Keritot 16b — the Talmud in English

Rabba said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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It is reasonable: the case of unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding labors is obvious to him, since the intervening days constitute awareness to divide.

And

only

the case of intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors is what he asked him, whether they are considered separate bodies or not.

And he resolved it for him:

Rabbi Eliezer by a kal va-chomer from a menstruant woman: if one had intercourse with five menstruant women during one period of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one, because they are separate bodies; all the more so

intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors are considered separate bodies.

But he did not accept

Rabbi Akiva

from him,

as he challenged in the Mishna: “What can be said about a menstruant woman, which has two prohibitions?”

And he also resolved for him

also

that the offshoots of labors are considered like labors

but he did not resolve this from a menstruant woman, since there are no offshoots in the case of a menstruant woman, Rashi above, 16a].

But he did not accept it from him 91 .

Rabba said: From where do I say

Rabba said: From where do I say it

that this was Rabbi Akiva’s question and that he did not accept Rabbi Eliezer’s answer?

For we learned

in tractate Shabbat:

They stated a great principle concerning Shabbat: Whoever forgets the essence of Shabbat

thinking that there is no mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah at all

and performs many labors

from different primary labors

on many Shabbatot

and in the end learns the matter of Shabbat—

he is liable only for

one sin-offering

one.

For here there is only one unawareness, because of which he transgressed all the prohibitions, namely, the removal of the mitzva of Shabbat from his knowledge.

One who knows the essence of Shabbat,

that there is a mitzva of Shabbat, and recognizes the labors prohibited on it, but forgot that today is Shabbat,

and performs many labors on many Shabbatot—

he is liable for each and every Shabbat

for one sin-offering, because the intervening days constitute awareness to divide, and each Shabbat is a separate unawareness. But he is not liable for a separate sin-offering for each and every labor that he performed, because all of them constitute one unawareness, namely, forgetting Shabbat.

One who knows that

today

is Shabbat, and performs many labors on many Shabbatot,

not knowing that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, and performed those labors on all the Shabbatot—

he is liable for each and every primary labor

because each labor is an unawareness in itself, since he did not know that it was prohibited on Shabbat.

And Rabba concludes his proof: Since in the final clause it teaches only that he is liable for each primary labor,

whereas it does not teach, “he is liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat,”

it is proven that he is not liable for the same labor that he performed on many Shabbatot, with a separate sin-offering for each Shabbat, because the Shabbatot are not like separate bodies; rather, all the Shabbatot are like one Shabbat. Thus it is as though he performed that labor several times on one Shabbat during one period of unawareness, for which he is liable only once [and as was explained above, here it is impossible to say that the awareness in between divides, since the unawareness concerns the labor and not Shabbat, and awareness of the labor occurs only through learning the halakha].

Whose is this

Mishna?

If you say it is Rabbi Eliezer, consider the final clause

of the Mishna of Shabbat:

One who performs many labors resembling one labor

all of which were offshoots of one primary labor

is liable only once.

And if it is Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Eliezer holds one liable for each of the offshoots of labors

a sin-offering for each offshoot

like labors

as though he performed different primary labors, for this was Rabbi Akiva’s second question. And Rabbi Eliezer answered him that he is liable for each and every one.

Rather, it is obvious that it is Rabbi Akiva, and learn from it

from the middle clause, which teaches that he is liable for each and every Shabbat, that

the case of unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding labors is obvious to him

to Rabbi Akiva,

since the intervening days constitute awareness to divide,

for that clause concerning one who knows the essence of Shabbat deals with unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding labors.

And from the final clause, from which we inferred that he is not liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat because the Shabbatot are not like bodies, learn that

the case of intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors is what he asked

Rabbi Akiva of Rabbi Eliezer,

whether they are considered like bodies

or not.

And he resolved it for him

Rabbi Eliezer

that they are considered like bodies.

And he also resolved his second question, that

the offshoots of labors are considered like labors.

And Rabbi Akiva accepted neither of them

Rabbi Akiva

from him,

but he held that Shabbatot are not considered like bodies, as we inferred from the final clause. And one who performs the offshoots of labors of the same primary labor is not similar to one who performs several different primary labors, as it explicitly teaches at the end of the Mishna in Shabbat: one who performs many labors resembling one labor [that is, offshoots of the same primary labor] is liable only once.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

I will always say to you that the case of intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors was obvious to Rabbi Akiva, that Shabbatot are not considered like bodies,

and he is liable for only one sin-offering for all the Shabbatot. And the Mishna of the great principle comes according to his view; therefore, in the final clause, concerning one who knows that it is Shabbat, he is not liable for each and every Shabbat.

And it is the case of unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding labors that he asked him, whether the intervening days constitute awareness to divide or not; and he resolved for him that the intervening days constitute awareness to divide, and Rabbi Akiva accepted

Rabbi Akiva

from him,

and therefore in the middle clause it teaches that he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And he resolved for him

that

the offshoots of labors are considered like labors, but he did not accept it from him,

and therefore it teaches at the end of the Mishna that one who performs many labors resembling one labor is liable only once.

Abaye and Rabba disputed only what was obvious to Rabbi Akiva and what his question was. But in the conclusion they both agree that Rabbi Akiva held that Shabbatot are not considered like bodies, that the intervening days constitute awareness to divide, and that the offshoots of labors are not considered like labors. But they disputed Rabbi Eliezer’s view: according to Rabba, Rabbi Eliezer held, in the case of intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors, that Shabbatot are considered like bodies; whereas according to Abaye, Rabbi Akiva did not ask him about this, and Rabbi Eliezer too held that they are not considered like bodies, and he is liable only once. Rashi.

Rav Hisda said:

In the case of

intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that they are considered like bodies.

And the final clause, which teaches “he is liable for each primary labor,” means that he is liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat, because the Shabbatot are separate bodies, and not as Rabba inferred.

And when he asks him: It is the case of unawareness of Shabbat and intentionality regarding labors that he asked him, whether the intervening days constitute awareness to divide.

And he resolved for him

that

the intervening days constitute awareness to divide

below it explains the proof from a menstruant woman, where intervening days likewise apply].

And he accepted

Rabbi Akiva

from him,

as it teaches in the middle clause, that he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And he resolved for him that the offshoots are considered like labors, and he did not accept it from him

as it teaches at the end of the Mishna.

Rav Hisda said: From where do I say it

that Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are considered like bodies?

For it was taught: One who writes two letters

on Shabbat [for this is the measure for the labor of writing]

during one period of unawareness is liable

for a sin-offering.

If he wrote the two letters

during two periods of unawareness,

and it became known to him between one letter and the other that he had sinned—

Rabban Gamliel holds him liable,

because the awareness in between does not divide them, since awareness of half a measure is not awareness, and the two letters combine together for liability for a sin-offering.

But the Sages exempt

because the awareness concerning the writing of one letter divides them, and here there is not one unawareness in the writing of the measure that creates liability, namely, two letters together .

And Rabban Gamliel agrees that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, he is exempt.

And another beraita was taught: One who writes two letters during two Shabbatot, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat: Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, and the Sages exempt.

And Rav Hisda concludes his proof:

It might have entered your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds like Rabbi Akiva,

as it will be explained below.

Granted, according to me, who say that in the case of intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors, even Rabbi Akiva agrees that Shabbatot are considered like bodies,

it is satisfactory that the beraitot do not contradict one another. For one can say that

that which was taught

concerning Rabban Gamliel

that he is exempt

deals with one who wrote the two letters

with intentionality regarding Shabbat and unawareness regarding labors,

because

since Shabbatot are considered like bodies,

that is, the two Shabbatot are like two primary labors, in our matter it is as though he performed half of a different labor on each Shabbat; the halves of the labors do not combine together, and therefore he is exempt.