Keritot 13b — the Talmud in English

the tear of his eye and the blood of his wound,

his injury,

and a woman's milk—

render impure with the impurity of liquids!

For the status of liquid applies to them, and once they touched a zav, they are like the other impure liquids. And their measure for rendering impure is

a quarter-log. 32 .

His saliva, his discharge, and his urine—

render with severe impurity,

for they render even a person and garments impure, because they are the “springs of the zav”; and their measure is

any amount.

And if you say

that

the place of milk is a spring,

then

the milk

of a woman

should likewise become impure with severe impurity in any amount, like his discharge and his saliva!?

Rather, conclude from it: the place of a woman's milk—

is not a spring!

Rather, the law of food applies to it. [And what the beraita teaches, that a woman's milk renders impure with the impurity of liquids by a quarter-log, is rabbinic; but by Torah law it is not a liquid but food. Nevertheless, conclude from it that it is not according to Rava, for it is not a spring, Shita Mekubetzet, note 2.] And we raise an objection:

If so, this beraita that Ravva said is difficult,

for he proved from it that milk is a spring.

For it teaches:

a woman's milk

renders impure [

renders food fit to receive impurity]

whether willingly or unwillingly.

And now that we say that milk is not a spring, why does it render [make fit] unwillingly? And why should its law differ from that of all other liquids, which make [food] fit only if a person desired them? And we answer:

Do you think

that

“unwillingly”

means

that he says that he does not desire it

to leave the milk?

No!

Rather,

what is “unwillingly”? In an unspecified case! For we say that the infant's intention is directed toward the milk,

and it is as though desire is present here. Therefore the milk has the capacity to make [food] fit to receive impurity. And this is not because it is a spring, but as an ordinary liquid [and this refers to that same drop on the breast, whose law is that of a liquid and which makes [food] fit. But the rest of the milk, we conclude now, is food and does not make [food] fit, Shita Mekubetzet, note 14] .

But

where he

says, “I do not desire it,”

when the infant does not wish to nurse, the milk that emerged is

pure,

for it does not make [food] fit to receive impurity [even that drop].

And from now it is possible to explain that which it teaches: “They permitted a woman who has contact with one rendered impure by a corpse to nurse her son, and her son is pure”—that it is speaking when the infant does not desire the milk; therefore all the milk was not made fit to receive impurity, and it remained pure, and therefore the infant is pure. And the first difficulty of Ravva above, “for we see [it] at the infant's mouth,” is also resolved. Rashi; and see Arukh la-Ner.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who ate impure foods

and drank impure liquids: if he drank a quarter-log of wine and entered the Temple [and performed [the service] while he was intoxicated with wine] and remained there for the time required to eat a peras—he is liable.

And we inquire about it:

Why do I need “remaining”? For it teaches, “and remained,”

and apparently this implies that in the Temple he remained for the time required to eat a peras. But as soon as he entered [and performed any service, Tosafot], when he was intoxicated with wine, he became liable.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said: This is what it teaches:

a.

One who ate impure foods and drank impure liquids

[his body thereby became disqualified, as explained immediately]. b.

And he drank a quarter-log of wine

and entered and performed [the service] in the Temple,

and remained while eating them and drinking them for the time required to eat a peras.

And he entered the Temple

after drinking the wine within the time required to eat a peras—

he is liable.

[With impure foods and liquids, a person becomes disqualified when he remained during the eating for this measure of time.]

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar says:

If he interrupted it, or if he put any amount of water into it, he is exempt.

The Sages taught:

It is written,

“Wine and strong drink you shall not drink

... when you enter the Tent of Meeting, and you shall not die.”

One might [say that this includes] even if

he drank

any amount ,

or

even if

he drank wine

from its vat,

which had not had sufficient time to ferment, and was still sweet and not intoxicating—would it also be forbidden for him to enter the Temple and perform the service?

The verse teaches, “and strong drink.”

To tell you that

there is no prohibition except

when he drank wine that has

enough to intoxicate! And how much

is

“enough to intoxicate”?

A quarter-log of forty-day-old wine!

That remained for forty days after its pressing.

You might say:

If so, since

wine is already included in strong drink,

why does the verse say “wine”? To tell you:

all

wine is subject to a prohibition

by a negative commandment, even

in any amount. And

likewise

it is subject to a prohibition

even when he drinks wine

from its vat, which did not remain after pressing and is still not intoxicating. But with regard to liability for death, it is specifically when it is intoxicating.

которое не простояло после отжимания и ещё не опьяняет. Однако что касается ответственности, влекущей смертную казнь, она возникает только в случае, когда вино опьяняет.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If only

“wine”

had been written, I would have said:

I have only [learned] wine.

From where [do I derive] other intoxicating drinks

that are forbidden?

The verse teaches, “and strong drink,”

to include all intoxicating drinks.

If so, why does the verse say “wine”? To tell you:

only

for wine

is he

liable to death

if he entered the Temple and performed [the service] after drinking it;

but for other intoxicating drinks

he is

subject only to a prohibition

[and not to death] .

Rabbi Elazar says:

It is written,

“You shall not drink wine,”

and it is also written,

“You shall not drink strong drink,”

to teach

that you shall not drink it in the manner of its intoxication! But if he interrupted it

in the middle of drinking the quarter-log

or put any amount of water into it—

he is exempt!

For in such a manner it is not intoxicating . [ Nevertheless, we derive from “wine” that even when it is not drunk in the manner of its intoxication, he is subject to a prohibition, and is exempt only from death, Shita Mekubetzet, note 13].

And we explain:

In what do

these tannaim disagree?

The first tanna holds: We derive

a gezera shava,

“strong drink, strong drink,” from the nazirite.

For just as “strong drink” concerning the nazirite refers only to wine and not to other intoxicating drinks, so too “strong drink” concerning service in the Temple. It does not come to include other intoxicating drinks, as Rabbi Yehuda says, but rather to exclude: only when it contains enough to intoxicate is he liable for it.

And Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “strong drink, strong drink” from the nazirite,

but with regard to entering the Temple, he includes other intoxicating drinks from “strong drink.”

And Rabbi Elazar holds: What is “strong drink”? Anything that intoxicates!

That is, in the manner of its intoxication.

The early authorities disagreed, according to Rabbi Elazar, concerning other intoxicating drinks, whether he holds like the Sages or like Rabbi Yehuda; see Tosafot, s.v. “Rav said,” and Responsa of the Rashba, no. 363.

And we say:

In accordance with whom does this beraita go: One who ate a fig

that grew in a place called

Ke'ilit, and drank honey

that was cooked with water,

or milk,

all of which are intoxicating like wine,

and entered the Temple and served

in the service—

, he receives lashes 37 .

In accordance with whom

does it go?

With Rabbi Yehuda,

for according to the first tanna he is entirely exempt for other intoxicating drinks.

Rav Yehuda bar Ahotai said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar. And Rav called Rabbi Elazar: “the fortunate one among the sages,”

the happiest of the sages [Rashi, Ketubot 40a].

Rav Aha of Hutzal had

a

vow concerning his wife,

for he vowed not to derive benefit from his wife.

He came before Rav Ashi

to have his vow annulled.

He said to him: Go today and come tomorrow,

because I drank wine today and it is forbidden for me to issue rulings, as will be derived below .

For Rav did not

usually

appoint an interpreter before him

to expound publicly

from one festival day to the next,

from the time he ate and drank and observed the festival until the following day,

because of intoxication.

He said to him

Rav Aḥa:

But did Rav not say: The halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar

that if he put water into it, he is exempt?

And you—is it that he placed

into the wine

water? [

And although Rabbi Elazar concedes that he is warned even when he put water into it, nevertheless the prohibition against issuing a ruling is only with that type of drink for which one is liable to death when entering the Temple, Shitah Mekubetzet, letter 16].

Rav Ashi said to him

Rav Ashi:

This is not difficult: this

that he is exempt when he put water into it is specifically

with

one who drinks only

a revi'it

of wine.

This

that he is liable is

with

one who drinks

more than a revi'it

of wine. For then, even if he put water into it, he is liable. And I drank more than a revi'it, and putting water into it is of no avail .

The Sages taught:

It is stated in the section concerning the prohibition against entering the Temple after drinking wine: “And to distinguish between the holy and the profane, and between the impure and the pure, and to teach the Children of Israel all the statutes that the Lord spoke to them through Moses.” And we expound the entire verse with regard to the matter that it is forbidden to perform all these things while under the influence of wine.

“And to distinguish between the holy and the profane” —

when you come to distinguish between the holy and the profane, do not drink wine;

these are valuations [

one who said, “The value of so-and-so is upon me to give to the Temple”]

and valuations, devoted property, and consecrated property

that one who drank wine and strong drink should not make an appraisal for all these, lest he appraise correctly.

“Between the impure and the pure” —

these are

the rulings concerning

impurities and purities,

that one under the influence of wine should not issue a ruling.

“And to teach” —

this is issuing a ruling

concerning what is forbidden and what is permitted .

“All the statutes” —

these are homiletical expositions,

that it is forbidden for one under the influence of wine to expound publicly, because there are matters of halakha in the exposition.

“That the Lord spoke” —

this is halakha,

to teach matters that are halakha given to Moses at Sinai.

“Through Moses” —

this is Talmud,

for it is forbidden for him to teach Gemara, from which the halakha is learned.

One might have thought even

the

Mishna

would also be forbidden for him to teach?

The verse therefore says, “and to teach,”

to exclude Mishna, for one does not issue a halakhic ruling from Mishna.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought even Talmud

is forbidden?

The verse therefore says, “and to teach.”

And although the Gemara contains halakha, nevertheless one who studies it does not issue a practical halakhic ruling .

And we say:

According to whom does this beraita go: “Excluded

from the general prohibition against issuing a ruling is the ruling that

a sheretz is impure, and a frog is pure” —

that those under the influence of wine may issue a ruling concerning them,

that they are permitted to issue this ruling!

Let us say that it is Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda and not the Sages!?

For according to the Sages, who prohibit him even from teaching Gemara, all the more so it is forbidden for him to issue such a ruling?

And we reject this:

You may even say it is the Sages.

And here it is different,

for the reason that it is permitted to issue a ruling concerning it is

“Go out and read it; it is a matter for everyone!”

This matter is known to everyone and is not considered issuing a ruling.

Rav said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda.

And we raise a difficulty:

But Rav would not appoint an interpreter for himself from one festival day to the next because of drunkenness,

yet according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted for him with Talmud, and all the more so with homiletical expositions; why, then, did Rav not expound?

And we answer:

Rav is different, for he would issue rulings

in his homiletical expositions.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let him stand

the interpreter, and let him expound in such a manner

that he not issue a ruling,

so that there will be no ruling in his exposition?

And we answer:

Wherever Rav sat —

he could not manage without issuing a ruling!

For people would come to ask him halakha.

Mishna:

There is

a person who

eats one eating, and they are liable for it for four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering.

How so?

An impure person who ate forbidden fat.

And it was

the fat

left over from consecrated things,

from an offering whose time had passed, and he ate it

on Yom Kippur.

Here there are four sin-offerings: for eating consecrated food in bodily impurity, for eating forbidden fat, for eating leftover sacrificial meat, and for eating on Yom Kippur; and one guilt-offering, which is a guilt-offering for meila, for having derived benefit from consecrated property .

Rabbi Meir says:

Sometimes there is one additional sin-offering:

if it was Shabbat, and he took it out with his mouth

from the private domain to the public domain while eating , then

he is liable

for an additional sin-offering because of the prohibition of carrying out on Shabbat .

The Sages said to him

the Sages:

It is not of the same category!

This sin-offering is not because of eating, but because of the labor of carrying out. Whereas the tanna in the Mishna counts only sin-offerings for eating.