Keritot 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

And this beraita, which teaches that he is liable,

deals

with a case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the prohibited labors,

in which it is not possible to say that the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies; [see the Shita Mekubetzet on the preceding page, note 26, for the reason]. Rather, the matter must be considered on the basis that the intervening days constitute awareness that divides, and it is as though he became aware between one Shabbat and the next that he had sinned. And since

he holds

that Rabban Gamliel maintains that even when he actually became aware,

awareness does not divide a half-measure,

he therefore holds him liable for the two letters, since the awareness in between is not considered awareness sufficient to divide them.

But according to Rabba, who says: He holds that Rabbi Akiva maintains that the Shabbatot are like one body

[and Rabban Gamliel likewise holds], the following difficulty arises:

Granted, this beraita, which teaches that he is liable, can be established both in a case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors,

and the reason that he is liable is

that the Shabbatot are like one body,

so that with each letter that he wrote on each Shabbat, he performed half of that same principal labor, and they therefore combine into one principal labor.

And it can also be established in a case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors,

and the reason for the liability is

that he holds

that Rabban Gamliel

maintains that awareness does not divide a half-measure.

But this beraita, which teaches that he is exempt—

how can you establish it? Neither in this case nor in that case

[the reading of the Rashash]. In the case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors, he should be liable because awareness does not divide a half-measure; and in the case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors, he should be liable because the Shabbatot are like one body.

And we answer:

Rabba could say to you: Rabban Gamliel maintains the view of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The Shabbatot are considered separate bodies.

And therefore he exempts him in a case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors.

And we challenge this:

But

it is impossible to say that Rabban Gamliel agrees with Rabbi Eliezer. For

from the fact that it teaches

in the beraita:

“And Rabban Gamliel concedes

that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, he is exempt”—

by inference, they disagree concerning the other case!

The tanna with whom he agrees in this beraita is the tanna with whom he disagrees in another matter: there, Rabban Gamliel holds him liable for writing one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, whereas that tanna exempts him there as well.

Granted, if you say that

Rabban Gamliel

maintains the view of Rabbi Akiva,

and Rabbi Akiva is the tanna to whom Rabban Gamliel concedes and whose view he accepts in a case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors, where he is exempt because the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies,

this is the disagreement

between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva in the second beraita, namely

in a case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors. Rabban Gamliel maintains

that he is liable because

awareness does not divide a half-measure, whereas Rabbi Akiva,

namely, the Sages,

maintains

that he is exempt because

awareness does divide a half-measure. And Rabban Gamliel concedes

to Rabbi Akiva in this beraita

that in a case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors he is exempt. Consequently,

Rabbi Akiva maintains:

The Shabbatot are considered separate bodies.

But if you say that Rabban Gamliel maintains the view of Rabbi Eliezer,

to whom he concedes in this matter, that he is exempt in a case of intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors,

by inference, they disagree

in another case. And

in what

do they disagree?

If it is in a case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors,

in this case

even Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rabban Gamliel

that he is liable, because

awareness does not divide a half-measure!

As it is taught

that Rabbi Eliezer holds as follows:

One who writes two letters on two Shabbatot,

that is, he wrote

one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat—Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable!

And necessarily, this refers to a case of an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors, because awareness does not divide a half-measure. For with regard to intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors, we learn in the Mishna at the beginning of our chapter that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies. If so, he should exempt him for writing one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the other matter over which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel disagree is

the

addition of one thread

to a woven fabric,

where the garment was already woven and he added one thread to it. Rabbi Eliezer exempts him, since there is not the measure that renders one liable for the labor of weaving [which is at least two rows of threads added along the length of the fabric]. Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, since the measure of two threads was stated only with regard to the beginning of weaving, because weaving with fewer than two threads does not endure. But if there was already a woven fabric and he is merely adding to what was already woven, even weaving one thread is significant.

And this is what the beraita is saying: Although Rabban Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer concerning the measure for weaving, nevertheless, with regard to one who writes two letters on two Shabbatot, [even though this resembles weaving, since here too, by writing the additional letter on the second Shabbat he completes the first letter, nevertheless] he concedes that he is exempt for the writing. For completing the writing of the second letter is not comparable to adding a thread in weaving. In the case of weaving, there is already a woven fabric and he is adding to it, and his liability for weaving the thread is not based on combining his labor in making the fabric at the outset. But when he writes one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on the other Shabbat, he is liable for the second one only because his first act of writing, on the previous Shabbat, combines with his writing on the second Shabbat. And since the two acts of writing, which need to combine to form the measure of writing two letters, took place on two Shabbatot, they do not combine, because the two Shabbatot are considered two bodies.

It is impossible to say this, for with regard to adding one thread to a woven fabric, Rabbi Eliezer does not disagree and exempt him; rather,

he certainly holds him liable

for it!

As we learned in a Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning

at the beginning of weaving the garment, or adds one thread

to a woven fabric

that has already been partially woven—

is liable.

The difficulty nevertheless remains for Rabba from that which it teaches: “And Rabban Gamliel concedes.”

And we answer:

Rabba said:

The matter in which Rabban Gamliel concedes is indeed with regard to Rabbi Eliezer. And

by inference, they disagree in this matter

[the reading of the Rashash],

as it is taught: One who carried out half a dried fig-bulk

from a private domain into a public domain,

and then carried out another half a dried fig-bulk.

If the two acts of carrying out were

performed during one period of unawareness, he is liable.

If they occurred during two periods of unawareness, he is exempt,

because there is awareness of a half-measure, and it divides between the two halves.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Even if he carried them out

during one period of unawareness,

he is liable specifically if he carried both halves

into one

public domain,

and only then

is he

liable.

But if he carried them

into two

separate public domains—for example, his house stood between two public domains and had two entrances on opposite sides, and he carried one half out in this direction and the other half in the other direction—he is

exempt,

because the domains divide the two acts of carrying out, and therefore the two halves that he carried out do not combine to form the measure of a dried fig-bulk that would render him liable.

Rabban Gamliel

maintains

the view of the first tanna

with regard to this detail, that the domains do not divide.

And Rabbi Eliezer

maintains

the view of Rabbi Yosei.

And this is what the beraita is saying: Although Rabban Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to whether domains divide, he concedes to him concerning writing two letters on two Shabbatot, for the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies and divide between them, so that the two letters do not combine to create liability for a sin-offering.

Come and hear

a challenge to Rabba: For we learned in the Mishna:

He said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva:

“He is liable for each and every one, by means of a kal va-chomer: If a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not many consequences…”

Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that he asked him about an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors—whether the intervening days constitute awareness that divides or not—this is why he said to him, “If a menstruating woman.”

For his proof is from one menstruating woman, in a case where there was awareness in between, so that he is liable for several sin-offerings, as will be explained below.

But according to Rabba, who says that he asked him about intentional awareness of Shabbat and an unwitting violation of the labors—whether the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies or not,

how is it possible to prove the matter from a menstruating woman? In the case of one menstruating woman, it is impossible for there to be separate bodies, and it should have

taught: “Menstruating women,”

so as to derive the matter from one who has relations with five menstruating women, who is liable for each one because they are separate bodies; all the more so, in the case of Shabbatot, which are considered separate bodies?

And we answer:

Rabba could say to you: Read it as “menstruating women.” 94 .

Shmuel reads it as “menstruating woman,”

in accordance with Rav Ḥisda.

Rav Adda bar Ahava reads it as “menstruating woman.”

Rav Natan bar Oshaya reads it as “menstruating women,”

in accordance with Rabba.

And we challenge this:

But according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that he asked him about an unwitting violation of Shabbat and intentional violations of the labors—whether the intervening days constitute awareness that divides or not,

if so,

“a menstruating woman,”

from whom Rabbi Eliezer proved his point—

what relevance does “the intervening days constitute awareness that divides” have to her?

And we answer:

Rava said: It is referring, for example, to one who had relations with her

while she was a menstruating woman,

and she immersed, and saw

blood,

and he again had relations with her

while she was menstruating,

and she immersed, and

again

saw

blood,

and he again had relations with her, for the immersions are like

“the intervening days.”

For the days during which she was pure are days of permission with regard to menstruation, just as weekdays are days of permission with regard to Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer proved that just as the intervening days in the case of menstruation constitute awareness that divides, and he is liable for each act of intercourse [when days of permission occurred between them], all the more so, awareness during the intervening days in the case of Shabbat constitutes awareness that divides, and he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

Come and hear:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

“One who has relations with minors will prove it.”

Granted, according to Rabba, this is why it teaches “minors”

in the plural: Rabbi Eliezer proved his point from one who has relations with many menstruating minors, who is liable for each one because the bodies divide them; all the more so, the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies.

But according to Rav Ḥisda—

what is the meaning of

“minors”?

For according to his view, the proof is from one minor who is menstruating, in whose case the awareness in between divides, and all the more so in the case of Shabbatot.

And we answer: “Minors” means

“ordinary minors.”

That is, many men have relations with many minors in the world, each of them having relations with one minor many times. From this it can be proved that awareness in between divides.

And we say:

The Mishna is not in accordance with this tanna.

For he maintains that Rabbi Akiva’s question concerned menstruation, and Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him from Shabbat.

As it is taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva did not ask Rabbi Eliezer in this manner.

Rather, this is what he asked: One who has relations with his wife while she is menstruating and again has relations with her during one period of unawareness—

what is the law?

Does he

bring one offering for all of them, or is he liable for each and every one

of the acts of intercourse, because the acts divide with regard to sin-offerings? [In Tosafot, at the beginning of chapter Kelal Gadol, s.v. “at the end of his words,” it appears that the question concerned a case in which she immersed and saw blood, asking whether the intervening days of permission constitute awareness that divides.]

He said to him

Rabbi Eliezer:

He is liable for each and every one. This can be derived by a kal va-chomer

from Shabbat:

If, with regard to Shabbat, which has only one warning—

that is,

he is warned concerning Shabbat, whereas Shabbat is not warned concerning him.

In other words, in every desecration of Shabbat only one person transgresses the prohibition, and nevertheless, if he performed several primary categories of labor in a single lapse of awareness,

he is liable for each and every one [and according to Tosafot, this concerns one type of labor, with the intervening days serving to divide the acts, and the case of a menstruating woman is derived from Shabbat. For with regard to Shabbat, we expound from a verse [in tractate Shabbat] that the intervening days constitute awareness sufficient to divide the acts] .

With regard to a menstruating woman, who has two warnings, since he is warned concerning her and she is warned concerning him, is it not all the more so that he should be liable for each and every one?

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva:

No! If you say this with regard to Shabbat,

that he is liable for each and every one, this is because

it has many derivatives,

many types of labor that lead to

many sin-offerings.

Can you say this with regard to a menstruating woman, who has neither many derivatives nor many sin-offerings?

For there is only the prohibition against intercourse.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with

the menstruating women

who are minors proves the point: they have neither many derivatives nor many sin-offerings, and

nevertheless

he is liable for each and every one

of the menstruating minors. The same law should apply, and he should be liable for each and every act of intercourse with one menstruating woman [and according to the aforementioned Tosafot, the same law applies: the intervening days divide the acts just as separate bodies divide them in the case of minors].

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva:

No! If you say this with regard to minors, it is because their bodies are separate,

as each one is a separate body. This is not so with regard to one menstruating woman. We do not say that the acts of intercourse divide the acts [and according to Tosafot, we do not say that the intervening days divide the acts] .

Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with

the same animal many times

proves the point.

Its bodies are not separate, and

nevertheless

he is liable for each and every one . [Rabbi Eliezer follows his position stated above, 15a, that he is liable for each and every act of intercourse in all forbidden relationships, and the same applies to an animal. In truth, he need not have brought proof from an animal to the case of a menstruating woman. For what advantage is there in many acts of intercourse with one animal, such that they should be divided more than many acts of intercourse with one menstruating woman? Rather, he should have answered him: “I hold that the acts of intercourse divide the acts.” However, he had heard this law from his teachers with regard to an animal, and therefore he responded that the same applies to a menstruating woman [Tosafot, s.v. “He said to him.”] [And according to Tosafot as well, this provides an answer to Rabbi Akiva’s question: even without the division created by the intervening days, the acts of intercourse themselves divide the acts].

Rabbi Eliezer follows his position above, 15a, that he is liable for each intercourse and each intercourse in all forbidden relations, and the same law applies to an animal. In truth, he did not need to prove it from an animal for niddah. For what preference is there in many acts of intercourse with one animal to divide more than many acts of intercourse with one niddah? Rather, he should have answered him: “I hold that the acts of intercourse divide.” However, he had heard this law from his teachers concerning an animal, and therefore he answered him that the same law applies to niddah [Tosafot, s.v. “He said”]. [And according to Tosafot as well, this provides an answer to Rabbi Akiva’s question, for even without the division of the intervening days, the acts of intercourse themselves divide].

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva: As far as I am concerned,

the animal is like a menstruating woman!

For I am likewise uncertain with regard to it whether the acts of intercourse divide the acts [and according to Tosafot' -

the animal is like a menstruating woman,

and in both cases the acts of intercourse do not divide the acts. Rather, I am uncertain with regard to the intervening days].

We have completed [the study of] you, chapter “They said to him.”

Mishna:

A person who

is uncertain

whether he

ate forbidden fat

, or is uncertain whether he did not eat it,

[The Gemara will explain whether the uncertainty is because two pieces were before him, one of forbidden fat and the other of permitted fat, and he initially thought that both were permitted fat and ate one of them, and afterward learned that one of them had been forbidden fat, but does not remember which one he ate; or whether there was only one piece before him, which he ate on the assumption that it was permitted fat, and he now wonders whether that piece had in fact been forbidden fat] .

b.

Even if he ate

a piece on the assumption that it was permitted fat and afterward learned with certainty that it had been forbidden fat, but now he is uncertain whether

there was

in the forbidden fat that he ate

the measure

of an olive-bulk,

or is uncertain

that there was not

an olive-bulk .