Keritot 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

Rava said:

It is reasonable to say: He found it obvious that an unwitting transgression concerning Shabbat combined with awareness of the prohibited labors is a case in which the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions.

And

only

the case of awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors was what he asked him: Are they considered like separate bodies or not?

And he resolved it for him:

Rabbi Eliezer derives it by means of a kal va-chomer from the case of a menstruating woman: If one engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women during one period of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one, because separate bodies divide the transgressions, all the more so

awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors is considered like separate bodies.

But he did not accept

Rabbi Akiva

this from him,

as he challenged in the Mishna: “What can be said about the case of a menstruating woman, which has two prohibitions?”

And he also resolved for him

as well

that derivatives of labors are considered like labors

(but he did not resolve this from the case of a menstruating woman, since there are no derivatives in that case; Rashi above, 16a).

But he did not accept this from him 91 .

Rava said: From where do I say this

that this was Rabbi Akiva’s question and that he did not accept Rabbi Eliezer’s answer?

As we learned

in tractate Shabbat:

They stated a major principle with regard to Shabbat: Anyone who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat

who believes that there is no mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah at all

and performs many labors

from different primary labors

on many Shabbatot

and eventually learns about the matter of Shabbat—

he is liable only for

a sin offering

one

.

This is because there was only one act of unawareness that caused him to commit all the transgressions: his failure to know of the mitzva of Shabbat.

One who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat,

that there is a mitzva of Shabbat and who recognizes the labors prohibited on it, but forgot that today was Shabbat,

and performed many labors on many Shabbatot—

is liable for each and every Shabbat

for one sin offering, because the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions, and each Shabbat represents a separate act of unawareness. However, he is not liable for a separate sin offering for each and every labor he performed, because they all resulted from one act of unawareness, namely, forgetting Shabbat.

One who knows that

today

is Shabbat, and performed many labors on many Shabbatot,

because he did not know that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, and he performed those labors on every Shabbat—

is liable for each and every primary labor

because each labor constitutes a separate act of unawareness: He did not know that it was prohibited on Shabbat.

And Rava concludes his proof: Since the latter clause teaches only that he is liable for each primary labor,

whereas it does not teach: “He is liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat,”

it is evident that he is not liable for a separate sin offering for that same labor when he performed it on many Shabbatot, one for each Shabbat. This is because the Shabbatot are not considered separate bodies; rather, all the Shabbatot are like one Shabbat. It is therefore as though he performed that labor several times on one Shabbat during a single period of unawareness, for which he is liable only once. [As explained above, here it is not possible to say that the awareness in between divides the transgressions, since the unawareness concerns the labor and not Shabbat, and awareness concerning the labor is acquired only by learning the halakha.]

Whose opinion is this

Mishna?

If you say it is Rabbi Eliezer, consider the latter clause

of the Mishna in tractate Shabbat:

One who performs many labors of a single type of labor

all of which were derivatives of one primary labor

is liable only once.

And if it is Rabbi Eliezer, does Rabbi Eliezer not hold one liable for every derivative of a labor

with a sin offering for each derivative

as for a labor

as though he performed different primary labors? This was, after all, Rabbi Akiva’s second question, and Rabbi Eliezer answered him that he is liable for each and every one.

Rather, it is obvious that it is Rabbi Akiva, and learn from this

from the middle clause, which teaches that he is liable for each and every Shabbat, that

an unwitting transgression concerning Shabbat combined with awareness of the prohibited labors is obvious to him

according to Rabbi Akiva,

because the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions,

as the case of one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat concerns an unwitting transgression concerning Shabbat combined with awareness of the prohibited labors.

And from the latter clause, from which we inferred that he is not liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat because the Shabbatot are not like separate bodies, learn that

it was the case of awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors that he asked

Rabbi Akiva of Rabbi Eliezer

whether they are considered like separate bodies

or not.

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him

Rabbi Eliezer

that they are considered like separate bodies.

And he also resolved his second question,

that derivatives of labors are considered like labors.

And Rabbi Akiva accepted neither of these answers

from

him,

but held that Shabbatot are not considered like separate bodies, as we inferred from the latter clause. And one who performs derivatives of the same primary labor is not comparable to one who performs several different primary labors, as the Mishna in tractate Shabbat explicitly teaches at its conclusion: One who performs many labors of a single type of labor [that is, derivatives of the same primary labor] is liable only once.

Abaye said

to Rava:

I can tell you that the case of awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors was obvious to Rabbi Akiva, and that he held that Shabbatot are not considered like separate bodies,

and he is liable for only one sin offering for all the Shabbatot. And the Mishna of the major principle comes in accordance with his view; therefore, in the latter clause, concerning one who knows that it is Shabbat, he is not liable for each and every Shabbat.

It was the case of an unwitting transgression concerning Shabbat combined with awareness of the prohibited labors that he asked him about: Do the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions or not? And he resolved it for him that the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions, and Rabbi Akiva accepted this

from

him,

and therefore the middle clause teaches that he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And he resolved for him

that

derivatives of labors are considered like labors, but he did not accept this from him,

and therefore the Mishna concludes that one who performs many labors of a single type of labor is liable only once.

Abaye and Rava disagreed only concerning what was obvious to Rabbi Akiva and what his question was. But in the final analysis, they both agree that Rabbi Akiva held that Shabbatot are not considered like separate bodies, that the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions, and that derivatives of labors are not considered like labors. They disagreed concerning Rabbi Eliezer: Rava held that Rabbi Eliezer maintained, regarding awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors, that the Shabbatot are considered like separate bodies, whereas Abaye held that Rabbi Akiva did not ask about this, and that Rabbi Eliezer too held that they are not considered like separate bodies, and that one is liable only once. Rashi.

Rav Hisda said:

In the case of

awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that they are considered like separate bodies.

And the latter clause, which teaches that he is liable for each and every primary labor, means that he is liable for each primary labor of each and every Shabbat, because the Shabbatot are considered separate bodies, and not as Rava inferred.

And when he asked him, it was the case of an unwitting transgression concerning Shabbat combined with awareness of the prohibited labors that he asked him about: Do the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions?

And he resolved it for him

that

the intervening days constitute awareness that divides the transgressions [below, the Gemara explains the proof from the case of a menstruating woman, where intervening days are relevant as well].

And he accepted

Rabbi Akiva

this from him,

as the middle clause teaches that he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And he resolved for him that derivatives of labors are considered like labors, but he did not accept this from him

as the Mishna concludes.

Rav Hisda said: From where do I say this

that Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are considered like separate bodies?

As it was taught in a beraita: One who writes two letters

on Shabbat [as this is the requisite measure for the labor of writing]

during a single period of unawareness is liable

for a sin offering

.

If he wrote the two letters

during two periods of unawareness,

and he became aware between writing one letter and the other that he had sinned—

Rabban Gamliel holds him liable,

because the awareness in between does not divide them, as awareness of half the requisite measure is not considered awareness, and the two letters combine to constitute the requisite measure for a sin offering.

But the Sages exempt him

because awareness that he wrote one letter divides the acts, and there is no single act of unawareness concerning the writing of the requisite measure, which consists of two letters together .

And Rabban Gamliel concedes that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat, he is exempt. And another beraita was taught: One who writes two letters on two Shabbatot, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat: Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

And Rav Hisda concludes his proof:

It might enter your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

as will be explained below.

Granted, according to my view, that I say that in the case of awareness of Shabbat combined with unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva concedes that the Shabbatot are considered like separate bodies,

it is understandable that the beraitot do not contradict one another. For it may be said that

this beraita

in which

Rabban Gamliel

exempts

him concerns a case where he wrote the two letters

with awareness of Shabbat and unwittingness concerning the prohibited labors. Since

the Shabbatot are considered like separate bodies,

meaning that the two Shabbatot are like two different primary labors, in our case it is as though he performed half of a different labor on each Shabbat, and the two halves of the labors do not combine. Therefore, he is exempt.

that is, the two Shabbatot are like two primary labors, in our matter it is as though he performed half of a different labor on each Shabbat; the halves of the labors do not combine together, and therefore he is exempt.