Keritot 18a — the Talmud in English

He raised an objection to him:

We learned in the Mishna: A levir who had intercourse with his levirate wife within three months of the death of his brother,

it is uncertain whether the child is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the latter—

he must divorce her, and the child is fit, and they are liable for an uncertain-guilt offering!

But it is impossible to clarify his prohibition, for he is a nine-month child of the first husband?

And we answer:

Who is the author of this?—

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar!

He raised an objection to him:

We learned:

If it was found on her immediately—

they are impure and liable for an offering. If it was found on her after a period of time—

they are impure due to uncertainty and exempt from the offering. And it was taught concerning it: And they are liable for an uncertain-guilt offering!

But here too it is impossible to clarify his prohibition, for she was a menstruating woman at the time of intercourse; and why are they liable for an uncertain-guilt offering?

And we answer:

Who is the author of this?—

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar!

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha in the name of Rav: If there were before him two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat, and he ate one of them and does not know which one he ate—

he is liable. One piece

one

which was uncertainly forbidden fat and uncertainly permitted fat, and he ate it—

he is exempt!

Rav Naḥman said: What is the reason of Rav? He holds: In the case of two pieces—

the prohibition was established!

For there is certainly one piece of forbidden fat here. But

one piece—

the prohibition was not established!

For it is possible that it is permitted fat, and there is no prohibition here at all.

Apparently, it would seem possible to explain the view of the Tosafot that the definition of the law of the prohibition having been established is that we do not create a prohibition through the uncertainty in order to make him liable for an uncertain-guilt offering. But it is not specifically necessary that there be two uncertain pieces before us. Therefore, when we discuss this time of twilight [at the end of Shabbat], whether it is Shabbat or an ordinary weekday, this is not considered the creation of a prohibition, for the uncertainty there is whether Shabbat continues until now or not. But when he performed labor at twilight at the beginning of Shabbat, when we come to create a prohibition for him through the uncertainty, in this case he is not liable for an offering. For although Shabbat will certainly come in the future, nevertheless, since it is not certain that it has already come [at the time he performed the labor], this is considered the creation of a prohibition. It still requires examination how this matter is to be explained according to Rabbah’s reason, because of “mitzvot.” [And the Hagahot Maharsham wrote that from these words of the Tosafot it is possible to prove the reasoning of the Magen Avraham [302], that even those rabbinic prohibitions which they permitted to perform at twilight at the beginning of Shabbat are nevertheless prohibited at twilight at the end of Shabbat, because of the presumption of the day that has passed.] However, the Leḥem Mishneh [Shegagot 2:8] infers from the language of Maimonides that even at twilight at the beginning of Shabbat he would be liable for an offering. [And according to all views, if he performed labor in the midst of the day and afterward was uncertain whether it was Shabbat or an ordinary weekday, he does not bring an uncertain-guilt offering. In this manner it is certainly not considered that the prohibition was established; rather, it is like one piece, uncertainly forbidden fat and uncertainly permitted fat, regarding which we rule as law that he does not bring an offering.] One must consider the second case that we learned in the Mishna, “It is uncertain whether it contains the requisite measure, or uncertain whether it does not contain the requisite measure”: how is this law to be explained according to all the reasons in the Gemara? From the words of Rabbi Yosef Korkos [Shegagot 2:8] the view of the Tosafot becomes clear: when he ate from a piece of forbidden fat that contained an olive-bulk, and he was uncertain whether he ate an olive-bulk or less, this is considered a case in which the prohibition was established, since we do not need to create and introduce a prohibition, for the prohibition was certainly before us. Likewise, it is also possible to clarify the matter according to the amount of fat remaining after his eating [at least when we knew how much it contained initially]. However, according to the reason of “mitzvot,” we are compelled to establish the case as one in which there were two pieces here, one forbidden fat and one permitted fat, and each contained an olive-bulk, and he had two uncertainties: a] whether he ate from the forbidden fat or from the permitted fat; b] even if he ate from the forbidden fat, whether he ate an olive-bulk or less. Now, although it would have been possible to divide this issue into two separate uncertainties and say that, indeed, in the first uncertainty the condition of “mitzvot” is fulfilled, nevertheless, in the matter of the second uncertainty there is no “mitzvot,” it has been innovated here that we discuss both of them together. Therefore we make him liable for an offering through the first uncertainty. [It follows that without the first uncertainty he would not be liable for an offering because of the second uncertainty. And although in truth, through the first uncertainty his uncertainty becomes easier, for there is a compound uncertainty, nevertheless, it is a decree of Scripture that he is not liable for an uncertain-guilt offering unless there is “mitzvot.”] Regarding the essence of their words, that they make him liable for an uncertain-guilt offering in a place where there is a compound uncertainty for leniency, Shaar HaMelekh [Tum’at Met 15:12] explained that this is specifically in the aforementioned manner that the Tosafot depicted, in which the prohibition was established [with regard to both uncertainties], and therefore the compound uncertainty does not help to exempt him. But where there is before us one piece, which is uncertainly forbidden fat and uncertainly permitted fat, and there is also uncertainty whether he ate an olive-bulk from it or not—in which regard the first uncertainty is not a case in which the prohibition was established—he is not liable for an offering. See there. [It follows that according to Rav Asi, that the Mishna is speaking of one piece, the second case, “It is uncertain whether it contains the requisite measure, or uncertain whether it does not contain the requisite measure,” is also speaking of one piece that was certainly forbidden fat, and the uncertainty is whether he ate an olive-bulk from it or less. Everything that compelled the Tosafot to establish this case as one of compound uncertainty is only according to Rav, who requires two pieces because of “mitzvot,” as was explained in our words above.] See also Minḥat Ḥinukh [128]. And we explain:

What difference is there between

the reason

that the prohibition was established

between the reason

that it is impossible to clarify their prohibition [and between the reason of “mitzvot.” Rabbenu Gershom]?

The difference between them is: For example, there were before him two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat, and a gentile came and ate the first, and a Jew came and ate the second.

According to Rabbah: there is no “mitzvot,”

for there are no longer two pieces, because

at the time that the Jew ate

there were no longer two pieces, and therefore he is exempt from an uncertain-guilt offering.

According to Rabbi Zeira: it is impossible now to clarify its prohibition,

for both of them have already been eaten, and according to his view as well, he is exempt from an uncertain-guilt offering.

But

according to Rav Naḥman,

he is liable for an uncertain-guilt offering! For initially there was here

an established prohibition,

for there were two pieces, and one of them was prohibited.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

It was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: For the forbidden fat of a koy he is liable for an uncertain-guilt offering.

But the prohibition was not established in the case of a koy, for it is possible that it is a wild animal, and there is no prohibition of forbidden fat here at all?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar

disagrees with the tannay of the Mishna and

does not require “the prohibition to have been established,”

but makes him liable for an uncertain-guilt offering in every case.

He raised an objection to him: It is uncertain whether the child is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the latter—

he must divorce her and the child is fit. And they are liable for an uncertain-guilt offering!

But the prohibition was not established here, for it is possible that he did not transgress any prohibition at all?

And we answer:

Who is the author of this?—

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar! He raised an objection to him: If it was found on his—

they are impure and liable for an offering. If it was found on hers immediately—

they are impure and liable for an offering. If it was found on hers after a period of time—

they are impure due to uncertainty and exempt from the offering. And it was taught concerning it: And they are liable for an uncertain-guilt offering.

But here too the prohibition was not established, for perhaps she was not yet a menstruating woman at the time of intercourse, and they did not transgress a prohibition?

He was silent,

Rav Naḥman!

After Rava left,

Rava

Rav Naḥman said

Rava [who was astonished at himself]:

Why did I not say to him

Rava

that this is the author—

it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir! For he does not require the prohibition to have been established

with regard to liability for an uncertain-guilt offering.

As it was taught: One who slaughters an uncertain-guilt offering outside

the Temple

Rabbi Meir makes him liable,

to bring an uncertain-guilt offering for the uncertainty of the prohibition of slaughtering outside. For every uncertain-guilt offering is an uncertain offering and an uncertain non-sacred animal: if he did not eat forbidden fat, then the uncertain-guilt offering that he brings is a non-sacred animal.

And when he slaughters it outside, it is uncertain whether he transgressed a prohibition or not.

And since Rabbi Meir makes him liable for an uncertain-guilt offering for this, even though the prohibition of slaughtering outside was not established—for it is possible that the offering is a non-sacred animal and he did not transgress any prohibition at all—we see that Rabbi Meir does not require the prohibition to have been established.

And the Sages exempt,

from an uncertain-guilt offering, for the prohibition was not established .

And we raise an objection:

And why

did Rav Naḥman remain silent? For even though, when Rava challenged him, he did not remember the view of Rabbi Meir, nevertheless,

let him say

to Rava

that it is Rabbi Elazar’s view,

just as he had answered him regarding his earlier questions?

And we answer: It did not matter to him to answer him so, since Rava already knew that he could answer so. Rather,

this teaches us

Rav Naḥman

that Rabbi Meir

stands in accordance with the method of Rabbi Elazar,

who does not require a fixed status for the prohibition; and he regretted that he had not told him this.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba said that Rav Avuha said that Rav:

There was before him

a piece of uncertain forbidden fat and uncertain permitted fat, and he ate it—

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages!

For what I said above—that we require one piece from among two pieces—is not according to everyone, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that a person may voluntarily bring a suspended guilt-offering every day, even when he does not know that he sinned; certainly, he does not specifically require one piece from among two pieces.

And we raise an objection:

According to Rabbi Eliezer,

why particularly when he ate

that piece? Surely

even if he did not eat it, also

he could bring a suspended guilt-offering,

as we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may voluntarily bring a suspended guilt-offering every day? [It cannot be said that Rav Naḥman came to teach us that, when there is one piece, he is liable for a suspended guilt-offering and not merely that he may voluntarily bring one. For from where would he know that Rabbi Eliezer holds so? After all, he spoke only of a voluntary offering, and perhaps he is never liable except when there are two pieces.]

And they answer:

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

What Rav Naḥman said according to Rabbi Eliezer—

Rabbi Eliezer said it according to the view of Bava ben Buta!

For we learned:

They said about Bava ben Buta that he would voluntarily bring a suspended guilt-offering every day, except for the day after Yom Kippur. He said: “By this Sanctuary”—this is an expression of an oath—“if they would let me, I would also bring one on the day after Yom Kippur,”

but

the Sages

say to him: Wait until you enter into a state of uncertainty!

For Yom Kippur atones for an uncertain sin, as is explained in the Mishna below. Therefore, you may not bring a suspended guilt-offering on the day after Yom Kippur; rather, wait another day, so that you will be in partial uncertainty: perhaps you sinned yesterday.

And this tanna disputes the first Rabbi Eliezer. For according to the words of Rabbi Eliezer, one may bring a suspended guilt-offering as a true voluntary offering, whereas according to this tanna, he brings one voluntarily only when he has uncertainty whether he sinned. And according to his view Rav Naḥman said that although on the day after Yom Kippur he cannot bring a suspended guilt-offering, nevertheless, if on that day he ate one piece of uncertain forbidden fat, that is sufficient for him to be able to bring a suspended guilt-offering voluntarily [according to Tosafot, s.v. “we have arrived.” See their words below, 25b, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Mishnayot below, chapter 6, section 21].

The Sages taught: There were before him two pieces, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat. A Jew came and ate the first,

and afterward

a gentile came and ate the second; he is liable

the Jew is liable for a suspended guilt-offering. For when the Jew ate, there were still two pieces.

And likewise,

if

a dog or a raven

ate the second, the Jew is liable for the first.

A gentile came and ate the first,

and afterward

a Jew came and ate the second; he is exempt.

For when the Jew ate, there were no longer two pieces before him.

And Rabbi Yehuda obligates,

for he holds that we do not require one piece from among two pieces.

He ate

the Jew

the first inadvertently and

the

second intentionally,

knowing that it was uncertain forbidden fat—

he is liable

for the first, which was eaten inadvertently, and at that time there were two pieces before him.

He ate

the first intentionally,

knowing that one of the two was forbidden fat,

and

the

second inadvertently,

having forgotten that it was uncertain forbidden fat—

he is exempt

for the second, since at the time that he ate it there were not two pieces.

And Rabbi Yehuda obligates

because he does not require one piece from among two pieces.

He ate both intentionally—

he is exempt from everything!

Both inadvertently,

when two people ate inadvertently, each one piece [the Ya'avetz’s version reads: “two inadvertently”]—

both of them are liable

for a suspended guilt-offering.

And

the second, not by the law

is he to bring a suspended guilt-offering, since there were not two pieces before him, but only one piece,

rather

he brings one for this reason:

if you say

that he is

exempt,

you have established the first as liable for a sin-offering!

For the Sages required the second to bring a suspended guilt-offering, despite the fact that he is not liable by law, so that people would not come to err and say that the reason for the second’s exemption is that the piece he ate was permitted fat; and if so, the first certainly ate forbidden fat and is liable for a sin-offering.

And we raise an objection:

And who is it?

Who is this tanna who said this?

If it is Rabbi,

surely

by law, and by law he is

to be liable also for a suspended guilt-offering, since Rabbi does not require two pieces?

If it is the Rabbis,

the difficulty is: Is it because the first was not established as liable for a sin-offering that we should say to the second—

bring non-sacred [matter] into the Temple courtyard?!

Bring non-sacred [matter] into the Temple courtyard?!

For by law he is exempt.

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, it is according to the Rabbis.