Keritot 17a — the Talmud in English

And as for the source that teaches that he is liable

it is discussing

a case of forgetting the Shabbat but knowingly performing the prohibited labors

In such a case, it is not possible to say that the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies [see the Shita Mekubetzet on the previous page, paragraph 26, for the reason]. Rather, one must consider the reason that the intervening days constitute awareness that separates the acts, making it as though he became aware between one Shabbat and the next that he had sinned. And since

he holds

that Rabban Gamliel maintains that even when he actually became aware of the sin,

awareness does not separate a half-measure,

he therefore holds him liable for the two letters: the awareness in the middle is not considered awareness sufficient to separate them.

But according to Rabba, who says: He holds that Rabbi Akiva maintains that the Shabbat days are like one body

[and Rabban Gamliel has the same view], the following difficulty arises:

Granted, as for the source that teaches that he is liable, it can be established both in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors

and the reason that he is liable is

that the Shabbat days are like one body.

Thus, for each letter that he wrote on each Shabbat, he performed half of that primary labor, and the two halves combine to form one primary labor.

And it can also be established in a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors,

and the reason for the liability is

that he holds

that Rabban Gamliel maintains that

awareness does not separate a half-measure.

But as for the source that teaches that he is exempt—

how can you establish it? It can be established neither in this case nor in that case

[this is the version of the Rashash]. In a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors, he should be liable because awareness does not separate a half-measure; and in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors, he should be liable because the Shabbat days are like one body.

And we answer:

Rabba could have said to you: Rabban Gamliel agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The Shabbat days are considered separate bodies.

Therefore, he exempts him in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors.

And we challenge this:

But

it is impossible to say that Rabban Gamliel agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. For

from the fact that it teaches

in the beraita:

“And Rabban Gamliel agrees

that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, he is exempt,”

by inference, they disagree in the other case!

The tanna with whom he agrees in this beraita is the tanna with whom he disagrees in another matter. There, Rabban Gamliel holds him liable for writing one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, while that tanna exempts him there as well.

It works out well if you say that

Rabban Gamliel

agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

and that Rabbi Akiva is the tanna with whom Rabban Gamliel agrees and whose view he follows in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors, where he is exempt because the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies.

This is the disagreement

between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva in the second beraita, namely,

in a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors. Rabban Gamliel holds

that he is liable because

awareness does not separate a half-measure, while Rabbi Akiva,

that is, the Sages,

holds

that he is exempt because

awareness does separate a half-measure. And Rabban Gamliel agrees

with Rabbi Akiva in this beraita

that in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors, he is exempt. Consequently,

Rabbi Akiva holds:

the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies.

But if you say that Rabban Gamliel agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer,

and that he agrees with him in this matter, that he exempts in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors,

by inference, they disagree

in another matter.

And in what

do they disagree?

If they disagree in a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors,

in this matter

even Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rabban Gamliel

that he is liable, because

awareness does not separate a half-measure!

As it is taught

that this is Rabbi Eliezer’s view:

One who writes two letters on two Shabbat days,

that is, he writes

one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat—Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable!

It must be discussing a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors, and the reason is that awareness does not separate a half-measure. For in a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors, we learn from Rabbi Eliezer in the Mishna at the beginning of our chapter that he holds that the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies. If so, he should have exempted him for writing one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the other matter in which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel disagree is

the

addition of one thread

to a woven fabric.

The garment had already been woven, and he added one thread to it. Rabbi Eliezer exempts him, because this does not contain the measure that renders one liable for the labor of weaving [which is at least two rows of threads added along the length of the fabric]. Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, because the measure of two threads was stated only at the beginning of weaving, since weaving does not endure with fewer than two threads. But if there was already a woven fabric and he merely adds to what had already been woven, even the weaving of one thread is significant.

And this is what the beraita is saying: Although Rabban Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer concerning the measure for weaving, nevertheless, with regard to writing two letters on two Shabbat days [although this resembles weaving, since here too, by writing the additional letter on the second Shabbat, he completes the first letter, nevertheless], he agrees that he is exempt for the writing. The completion of the writing by the second letter is not comparable to adding a thread to a woven fabric. In the case of weaving, the fabric already exists, and he merely adds to it; his liability for weaving the thread is not based on combining his labor in making the original fabric with the later labor. But in the case of writing one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on the other Shabbat, he is liable for the second letter only because his original labor of writing on the previous Shabbat combines with his writing on the second Shabbat. Since the two acts of writing, which must combine to form the measure of writing two letters, took place on two Shabbat days, they do not combine, because the two Shabbat days are considered two separate bodies.

This cannot be said. For with regard to adding one thread to a woven fabric, Rabbi Eliezer did not disagree by exempting him; rather,

he certainly holds him liable

for it!

As we learned in a Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning,

at the beginning of weaving the garment, or who adds one thread

to the woven fabric

that has already been partially woven—

is liable.

The difficulty from the statement, “And Rabban Gamliel agrees,” still remains for Rabba.

And we answer:

Rabba said:

The statement that Rabban Gamliel agrees is indeed referring to his agreement with Rabbi Eliezer. And

by inference, they disagree in this matter

[this is the version of the Rashash]:

As it is taught: If one carried out half a dried fig

from a private domain into a public domain

and then carried out another half of a dried fig.

If the two acts of carrying out occurred

during one lapse of awareness, he is liable.

If they occurred during two lapses of awareness, he is exempt,

because awareness does separate a half-measure, and it separates the two halves.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Even if he carried them out

during one lapse of awareness,

he is liable specifically if he carried both halves

into one

public

domain;

then he is

liable.

But if he carried them

into two

separate public domains—for example, his house stood between two public domains and had two entrances on opposite sides, and he carried one half out in one direction and the other half in the other direction—he is

exempt,

because the domains separate the two acts of carrying out. Therefore, the two halves that he carried out do not combine to form the measure of a dried fig required to render him liable.

Rabban Gamliel

held

like the first tanna

with regard to this detail, that the domains do not separate the acts.

And Rabbi Eliezer

held

like Rabbi Yosei.

And this is what the beraita is saying: Although Rabban Gamliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer concerning whether domains separate the acts, he agrees with him with regard to writing two letters on two Shabbat days. The Shabbat days are considered separate bodies and separate the acts, so that the two letters do not combine to make him liable for a sin offering.

Come and hear a proof

to challenge Rabba: For we learned in the Mishna:

He said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva:

“He is liable for each and every one,” by an a-fortiori inference: Just as a menstruating woman, in whose case there are not many consequences,

Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that he asked him about a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors—whether the intervening days constitute awareness that separates the acts or not—this is why he said to him, “Just as a menstruating woman.”

For his proof is from one menstruating woman, in a case where there was awareness in the interim, and he is liable for several sin offerings, as will be explained below.

But according to Rabba, who says that he asked him about a case of knowingly violating the Shabbat while forgetting the prohibited labors—whether the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies or not,

how can he prove his point from a menstruating woman? In the case of one menstruating woman, it is impossible for there to be separate bodies. It should have said

“menstruating women,”

and derived the ruling from one who has relations with five menstruating women, that he is liable for each one because they are separate bodies; all the more so with regard to the Shabbat days, which are considered separate bodies.

And we answer:

Rabba could have said to you: Read it as “menstruating women.”

Shmuel reads “menstruating woman”

like Rav Ḥisda.

Rav Adda bar Ahava reads “menstruating woman.”

Rav Natan bar Oshaya reads “menstruating women”

like Rabba.

And we challenge this:

And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that he asked him about a case of forgetting the Shabbat while knowingly performing the prohibited labors—whether the intervening days constitute awareness that separates the acts or not,

if so, in the case of a

menstruating woman

from whom Rabbi Eliezer derived his proof,

what is there in her case that can be described as “the intervening days constitute awareness that separates the acts”?

And we answer:

Rava said: For example, he had relations with her

while she was menstruating,

and she immersed, and then saw

blood,

and he again had relations with her

while she was menstruating,

and she immersed, and

again

saw

blood,

and he again had relations with her, because the immersions are like

“intervening days.”

For the days during which she was ritually pure are days when relations with her were permitted with regard to the laws of menstruation, just as weekdays are days when labor is permitted with regard to Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer proved that just as the intervening days in the case of menstruation constitute awareness that separates the acts, and he is liable for each act of intercourse [when permitted days intervened], all the more so awareness created by the intervening days in the case of Shabbat constitutes awareness that separates the acts, and he is liable for each Shabbat.

Come and hear a proof:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

“The case of one who has relations with minors proves it.”

Granted, according to Rabba, this is why it teaches “minors”

in the plural: Rabbi Eliezer proved his point from one who has relations with many menstruating minors, for which he is liable for each one because the bodies separate the acts; all the more so, the Shabbat days are considered separate bodies.

But according to Rav Ḥisda—

what

does “minors” mean?

For according to his view, the proof is from one menstruating woman, in whose case awareness in the interim separates the acts, and all the more so in the case of Shabbat.

And we answer: “Minors” means

“minors in general.”

That is, many men have relations with many minors in the world, and each of them has relations with one minor many times. From this it can be proved that awareness in the interim separates the acts.

And we say:

The Mishna is not in accordance with this tanna.

For he holds that Rabbi Akiva’s question concerned menstruation, and Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him from Shabbat.

As it is taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva did not ask Rabbi Eliezer in this manner.

Rather, he asked him as follows: One who has relations with his wife while she is menstruating and then again has relations with her during one lapse of awareness—

what is the law?

Does he

bring one offering for all of the acts, or is he liable for each and every one

of the acts of intercourse, because the acts of intercourse separate one another with regard to sin offerings? [In Tosafot, at the beginning of chapter “Kelal Gadol,” s.v. “Sof ha-devar,” it appears that the question concerned a case in which she immersed and then saw blood, asking whether the intervening days constitute awareness that separates the acts.]

He said to him

Rabbi Eliezer:

He is liable for each one and one. By a kal va-chomer

from Shabbat:

And if Shabbat, which has only one warning—

that is,

that he is warned concerning Shabbat, while Shabbat is not warned concerning him.

That is to say, in every desecration of Shabbat only one person transgresses the prohibition, and nevertheless, if he performed several primary categories of labor in one lapse of awareness,

he is liable for each one and one .

And according to Tosafot, it is speaking of one labor, and because of the intervening days; and he derives niddah from Shabbat. For concerning Shabbat we expound from a verse [in tractate Shabbat] that the intervening days constitute awareness for division.

[Niddah], which has two warnings—that he is warned concerning niddah, and niddah is warned concerning him—is it not a logical inference that he is liable for each one and one?

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva:

No! If you have said this concerning Shabbat,

that one is liable for each one and one, that is because

it has many derivatives,

many types of labor that bring about

many sin-offerings.

Can you say this concerning niddah, which has neither many derivatives nor many sin-offerings,

for it contains only the prohibition of intercourse?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with

the young niddot

will prove it, for they have neither many derivatives nor many sin-offerings, and

nevertheless

he is liable for each one and one

of the young niddot. And the same law applies: he should be liable for each intercourse and each intercourse with one niddah [and according to the above Tosafot, the same law applies, that the intervening days divide just as the bodies divide].

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Rabbi Akiva:

No! If you have said this concerning the young ones, since the bodies are divided,

since each one is a separate body. This is not so with one niddah. And we do not say that the acts of intercourse divide [and according to Tosafot, we do not say that the intervening days divide].

The difficulty was raised by the Arukh la-Ner, why should it not be learned by a common principle? That is to say, from Shabbat and the young ones together: when we challenge, “What is it about Shabbat, which has many derivatives?” we say, “The young ones prove it”; and when we challenge, “What is it about the young ones, since the bodies are divided?” we say, “Shabbat proves it,” and the matter returns to its original position. Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with one animal

many times

will prove it.

For the bodies are not divided, and

nevertheless

he is liable for each one and one .

Rabbi Eliezer follows his position above, 15a, that he is liable for each intercourse and each intercourse in all forbidden relations, and the same law applies to an animal. In truth, he did not need to prove it from an animal for niddah. For what preference is there in many acts of intercourse with one animal to divide more than many acts of intercourse with one niddah? Rather, he should have answered him: “I hold that the acts of intercourse divide.” However, he had heard this law from his teachers concerning an animal, and therefore he answered him that the same law applies to niddah [Tosafot, s.v. “He said”]. [And according to Tosafot as well, this provides an answer to Rabbi Akiva’s question, for even without the division of the intervening days, the acts of intercourse themselves divide].

He said to him

Rabbi Akiva: As for me,

the animal is like niddah!

For I am also uncertain concerning it whether the acts of intercourse divide in its case [and according to Tosafot -

the animal is like niddah

and in both of them the acts of intercourse do not divide. Rather, I am uncertain concerning the intervening days].

We have returned to you, chapter “They said to him”

Mishna:

A person who

is uncertain

whether he

ate forbidden fat

, or is uncertain whether he did not eat,

or, as will be explained in the Gemara, whether the doubt is because two pieces were before him, one of forbidden fat and the other of permitted fat, and he initially thought that both were permitted fat and ate one of them, and afterward it became known to him that one of them had been forbidden fat, but he does not remember which one he ate; or whether there was before him only one piece and he ate it on the assumption that it was permitted fat, and now he is uncertain lest that piece had been forbidden fat

Rashi and Tosafot wrote that this entire law applies specifically when, before eating it, he thought that it was permitted fat, and afterward a doubt arose for him concerning this. But if, before eating it, he knew that it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he ate it, he does not bring an asham talui. See also note 12 concerning this matter. b.

And even if he ate

a piece on the assumption that it was permitted fat and afterward it became known to him with certainty that it had been forbidden fat, but now he is uncertain:

whether there is

in the forbidden fat that he ate

the measure

of an olive-bulk,

or whether ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

there is not

an olive-bulk .