Keritot 11b — the Talmud in English

For

you should have taught the inverse —

that they treated partial penetration like completion! For partial penetration is the novelty, and likewise it should have said, “They treated intercourse not in the customary manner like intercourse in the customary manner”!?

He said to him

— the tanna to Rav Sheshet —:

Shall I erase it

— shall I erase this beraita?

Rav Sheshet said to him:

Rav Sheshet

No,

do not erase it; rather,

this is what it teaches:

a.

“They made one who completes

his intercourse

not in the customary manner with a designated maidservant, for which they are not liable,

like one who partially penetrates

a designated maidservant

in the customary manner!

For in both of them he is exempt: in this one because it is not in the customary manner, and in that one because it is only partial penetration. And because

‘emission of semen’ is written —

to exclude intercourse not in the customary manner and to exclude partial penetration.”

b. And likewise they made the

intentional

one

who engages in intercourse not in the customary manner with a maidservant, for which he is not liable,

like one

who is unintentional,

even when he has intercourse with her

in the customary manner, for he is exempt, because ‘emission of semen’ is written

to exclude one who is unintentional.

And likewise they made the

one who is awake and engages in intercourse not in the customary manner with a maidservant, for which he is not liable,

like the

one who is asleep,

and even

in the customary manner, for he is exempt. What is the reason? Because ‘emission of semen’ is written

to exclude the one who is asleep.

It follows: the intentional one and the one who partially penetrates,

even intentionally,

with a maidservant —

his law

is like

one

who is unintentional in all

the

forbidden relations,

and he is exempt [see Tosafot, s.v. “when one is unintentional”].

And the

one who is asleep in the customary manner

with a maidservant — his law

is like one who is asleep with the forbidden relations,

and he is exempt.

And the

one who is awake and engages in intercourse not in the customary manner with a maidservant

— his law

is like one who is asleep with all the forbidden relations,

and he is exempt. [

And the Gemara comes to inform us [from “It follows” onward] that only with partial penetration and intercourse not in the customary manner does the law of the forbidden relations differ from that of a maidservant, for with the forbidden relations one is liable for them. But with one who is asleep and one who is unintentional, he is exempt even with the forbidden relations, for he is coerced. Shita Mekubetzet, letter 20 ].

We have returned to you, chapter “Four Who Lack Atonement.”

Mishna:

They told him,

they testified to a person:

“You ate forbidden fat! He brings a sin-offering. One

witness

says: ‘This person ate

forbidden fat.’

And one

witness

says: ‘He did not eat’ 1 .

Or

one

woman

says: ‘He ate,’ and another woman

says

says: ‘He did not eat!’ —

this one

brings a provisional guilt-offering 2 ,

as is the law of a person who is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat .

One

witness

says: “He ate,” and he,

the person about whom the witness testifies that he ate,

says: “I did not eat!”

he is

exempt

from a sacrifice.

Two say: “He ate,” and he himself says: “I did not eat!”

Rabbi Meir obligates

a sin-offering , but the Sages exempt.

Rabbi Meir said

a proof for his words:

“If two

witnesses

bring him to the severe death penalty,

for if they testify concerning him that he intentionally committed a transgression punishable by death at the hands of the court, they execute him on their testimony, even if he contradicts them,

will they not bring him

through their testimony

to a sacrifice, the lighter

than the punishment of death?!

The Sages told him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Meir:

“What if he wishes

to lie in order to exempt himself from a sacrifice and

say, ‘I was intentional

in eating the forbidden fat and not inadvertent’? He would then be

exempt

from a sacrifice, even though there are witnesses here that he ate. Therefore, even when he says, ‘I did not eat,’ he should be exempt from a sacrifice [and in the Gemara it will be explained for what reason he is credible].

He ate

an olive-volume of

forbidden fat,

and again ate an olive-volume of

forbidden fat

inadvertently

in one lapse of awareness,

for it did not become known to him between the olive-volumes that he had sinned —

he is liable only

for one sin-offering

one.

But if he ate during two lapses of awareness—that is, it became known to him after eating the first olive-volume that he had sinned, and afterward he forgot that it is forbidden to eat forbidden fat [or that this piece is forbidden fat] and ate a second olive-volume—he is liable for two sin-offerings, because lapses of awareness divide liability for sin-offerings.

He ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul, and notar,

an olive-volume of each,

in one lapse of awareness —

he is liable for each and every one

of the acts of eating, a separate sin-offering. We thus learn that regarding

this

there is

a stringency in

eating

many kinds over one kind!

And

at times we find that there is

a stringency in one kind over many kinds:

For if he ate about half an olive-volume

of a prohibited substance,

and again ate about half an olive-volume in one lapse of awareness,

with no knowledge between them that he had sinned by eating half the measure of a prohibited substance, then if the two halves were

of one kind

of prohibited substance —

he is liable

for a sin-offering, for they combine to make an olive-volume, if he ate them within the measure of the eating of a peras, as will be learned below.

But if they were

of two kinds

of prohibited substance —

he is exempt

from a sin-offering, because two different prohibitions do not combine together to the measure of an olive-volume.

Gemara:

It was taught

in the Mishna:

“They told him, ‘You ate forbidden fat’” —

“He brings a sin-offering!”

And we considered it:

“They told him” —

how many are they,

those who say it? Necessarily, since it is taught in the plural, it implies that

two

they are, the “ones who say.”

And he,

the one about whom they testified that he ate forbidden fat —

what did he say to them?

If you say that he was silent and did not contradict them.

For it is impossible to say so, because if you say so, it should be inferred:

rather,

specifically concerning

the silence before two,

when he is silent while two testify that he ate,

is it that he brings a sin-offering,

but

concerning silence

before the testimony

of one,

when only one testifies that he ate and he is silent—it is proven that he

does not

bring a sin-offering!

And now this is difficult:

let us say from the middle clause

of the Mishna:

For it teaches:

“One witness says, ‘He ate,’ and he says, ‘I did not eat’” —

“Exempt!”

And we infer:

the reason is that he contradicts him

the witness.

But

if he

was silent

and did not contradict him —

he is liable! And all the more so

when he is silent before

two

and is liable. And this is difficult against the first clause, from which we inferred that specifically when he is silent before two he is liable, but when he is silent before one he is exempt?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the first clause is speaking

when he contradicts them,

the two witnesses, and says, “I did not eat,” and nevertheless he is liable;

and whose view is it? —

It is Rabbi Meir’s, who says

in the latter clause that

“contradiction by two

when there are two witnesses

is not a contradiction. But according to the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir and exempt in the latter clause,

he is exempt

here as well.

If so, this is difficult:

what does it teach us

the first clause of the Mishna, when

from the latter clause you learn it

that this is Rabbi Meir’s view!?

And we answer:

this it teaches us

in the latter clause:

this matter

that we stated in the first clause is not according to everyone; rather,

it is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages

.

and it is when he contradicts them.

But if he is silent, everyone agrees that he is liable for a sin-offering, even before one witness, as we inferred from the middle clause.

There are those who say: “They told him”

is speaking of one witness, for

even one is called “they told.”

For we learned: “A woman whose husband went to an overseas country, and they came and said to her, ‘Your husband died,’ and she remarried,”

to another man,

and afterward her husband came —

“She must leave this one and that one,”

for she is forbidden to both of them, as is the law of a woman who committed adultery while married, who is forbidden to her husband and to the man with whom she committed adultery.

For we hold that even with one

who said to her, “Your husband died,” and she married on his word, the law of the Mishna applies, that she must leave this one and that one.

From where? From what the latter clause teaches

of that Mishna:

“She remarried without authorization” —

“She is permitted to return to him,”

her first husband.

And we explain:

What is “without authorization”? Without the authorization of the court!

That is, she did not require the authorization of the court, since the matter was

according to

two

witnesses

who said to her, “Your husband died”; therefore she is considered like one who committed adultery under coercion, who is permitted to her husband [if he is not a koen].

By inference, in the first clause

it is speaking of when she married

with the authorization of the court,

namely

with one witness

alone. Here she is required to receive the authorization of the court, because this permission to marry on the basis of one witness who testifies that the husband died is a special rabbinic enactment to permit a woman to marry on the basis of one witness.

It follows that regarding one witness it teaches, “they told,”

for there in the Mishna it is written, “They told her, ‘Your husband died.’”

And here too, since it teaches, “they told him,” it implies even one witness.

And we return to explain the Mishna:

And he

to whom they said that he ate forbidden fat —

what is it saying?

If you say that he contradicts him

the witness —

does he bring

a sacrifice?

But the middle clause teaches: “One witness says, ‘He ate,’ and he says, ‘I did not eat’; he is exempt!”

Rather,

perhaps you will say

that he was silent.

It is still difficult, for

from the middle clause you learn

that he is liable for a sacrifice.

For it teaches: “One witness says

that he ate forbidden fat, and he says, “I did not eat”; he is exempt. And we infer:

the reason is that he contradicts him, but if he was entirely silent, he is liable?!

We answer:

In fact, he does not contradict him

but is silent.

And this is what it teaches: “They told him, ‘You ate forbidden fat’” —

“He brings a sin-offering.” In what case is this said? When he is silent. But if he contradicts him,

that is, the case in the middle clause —

he is exempt.

And we considered it:

And from Torah law —

from where do we know that one

witness who says to a person, “You ate forbidden fat,” and he

does not contradict him, is liable?

And we answer:

For the Sages taught:

it is written concerning a sin-offering,

“Or it becomes known to him his sin

that he committed.” This implies that it became known to him by himself,

and not that others inform him,

in which case he is not liable for a sin-offering.

One might think that even when he does not contradict them

he too is exempt from a sacrifice?

The verse states: “Or it becomes known to him.”

And since it is not written “it became known to him,” it implies

in any event,

even if he does not know by himself, he is liable, since he did not contradict them [Hafetz Hayim on the Sifra].

With what are we dealing? If you say with two

who inform him—two witnesses—that he ate, this is difficult: is the testimony of

two and he does not

himself

contradict them —

does it require a verse?!

For surely it is obvious that he is liable?!