Keritot 12a — the Talmud in English

Rather, it is not with one? And it teaches

that

when he does not contradict him, he is credible! Learn from this

that one witness obligates a sacrifice where the person does not contradict him [in the Gemara of Yevamot 87b it is explained that this is because silence is like admission. On this basis Tosafot wrote in our passage that this applies specifically when he is silent, but if he says, “I do not know,” he is exempt from a sacrifice] .

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir said: kal va-chomer—

if two witnesses brought him to a severe death, shall they not bring him to the lesser offering?

They raised a dilemma before them: What is the reason of the Rabbis that witnesses do not obligate him to bring an offering when he denies them?

Is it

because

a person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men

with regard to an offering, since, as it is an atonement for him, if the matter were true he would not refrain from bringing it .

Or perhaps it is because we say: since, if he had wished, he could have

would have

said: “I was deliberate,” and

he would have been

exempt

by this from an offering, since the witnesses do not know whether he was inadvertent or deliberate. Therefore,

when he also said, “I did not eat”—

he is believed.

For we interpret his words as meaning that he is saying: “I did not eat inadvertently; rather, deliberately,”

and he is exempt [

for it is impossible to interpret this literally, like the migo throughout the Talmud, since here it is a migo in the presence of witnesses, Tosafot. However, Rashi explains the migo literally] . And we explain:

And what practical difference

is there in this dilemma?

To resolve from it the matter of ritual impurity

in a case where the witnesses say to him, “You became impure, and immediately entered the Temple,” and he says, “I did not become impure.”

For if you say that the reason of the Rabbis is because a person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men,

then

even

with

ritual impurity as well

we say:

a person is trusted concerning himself.

Therefore,

it makes no difference whether it is new impurity,

where they testify against him that immediately after he became impure he entered the Temple,

or whether it is old impurity,

where they testify that he became impure yesterday and entered the Temple today—he is trusted concerning himself that he did not become impure, and he is exempt from an offering.

And if you say

that

the reason of the Rabbis is because they say

that

“there is a migo,”

then

when the Rabbis exempt him

with regard to impurity, this is specifically

from old impurity, but for new impurity he is obligated

to bring an offering. And it explains as follows:

What is the reason?

For with regard to

old impurity

we say:

since, if he had wished,

he

would have said, “I immersed

yesterday,” and

he would have been

exempt for entering the Temple today, therefore,

when he also says, “I did not become impure,” he is exempt.

Because

it can be said: What is the meaning of “I did not become impure,” which he says?

This is what he is saying:

“I did not remain in my impurity; rather, I immersed!”

But for new impurity he is obligated.

What is the reason?

Because

when he also says, “I immersed,” he is obligated. For

indeed

the witnesses said to him, “Now you became impure,”

and even if he immersed immediately, he is still one who immersed that day and is forbidden to enter the Temple. [For had he said, “I did not enter the Temple,” we would reconcile his words by intending him to say, “I did not enter inadvertently; rather, deliberately.” But now that he says, “I did not become impure,” even if his intention is that he became impure deliberately, this does not exempt him from an offering, since, as the entry was inadvertent, it does not matter to us how the impurity occurred, and he is obligated to bring an offering. Rashi].

What is it?

Come and hear

to resolve the dilemma: For it was taught in a beraita:

One witness said to him: “You became impure,”

and entered the Temple!

And he says: “I did not become impure”—

he is exempt

from an offering for entering the Temple in impurity.

Could it be even when two

say to him, “You became impure,” and he denies it—he should be exempt?

Rabbi Meir said: kal va-chomer

that he is obligated to bring an offering: For

if two brought him to death

of

a severe nature, shall they not bring him to the lesser offering?!

And the Sages say: A person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men,

therefore he is exempt from an offering.

Infer from this

that

the reason of the Rabbis is because a person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men,

as they explicitly say.

And we reject this:

Rav Ami said: In truth, the reason of the Rabbis is because we say there is a migo. And they disagree only with regard to old impurity

and not with regard to new impurity.

And this is what it teaches: Since, if he wished to say, “I did not remain in my impurity”

but rather, “I immersed,” and

he would have been exempt

from an offering,

therefore a person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men!

That is, we reconcile his words as meaning that this was his intention, and therefore he is more trusted than one hundred men, since only he knows whether he immersed yesterday or not.

And we ask:

If so, this is the case of forbidden fat

of the Mishna?! And why did they disagree in two cases? [Granted, if the reason of the Rabbis is that he is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men, this is understandable, for in this disagreement concerning impurity the Rabbis explained their reason as they explicitly say, that it is because of trustworthiness, and one case comes and reveals the meaning of the other. But if their reason is because of a migo, there is no novelty at all in the disagreement concerning impurity; on the contrary, in the Mishna, concerning forbidden fat, this reason is stated more explicitly. Shitah Mekubbetzet, letter 16].

And we answer:

It might have been said

that specifically with regard to

“you ate forbidden fat”

of the Mishna is he trusted according to the Rabbis because of a migo, since

he reconciles his statement,

intending to say that

“I did not eat inadvertently; rather, deliberately.” But

when two said to him

“You became impure,” and he says, “I did not become impure,” say that he does not reconcile his statement,

for if he intended to say that he did not become impure inadvertently but deliberately, this would not help to exempt him from an offering, since the entry was inadvertent.

It teaches us

that the Rabbis in the beraita,

here too

reconcile his statement in a different manner, intending him to say:

“I did not remain in my impurity; rather, I immersed.”

Come and hear:

For it was taught in a beraita: It is written concerning the sin-offering for entering the Temple in impurity,

“And he shall confess.”

And it is understood from the verse that specifically if he

admits the matter

is

he obligated,

but if he

does not admit the matter, he is exempt.

Therefore, if

one witness says to him: “You became impure!” and he says: “I did not become impure,” he is exempt.

Could it be even when two

say to him, “You became impure,”

and

he

denies them,

he should be exempt?

Rabbi Meir said:

kal va-chomer:

if two brought him to death

of

a severe nature, shall they not bring him to the lesser offering?!

Rabbi Judah says: A person is more trusted concerning himself than one hundred men! And the Sages agree

[this is a third opinion, and they are the Sages of the Mishna]

with Rabbi Judah—

with regard to forbidden fats,

when he ate forbidden fat and says, “I did not eat,”

and with regard to entering the Temple,

when they said to him, “You became impure and entered the Temple,” and he says, “I did not enter,” so that he is exempt from an offering. For there is a migo there, since his words can be reconciled as meaning, “I did not eat or enter inadvertently; rather, deliberately.”

But with regard to impurity,

that is, if he says to them, “I entered, but I did not become impure,”

they do not agree with him,

but maintain like Rabbi Meir, that he is obligated, because there is no migo there. And it explains as follows .

Thus, the reason of the Rabbis is a migo [and they disagree with Rabbi Judah, for according to him the reason is trustworthiness, and therefore he is trusted also with regard to impurity].

And we ask:

In what case are we dealing?

With what kind of impurity do the Sages not agree with Rabbi Judah?