Horayot 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

It was further taught in a beraita:

And Rabbi and the Sages agree

that

the

anointed priest

does not bring

any

suspended-guilt offering. 1 .

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

From where do we derive this?

And we explain:

As it is written

concerning the suspended-guilt offering: “

And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act in which he acted unwittingly

and he did not know.”

And we interpret: One whose sin was committed through an unwitting act alone is atoned for by a suspended-guilt offering, but not an anointed priest, whose sin also depends upon an unawareness of the matter!

This exposition applies only according to the Sages, who maintain that for every transgression an anointed priest is liable only for an unwitting act together with an unawareness of the matter.

But

Rabbi,

who maintains that in the case of idolatry an anointed priest is liable for an unwitting act alone,

maintained

that this is what they expounded from this verse:

One whose entire sin

—that is, whose liability for every transgression is for a sin-offering—depends

upon an unwitting act

alone is the one who is atoned for by a suspended-guilt offering;

this one is excluded

—the anointed priest—

whose entire sin is not through an unwitting act.

For it is only in the case of idolatry that he is liable for the unwitting act in itself, but for the other mitzvot he is not liable for the unwitting act in itself,

but for an

unwitting act together with

an unawareness of the matter!

And we object:

Is “all

his unwitting act

” written

in the verse, so that we can expound that only one whose entire sin is through an unwitting act alone is liable for a suspended-guilt offering?

And we answer:

Yes!

This verse is indeed written in language from which it may be expounded that only one whose entire sin is through an unwitting act brings a suspended-guilt offering.

For if so,

as you say—that even one whose sacrificial liability depends upon an unawareness of the matter also brings a suspended-guilt offering—

let the verse write:

“And the priest shall atone for him”

“for his unwitting act.”

And

why do I need

the addition that the verse added, stating

“in which he acted unwittingly”?

Rather, this teaches us

through this addition

that it is only when one’s entire sin is through an unwitting act

that the verse speaks of him, and not of an anointed priest, whose entire sin is not through an unwitting act, since for the other mitzvot he is liable only together with an unawareness of the matter.

And

if

the Sages,

who maintain that even in the case of idolatry an anointed priest is liable only for an unawareness of the matter together with an unwitting act, expound this verse according to its straightforward sense, and not from the superfluous words “in which he acted unwittingly,” they expound as follows:

One whose sin is through an unwitting act

alone brings a suspended-guilt offering;

the anointed priest is excluded, for his sin is not through an unwitting act, neither in the case of idolatry nor in the case of the other mitzvot, but through an unawareness of the matter together with an unwitting act.

Mishna:

The court is not liable

to bring an offering

until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. 3 .

But if they issued a ruling concerning a matter for which the liability is a guilt-offering, they are not liable. There are two reasons for this:

First, it is stated with regard to a guilt-offering, “And if it be a single person,” and the court is not considered “a single person.” Second, in the case of guilt-offerings one is liable even for an intentional act; therefore, an unawareness of the matter does not apply to it, and an unawareness of the matter is the condition for the court’s liability.

And likewise the anointed priest

is not liable to bring a bull unless he issued a ruling and sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

However, he is liable to bring a guilt-offering, like any individual who sins, for the anointed priest too is included in the “single person” mentioned with regard to a guilt-offering.

And

likewise,

the court is not

liable to bring a bull and a goat for an erroneous ruling

in the case of idolatry, until they issue a ruling permitting

a matter

concerning a matter

that is one of the laws of idolatry,

whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

Gemara:

From where do we derive

that they are not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: It is stated here

with regard to a court that issued an erroneous ruling, “And the sin-offering of which they sinned became known

for it,”

and it is stated there, in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relationships, “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival, to uncover her nakedness

upon it”—

what is stated there

in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relationships, concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so too here

with regard to a court’s ruling, the verse speaks

of a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

We have found this with regard to the public; from where do we derive it with regard to an anointed priest?

We derive it from the verse, “If the anointed priest sins

to the guilt of the people”—

the anointed priest is like the public. 5 .

A ruler

from where do we derive that he is liable to bring a goat only if he unwittingly performed an act concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

He derives

a gzera shava:

“mitzvot”—

“mitzvot”

from the public.

It is written with regard to a ruler, “And he performs one of all the mitzvot

of the Lord that shall not be performed,”

and it is written with regard to the public, “And they perform one of all the mitzvot

of the Lord that shall not be performed.”

Just as the public

is not liable except for

a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so too a ruler

is not liable until he performs an act unwittingly concerning

a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

And likewise,

an individual

does not bring his sin-offering for his unwitting act unless he sinned unwittingly concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet, as

the verse says, “And if it be a single person,” and he shall derive

the law of the individual, which is written

below, from

the ruler, who is written

above

—before it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Nor in the case of idolatry, until they issue a ruling”

concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. And we raise a difficulty concerning this: It is only with regard to their liability for the other mitzvot that we learned a gzera shava from the passage concerning forbidden sexual relationships, whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. But

in the case of idolatry, from where do we derive

that the court is not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

As the Sages taught: Since idolatry was singled out to be judged on its own

with a bull and a goat, and it has no gzera shava to the passage concerning forbidden sexual relationships,

one might have thought that they would be liable

for their ruling

even for a matter whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation does not entail a sin-offering,

such as one who embraces or kisses an idol, whose liability is not for karet but merely for a negative commandment.

It is stated here,

with regard to a ruling concerning idolatry,

“from the eyes,” and it is stated there

with regard to the other mitzvot,

“from the eyes.” Just as there

they are not liable even in the case of idolatry except for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering,

from where do we derive this with regard to an individual, a ruler, and an anointed priest

—that their sacrificial liability in the case of idolatry applies only to a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

The verse says

with regard to the sin-offering of an individual [Numbers 15],

“And if it be a single person”—

one individual, one ruler, and one anointed priest are all included in “a single person,” and he shall derive the one written below

—the individual, the ruler, and the anointed priest, who are written last—

from the one written above

—the public, which is written first. We thus know that just as the public is not liable for an offering in the case of idolatry unless they sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so too a ruler and an anointed priest are not liable for an offering unless they sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

The Gemara now returns to clarify the basis of the derivation that the court is not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

And it objects:

This works according to the one who derives “upon it” for a gzera shava,

and does not need it for another exposition; it is possible to say

as we said,

that this verse teaches us through a gzera shava that they are not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

But according to the Sages, who derive “upon it”

for another exposition, to teach

the forbidden sexual relationships and their rival wives,

who are exempt from yibbum—namely, to teach that if the wife of one’s brother, who fell before him for yibbum, is forbidden to him as a forbidden sexual relation [in addition to the prohibition of a brother’s wife], she is exempt from yibbum, and likewise the rival wife of this forbidden relation, who was married to his brother, is exempt from yibbum, even though she herself is not a forbidden relation to him—and according to their view it is impossible to derive the law of a court’s ruling through a gzera shava from the passage concerning forbidden sexual relationships. If so,

from where do they derive a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

And we answer:

They derive it from what Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son:

that in the verse stated concerning idolatry,

“There shall be one Torah for you for one who acts unwittingly. But the person who acts defiantly ...” the entire Torah was likened

here

to idolatry. Just as idolatry

mentioned in this passage is a matter

for whose intentional violation one is liable to karet

—as it is stated concerning it, “he shall surely be cut off”—

and for whose unwitting violation one brings a sin-offering, so too here,

with regard to the other mitzvot,

those who are liable

—the individual, the ruler, and the anointed priest—to bring a sin-offering are liable only

for

a matter whose

intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

We have found

a source that

an individual

and

a ruler and an anointed priest

bring their sin-offerings only when they performed an act whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering,

, whether

they sinned

in the case of idolatry or in the case of the other mitzvot,

since in this passage all the mitzvot of an individual were likened to idolatry. But still,

from where do we derive this with regard to the public

—that they are liable for a bull only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

He derives it:

the public, which is written

above,

at the beginning of the passage,

from the one written below,

from the individual written at the end of the passage. And we derive from it that the public too has no sacrificial liability, whether for idolatry or for the other mitzvot, except when the sin carries karet if intentional and a sin-offering if unwitting.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

But Rabbi,

who derived through the gzera shava of “upon it”—“upon it” from forbidden sexual relationships that there is no sacrificial liability except for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering,

what does he do with this teaching of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi

who derived it through a juxtaposition, by which the entire Torah was likened to idolatry

?

And we answer:

He derives from it what was taught in a beraita: Since we find

among the inhabitants of an apostate city who intentionally worshipped idols

that Scripture distinguished between

the law of

the many

who worshipped

and

the law of

individuals

who worshipped: for if

the many

—the majority of the city—worshipped, they are put to death

by the sword, and their property is destroyed,

whereas if only

individuals

—a minority of the city—worshipped, their death is

by stoning, and their property remains,

intact.

One might have thought that we should distinguish

also

between their offerings

when they worshipped unwittingly, and that the many who worshipped should bring an offering unlike the offering of an individual and unlike the communal offering of all Israel.

The verse states: “There shall be one Torah” and so on, teaching us that all those who act without a ruling have the same law. Therefore, even the numerous inhabitants of an apostate city are considered individuals, and each one brings a female goat as a sin-offering.

and so on, to teach us that all those who acted without relying on a ruling have the same status. Therefore, even the many people of a condemned city are considered like individuals, and each one brings a female goat as a sin-offering.

Rav Helkiah from Hagronya challenged this:

It follows that the reason for equating the offering of an individual with that of many is only

that Scripture did not distinguish

between the numerous and the few inhabitants of an apostate city, but included them all together under “one Torah.”

If so,

had we not derived this from “one Torah,” but Scripture had

distinguished

between the many and the few,

we would have said that we should distinguish

between their offerings: If the majority of the city’s inhabitants worshipped idolatry, we would obligate them to bring a special offering, different from the offering of an individual and different from the offering of the community that acted on the instruction of the court. If so, the matter would be difficult from either perspective:

What should they bring?

If we say:

Let them bring a communal bull,

this is not a special offering, since

it is brought for other mitzvot

as well. It is impossible that the offering of the majority of the inhabitants of an apostate city should be equated with the offering of the majority of Israel, for if the majority of Israel worshipped idolatry, they would not become an apostate city; necessarily, their offering is distinct.

and if we say:

Let them bring a bull as an burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering,

this too is not a special offering, since

the community brings it for idolatry.

And if we say:

Let them bring a goat,

then

a ruler

who sinned unintentionally

brings it for other mitzvot.

And if we say:

Let them bring a female goat,

then

is that not also the offering of an individual?!

And we answer: Nevertheless, it

was necessary

to write “one Torah,” because

it might enter your mind to say: The community brings a bull as an burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering,

whereas

these,

the majority of the inhabitants of an apostate city who sinned unintentionally,

should bring the reverse—

a bull as a sin-offering and a goat as an burnt-offering.

Alternatively,

without the derivation from “one Torah,” we would have said that these many individuals would remain in a situation in which they

need

a distinct offering

“but there is no remedy for them” , since it is impossible to distinguish their offering, and they would bring no offering at all. Therefore,

since it is impossible to distinguish in their offering, and they would not bring any offering at all. Therefore,

it teaches us

the derivation from “one Torah”: They must each bring a female goat as a sin-offering, as is the law concerning every individual who unintentionally worshipped idolatry.

We inquire:

Everyone

at least

held that when these verses were written,

“When you err” and “one Torah” [which are stated in the portion of Shelach]

they were written with reference to acting on the instruction concerning idolatry. What is the indication—

from where is it evident that these verses refer to idolatry?

And we answer:

Rava said—and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and some say it was simply stated:

In this portion the verse states,

“And when you err and do not perform all these mitzvot”

and its meaning is that it refers to a mitzva that is considered equivalent to all these mitzvot.

Which mitzva is equivalent to all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idolatry.

For anyone who acknowledges idolatry is considered to have denied the entire Torah.

The school of Rabbi taught: The verse states,

“And when you err and do not perform all these mitzvot

that the Lord spoke to Moses,”

which implies that the Children of Israel heard the speech of the Almighty to Moses.

And it is written

on the other hand,

“that the Lord commanded you through Moses,”

which implies that the Children of Israel did not hear the Lord’s speech with Moses; rather, only commandments were conveyed “through Moses.”

Which mitzva was spoken by the Almighty

that the Children of Israel themselves heard at Mount Sinai,

and He commanded

them concerning it also

through Moses,

without their themselves hearing the command from Moses?

You must say: This is idolatry,

for all Israel heard directly from the Almighty at the revelation at Mount Sinai the first two commandments, “I am” and “You shall have no other gods.”

And this is consistent with

what Rabbi Yishmael taught: “I am” and “You shall have no other gods”—we heard them from the mouth of the Almighty!

In addition, they were commanded concerning this many further times through Moses, such as, “You shall not bow down to another god.”