Keritot 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

And we raised a difficulty:

Shall we say that Rabbi Meir maintains

that the Mishna obligates one to bring many offerings for a single act of eating because

one prohibition can take effect upon another?

Otherwise, it would be impossible for several prohibitions to accumulate upon a single piece. [See Arukh LaNer as to why the question is raised only with regard to Rabbi Meir and not with regard to the first tanna.]

And we answer:

Although a prohibition

alone

cannot take effect upon another prohibition,

nevertheless, where the additional prohibition is

a comprehensive prohibition

or

an expansive prohibition—

he maintains

that one prohibition can take effect upon another, as will be explained.

A comprehensive prohibition is, for example, the case of a person who is

pure,

who

initially,

while he was pure,

was not

prohibited

from eating

anything except forbidden fat.

But once

he became impure,

then

since he became prohibited

from then on also

from

eating

pure pieces

of sacrificial meat,

there was added to him

as an impure person

also a prohibition

against eating sacrificial food while impure,

in addition to

the prohibition against eating the

forbidden fat

of the sacrifice. This is called a “comprehensive” prohibition rather than an “expansive” prohibition, because nothing was added to the piece of fat itself; rather, because the person became impure, a comprehensive prohibition against eating sacrificial food was added to him, which includes both the fat and the meat. Therefore, that prohibition takes effect upon the person, since through the comprehensive prohibition both the fat and the meat became prohibited to him; consequently, he is now prohibited from eating the fat of sacrificial food also because of bodily impurity.

And

an expansive prohibition is, for example:

forbidden fat,

which

initially,

before the animal was consecrated as a sacrifice,

was not

prohibited except as food.

But once

it was consecrated,

then

since there was added to it

now

a prohibition against deriving benefit

because of its consecration,

there was added to it as well a prohibition

against eating consecrated food

with regard to

eating the

forbidden fat .

This is called an “expansive” prohibition: until then, the fat was prohibited only as food, and now a new prohibition against deriving benefit was added to it. This is the definition of an “expansive prohibition”: another prohibition is added to that very piece. For example, in the case of consecrated property, in addition to the prohibition against eating it because it is consecrated, a prohibition against deriving benefit is added to the piece of fat as well; this newly added prohibition against deriving benefit results from the consecrated status that took effect upon it and had not applied previously.

Accordingly, an additional prohibition against eating consecrated property applies to the fat, for which he is liable to bring an asham me’ilot.

Nevertheless, for a common person

only

is it prohibited.

But for the Most High it is permitted

to offer the fat upon the altar. But once

it became notar,

then

since a prohibition was added to it with regard to the Most High,

so that it was now prohibited to be offered,

there was added to it

also a prohibition against eating it as “notar,”

with regard to a common person.

This too is an “expansive” prohibition: when this piece became prohibited to a common person, it became prohibited by virtue of that same prohibition to the Most High as well.

An additional, third liability to bring a sin offering now arises because of notar.

Yom Kippur took effect upon it,

then

since there was added to it

with regard to the person

a prohibition

against eating

ordinary food,

there was added to it

also a prohibition against eating it

with regard to sacrificial property—that is, with regard to this piece of fat, which is sacrificial property. This is a comprehensive prohibition, since all foods become prohibited on Yom Kippur, including this piece as well.

Let him teach five sin-offerings, and let us establish it as a case in which he ate

And he is consequently liable to bring a fourth sin offering because of Yom Kippur.

And we challenge this:

Let the Mishna teach five sin offerings, and let us establish it as referring to a case in which he ate

in addition to an olive-bulk of forbidden fat

an olive-bulk of piggul.

[It would still be considered a single act of eating, since the throat can contain two olive-bulk measures, as will be explained below.]

And we answer:

The Mishna is speaking of one animal,

from which it is possible to eat and thereby become liable for many sin offerings.

It is not speaking of two animals. And notar and piggul cannot be found in one animal,

since piggul takes effect before notar. The sacrifice becomes piggul specifically during the sacrificial rites, through the priest’s intention; once it has become piggul, and is unfit both for human consumption and for offering upon the altar, it can no longer become notar. Notar applies specifically to “what remains from a sacrifice that was offered in accordance with its requirements, after the time allotted for eating it” [Rambam].

And we challenge this:

Why not?

For

you can find

piggul and notar in one animal!

For example: if he placed a limb that was piggul upon the altar, its piggul status was removed from it

because the altar sanctified it [and it even becomes permitted for eating; Tosafot, Zevaḥim 42b, s.v. hakometz], and afterward it was removed from the altar; when its time passed,

it became notar.

Whereas another limb that he did not place upon the altar remained subject to its piggul status.

And if so, we have found notar and piggul in one animal. And one can find a case in which he would become liable for an additional sin-offering: when he eats an olive-bulk from the limb that was rendered piggul and was not placed on the altar, and an olive-bulk from the limb that was notar.

And as Ulla said: If a fistful rendered piggul was placed beside the altar —

its status as piggul is removed from it ,

and if it remained after its allotted time,

it is notar.

And we answer: only

one limb is under discussion in

the Mishna;

two limbs are not under discussion.

And notar and piggul

are indeed found together in two limbs, but

they cannot be found in one limb.

And we raise an objection:

Why not?

Surely

one can find such a case

even in a single limb:

for example, if he placed a limb rendered piggul beside the altar,

in such a manner

that

one

half

of the limb

he placed on the altar, while the other half

remained

outside the altar,

outside it.

For that

half

that he

placed on the

altar, its status as

there,

piggul

was removed from it,

and

when it remained beyond its allotted time

it became notar, as Ulla said: If a fistful rendered piggul was placed on the altar, its status as piggul is removed from it and it becomes notar.

And for the other half of the limb he is liable on account of piggul!? This appears to be the meaning of the abbreviation “A.L.” appearing in the Gemara.]

This appears to be the meaning of the abbreviation appearing in the Gemara]

It can be answered: No,

it is not possible to say this with regard to one limb, since it is impossible to place it in such a way that it would be divided into exactly two halves. If so, either way:

if the majority of the

limb he placed upon the

altar —

he would cast

all of it

onto the altar!

For the status of piggul would be removed from all of it, and there would be only notar. But if

the majority

of the limb he placed

outside,

outside the altar —

he would cast

all of it

outside!

The entire limb would remain piggul, and the status of notar would not take effect. And we reject this: If so, since you say that we follow the majority of the limb, and the law of the minority of the limb is the same as that of its majority —

resolve

from here that matter

about which Rami bar Ḥama asked

in tractate Ḥullin. For we learned there with regard to the birth of a firstborn animal that the sanctity of the firstborn does not take effect while it is in its mother’s womb; rather, it takes effect when the majority of the fetus has emerged from the womb. The question consequently arises: What is the law if only a minority of the firstborn emerged, but within that part of its body that emerged, one limb had already emerged to the extent of a majority of that limb? If we combine the minority of that limb that has not yet emerged with the majority of the limb that has emerged, and consider the entire limb to have emerged, then the majority of the fetus would now be outside. Did

they follow the majority with regard to limbs,

so that when the majority of the limb emerged, we say that its minority is drawn after it, as though it too had emerged, and it can combine with the rest to constitute a majority of the fetus, making it considered as having emerged to the extent of a majority,

or not

do they follow the majority with regard to limbs?

And since Rami bar Ḥama did not resolve from our sugya that we follow the majority with regard to limbs, infer from this that there is no proof from here that we follow the majority of a limb. If so, the difficulty returns to its place: one can find a case in which he is liable for two prohibitions in a single limb, part of which was placed on the altar and part of which was outside the altar?

And we answer:

Rather,

one can indeed find a case in which he is liable for two prohibitions even with regard to a single limb. Nevertheless, one cannot find piggul and notar together in a single olive-bulk. And the Mishna

is discussing one olive-bulk,

for which he is liable for many sin-offerings [alternatively, it teaches “one act of eating,” meaning an olive-bulk], whereas

it is not discussing two olive-bulks.

And we raise an objection:

And

if

it does not

discuss two olive-bulks, the Mishna?

But it teaches

that he is liable for a sin-offering for eating

on Yom Kippur, and on Yom Kippur

one is liable only for eating the measure of a

date-sized portion .

And

with a

date-sized portion there are two olive-bulks 53.

And we answer:

Rabbi Zeira said: For example, he ate a kidney

[the kidney]

together

with

its fat

surrounding it. For the olive-bulk of fat by itself, he is liable for three sin-offerings: for fat, for eating sacrificial meat while impure through bodily impurity, and for notar. He is also liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. Likewise, the olive-bulk of fat combines with the kidney to make him liable for a sin-offering for eating on Yom Kippur the measure of a date-sized portion. Therefore, although the Mishna is now discussing two olive-bulks, this should not pose a difficulty: why should he not be liable for notar and piggul on account of two olive-bulks, for example, if the offering was rendered piggul and he placed the kidney on the altar, removing its status as piggul, so that he would be liable for notar on account of it, while he would be liable for piggul on account of the fat? As stated, however, the Mishna seeks to find a case in which one olive-bulk generates liability for all the sin-offerings. The olive-bulk of fat, for which he is liable for all three sin-offerings [fat, sacrificial meat while impure, and notar] and a guilt-offering for misuse, is also the olive-bulk that generates the fourth sin-offering, for Yom Kippur, by combining with the kidney to constitute the measure of a date-sized portion. But with regard to piggul, even if one could find a case in which the kidney was placed on the altar, its status as piggul was removed, and he became liable for notar on account of it, while the prohibition of piggul remained with regard to the fat, nevertheless the olive-bulk of fat would not entail liability for notar. Therefore the tannai did not count the sin-offering for piggul together with them. Rashi].

Therefore, although the Mishna is now speaking about two olive-bulks, this does not pose a difficulty: Why should he not be liable on account of notar and piggul for two olive-bulks, for example, if the offering had piggul and he brought the kidney onto the altar, removing its piggul status, so that he is liable for it on account of notar, while he is liable for the fat on account of piggul? As stated, the Mishna seeks a case in which one olive-bulk causes liability for all the sin-offerings. The olive-bulk of fat for which he is liable for all three sin-offerings [fat, sacrificial food while impure, and notar], and for a guilt-offering on account of misuse, is also the olive-bulk that causes liability for the fourth sin-offering, for Yom Kippur, by combining with the kidney to make the measure of a large date. But with regard to piggul, even if it is possible for the kidney to be brought onto the altar, thereby removing its piggul status so that he becomes liable for it on account of notar, while the prohibition of piggul remains in the fat, the olive-bulk of fat is nevertheless not subject to liability for notar. Therefore, the tanna did not count a sin-offering for piggul together with the others. Rashi].

Rav Pappa said: For example, he filled

the olive-bulk of fat

with dates,

and the dates completed the measure of a date-sized portion.

Rav Adda bar Aḥa taught

in the Mishna

five sin-offerings.

And he explains it

as referring to a fifth sin-offering

such as when he ate an olive-bulk of piggul

in addition to the olive-bulk of fat,

and not by means of either of the two changes that we made

above.

And we raise an objection: If so,

let it teach six sin-offerings! And let us establish it as a case in which he also ate an olive-bulk of blood?

And we answer:

It is discussing one act of eating; it is not discussing two acts of eating.

And the Sages estimated that the throat cannot hold more than two olive-bulks,

therefore only two olive-bulks are considered one act of eating .

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says:

If it was Shabbat and he removed it with his mouth, he is liable.

And we consider the matter:

Let it teach, “If he removed it, he is liable,”

also for the act of carrying, since the discussion concerns Yom Kippur, on which carrying is likewise prohibited. If so,

what is the reason it teaches,

in order to make him liable for the labor of carrying,

“If it was Shabbat”?

And we answer:

Rafram said: This indicates that there

is

an eruv and the prohibition of carrying for Shabbat,

where carrying is prohibited and eruv of courtyards were instituted,

but there is no eruv and prohibition of carrying for Yom Kippur,

on which carrying is not prohibited [because it is an unusual labor. Tosafot, Beitza 12a, s.v. dilma] .

And we raise an objection:

From where do you know this? Perhaps there is an eruv and the prohibition of carrying

also

for Yom Kippur.

And this is what it teaches:

Rabbi Meir:

“If it was Shabbat and he removed it, he is liable even

for carrying,

on account of Shabbat and

also for carrying on account of

Yom Kippur,”

that is, two additional sin-offerings?

And we answer:

Rather, if Rafram’s statement was stated, it was stated

with regard to this

matter that

was stated.

As it was taught:

With regard to the goat sent to Azazel, it is stated:

“And he shall send it by the hand of a man who is ready.”

And we expound:

“A man”

comes to qualify a non-koen

to send the goat, for a koen is not required.

“Who is ready,”

meaning that it is sent at its proper time and appointed occasion,

even in a state of impurity and even on Shabbat.

And we further expound from

“who is ready”

“prepared,”

that the messenger must have been prepared from the day before to lead the goat. This is the conclusion of the wording of the baraitha.

It teaches

in the baraitha:

“Who is ready,”

and

“even on Shabbat.”

And concerning this

Rafram said: This indicates

that since it was necessary to derive that it is permitted to send the goat even when Yom Kippur falls on Shabbat,

there is an eruv and the prohibition of carrying for Shabbat, but there is no eruv and prohibition of carrying for Yom Kippur!

For if carrying were prohibited on Yom Kippur, we would already know that sending the goat overrides the prohibition of carrying on Yom Kippur, and it would likewise follow that it overrides the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat. The verse would therefore not have needed to include a further teaching that sending the goat overrides the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat.

And we raise an objection:

From where?

Perhaps we do not derive the overriding of the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat from Yom Kippur, because

the goat that is sent

on Yom Kippur

is different, for this is what makes it fit to be performed on Yom Kippur!

That is its mitzva: to be sent on Yom Kippur, just as the daily offerings of Shabbat are sacrificed on Shabbat. But if Yom Kippur falls on Shabbat, one might have thought that it would not override Shabbat; therefore the verse was necessary .

And we conclude:

Rather,

this

statement of Rafram is a false report.

Mishna:

There is a single act of intercourse for which one can be liable for six sin-offerings.

How so?

a.

One who engages in intercourse with his daughter is liable on her account for his daughter.

b.

And his sister,

for that daughter is also his sister,

as, for example, when he engaged in intercourse with his mother and fathered a daughter by her.

c.

His brother’s wife,

who had previously been married to his brother [from his father].

d.

And his father’s brother’s wife,

whom his father’s brother had married.

e.

And a married woman,

for she is a married woman.

f.

And a menstruant,

who had begun her period of menstruation.