Keritot 17b — the Talmud in English

c. And likewise, if

permitted fat and forbidden fat were before him, and he ate one of them

because he thought that both of them were permitted fat, and afterward it became known to him that one of them had been forbidden fat,

and he does not know which of them he ate.

But if, when he ate, he knew that there was here a doubt concerning a prohibition, he is deliberate regarding eating an uncertain prohibition, and he does not bring an offering. See note 1. d. And likewise, if

his wife and his sister were with him in the house. He acted unintentionally with one of them,

for he had relations with her because he thought that she was his wife,

and he does not know

now

with which of them he acted unintentionally,

for he is uncertain lest he had relations with his sister.

e. And likewise, if

Shabbat and a weekday were [before him], and he performed work on one of them, and he does not know on which of them he performed it

whether on Shabbat or on the weekday.

In all these cases

he brings an asham talui!

f.

Just as when he ate

an olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

and again

and

ate an olive-bulk

of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness,

for it did not become known to him between one eating and the other that he had sinned,

he is liable for only one sin-offering

when it becomes known to him that they were certainly forbidden fat,

so too, regarding their “not known”

that is, regarding their uncertainty—for example, he ate two pieces and thought that they were permitted fat, and afterward it became known to him that both of them were possibly forbidden fat [and it did not become known to him between one piece and the other that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat]—

he does not bring

for them

more than one asham talui!

But

if there was knowledge in the meantime,

for it became known to him between the first eating and the second that he had eaten possibly forbidden fat, then

just as

with certain knowledge between one eating and another

he brings a sin-offering for each one, so too he brings an asham talui for each one,

because of the intervening knowledge of the doubt.

g.

Just as when he ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul, and notar,

an olive-bulk of each one,

in one lapse of awareness,

and afterward it became known to him that he had certainly sinned,

he is liable

for a sin-offering

for each one

of the prohibited foods that he ate,

so too, regarding their “not known,”

with knowledge of a doubt—

he brings an asham talui for each one.

Gemara:

It was stated: Rav Asi said:

What we learned at the beginning of the Mishna, “He is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat, or is uncertain whether he did not eat”—we learned it

even with one piece!

For even if there was only one piece before him, and he thought that it was permitted fat and ate it, and afterward it became known to him that it was

possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat,

even in this manner he is liable for an asham talui.

Hiyya bar Rav said: We learned [the case of] a piece from two pieces

that specifically when there were two pieces before him and he thought that both were permitted fat, and ate one of them, and afterward it became known to him that one of the two pieces had been forbidden fat, is he liable for an asham talui; but with one piece, he is exempt from an offering .

And we explain:

In what do they disagree?

Rav Asi holds: “There is significance to the written form.”

That is, when there is a difference in Scripture between the form in which the letters of a particular word are written and the form in which it is read, the primary consideration is the meaning of the writing. And in the passage concerning an asham talui it is written, “and he did one of all the mitzvot of the Lord that should not be done, and he did not know.” Since the primary consideration is according to the writing, and

“mitzvot” is written

with one vav, which is the singular form, he is liable even if there was only one piece before him.

And Hiyya bar Rav said: “

There is significance to the reading,”

for the primary consideration is according to the reading; therefore

“mitzvot” is read

[with a holam], in the plural, so that specifically with one piece from two pieces [that is, there are two pieces of doubt before him, concerning which it is a mitzva not to eat them. Rabbenu Gershom].

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi. And some say:

he raised an objection

Hiyya bar Rav to Rav Asi:

We learned in the final clause of the Mishna:

“Forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him, and he ate one of them!” Is it not the case that, since the final clause

deals with

two pieces, the first clause too

deals with

two pieces

specifically, and this is a difficulty against Rav Asi?!

Rav said to them: Do not go after the reverse!

Do not raise a difficulty from a Mishna that can be interpreted in two ways! [Rashi, Ketubot 48].

For Rav Asi

Rav Asi

could answer you: The final clause

indeed deals

with two pieces,

but

the first clause

deals

with one piece.

And we ask:

If so,

why was it necessary to teach the final clause? For

it may be said

that now, when in the first clause there was before him only

one piece, he is made liable

for it to an asham talui, when he ate one from

two pieces

of the final clause—

is it necessary to say so?!

For logically, one who eats one of two pieces is more severe than one piece, as follows in the discussion [with two pieces, the prohibition can be clarified, and the prohibition was established]?!

And we answer:

This one, and it is unnecessary to say that one,

it teaches.

And we consider it:

But according to Hiyya bar Rav, who said: Since the final clause is about two pieces—

the first clause too is taught as being about two pieces,

and just as it was asked of Rav Asi, it should be asked of him himself:

why do I need two

to teach?

And we answer: The Mishna

is explaining

and teaches as follows:

“He is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat, or is uncertain whether he did not eat; he brings an asham talui. How so? For example, forbidden fat and permitted fat were before him!”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: There were before him two pieces, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat; he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate—he is liable.

But if there was before him

one piece, possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

And this is according to Hiyya bar Rav.

Rabba said: What is the reason of Rav? For the verse says, “And he did one of all the mitzvot of the Lord unintentionally” [that is, the verse above, but it was quoted with a change of wording, because when they expounded the verse sometimes a book was not available before them, and they did not wish to recite it by heart, since “matters written [in Scripture] may not be recited by heart”; therefore they changed what was written. Introduction to the book Beit HaLevi]. And we expound:

[This is the verse cited above, but it was quoted with slightly different wording. When the Sages expounded a verse, they sometimes did not have a book before them and did not wish to recite the written words by heart, since “written matters may not be recited by heart”; therefore they changed the wording from the text. Introduction to Beit HaLevi.] And we derive:

Until he acts unintentionally with respect to two mitzvot!

That is, there must be two pieces before him, because “‘

mitzvot’

is read,”

for there is significance to the reading.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba

against Rav’s method: It was taught:

Rabbi Elazar says: A koy,

which is possibly a wild animal and possibly a domesticated animal, and the fat of a domesticated animal is forbidden while the fat of a wild animal is permitted—

one is liable for its fat!

One who ate the fat of a koy unintentionally, because he thought that it was a wild animal, brings

an asham talui.

But here there is not one piece from two pieces; rather, there is one piece, namely the koy, concerning which it is uncertain whether its fat is permitted or forbidden. Why is he liable for an asham talui?

He said to him

Rabba:

Rabbi Elazar holds that there is significance to the written form, and

“

mitzvot”

is written.

Therefore he makes him liable even with one piece. But I hold that the tanna of the Mishna disagrees with him, and holds that there is significance to the reading, and we read “mitzvot,” and he makes one liable only when there were two pieces before him; and I rule according to him [Shitah Mekubetzet, letter 13].

He raised an objection:

We learned in Yevamot: One who performs levirate marriage with his brother’s wife within three months from the time of his brother’s death, and afterward the yevama gave birth to a son who is

uncertain

whether he is

a nine-month

old son

of the first,

from her brother-in-law, who was her first husband,

or a seven-month

old son

of the last,

who was born from him, the yavam—

must send out

the yevama because of the doubt: perhaps the son is from the first, in which case his brother left offspring after him and there is no mitzva of levirate marriage here, and the woman is forbidden to him under the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

And the offspring—

is fit

in either event, whether he is the first one’s or whether he is the last one’s.

And they are liable—

the yavam and the yevama—

for an asham talui,

lest they transgressed the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

But here too there is not one piece from two pieces?

And we answer:

Who is this?—

It is Rabbi Elazar!

For he holds that there is significance to the written form.

He raised an objection:

We learned in tractate Niddah:

If

blood

is found on

the examination cloth [a cloth used for examination]

of his,

of the husband, who wiped himself after intercourse, even after a long time from the intercourse—

they are impure,

both of them, under the law of a menstruant woman and the one who had relations with her, for since the blood was found on the husband’s body, this blood was certainly already present at the time of intercourse, and it follows that he had relations with a menstruant woman,

and they are liable,

both of them, each one

for an offering,

a separate sin-offering, for they certainly transgressed the prohibition of a menstruant woman unintentionally.

But if the blood was found

on

the cloth

of hers,

there is a difference:

If this was

“immediately”

at once [in the Greek language] after intercourse—

they are impure,

both of them under the law of a menstruant woman and the one who had relations with her,

and they are liable for an offering,

a sin-offering, for it is certain that at the time of intercourse the blood had already been dislodged and emerged from the source, and they had intercourse while she was a menstruant woman.

But if

the blood was found

on the blood

on

the cloth

of hers after some time,

for she did not wipe herself until some time had passed from the intercourse—

they are impure because of the doubt!

For perhaps the blood emerged only after intercourse, and they did not have intercourse in impurity. Therefore the husband is impure because of the doubt; and concerning the woman, her impurity because of the doubt is explained in tractate Niddah [for seemingly, now that she saw it, she is certainly a menstruant woman].

And they are exempt from the offering

a sin-offering.

And it was taught concerning this: And they are liable for an asham talui

because of the doubt, lest the blood had already emerged at the time of intercourse, and they transgressed the prohibition of a menstruant woman.

But here too there is not one piece from two pieces?

And we answer:

Who is this?—

It is Rabbi Elazar!

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: There were before him two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat; he ate one of them, and does not know which of them he ate—he is liable.

And if there was before him

one piece, possibly permitted fat and possibly forbidden fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

Rabbi Zeira said: What is the reason of Rav?

He holds: With two pieces—

it is possible to clarify its prohibition,

if he transgressed a prohibition, since, as the second piece remains, it is possible that a person who is expert will now come and recognize whether this one is permitted fat, and then certainly the first one that he ate was forbidden fat. But

with one piece—

it is impossible to clarify its prohibition

after it has been eaten. And since an asham talui comes only to protect a person from suffering in the meantime, until it becomes known to him that he sinned and he brings a sin-offering, therefore he is liable for it only in a case where it is possible that it will ultimately become known that he indeed sinned .

And we explain:

What difference is there between Rabba’s reason

that we derive it from the fact that “mitzvot” is written in the plural

and Rabbi Zeira’s reason

that there must be a possibility of clarifying its prohibition?

There is a difference between them:

when there were before him two pieces, one of

a kezayit and

one of

half

a kezayit, and he ate the kezayit, and afterward it became known to him that one of the two pieces was forbidden fat.

According to Rabba,

since the reason is because we follow the written reading, and we read “mitzvot” in the plural, here

there is no “mitzvot,”

for half the kezayit is considered as nonexistent, and it is as though there is here only one piece, which is uncertain whether it is forbidden fat or permitted fat,

and he is exempt.

For we read “mitzvot,” and from Scripture we derive that two pieces are required.

But

according to Rabbi Zeira

behold,

its prohibition can be clarified,

through the remaining half-kezayit; therefore he is liable for an asham talui.

Rabbi Jeremiah challenged Rabbi Zeira:

It was taught:

Rabbi Elazar says: A koy is liable for an asham talui on account of its forbidden fat.

But in the case of a koy, it is impossible to clarify its prohibition, for there is no possibility of finding out whether it is a domesticated animal; and why is it liable for an asham talui?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Rabbi Elazar

disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna and

holds: We do not require

that it be possible

to clarify its prohibition.