Keritot 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

c. Likewise, if

permitted fat and forbidden fat were before him, and he ate one of them

because he thought that both were permitted fat, and afterward learned that one of them had been forbidden fat,

but does not know which one he ate.

[But if, at the time he ate, he knew that there was a possible prohibition here, he was intentional with regard to eating an uncertainly prohibited substance, and he does not bring an offering.] See note 1. d. Likewise, if

his wife and his sister were with him in the house, and he inadvertently had relations with one of them,

because he thought that she was his wife,

and does not know

now

with which of them he acted inadvertently,

as he is uncertain whether he had relations with his sister.

e. Likewise, if

Shabbat and a weekday were before him, and he performed a labor on one of them, but does not know on which one he performed it

—whether on Shabbat or on the weekday.

In all these cases he

brings an asham talui!

f.

Just as, if he ate

an olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

and then

again

ate an olive-bulk

of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness,

because he did not learn between one eating and the next that he had sinned,

he is liable to only one sin-offering

when he learns that both were certainly forbidden fat,

so too with regard to their “not known” status,

that is, with regard to their uncertain status. For example, he ate two pieces and thought that they were permitted fat, and afterward learned that both of them were possibly forbidden fat [but did not learn between eating one piece and eating the other that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat]—

he does not bring

for them

more than one asham talui!

But

if there was an intervening awareness,

meaning that between the first and second eating he learned that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat, then

just as

with certain awareness between one eating and the next

he brings a sin-offering for each and every one, so too does he bring an asham talui for each and every one,

because of the intervening awareness of uncertainty.

g.

Just as, if he ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul, and notar,

an olive-bulk of each,

in a single lapse of awareness,

and afterward learned that he had certainly sinned,

he is liable

for a sin-offering

for each and every one

of the prohibited substances that he ate,

so too with regard to their “not known” status,

with uncertain awareness—

he brings an asham talui for each and every one.

Gemara:

It was stated: Rav Asi said:

What we learned at the beginning of the Mishna, “He is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat, or is uncertain whether he did not eat it,” applies even to

one piece!

Thus, even if only one piece was before him, and he thought it was permitted fat and ate it, and afterward learned that it was

possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat,

even in this case he is liable to bring an asham talui.

Ḥiyya bar Rav said: We learned a piece from among two pieces

meaning that he is liable to bring an asham talui only when two pieces were before him, he thought that both were permitted fat, ate one of them, and afterward learned that one of the two pieces had been forbidden fat. But in the case of one piece, he is exempt from bringing an offering .

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree?

Rav Asi holds: “The written form is authoritative.”

That is, when there is a difference in Scripture between the way the letters of a particular word are written and the way it is read, the primary consideration is the meaning conveyed by the written form. In the passage concerning an asham talui, it is written: “And he performs one of all the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed, and he did not know.” Since the written form is primary, and

“mitzvot” is written

with a single vav, which is the singular form, he is liable even if only one piece was before him.

And Ḥiyya bar Rav said: “

The reading is authoritative,”

for the primary consideration is the reading; therefore

“mitzvot” is read

[with a ḥolam], in the plural, meaning that he is liable specifically in the case of one piece from among two pieces [that is, two pieces of uncertain status were before him, concerning which there is a mitzva not to eat them. Rabbeinu Gershom].

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi. And some say

that

Ḥiyya bar Rav raised an objection to Rav Asi:

We learned in the final clause of the Mishna:

“Permitted fat and forbidden fat were before him, and he ate one of them.” Is it not the case that, since the final clause

speaks of

two pieces, the first clause too

speaks specifically of

two pieces

? This is an objection to Rav Asi!

Rav said to them: Do not follow the reverse approach!

Do not raise a difficulty from a Mishna that can be interpreted in two ways! [Rashi, Ketubot 48b].

Rav Asi could

indeed

answer you: The final clause

does speak

of two pieces,

but

the first clause

speaks

of one piece.

And we ask:

If so,

why was it necessary to state the final clause?

One can say:

Now, if in the first clause, where only

one piece was before him, he is liable

for it to bring an asham talui, then when he ate one of

two pieces

in the final clause—

is it necessary to state this?!

For logically, eating one of two pieces is more serious than eating one piece, as will be explained later in the discussion [since in the case of two pieces it is possible to determine which is prohibited, and the prohibition is established in its place]?!

And we answer:

This case, and there is no need to state that case,

is what the Mishna is saying!

We inquire further:

But according to Ḥiyya bar Rav, who said: Since the final clause speaks of two pieces,

the first clause too was taught as referring to two pieces,

then the same difficulty that he raised against Rav Asi should be raised against himself:

Why do I need two

statements?

And we answer: The Mishna

is explaining

and this is what it is saying:

“He is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat, or is uncertain whether he did not eat it: he brings an asham talui. How so? For example, permitted fat and forbidden fat were before him!”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Two pieces were before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat; he ate one of them but does not know which one he ate—he is liable.

But if

one piece was before him, possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

This is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav.

Rabba said: What is the reason for Rav’s opinion? For the verse states: “And he performs one of all the mitzvot of the Lord inadvertently”

[This is the verse cited above, but it was quoted with a slight change in wording. When the Sages expounded a verse, sometimes a book was not available before them, and they did not wish to recite it by heart, since “matters that are written may not be recited by heart”; therefore they altered the wording from that which was written. Introduction to the Beit HaLevi]. And we expound:

until he acts inadvertently with regard to two mitzvot!

That is, two pieces must have been before him, because

“mitzvot”

is read

in the plural, as the reading is authoritative.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba

against Rav’s method: It was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: A koy,

which is of uncertain status, possibly a wild animal and possibly a domesticated animal, and the fat of a domesticated animal is prohibited while the fat of a wild animal is permitted—

one is liable for its fat!

One who ate the fat of a koy inadvertently, because he thought it was a wild animal, brings

an asham talui.

But here there is not one piece from among two pieces; there is only one piece, namely the koy, whose fat is uncertainly permitted or prohibited. Why, then, is he liable to bring an asham talui?

He said to him

Rabba:

Rabbi Elazar holds that the written form is authoritative,

and

“mitzvot”

is written in the singular. Therefore, he holds one liable even in the case of one piece. But I maintain that the tanna of the Mishna disagrees with him, holding that the reading is authoritative, and “mitzvot” is read in the plural; therefore, he holds one liable only when two pieces were before him, and I rule in accordance with his opinion [Shita Mekubetzet, note 13].

Therefore he makes him liable even with one piece. But I hold that the tanna of the Mishna disagrees with him, and holds that there is significance to the reading, and we read “mitzvot,” and he makes one liable only when there were two pieces before him; and I rule according to him [Shitah Mekubetzet, letter 13].

He raised an objection:

We learned in Yevamot: A man who performs yibbum with his brother’s wife within three months of his brother’s death, and afterward the woman gives birth to a son who is

uncertain

whether he is

a nine-month

child

from the first,

her first husband, his brother,

or a seven-month

child

from the latter,

born from him, the yavam—

must send away

his yevama because of the uncertainty: perhaps the child is from the first husband, in which case his brother left offspring and there was no mitzva of yibbum, and the woman is prohibited to him as his brother’s wife.

And the child—

is fit,

either way: whether he is the first husband’s child or the latter’s.

And they are liable—

the yavam and the yevama

to an asham talui,

since perhaps they violated the prohibition against a brother’s wife.

But here too there is not one piece from among two pieces!

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?

It is Rabbi Elazar’s!

For he holds that the written form is authoritative.

He raised an objection:

We learned in tractate Niddah:

If

blood is

found on

a cloth [used for examination]

belonging to him,

the husband, who wiped himself after intercourse, even if a long time had passed since intercourse—

both are impure,

according to the law of a menstruant woman and the man who had intercourse with her. Since the blood was found on the husband’s body, it is certain that this blood was already present at the time of intercourse, and it follows that he had intercourse with a menstruant woman,

and they are liable,

both of them, each

for an offering

of a separate sin-offering, since they certainly violated the prohibition of menstruation inadvertently.

But if the blood is found

on

the cloth

belonging to her,

there is a distinction:

If it was

“immediately”

after intercourse [in Greek],

both are impure

according to the law of a menstruant woman and the man who had intercourse with her,

and they are liable for an offering

of a sin-offering, since it is certain that, at the time of intercourse, the blood had already detached and emerged from the source, and they had intercourse while she was a menstruant.

But if

the blood is found

on the blood

on

the cloth

belonging to her after some time,

meaning that she did not wipe herself until some time after intercourse,

both are impure by uncertainty!

Perhaps the blood emerged only after intercourse, and they did not have intercourse in a state of impurity. Therefore, the husband is impure by uncertainty; as for the woman, her uncertain impurity is explained in tractate Niddah [for seemingly, now that she has seen blood, she is certainly a menstruant].

And they are exempt from the sin-offering

of a sin-offering.

And it was taught concerning this: And they are liable to an asham talui

because of the uncertainty, as perhaps the blood had already emerged at the time of intercourse and they violated the prohibition of menstruation.

But here too there is not one piece from among two pieces?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?

It is Rabbi Elazar’s!

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: Two pieces were before him, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat; he ate one of them but does not know which one he ate—he is liable.

And if

one piece was before him, possibly permitted fat and possibly forbidden fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

Rabbi Zeira said: What is the reason for Rav’s opinion?

He holds: In the case of two pieces—

it is possible to determine its prohibited status,

if he violated a prohibition. Since the second piece remains, it is possible that a person who is expert may now come and identify whether this piece is permitted fat; then it will certainly be established that the first piece he ate was forbidden fat. But

in the case of one piece—

it is impossible to determine its prohibited status

after it has been eaten. And since an asham talui is brought only to protect a person from suffering in the interim, until he learns that he sinned and brings a sin-offering, therefore he is liable for it only in a case in which it is possible that it will ultimately become known that he indeed sinned .

And we explain:

What difference is there between Rabba’s reason

that he derives the law from the fact that “mitzvot” is written in the plural,

and Rabbi Zeira’s reason

that it is necessary for it to be possible to determine its prohibited status?

There is a difference between them:

when there were before him two pieces, one of

an olive-bulk and

one of

half

an olive-bulk, and he ate the olive-bulk, and afterward learned that one of the two pieces was chelev.

According to Rabbah,

for the reason is that there is yesh em la-mikra, and we read “mitzvot” in the plural, here

there are no “mitzvot,”

for half the olive-bulk is considered nonexistent, and it is as though there is here only one piece that is uncertain whether it is chelev or permitted fat,

and he is exempt.

For we read “mitzvot,” and from the verse we derive that two pieces are required.

But

according to Rabbi Zeira,

there is

a possibility of determining its prohibition

through the remaining half of the olive-bulk; therefore, he is liable to bring an asham talui.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira:

It was taught:

Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of a koy, one is liable to bring an asham talui for its forbidden fat.

But in the case of a koy, it is impossible to determine its prohibition, as there is no way to ascertain whether it is a domesticated animal; so why is one liable to bring an asham talui?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Rabbi Elazar

disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna and

holds that we do not require

that it be possible

to determine its prohibition.