Keritot 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

But

in the latter clause, concerning me'ila

“for each uncertainty he brings an asham talui”

for each and every one

it does not teach this.

Whose opinion is this

the latter clause, which follows the opinion of the first tanna?

If you say it is Rabbi Akiva’s

opinion, then

it should also teach

in the

latter clause

“and for their uncertainties he brings an asham talui”?

As we learned: Rabbi Akiva obligates one who is uncertain about me'ila to bring an asham talui.

Rather, is it not Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion?

And he holds like the Sages, who exempt one who is uncertain about me'ila from bringing an asham talui, because an asham talui is brought only for a sin whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, whereas intentional me'ila is not punishable by karet.

And it teaches

the first tanna [who, according to our explanation, is Rabbi Yehoshua] in the first clause

“if there were five occasions of unawareness, he brings five sin-offerings,”

which implies that specifically separate occasions of unawareness divide the acts, but five sacrificial animals do not divide them; rather, he brings one sin-offering for all of them.

And infer from this: Rabbi Yehoshua accepted

from

him

Rabbi Akiva’s position! [And according to this, one must say that what the first tanna teaches at the beginning of his statement, “If he ate five pieces of notar from one sacrificial animal, he brings only one sin-offering,” is not specifically referring to one sacrificial animal; rather, the same applies even to five sacrificial animals, Shita Mekubetzet on the preceding page, letter 21.]

And we reject this:

Rather,

let us say

on the contrary.

From the latter clause

of the first tanna,

which teaches, “For five sacrificial animals, even with one occasion of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one,” infer

the opposite:

he did not accept his position

but remained of the opinion that five sacrificial animals divide the acts with regard to sin-offerings [and the same applies to five dishes from one sacrificial animal: he is liable for five sin-offerings, as is demonstrated by Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the Mishna, the aforementioned Shita Mekubetzet].

And what can you say

so that the first and latter clauses will not contradict one another? There is a

dispute between tannaitic authorities.

There is one tanna

who holds

that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted

Rabbi Akiva’s position, and he is the tanna of the first clause;

and there is another tanna

who holds

that he did not accept it, and he is the tanna of the latter clause.

the latter clause.

It cannot be said this way! For this too would not resolve Rabbi Yehoshua’s position. Rather,

even if you say

that the first clause is

Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, who holds that for five sacrificial animals one brings only one sin-offering, whereas with regard to Rabbi Yehoshua there is no dispute at all concerning his statement: certainly, he did not accept Rabbi Akiva’s position, and the latter clause of the first tanna follows his opinion.

And as for what troubles you from the end of the beraita, which follows the first clause of the first tanna [for the latter clause speaks of five dishes with regard to me'ila, analogous to the first clause’s five dishes with regard to a sin-offering, and comes to teach that me'ila differs from a sin-offering]: Rabbi Akiva obligates one who is uncertain about acts of me'ila to bring an asham talui, so why does the beraita not teach this in the latter clause?

We answer you:

We can explain it for you:

This tanna agrees with Rabbi Akiva

in one matter

and disputes him in another. He agrees with him concerning occasions of unawareness,

as he holds that five sacrificial animals and five dishes do not divide the acts.

But he disputes him concerning acts of me'ila,

as he holds that one is not liable to bring an asham talui for uncertainty about me'ila.

And we inquire into it: What are the circumstances of five dishes? Shmuel said: It is like that which we learned: Five items of an

offering

olah combine

to form an olive-sized measure, so that one who burns an olive-sized measure of all of them together outside the Temple courtyard is liable to the punishment of karet

the meat

[of an olah offering, which is burned on the altar; therefore, the teaching specifically mentions an olah],

and the forbidden fat, the wine, the flour, and the oil

from the meal-offering accompanying the olah. Likewise, one who eats from these five items [an olive-sized measure of each] has five dishes and is liable for five acts of me'ila.

Hezekiah said:

Even in the olah itself one can find five dishes,

for example, if he ate from five limbs

of it.

Resh Lakish said: Even if you say it was one limb, it is possible in the case of the shoulder,

which contains five limbs.

Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa said:

Even if it was literally one limb, it is possible

for example, if he ate it with five types of stew,

each olive-sized portion being cooked with a different relish, such as onion, cabbage, or the like.

Rabbi Yohanan said: For example, if he ate it prepared in five different ways,

such as roasted, cooked, pickled, thoroughly boiled, and cooked in a pot [with the gravy that emerges from the meat].

Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: If one performs many labors

all of which are derivatives of one primary labor [for example, he plants, grafts a branch, and grafts a tree, all of which are derivatives of the primary labor of sowing],

on many Shabbatot,

having repeatedly performed the same labors on each Shabbat, and all the labors were

of the nature of one labor

[as stated, they are derivatives of one primary labor], and he performed them

in one state of unawareness—

what

is the law?

Does he

incur liability

for one sin-offering

for all of them, or is he liable for each and every one

[the Gemara will explain whether liability for several sin-offerings is due to the many Shabbatot or to the many labors]?

He said to me

Rabbi Eliezer:

He is liable for each and every one, by means of a kal va-homer: Just as

the prohibition of

a menstruating woman, which does not have many results,

many types of transgressions leading to

many sin-offerings,

since it involves only the prohibition of intercourse, and nevertheless

he is liable for each and every one

[as the Gemara will explain, and likewise all the statements of the Mishna],

Shabbat, which has many results,

many types of labors leading to

many sin-offerings,

since it includes primary labors and derivatives,

should it not follow that he is liable for each and every one?!

I said to him: No!

This is not a valid kal va-homer.

If you say with regard to a menstruating woman

that he is liable for each and every one because

there are two warnings in her case: he is warned with regard to the menstruating woman, and the menstruating woman is warned with regard to him,

that is, although Shabbat is more stringent in that it includes more types of transgressions, nevertheless, menstruation has a stringency that Shabbat does not: for one transgression, two people are liable for sin-offerings.

Can you say the same with regard to Shabbat, where there is only one warning,

so that only one person is liable for a sin-offering? Therefore, it follows that he should not be liable for each and every one.

He said to me

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has relations with

menstruating women,

who are minors, provides proof

—

that there is only one warning in their case,

for the minor is not liable for intercourse,

and

nevertheless

he is liable for each and every one,

and the same should follow by a kal va-homer with regard to Shabbat.

I said to him: No!

This too is not a proof.

If you say with regard to minors,

it is because

although they do not have a warning now,

there will be a warning

after some time,

when they grow up.

Can you say with regard to Shabbat, where there is

neither

now nor after some time, but only one warning?

He said to me

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has relations with an animal provides proof.

For an animal is never subject to a warning, and nevertheless he is liable for each and every one. The same should follow by a kal va-homer with regard to Shabbat.

I said to him: Indeed!

The animal is like Shabbat.

It can be used to resolve my question concerning Shabbat [this explanation follows one opinion in the Gemara, according to which Rabbi Akiva ultimately accepted Rabbi Eliezer’s position. There is another opinion in the Gemara that he did not accept it. According to that opinion, the Mishna is explained as follows:

the animal is like Shabbat,

and I am likewise uncertain concerning it whether he is liable for each and every one, since it is not warned with regard to him, just as I am uncertain concerning Shabbat].

Gemara:

And we inquire into it:

What did Rabbi Akiva ask Rabbi Eliezer

? For what reason should he be liable for several sin-offerings even though everything was done in one state of unawareness?

If

his question was because he performed the labor on several Shabbatot, and whether

Shabbatot are considered like bodies, and if not—

he should have asked him. His question would then have been whether separate Shabbatot are considered two separate bodies of transgression, meaning that it is as though he performed two different primary labors in one state of unawareness, for which he is liable for a sin-offering for each primary labor; likewise, he would be liable for each Shabbat. Or perhaps this is only like performing the same labor several times [on one Shabbat] in one state of unawareness, in which case he is liable for only one sin-offering.

It is impossible to say this. For if so,

he should have asked him: If one performs one labor on many Shabbatot,

performing only one labor on each Shabbat, why did he formulate his question as referring to one who performed many labors on each Shabbat?

And if

Rabbi Akiva’s question was because he performed several derivatives of one primary labor, and whether

derivatives of labors are considered like primary labors

of labors

and if not—

he should have asked him. The question would then be whether separate derivatives of the same primary labor [such as milking and squeezing, which are two derivatives of the primary labor of threshing] divide the acts with regard to sin-offerings as do separate primary labors, so that he is liable for each derivative, or whether they do not, since they resemble one another, as they are derivatives of one primary labor.

This would still be difficult, for

he should have asked him: If one performs many labors of the nature of one labor on one Shabbat,

why did he mention many Shabbatot?

Rabba said: The scholars of the academy of Rav said: He asked him about two matters! Whether Shabbatot are considered like bodies, or not—

he asked him in a case where he performed one labor on many Shabbatot; and also,

whether derivatives of labors are considered like labors, or not—

he asked him in a case where he performed several derivatives on one Shabbat.

And he resolved for him that Shabbatot are considered like bodies.

And he also resolved for him

that

derivatives of labors are considered like labors 88 .

he asked him

in a case where he performed several derivative acts on one Shabbat.

And he resolved for him that Shabbatot are considered like separate bodies.

And he also resolved for him

that

derivative acts of labor are considered like separate labors

It is explained in Tractate Shabbat 70a that the verses teach that there are two possibilities when one unwittingly performs several principal categories of labor during a single Shabbat.

a. Unawareness of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors: that is, he knows that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, but forgot that today is Shabbat. His law is that he is liable to only one sin-offering, because there is only one cause of his unawareness, namely, forgetting Shabbat.

b. Awareness that it is Shabbat and unawareness of the labors: that is, he knows that today is Shabbat, but does not know that these labors are prohibited. In this case he is liable to a sin-offering for each principal category of labor, because there are several instances of unawareness here: each labor was performed as a result of a separate unawareness. [This discussion is connected to our sugya to some extent, although our sugya primarily discusses the case of one who performed a single labor on many Shabbatot. Here too there is a distinction between unawareness of Shabbat with awareness of the labors and awareness that it is Shabbat with unawareness of the labors; however, the reasons for distinguishing between them differ from those stated above. Care must be taken not to conflate the subjects].

And

we were discussing: Rabbi Akiva’s question concerning one who performs a single labor on many Shabbatot: whether

the Shabbatot

are considered separate entities or not—

how,

in what case,

could he have asked it?

Was it with regard to

unawareness of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors,

when he knows that this labor is prohibited, but on each Shabbat forgets that today is Shabbat?

It is obvious to him

that he is liable for each and every Shabbat, because

the intervening days

between one Shabbat and the next

constitute awareness that differentiates [Rashi, at the beginning of the chapter Kelal Gadol in Tractate Shabbat, explains that it is impossible that during the week he did not hear that the day in question had been Shabbat. Although he did not recall the labor that he had performed, since his unawareness resulted from not knowing that it was Shabbat, his awareness during the week that it had been Shabbat is nevertheless considered awareness that differentiates, and each Shabbat constitutes a separate instance of unawareness. The Tosafot there explain that it is a biblical decree that the intervening days constitute awareness that differentiates with regard to unawareness of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors. Although in practice he did not become aware during the week that he had sinned, it is as though he became aware between one Shabbat and the next that he had sinned. This is likewise evident from Rashi here] .

And

only with regard to

awareness that it is Shabbat and unawareness of the labors,

when he knows that today is Shabbat but does not know that this labor is prohibited,

is it that

Rabbi Akiva

asked him

of Rabbi Eliezer. For here it is impossible to say that the intervening days constitute awareness that differentiates, because with regard to unawareness of the labor, there is no awareness unless he learns and knows that this labor is prohibited. The question is:

whether

separate Shabbatot

are considered separate entities,

so that the matter is considered as though he performed several different principal categories of labor on a single Shabbat [in a case of awareness that it is Shabbat and unawareness of the labors], for which he is liable for each principal category of labor; so too, each Shabbat is considered a separate entity.

Or not,

the Shabbatot are not considered separate entities, but rather he is like one who performs a single labor several times on the same Shabbat during a single period of unawareness, in which case he is liable to only one sin-offering .

Or perhaps: It is obvious to him that, in a case of awareness that it is Shabbat and unawareness of the labors, the Shabbatot are considered separate entities

and he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And

only

unawareness of Shabbat and awareness of the labors is what he asked him about.

For in this case, it would not help to say that the Shabbatot are separate entities, since even one who performs several principal categories of labor in a case of unawareness of Shabbat and awareness of the labors [on a single Shabbat] is liable to only one sin-offering. The question is with regard to

the intervening days: whether they constitute awareness that differentiates,

so that he is liable for each and every Shabbat, as though he became aware in the interim that he had sinned,

or not,

do they not constitute awareness that differentiates?