Keritot 12b — the Talmud in English

If you say ![](pamud.bmp "

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concerning “old” impurity,

that they testify concerning him that he became impure yesterday and entered the Temple today, if so, why do they not concede to him?

What is different about forbidden fat and entering the Temple, that they concede to him

that he has a migo, because

if he wished, he could say: “I was intentional”?

If so, concerning

“old” impurity as well

he has a migo, for he can

reconcile his statement. (

For)

for

after all,

if he wished, he could say

that indeed I became impure as you say, but I immersed yesterday. And now as well we say that what he said, “I did not become impure,” means:

“I did not remain in my impurity, but I immersed?!”

And we answer:

Ravina said: Actually, it is concerning old impurity. And it is a case where witnesses said to him:

You became impure yesterday, and

you ate

today

sacred food in bodily impurity! And he said to them: “I did not become impure!” Here, he cannot reconcile his statement. For it cannot be said

that his intention was to say

“I did not remain in my impurity, but I immersed,”

because if so,

what should he have said to them? “I immersed and ate!”

But

when he said this to them—

at least, his first statement was contradicted with regard to contact impurity!

For earlier he said, “I did not become impure at all,” meaning that he did not touch impurity. For if his initial intention had been to say that he immersed, he should have answered them, “I did not eat,” meaning: I did not eat an eating that obligates a sacrifice, as you maintain, because I immersed beforehand! And since he did not answer them appropriately, he certainly came to deny them entirely—that he did not touch impurity! And now, when we wish to explain his words as meaning that he indeed touched impurity but immersed, he is contradicting his earlier words, and therefore he is not deemed credible [explanation of the matter according to the Shittah Mekubbetzet, sections 20 and 26]. [

Another explanation:

The Sages concede to Rabbi Judah concerning forbidden fat and entering the Temple

when they testify concerning him that he ate forbidden fat or became impure and entered the Temple, in order to make him liable, then he is trusted concerning himself to exempt himself from a sacrifice.

But concerning impurity,

if they testify concerning him that he became impure and touched pure foods—

they do not concede to him,

but he is not trusted, and we render the pure foods impure.

And we conclude the proof:

What are we dealing with? If you say that it is concerning old impurity [

as it implies that in every impurity they do not concede to him, even in old impurity], why should he not be trusted through a migo? After all, with regard to the pure foods as well, his words can be reconciled, that

“I did not remain in my impurity, but I immersed”

before the contact. Rather, certainly, the reason of the Rabbis is not because of a migo, but because a person is trusted concerning himself more than one hundred people. Therefore, we say this only concerning a sacrifice [as explained above, for if it were true, he would not refrain from bringing atonement], but not concerning pure foods.

And we reject this:

Ravina said,

actually, the reason of the Rabbis is because of a migo. And that which they say, that concerning impurity they do not concede to Rabbi Judah, applies even with regard to a sacrifice and even

to old impurity, and it is a case where witnesses said to him: “You ate sacred food in bodily impurity,”

as explained in the first explanation].

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Judah,

that he is trusted concerning himself that he did not become impure, even against witnesses.

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Judah said

that it is permitted for him to eat pure foods from this point onward

only privately,

but in the presence of others it is forbidden, lest they come to treat pure foods lightly.

And

only

for himself

may he eat, but he may not feed others pure foods that he touches, for there are witnesses that he is impure [the Hazon Ish explains that these amoraim maintain that the reason of Rabbi Judah is that a person is trusted concerning himself more than witnesses in a matter that is between him and himself, and therefore he does not bring a sacrifice. The same law applies: he is permitted to eat pure foods privately].

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages that if two people said to him, “You had intercourse with a betrothed maidservant!” And he said, “I did not have intercourse!”

that he is

trusted.

And he is exempt from a sacrifice. For here there is a migo:

if he wished, he could have said to them: “I did not complete intercourse” [

for the witnesses do not know this]. And one is liable to a sacrifice for a betrothed maidservant only for completion of intercourse. Therefore, he is trusted to say, “I did not have intercourse.” This is unlike the case in our Mishna, where Rabbi Meir disputes, for there he has no migo, since he is not comfortable saying that he was wicked and ate forbidden fat intentionally. But concerning a betrothed maidservant, he can say that he had intercourse unintentionally and did not complete it [according to Rashi, who explains the migo of our sugya like every migo in the Talmud. And Tosafot explained nothing here; according to their approach, that the migo here differs from every other migo, since it is a migo in the presence of witnesses, but its substance is that we reconcile his statement, while Rabbi Meir disputes that he can reconcile his statement after initially saying, “I did not eat at all” (see Tosafot, s.v. “What,” Bava Metzia 3b), according to this it is not understood why he concedes concerning a betrothed maidservant, and this requires investigation].

Rav Sheshet said: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages concerning a nazirite who became impure,

namely,

that two people said to him: “You became impure!” And he said: “I did not become impure!”

that he is

exempt

from the sacrifice of a nazirite who became impure.

For if he wished, he could have said: “I asked

a sage

concerning my naziriteship,”

before I became impure, and he permitted me the naziriteship. [For the naziriteship has the status of a vow, which a sage can annul.] And with such a migo, that he could have exempted himself from a sacrifice by claiming that it had been permitted, Rabbi Meir concedes.

Abaye said: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages that if two people said to him: “Do you know testimony

in favor of

so-and-so, and when that so-and-so adjured you to come testify on his behalf, you denied it, claiming that you did not know testimony concerning him, and since you denied his adjuration, you are liable for the sacrifice for an oath of testimony!”

he is exempt

And he says: “I did not know

the testimony”—

he is exempt

from a sacrifice.

For if he wished, he could have said:

I did not testify because

I did not intend

at the time I saw the event

to testify,

to be a witness concerning the matter, and therefore I am not fit to testify [see Shittah Mekubbetzet, section 4, and Tosafot Yeshanim, s.v. “I did not”]. And see the notes.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one ate forbidden fat and forbidden fat under one lapse of awareness—

he is liable for only one [sin-offering]!

Rabbi Zeira strongly objected to him: Why is he liable for only one sin-offering? But he ate two olive-sized portions of forbidden fat!

Abaye said to him: Lapses of awareness divide!

For if he ate under two lapses of awareness—that is, after he ate the first olive-sized portion, it became known to him that he had sinned, and then it was forgotten from him again and he ate a second olive-sized portion—then he has two lapses of awareness, and only then is he liable for two sin-offerings.

But here,

only

one lapse of awareness exists!

For it became known to him that he had sinned only after he ate both olive-sized portions, and therefore he is liable for only one sin-offering.

There are those who say:

that in the Mishna he is liable to only one sin-offering is

Rabbi Zeira challenged him

as follows:

The reason

that in our Mishna he is liable for only one sin-offering is because it is

one lapse of awareness

—

but if there were two lapses of awareness, he would be liable for two; why?

For the

designation “forbidden fat”

that he ate

is one!

How can he become liable for two sin-offerings for one designation of the prohibition?

Abaye said to him: Lapses of awareness divide!

We learned in the Mishna:

If one ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul, or notar, he is liable.

If he ate half an olive-sized portion and then ate another half an olive-sized portion under one lapse of awareness, from one type, he is liable.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it: Why do I need it to teach

“from one type, he is liable”?

For

it is obvious

that he is liable, since together he ate a complete olive-sized portion of one prohibited type?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini:

What are we dealing with here?

For example, he ate

the two half-olive-sized portions

from two tamḥuyin,

which were cooked in two forms, such as boiled and roasted,

and according to Rabbi Joshua, who says: “Tamḥuyin

divide!”

For if he ate two olive-sized portions [under one lapse of awareness], each from a different tamḥui, they are divided with regard to sin-offerings, so that he is liable for a separate sin-offering for each eating from a tamḥui.

Lest you say: When Rabbi Joshua said

that tamḥuyin divide,

it makes no difference whether leniently or stringently,

that just as the tamḥuyin divide stringently when there are two olive-sized portions, making him liable for two sin-offerings, so too they divide leniently when there are two half-olive-sized portions, so that they do not combine into an olive-sized portion to make him liable even for one sin-offering,

it teaches us

the Mishna

that he is liable

for eating two half-olive-sized portions from two tamḥuyin.

Apparently: stringently he said,

Rabbi Joshua,

but leniently he did not say.

There are those who say:

that we raise an objection

from the final clause

of the Mishna, which teaches: that if he ate half an olive-bulk and again ate half an olive-bulk

of two kinds

of prohibited substances,

he is exempt.

For

it is obvious

that he is exempt, since he did not eat an olive-bulk of one prohibited kind?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini:

That which the Mishna teaches, “of two kinds,” does not refer to literally two kinds, but to one kind. And

it is referring to a case where he ate them in two tamḥuyin, and according to Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: tamḥuyin divide.

For you might say: When Rabbi Yehoshua said this, he said it stringently, but he did not say it leniently,

and the two half-olive-bulks join together to obligate him to bring a sin-offering, even though he ate them in two tamḥuyin,

it teaches us

that the Mishna says that

“of two kinds he is exempt!”

And

what does “of two kinds” mean? It is one kind! And why does it call it two kinds? Because he ate

the two halves

in the manner of two kinds,

that is,

in two tamḥuyin.

And it teaches

that he is

exempt. Thus, whether leniently or stringently, Rabbi Yehoshua says

that tamḥuyin divide.

And we raise an objection:

From the final clause

of the Mishna, which we established as meaning that what it teaches, “of two kinds,” refers to

one kind and two tamḥuyin,

if so, the

first clause

which teaches, “of one kind he is liable,” refers to

one kind and one tamḥui.

And the question returns to its place, for

it is obvious

that he is liable, since there is here one kind and one tamḥui, and certainly they join together to form an olive-bulk?

And we answer:

Ravina said:

Here, with what are we dealing?

With a case where he had awareness in the interim!

He became aware between the two half-olive-bulks that he had sinned,

and according to Rabban Gamliel, who says: There is no awareness for a half-measure!

For even though awareness divides complete measures, so that if he became aware between one olive-bulk and another olive-bulk that he had sinned, he must bring a sin-offering for each olive-bulk, nevertheless, with regard to a half-measure awareness does not divide; rather, the two halves join together despite the fact that there was awareness between them, because awareness of a half-measure is not awareness of a sin [and therefore the Mishna calls this “in one lapse of awareness,” even though there was awareness in the middle, Tosafot, s.v. de-amar].

For we learned: One who writes two letters

on Shabbat

in two lapses of awareness,

that is, one letter

one

in

the morning

and one letter

one

in

the evening [and even if he did not become aware in the interim, since he had time in which he could have become aware, it is considered for him as two lapses of awareness. Rashi, Shabbat]—

letter in the evening; even if he did not learn of his act in the interim, since he had enough time to learn of it, this is considered two lapses of awareness; Rashi, Shabbat]—

Rabban Gamliel holds him liable

for a sin-offering,

and the Sages exempt.

And we say:

Rabban Gamliel holds: There is no “awareness” for a half-measure,

and therefore he holds him liable.

And the Rabbis hold: There is awareness for a half-measure,

and the awareness divides between the two writings of the two letters, and they do not join together; therefore he is exempt.

Mishna:

That which we learned in the previous Mishna, that one who eats half an olive-bulk and again eats half an olive-bulk of one kind is liable—

how long may the one who eats them linger

and they will still join together?

As though he were eating roasted grains [roasted wheat]! For we estimate it as though the olive-bulk had crumbled into small pieces the size of roasted grains, and he eats them one by one. If he did not linger in eating them longer than this time, they join together,

roasted wheat]. One assesses the matter as though the olive-bulk had crumbled into small pieces the size of roasted grains, and he eats them one at a time. If he did not take longer to eat them than this period, they combine;

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

He is never liable for eating them

until he lingers from beginning to end

of the eating no longer than

the time required for eating a pras [from the language of “a broken piece,”] that is, half of a loaf, when the size [of the loaf] is eight eggs. And some say six eggs.

Foods and liquids that are impure do not render a person impure by Torah law. Rather, the Sages decreed that a person who eats impure food in the measure of half a pras, or drinks impure liquid in the measure of a revi'it, becomes disqualified [rendered impure] in his body from eating teruma until he immerses. He ate half a pras of impure foods, or he drank a revi'it of impure liquids, or he drank a revi'it of wine and entered the Temple, and lingered in eating or drinking

the time required for eating a pras—

he is liable

to a person who enters the Temple after this drinking receiving death at the hands of Heaven. Likewise, a person is disqualified from eating teruma after such eating and drinking. But if he lingered longer than the time required for eating a pras, the impure foods or liquids do not join together to the measure that disqualifies the person, and the wine does not join to the measure that makes one who enters the Temple liable.

Rabbi Elazar says:

With regard to liability for entering the Temple after drinking a revi'it of wine,

if he interrupted it,

meaning that he did not drink the revi'it all at once,

or if he put into it

of the wine

any amount of water—

he is exempt

when he enters the Temple after this drinking.

Gemara:

It was asked of them: Did Rabbi Meir state this stringently,

meaning that he is more stringent than the Rabbis,

or did he state it leniently,

meaning that he is more lenient than they?

And this is what they asked: Did

he state it stringently

Rabbi Meir?

And this is what it teaches: “As though he were eating roasted grains,”

that the measure of the interval is the time required to eat the olive-bulk in small pieces,

for even the entire day,

even if this time continues throughout the entire day,

and even though from beginning to end

he lingered

longer than the time required for eating a pras, since his eating continued,

that is, he did not linger longer than the measure of eating roasted grains—

he is liable!

And the Rabbis said to him: It is only when he lingers

only

within the time required for eating a pras that he is liable,

but if he lingered

longer than the time required for eating a pras, he is exempt.

meaning, even if this period extends throughout the entire day,

and although from the beginning to the end

he waited

longer than the time required to eat a half-loaf, since his eating continued,

Or perhaps

Rabbi Meir

stated it leniently.

That is, Rabbi Meir agrees with the Rabbis that the measure is the time required for eating a pras. Rather, he is more lenient than they.

And this is what it teaches: “As though he were eating roasted grains,”

meaning,

provided that he did not interrupt between one and the other,

but ate them all at once, in the manner of roasted grains, which are eaten one immediately after the other; then the measure is the time required for eating a pras. But if he interrupted between one and the other, in the middle of the eating, then even though from beginning to end he lingered only

within the time required for eating a pras—

he is exempt.

And the Rabbis said to him:

Even if he interrupted,

since from beginning to end it is within the time required for eating a pras,

he is

liable.

Come and hear

to resolve the question: We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: Until he lingers from beginning to end within the time required for eating a pras.

he waited only

the time required to eat a half-loaf—

he is exempt.

And the Sages said to him: Even if he interrupted,

since from the beginning to the end it was the time required to eat a half-loaf,

he is

liable.

Come and hear

a proof to resolve the question. We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: He is liable only if he waits, from the beginning to the end, the time required to eat a half-loaf.

«А Мудрецы говорят: до тех пор, пока от начала до конца не пройдёт время, необходимое для поедания половины хлеба».