather, this is what it teaches:

Rabbi said:

Just as if he had knowledge

of

certainty

between one piece and the other,

he brings a sin offering for each one and one, so if he had knowledge of an uncertainty

between them [and even ultimately it became known to him only that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat],

he brings an asham talui for each one and one.

Abaye said

to Rava:

But can you not accept that knowledge of an uncertainty does separate sin offerings? For if it enters your mind that knowledge of an uncertainty does not separate sin offerings, and he brings one sin offering,

then

why

did Rabbi say, with regard to knowledge of an uncertainty, that he

brings an asham talui for each one and one? And was it not taught: The general rule is that anyone whose cases are distinct with regard to sin offerings

so that he brings a separate sin offering for each one—

has distinct cases with regard to ashams

taluim? How, then, could there be a distinction according to Rabbi between sin offerings and ashams?

Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: According to you, who say that knowledge of an uncertainty separates sin offerings, what will you say in the following case? If one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur

in one lapse of awareness,

and

Yom Kippur

stands in place of an asham talui,

for it atones for a possible sin and exempts him from an asham talui,

would you likewise

say

that he brings two sin offerings

after Yom Kippur? Just as knowledge of an uncertainty separates sin offerings, since it makes a person liable to an asham talui, so too the actual atonement of an asham talui—namely, Yom Kippur, which provides the atonement of an asham talui—should separate the two olive-bulk quantities. How can this be said?

We ate them in one lapse of awareness,

and there was not even knowledge of an uncertainty in between?!

Abaye said to him: And who tells us that Yom Kippur atones

in place of an asham talui

even though it did not become known to him

that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat?

Perhaps

Yom Kippur atones only

when it becomes known to him

that he had knowledge of an uncertainty before Yom Kippur. But if he had no knowledge whatsoever, Yom Kippur does not atone. If so, there is no difficulty from one who ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk after Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, since in that case Yom Kippur indeed does not atone.

Rava said to him: Fool!

Ignoramus [alternatively: idler]!

We learned: “When it became known and when it did not become known”! [In tractate Shevuot.] Whether he had knowledge of an uncertainty in between or had no knowledge at all, Yom Kippur atones, since if after Yom Kippur it becomes known to him that he committed a possible sin, he is exempt from an asham talui. The difficulty therefore returns to its place: What of one who ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk after Yom Kippur?

in tractate Shevuot]. Whether he had knowledge of an uncertainty or had no knowledge at all, Yom Kippur atones. If after Yom Kippur it becomes known to him that he had committed a possibly sinful act, he is exempt from a guilt-offering for uncertain transgression. The difficulty therefore returns to its place: What is the ruling in the case of one who ate an olive-bulk measure of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk measure after Yom Kippur?

Some say that Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: What would you say if one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the morning on Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon on Yom Kippur?

Would you

likewise say that he is liable to bring two sin offerings?!

For Yom Kippur is equivalent to knowledge of an uncertainty, since it atones in place of an asham talui; and if knowledge of an uncertainty separates them, the same should apply to Yom Kippur.

Abaye said to him: And who tells us that Yom Kippur—

at every moment

of the day—

atones? Perhaps the entire day

is what atones, meaning

from the evening,

from the beginning of the night, until the end of the day; this is what atones, but part of the day does not atone. If so, when one eats an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on Yom Kippur itself, it does not atone, and consequently it does not separate the sin offerings?!

Rava said

to him:

Fool! We learned

below [25a]:

If a possible transgression came into his possession on Yom Kippur, even at twilight, he is exempt, for the entire day atones!

That is, every moment of the day. The difficulty nevertheless remains: What of one who ate an olive-bulk in the morning and another olive-bulk in the afternoon?

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection

to Rabbi Zeira, who said that knowledge of an uncertainty separates with regard to sin offerings: We learned in tractate Yoma:

If one ate and drank

on Yom Kippur

in one lapse of awareness,

he is liable to bring only one sin offering!

For drinking and eating constitute one category of prohibition with regard to Yom Kippur.

But between the eating and the drinking there must necessarily have been time during the day for it to become known to him?!

That is, it was possible for him to become aware,

and

even if he did not become aware at that time,

it atoned for him

then,

Yom Kippur,

and since

Yom Kippur stands in place of an asham talui,

it is as though he had knowledge of an uncertainty at that time.

Yet it teaches: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

And if it enters your mind that knowledge of an uncertainty separates sin offerings,

he should be liable to bring two sin offerings

for the eating and the drinking?

And we answer:

They said: When Rabbi Zeira said

that knowledge of an uncertainty separates sin offerings, this applies specifically

according to Rabbi.

But

this

Mishna—

it is the Rabbis’ opinion!

That is, it follows the tannaim who disagree with Rabbi in the beraita above and hold that knowledge of an uncertainty does not separate ashams taluim, and the same applies to sin offerings.

And we challenge this:

But from the fact that the latter clause

of this Mishna

is Rabbi’s opinion, as it teaches: If one drank brine

[the liquid that comes out of salted fish]

and fish sauce

[the fat of salted fish] on Yom Kippur—

he is exempt!

And we infer:

Here,

if he drank

vinegar—

he is liable!

And whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi’s opinion!

As it was taught in a beraita: Vinegar does not restore a person’s vitality. Rabbi says: I say that vinegar restores a person’s vitality.

And since the latter clause is Rabbi’s opinion,

it follows that

the first clause is also Rabbi’s opinion.

Yet it teaches in the first clause that knowledge of an uncertainty does not separate sin offerings, which is a difficulty for Rabbi Zeira?!

And we answer:

They said:

This is not compelled. Rather,

the latter clause is Rabbi’s opinion,

while

the first clause is the Rabbis’ opinion.

Rava raised an objection

to Rabbi Zeira: It was taught in a beraita:

If one ate today

consecrated food worth half a peruta, and

ate tomorrow

again worth half a peruta; or

benefited today

from consecrated property [through an item that is not food] worth half a peruta, and again

benefited tomorrow

from it worth half a peruta; or

ate today

and

benefited tomorrow,

or

benefited today

and

ate tomorrow. And even if

the interval

from

the first eating or benefit

until

the second was

three years, how do we know that they combine with one another

to make him liable for an asham me’ilot?

The verse states: “He has committed a trespass,”

the verse includes

additional cases!

And why

do they combine?

Yom Kippur atoned for it,

having occurred during the three years, and it is as though he had knowledge of an uncertainty in the interim. Just as, according to your words, knowledge of an uncertainty separates them so as to make him liable for two sin offerings, so too it should prevent the two half-measures from combining. Likewise, Yom Kippur should separate them. Why, then, do the eating before Yom Kippur and the eating after it combine?

And we answer:

They say: Since Yom Kippur atones

specifically

for a prohibition,

but

for a monetary obligation,

namely, me'ila, which is a monetary liability to the sacred property,

it does not atone .

And if you wish, say: Since Yom Kippur atones

specifically

for the entire measure,

but

it does not atone for half a measure, and therefore the halves of the measure combine, since Yom Kippur did not atone for the first half, and it is not considered an interim state of awareness of uncertainty .

therefore, two half-measures combine, since Yom Kippur did not atone for the first half, and in the meantime this is not considered awareness of a doubt .

And similarly Reish Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught: Awareness of uncertainty divides the offerings of sin. Rabbi Yohanan said: Awareness of uncertainty does not divide the offerings of sin. Rather, this is what Rabbi taught:

Rabbi:

Just as, if he had awareness

of

certainty, he brings a sin-offering for each one, so too, if he had awareness of uncertainty, he brings an asham talui for each one.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, this is why he derives the asham from the sin-offering.

Rabbi derives the asham from the sin-offering, since definite awareness in the case of a sin-offering is explicitly stated in the verse as dividing the sin-offerings, as it is written: “Or his sin became known to him” [which indicates that through the awareness he becomes liable for a sin-offering, and consequently the subsequent unwitting act is not atoned for by that sin-offering]; and from it they derive the law of awareness of uncertainty in the case of an asham talui.

But according to Reish Lakish, does he need to derive the sin-offering from the asham for Rabbi to derive it?! Since awareness of uncertainty is primarily stated with regard to an asham talui, as it is written, “and he did not know,” he should have derived from it the law of the sin-offering, that awareness of uncertainty also divides the sin-offerings in its case?!

Since awareness of a doubt is primarily stated with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, as it is written: “And he did not know,” he should have derived from it that with regard to a sin-offering as well, awareness of a doubt divides the cases?!

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

And the statement of Rabbi Yohanan is contradicted by the statement of Rabbi Yohanan, and the statement of Reish Lakish is contradicted by the statement of Reish Lakish. There is a distinction between all the sin-offerings in the Torah and the ascending-and-descending offering brought for impurity involving the Sanctuary and its sacred things. In the case of all sin-offerings, even if one who sinned unwittingly had no awareness before the sin, but was unwitting from the outset—for example, he had never known that chelev was prohibited—nevertheless he brings a sin-offering when he learns that he sinned. In contrast, in the case of impurity involving the Sanctuary, there must be “awareness at the beginning, awareness at the end, and unawareness in between”; that is, only if he initially knew that he was impure and that this was the Sanctuary, or that this was sacred flesh, and afterward forgot the impurity or forgot that this was the Sanctuary or that this was sacred, and entered the Sanctuary or ate sacred flesh because of his loss of the earlier awareness, and in the end learned of it, does he bring an ascending-and-descending offering.

There is a distinction between all the sin-offerings in the Torah and the variable offering brought for entering the Temple or eating consecrated food while ritually impure. With regard to all the sin-offerings, even if the sinner did not know before the sin that the act was prohibited, but was unaware from the outset—for example, he had never known that forbidden fat was prohibited—nevertheless, he brings a sin-offering when he learns that he sinned. But with regard to impurity involving the Temple or consecrated food, he must have “awareness at the beginning, awareness at the end, and unawareness in between.” That is, he brings the variable offering only if he initially knew that he was impure and that this was the Temple, or that this was consecrated meat, and afterward forgot the impurity or forgot that this was the Temple or that this was consecrated food; he then entered the Temple or ate consecrated food because he had forgotten his earlier knowledge, and ultimately became aware of it.

As it was taught:

There were

two paths, one impure

because a corpse was buried there, and one who passed along it necessarily overshadowed it,

and one pure.

It was not known which of them was impure.

And he went

a person

along

the first path,

and did not enter

the Sanctuary afterward until he had also gone

along the second, and

then

entered

the Sanctuary unwittingly, having forgotten that he was impure—

he is liable

for an ascending-and-descending offering, since he had definite awareness at the outset that he was impure: Once he had walked along both paths, one of which was impure, he was certainly rendered impure. But if he

went along the first path,

and forgot that he had gone along it,

and entered

the Sanctuary—

he is exempt,

since he is not certainly impure.

Afterward he went

along the second path,

and forgot the two paths along which he had gone,

and entered—

he is liable,

as above.

He went along the first path

and forgot,

and entered, and

afterward, when he remembered that he was possibly impure,

was sprinkled

with the ashes of the red heifer on the third day,

and was sprinkled again

on the seventh day,

and immersed

and became completely pure from his possible impurity,

and

afterward

went along the second path,

and forgot,

and entered—

he is liable

for a sin-offering, since one of the two entries into the Sanctuary was certainly made in a state of impurity.