Keritot 16a — the Talmud in English

But

in the latter clause, concerning meila

— “For each uncertainty he brings a provisional guilt-offering

for each one and one”

— it does not teach this.

Whose opinion is this

latter clause, which proceeds according to the view of the First Tanna?

If you say it is Rabbi Akiva’s

opinion, then

it should also teach

in the

latter clause: “And for their uncertainties he brings a provisional guilt-offering”?

“and for their uncertainties he brings an asham talui”?

For we learned: Rabbi Akiva obligates one to bring a provisional guilt-offering for uncertain meila.

Rather, is it not Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion?

And he holds like the Sages, who exempt one in the case of uncertain meila from a provisional guilt-offering, because a provisional guilt-offering comes only for a sin whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, whereas for intentional meila one is not liable for karet.

And it teaches

that the First Tanna [according to our explanation, he is Rabbi Yehoshua] teaches in the first clause

“For five lapses of awareness he brings five sin-offerings,”

which implies that specifically lapses of awareness divide, but five sacrifices do not divide; rather, he brings one sin-offering for all of them.

And infer from it: Rabbi Yehoshua accepted

Rabbi Yehoshua

from him

the view of Rabbi Akiva! [And according to this, one must say that what the First Tanna teaches at the beginning of his words, “If he ate five pieces of notar from one sacrifice, he brings only one sin-offering,” is not specifically one sacrifice, but even five sacrifices, Shיטה Mekubetzet on the previous page, letter 21.]

And we reject this:

Rather

let us say

on the contrary.

From the latter clause

of the First Tanna,

which teaches, “From five sacrifices, even with one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each one and one,” infer

the opposite:

he did not accept it from him

but remained with his view that five sacrifices divide with regard to sin-offerings [and the same applies to five trays from one sacrifice: he is liable for five sin-offerings, as is demonstrated by Rabbi Yehoshua’s words in the Mishna, the aforementioned Shיטה Mekubetzet].

But what can you say

so that the first clause and the latter clause should not contradict one another? It is

a dispute among tannaim.

There is a tanna

who holds

that he accepted it,

Rabbi Yehoshua, and he is the tanna of the first clause;

and there is a tanna

who holds

that he did not accept it,

and he is the tanna of the latter clause.

It is impossible to say this! For even this does not resolve Rabbi Yehoshua’s view. Rather,

even if you say

that the first clause is

Rabbi Akiva’s opinion,

who holds that for five sacrifices he brings only one sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua has no dispute at all in his words; rather, certainly he did not accept it from Rabbi Akiva, and the latter clause of the First Tanna proceeds according to his view.

And regarding what is difficult for you from the end of the beraita, which proceeds according to the first clause of the First Tanna [which in the latter clause speaks of five trays in meila, corresponding to the first clause, which speaks of five trays with regard to a sin-offering, and comes to inform us that meila differs from a sin-offering], and yet Rabbi Akiva obligates one to bring a provisional guilt-offering for uncertain acts of meila, so why does it not teach this in the latter clause?

We have answered you:

And this tanna holds like him

Rabbi Akiva

in one matter, and disputes him in one matter. He holds like him with regard to the lapse of awareness,

that five sacrifices and five trays do not divide.

And he disputes him with regard to acts of meila,

for he holds that one is not liable for a provisional guilt-offering for uncertain meila.

And we raised the question:

What are the circumstances of five trays?

Shmuel said: Like that which we learned: Five matters in a

burnt-offering

combine

to the measure of an olive-sized portion, to make one who burns an olive-sized portion of all of them together outside [the Temple] liable to the punishment of karet

the flesh

[of the burnt-offering, which is burned upon the altar. Therefore it specifically mentions a burnt-offering],

and the fat, the wine, the fine flour, and the oil

from the libation-offering that comes with the burnt-offering. Likewise, one who eats from these five matters [an olive-sized portion of each]—this is five trays—and is liable for five guilt-offerings for meila.

Hezekiah said:

Even with the burnt-offering itself one can find five trays,

for example, if he ate from five limbs

of it.

Resh Lakish said: Even if you say [it is] one limb, one can find it in the shoulder,

which contains five limbs.

Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaḥa said:

Even with one actual limb one can find it,

for example, if he ate it prepared in five types of pot

so that each olive-sized portion was cooked with a different relish, such as with onion or cabbage and the like.

Rabbi Yohanan said: For example, if he ate it with five flavors

such as roasted, cooked, pickled, thoroughly cooked [cooked excessively], and tzלי keder [cooked with the gravy that emerges from the meat].

Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: One who performs many labors

and all of them are derivatives of one primary labor [for example, planting, layering, and grafting, all of which are derivatives of the labor of sowing],

on many Shabbatot,

returning and performing the same labors on every Shabbat, and all the labors were

of the nature of one labor,

[as stated, they are derivatives of one primary labor], and he performed them

with one lapse of awareness—

what is the law?

Is

he liable

for one sin-offering

for all of them, or is he liable for each one and one

[and the Gemara will explain the question: for what reason should he be liable for several sin-offerings—because of the many Shabbatot or because of the many labors]?

He said to me,

Rabbi Eliezer:

He is liable for each one and one, by a kal va-chomer: What

prohibition is

menstruation, which has no many derivatives,

many types of transgressions that bring about

many sin-offerings,

for it contains only the prohibition of intercourse, and nevertheless

he is liable for each one and one

[the Gemara will explain this, as well as all the words of the Mishna].

[With] Shabbat, which has many derivatives,

many types of labors that bring about

many sin-offerings,

for it has primary labors and derivatives—is it not the law that he should be liable for each one and one?!

is it not all the more so that he should be liable for each and every one?!

I said to him: No!

This is not a kal va-chomer. For

if you say with regard to menstruation

that he is liable for each one and one, because

it has two warnings: he is warned concerning the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned concerning him,

that is, although Shabbat is more stringent in that it contains more types of transgressions, nevertheless menstruation has a stringency that Shabbat does not have: for one transgression, two people are liable for a sin-offering.

Can you say this with regard to Shabbat, which has only one warning,

for only one person is liable for a sin-offering? Therefore, it is logical that he should not be liable for each one and one.

He said to me,

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with

menstruant women,

the minors will prove it—

for they have only one warning,

since the minor is not liable for intercourse,

and

nevertheless

he is liable for each one and one,

and this is a kal va-chomer for Shabbat.

I said to him: No!

There is no proof from this either. For

if you say with regard to minors,

because

although they do not have now

a warning,

they have one later,

when they grow up.

Can you say this with regard to Shabbat, which has

neither

now nor later,

but only one warning?

He said to me,

Rabbi Eliezer:

One who has intercourse with an animal will prove it.

For an animal is never warned, and nevertheless he is liable for each one and one. This is a kal va-chomer for Shabbat.

I said to him:

Indeed!

The animal is like Shabbat.

And from it I can resolve my question concerning Shabbat [this explanation follows one view in the Gemara, according to which Rabbi Akiva ultimately accepted Rabbi Eliezer’s view. There is another view in the Gemara that he did not accept it from him. According to this view, the explanation of the Mishna is as follows:

the animal is like Shabbat,

and I am uncertain concerning it as well, whether he is liable for each one, since it is not warned concerning him, just as I am uncertain concerning Shabbat].

Gemara:

And we raised the question:

What did Rabbi Akiva ask him

Rabbi Eliezer? For what reason should he be liable for several sin-offerings even though everything was done with one lapse of awareness?

If

it is because he performed the labor on several Shabbatot, and whether

Shabbatot are considered like bodies, and if not—

he should have asked him.

His question would have been whether separate Shabbatot are considered like two bodies of transgressions, that is, as though he performed two different primary labors with one lapse of awareness, for which he is liable for a sin-offering for each primary labor; and likewise, he is liable for each Shabbat. Or perhaps it is only like performing the same labor several times [on the same Shabbat] with one lapse of awareness, for which he is liable for only one sin-offering.

It is impossible to say this. For if so,

he should have asked him: One who performs one labor on many Shabbatot,

performing only one labor on each Shabbat—why did he mention in his question that he performed many labors on every Shabbat?

And if

Rabbi Akiva’s question is because he performed several derivatives of one primary labor, and whether

derivatives of labors are considered like primary labors

of

labors, and if not—

he should have asked him.

Whether separate derivatives of the same primary labor [such as milking and squeezing, which are two derivatives of the primary labor of “threshing”] divide with regard to sin-offerings like separate primary labors, so that he is liable for each derivative and derivative, or not, since they resemble one another, as they are derivatives of one primary labor.

It would still be difficult, for

he should have asked him: One who performs many labors of the nature of one labor on one Shabbat,

and why did he mention many Shabbatot?

Rabba said: They say in the academy of Rav: He asked him two things! Whether Shabbatot are considered like bodies, and if not—

he asked him,

in a case where he performed one labor on many Shabbatot; and also

whether derivatives of labors are considered like labors, and if not—

he asked him,

in a case where he performed several derivatives on one Shabbat.

And he resolved for him that Shabbatot are considered like bodies.

And he also resolved for him

as well

that derivatives of labors are considered like labors 88 .

It is explained in tractate Shabbat 70a that we derive from verses that there are two modes regarding one who performs several principal categories of labor on one Shabbat unwittingly.

A. Unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors—that is, he knows that these labors are forbidden on Shabbat, but he forgot that today was Shabbat. And its law is that he is liable for only one sin-offering, because the cause of the unawareness is one, namely, forgetting Shabbat.

B. Deliberate knowledge of Shabbat and unawareness of the labors—that is, he knows that today is Shabbat, but he does not know that these labors are forbidden. And in this manner he is liable for a sin-offering for each principal category of labor, because there are many unawarenesses here, as each labor was performed in a different unawareness. [And these matters are connected to our sugya to some degree, although our sugya deals mainly with the case in which he performed one labor on many Shabbatot. And here too there is a difference between unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors, and deliberate knowledge of Shabbat and unawareness of the labors; however, the reasons for distinguishing between them differ from what was stated above, and one must take care not to mix the subjects].

And

we were discussing: Rabbi Akiva's question regarding one who performs one labor on many Shabbatot: whether

the Shabbatot

are deemed like distinct bodies or not—

how,

in what manner,

should he have asked it?

Was it with regard to

unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors,

when he knows that this labor is forbidden, but on each Shabbat he forgot that today was Shabbat?

It is obvious to him

that he is liable for each and every Shabbat, because

the days in between

between one Shabbat and the next

serve as awareness to divide [Rashi in Shabbat, at the beginning of the chapter “The Great Principle,” explains that it is impossible that he did not hear during the week that that day had been Shabbat. And although he did not recall the labor that he had performed, nevertheless, since the unawareness was on account of not knowing about Shabbat, awareness of Shabbat in the middle of the week is considered awareness that divides, and each Shabbat is a different unawareness. And Tosafot there explained that it is a scriptural decree that the days in between serve as awareness to divide with regard to unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors. And although in practice he did not come to know in the middle of the week that he had sinned, it is as though he came to know between one Shabbat and the next that he had sinned; and this too is demonstrated by Rashi here] .

And

only with regard to

deliberate knowledge of Shabbat and unawareness of the labors,

when he knows that today is Shabbat but does not know that this labor is forbidden,

is it that

Rabbi Akiva

asked him

of Rabbi Eliezer. For here it is impossible to say that the days in between serve as awareness to divide, because with regard to unawareness of the labor, there is no awareness except through his learning and knowing that this labor is forbidden. And the uncertainty is:

whether

separate Shabbatot

are deemed like distinct bodies,

so that the matter is considered as though he performed several different principal categories of labor on one Shabbat [with deliberate knowledge of Shabbat and unawareness of the labors], for which he is liable for each principal category of labor; so too, each Shabbat is considered a body in itself.

Or not

are the Shabbatot considered distinct bodies, but he is like one who performs one labor several times on the same Shabbat in one concealment, who is liable for only one sin-offering?

Or perhaps: deliberate knowledge of Shabbat and unawareness of the labors is obvious to him, that the Shabbatot are deemed like distinct bodies

and he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And

only

unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors is what he asked him.

For in this manner, if we say that the Shabbatot are like separate bodies, this will not help, since even one who performs several principal categories of labor with unawareness of Shabbat and deliberate knowledge of the labors [on one Shabbat] is liable for only one. And the uncertainty is concerning

the days in between: whether they serve as awareness to divide,

and he is liable for each and every Shabbat, as though he came to know in the middle that he had sinned,

or not

do they serve as awareness to divide?