Keritot 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

He raised an objection to him:

We learned in a Mishna: If a levir engaged in intercourse with his yevama within three months of his brother’s death,

and it is uncertain whether the child is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the latter—

he must separate from her, but the child is fit, and they are liable to bring an Asham Talui!

But it is impossible to clarify the nature of his prohibition, since he may be a nine-month child of the first husband?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar!

He raised an objection to him:

We learned:

If blood was found on her cloth immediately—

they are impure and liable to bring a sin-offering. If it was found on her cloth after some time—

they are impure due to uncertainty and exempt from the sin-offering. And it was taught concerning this: And they are liable to bring an Asham Talui!

But here too it is impossible to clarify the nature of their prohibition, since she was a menstruant at the time of intercourse; why, then, are they liable to bring an Asham Talui?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar!

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said: If two pieces were before a person, one forbidden fat and one permitted fat, and he ate one of them without knowing which one he had eaten—

he is liable. One piece

one

of uncertain status—whether it is forbidden fat or permitted fat—and he ate it—

he is exempt!

Rav Naḥman said: What is Rav’s reason? He holds that, in the case of two pieces—

the prohibition was established!

For there is certainly one piece of forbidden fat here. But

one piece—

the prohibition was not established!

For it may be a piece of permitted fat, in which case there is no prohibition here at all .

Apparently it would have seemed appropriate to explain the opinion of the Tosafot that the definition of the law of an established prohibition is that we do not create a prohibition through the uncertainty in order to make him liable for an Asham Talui. It is not specifically necessary that two pieces of uncertain status be before us. Therefore, when we consider this twilight period [at the end of Shabbat] and ask whether it is Shabbat or a weekday, this is not considered creating a prohibition, since the uncertainty is whether Shabbat continued until this point or not. But if he performed labor during twilight at the beginning of Shabbat, when we would be creating a prohibition upon him through the uncertainty, he would not be liable to bring a sacrifice. Although Shabbat will certainly arrive in the future, since it is not certain that it has already arrived [at the time he performed the labor], this is considered creating a prohibition. It still requires examination how this is to be understood according to Rabba’s rationale, because of “mitzvot.” [And the Haggahot Maharsham wrote that from these words of the Tosafot one can prove the reasoning of the Magen Avraham [302], that even those rabbinic prohibitions which they permitted one to perform during twilight at the beginning of Shabbat are nevertheless prohibited during twilight at the end of Shabbat, because of the presumption of the day that has passed.] However, the Leḥem Mishne [Shegagot 2:8] infers from the language of the Rambam that even during twilight at the beginning of Shabbat he would be liable to bring a sacrifice. [According to all opinions, if he performed labor in the middle of the day and afterward became uncertain whether it was Shabbat or a weekday, he does not bring an Asham, because in such a case the prohibition is certainly not considered established. Rather, this is like one piece whose status is uncertain as to whether it is forbidden fat or permitted fat, and we rule that he does not bring a sacrifice.] One must examine the second case that we learned in the Mishna, “It is uncertain whether it contains the requisite measure, or whether it does not contain the requisite measure”: How is this law to be understood according to all the rationales in the Gemara? From the words of Rabbi Yosef Corcos [Shegagot 2:8], the opinion of the Tosafot becomes clear: When he ate from a piece of forbidden fat that contained an olive-bulk, and it became uncertain to him whether he ate an olive-bulk or less, this is considered an established prohibition, since we need not create and establish a prohibition—the prohibition was certainly before us. Likewise, the matter may also be clarified according to the amount of fat remaining after he ate [at least when we knew how much it originally contained]. According to the rationale of “mitzvot,” however, we are forced to establish the case as one in which there were two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat, each containing an olive-bulk, and two uncertainties arose for him: a) whether he ate from the forbidden fat or from the permitted fat; b) even if he ate from the forbidden fat, whether he ate an olive-bulk or less. Although it would have been possible to divide this matter into two separate uncertainties and say that, with regard to the first uncertainty, the condition of “mitzvot” is fulfilled, whereas with regard to the second uncertainty there is no “mitzvot,” it has now been established that we consider both together. Therefore, we make him liable for a sacrifice on account of the first uncertainty. [It follows that without the first uncertainty, he would not be liable for a sacrifice on account of the second uncertainty. Although in reality the first uncertainty makes his uncertainty easier, since there is a compound uncertainty, nevertheless it is a scriptural decree that he is not liable for an Asham unless there is “mitzvot.”] Regarding their fundamental assertion, that they make him liable for an Asham Talui where there is a compound uncertainty favoring leniency, the Sha’ar ha-Melekh explained [Tum’at Met 15:12] that this applies specifically to the above-described case of the Tosafot, in which there is an established prohibition [with regard to both uncertainties], and therefore the compound uncertainty does not exempt him. But if there is one piece before us whose status is uncertain as to whether it is forbidden fat or permitted fat, and there is also uncertainty whether he ate an olive-bulk from it, then with regard to the first uncertainty the prohibition was not established, and he is not liable to bring a sacrifice; see there. [It follows that according to Rav Asi, who understands the Mishna as referring to one piece, the second case, “It is uncertain whether it contains the requisite measure or whether it does not,” likewise refers to one piece that was certainly forbidden fat, with the uncertainty being whether he ate an olive-bulk or less. Everything that compelled the Tosafot to establish this case as one of a compound uncertainty was only according to Rav, who requires two pieces because of “mitzvot,” as explained above.] See also Minḥat Ḥinukh [128]. And we explain:

What is the practical difference between

the rationale

of an established prohibition

and the rationale

that it is impossible to clarify the nature of their prohibition [and between the rationale of “mitzvot”? Rabbenu Gershom]?

The practical difference between them is a case in which two pieces were before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat; a gentile came and ate the first, and a Jew came and ate the second.

According to Rabba: There is no “mitzvot,”

since there are no longer two pieces, for

at the time the Jew ate

there were no longer two pieces; therefore he is exempt from an Asham Talui.

According to Rabbi Zeira: It is now impossible to clarify the nature of the prohibition,

since both pieces have already been eaten, and according to his view as well, he is exempt from an Asham Talui.

But

according to Rav Naḥman,

he is liable to bring an Asham Talui, for initially

the prohibition had been established:

there had been two pieces, one of which was prohibited.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

It was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a koy, one is liable to bring an Asham Talui for eating its forbidden fat.

But the prohibition was not established in the case of a koy, since it may be a wild animal, in which case there is no prohibition of forbidden fat at all?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar

disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna and

does not require “the establishment of a prohibition,”

but makes one liable to bring an Asham Talui in every case.

He raised an objection: It is uncertain whether the child is a nine-month child of the first husband or a seven-month child of the latter—

he must separate from her, but the child is fit. And they are liable to bring an Asham Talui!

But the prohibition was not established here, since it is possible that he did not transgress any prohibition at all?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?—

It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar! He raised an objection: If it was found on his cloth—

they are impure and liable to bring a sacrifice. If it was found on her cloth immediately—

they are impure and liable to bring a sacrifice. If it was found on her cloth after some time—

they are impure due to uncertainty and exempt from the sacrifice. And it was taught concerning this: And they are liable to bring an Asham Talui.

But here too the prohibition was not established, since perhaps she had not yet become a menstruant at the time of intercourse, and they did not transgress a prohibition?

Rav Naḥman was silent

Rav Naḥman!

After Rava had left,

Rava

said that Rav Naḥman [who was astonished at himself]:

Rav Naḥman [who was astonished at himself]:

Why did I not say to him

Rava

that this is—

the opinion of Rabbi Meir! For he does not require the establishment of a prohibition

with regard to liability for an Asham Talui.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who slaughters an Asham Talui outside

the Temple courtyard

Rabbi Meir makes him liable

to bring an Asham Talui for the uncertain transgression of slaughtering offerings outside. For every Asham Talui is a doubtful offering or an unconsecrated animal: If he had not eaten forbidden fat, the Asham Talui that he brings is unconsecrated.

And when he slaughters it outside, it is uncertain whether he transgressed a prohibition or not.

Since Rabbi Meir makes him liable to bring an Asham Talui for this, even though the prohibition of slaughtering offerings outside was not established—for it is possible that the Asham is unconsecrated and that he did not transgress any prohibition at all—we see that Rabbi Meir does not require the establishment of a prohibition.

But the Sages exempt

him from bringing an Asham Talui, since the prohibition was not established .

And we ask:

But why

did Rav Naḥman remain silent? Although he did not remember Rabbi Meir’s opinion at the time Ravava challenged him, nevertheless, he could

have said

to Ravava

that it is Rabbi Elazar’s opinion,

as he had answered him regarding his earlier questions?

And we answer: It did not matter to him to give that answer, since Ravava already knew that he could answer in that manner. Rather,

this teaches us

Rav Naḥman:

Rabbi Meir

follows the method of Rabbi Elazar,

who does not require a fixed state of uncertainty for the prohibition to apply; and he regretted that he had not told him this.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said:

There was before a person

a piece of meat that was either forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he ate it—

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages!

For what I said above—that we require one piece from among two pieces—is not agreed upon by everyone. For according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that a person may voluntarily bring an asham talui every day, even when he does not know that he sinned, it is certainly unnecessary to require specifically one piece from among two pieces.

And we ask:

According to Rabbi Eliezer,

why specifically when he ate

that piece? After all,

even if he did not eat it, he could also

bring an asham talui,

as we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may voluntarily bring an asham talui every day. [It cannot be said that Rav Naḥman intended to teach us that for one piece he is obligated to bring an asham talui, and not merely that he may volunteer to do so. For from where would he know that Rabbi Eliezer holds this? After all, he spoke only of a voluntary offering, and it is possible that he is never obligated except when there are two pieces].

And they answer:

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

What Rav Naḥman said regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion—

Rabbi Eliezer was speaking according to the opinion of Bava ben Buta!

As we learned: They said about Bava ben Buta that he would voluntarily bring an asham talui every day, except on the day after Yom Kippur. He said: “By this Temple”—this is an expression of an oath—“if they would permit me, I would bring one even on the day following Yom Kippur,”

it was said about Bava ben Buta that he would voluntarily bring a conditional guilt-offering every day except for the day after Yom Kippur. He said: “By this Sanctuary”—[an oath expression]—“if they had allowed me, I would have brought one even on the day after Yom Kippur.”

but

the Sages

would say to him: Wait until you enter into a state of uncertainty!

For Yom Kippur atones for an uncertain sin, as is explained in the Mishna below. Therefore, you should not bring an asham talui on the day after Yom Kippur; rather, wait another day, so that you will have some uncertainty—perhaps you sinned yesterday.

And this tanna disputes the first opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. According to Rabbi Eliezer, one may bring an asham talui as a purely voluntary offering, whereas according to this tanna, one brings it voluntarily only when he has an uncertainty as to whether he sinned. And it is according to this opinion that Rav Naḥman said that although one cannot bring an asham talui on the day after Yom Kippur, nevertheless, if on that day he ate one piece that was possibly forbidden fat, that alone is sufficient for him to be able to bring an asham talui voluntarily [according to Tosafot, s.v. “We have arrived.” See their remarks below, 25b, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s glosses on the Mishna below, chapter 6, section 21].

The Sages taught: There were before him two pieces, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat. A Jew came and ate the first,

and afterward

a gentile came and ate the second; he is liable

for an asham talui. For when the Jew ate, there were still two pieces.

Likewise,

if

a dog or a raven

ate the second, the Jew is liable for the first.

A gentile came and ate the first

and afterward

a Jew came and ate the second; he is exempt.

For when the Jew ate, there were no longer two pieces before him.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi obligates him,

for he holds that one does not require one piece from among two pieces.

If he ate

a Jew

the first piece inadvertently and

the

second intentionally,

knowing that it was possibly forbidden fat—

he is liable

for the first, which he ate inadvertently, when there were two pieces before him.

If he ate

the first intentionally,

knowing that one of the two was forbidden fat,

and

the

second inadvertently,

having forgotten that it was possibly forbidden fat—

he is exempt

for the second, since at the time he ate it there were not two pieces.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi obligates him

because he does not require one piece from among two pieces.

If he ate both intentionally—

he is exempt from everything!

If both were eaten inadvertently,

meaning that two people ate inadvertently, each one eating one piece [the Ya'avetz’s version reads: “two inadvertently”]—

both are liable

for an asham talui.

And

the second, not by strict law,

brings an asham talui, since there was not before him a pair of pieces, but only one piece;

rather,

the reason he brings it is:

if you say

that he is

exempt—

you have established the first as liable for a sin offering!

The Sages obligated the second to bring an asham talui, despite his not being liable by strict law, so that people would not err and say that the reason the second is exempt is that the piece he ate was the permitted fat; if so, the first certainly ate forbidden fat and is liable for a sin offering.

And we ask:

And who is

this tanna who said this?

If it is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi,

then

by strict law—and by strict law he is

liable to bring an asham talui even for the second, since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not require two pieces?

If it is the Sages,

the following difficulty arises: Is it

because the first was not established as liable for a sin offering that we should say to the second

“Bring an unconsecrated offering to the Temple courtyard”?!

For he is exempt by strict law.

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, it is according to the opinion of the Sages.