Horayot 8a — the Talmud in English

It was further said in the beraita:

And they agree,

the Sages and Rabbi,

that the

anointed priest

does not bring

any

conditional guilt-offering. 1 .

And we raise an objection concerning this:

From where do we know it?

And we explain:

For it is written

concerning a conditional guilt-offering: “

And the priest shall make atonement for him for his unwitting act which he committed unwittingly,

and he did not know.”

And we expound: One whose sin was only an unwitting act—that person attains atonement through a conditional guilt-offering, but not an anointed priest, whose sin also depends upon an unawareness of the matter!

This exposition is only according to the Sages, who hold that for every transgression the anointed priest is liable only for an unwitting act together with an unawareness of the matter.

But

Rabbi,

who holds that in the case of idolatry the anointed priest is liable for an unwitting act alone,

held that this is what they expounded from this verse:

that this verse should be interpreted as follows:

One whose entire sin [that is, in every transgression his liability for a sin-offering, depends]

[meaning: in every transgression, his liability for a sin-offering depends]

upon unwittingness

alone—that is the one who attains atonement through a conditional guilt-offering,

to exclude this one [the anointed priest]

[the anointed priest]

whose entire sin is not through unwittingness.

For concerning idolatry alone he is liable for the unwitting act in itself, but concerning the other mitzvot he is not liable for the unwitting act in itself,

but for

an unwitting act together with

an unawareness of the matter!

And we object:

Is “all

his unwittingness

” written in the verse, so that we can expound that only one whose entire sin is through unwittingness alone is liable for a conditional guilt-offering?

in the verse, so that we can interpret it to mean that only one whose entire sin involves an unwitting act alone is liable to bring a suspensive guilt-offering?

And we answer:

Yes! Behold, this verse is written in language from which it can be expounded that only one whose entire sin is through unwittingness brings a conditional guilt-offering.

This verse is written in a form that allows it to be interpreted as teaching that only one whose entire sin involves an unwitting act brings a suspensive guilt-offering.

For if so, according to your words, that even one whose sacrificial liability depends upon an unawareness of the matter also brings a conditional guilt-offering ,

it were as you say—that even one whose liability for his offering depends on the absence of awareness of the law also brings a suspensive guilt-offering—

let it write,

“and the priest shall make atonement for him”

“for his unwittingness.”

And

why do I need

the addition that Scripture added and wrote

“which he committed unwittingly”?

Rather, this teaches us

through this addition,

that only when his entire sin is through unwittingness

does Scripture speak of him, and not of an anointed priest, whose entire sin is not through unwittingness, for concerning the other mitzvot he is liable only in conjunction with an unawareness of the matter.

And

if

the Sages,

who hold that even concerning idolatry the anointed priest is liable only for an unawareness of the matter together with an unwitting act, expound this verse according to its plain meaning, and not from the surplus words “which he committed unwittingly,” and this is what they expounded:

One whose sin is through unwittingness

alone—he brings a conditional guilt-offering,

to exclude an anointed priest, whose sin is not through unwittingness, neither concerning idolatry nor concerning the other mitzvot, but rather through an unawareness of the matter together with an unwitting act.

Mishna:

The court is not liable

to bring an offering,

until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. 3 .

But if they issued a ruling concerning a matter whose liability is a guilt-offering, they are not liable. There are two reasons for this

The first is that it is stated concerning a guilt-offering, “and if one person,” whereas the court is not considered “one person.” The second is that for a guilt-offering one is liable even for an intentional act, and if so, an unawareness of the matter, which is the condition for the court’s liability, is not applicable to it.

And likewise the anointed priest

is not liable to bring a bull unless he issued a ruling and sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

But he is liable to bring a guilt-offering like every individual who sinned, for the anointed priest too is included in the “one person” stated concerning a guilt-offering.

And

likewise,

the court is not

liable to bring a bull and a goat for an erroneous ruling

concerning idolatry, until they issue a ruling

permitting

a matter,

a particular law of idolatry,

whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

Gemara:

From where do we know

that they are not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says: It is stated here

concerning a court that issued an erroneous ruling, “and the sin became known concerning which they sinned

for it,” ,

and it is stated there, in the section of forbidden sexual relations, “and a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival, to uncover her nakedness

for it”—

just as there, in the section of forbidden sexual relations, Scripture speaks of

a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so here

in the ruling of the court, Scripture speaks of

a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

We have found this concerning the public; from where do we know it concerning the anointed priest?

We derive it from the verse, “If the anointed priest sins

to the guilt of the people”—

behold, the anointed priest is like the public. 5 .

The ruler

—from where do we know that he is liable for a goat only if he erred in an act concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

He derives

a verbal analogy,

“commandments”—

“commandments”

from the public.

It is written concerning the ruler, “and he shall perform one of all the commandments

of the Lord that shall not be performed,”

and it is written concerning the public, “and they shall perform one of all the commandments

of the Lord that shall not be performed.”

Just as the public

are liable only for

a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so the ruler

is not liable until he performs through an unwitting act

a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

And likewise,

an individual

does not bring his sin-offering for his unwitting act unless he sinned unwittingly concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet, for

the verse says, “And if a person,” and let him learn

the law of the individual, which is written

below, from

the ruler, who is written

above [before him].

[before him].

We learned in the Mishna:

And not concerning idolatry, until they issue a ruling

concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. And we raise an objection: It is only concerning their liability for the other mitzvot that we learned a verbal analogy from the section of forbidden sexual relations, whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering; but

concerning idolatry, from where do we know

that the court is not liable until it issues a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

For the Sages taught: Since idolatry emerged to be judged separately

by a bull and a goat, and there is no verbal analogy in its case to forbidden sexual relations,

one might have thought that they would be liable

for their ruling concerning it

even for a matter whose intentional violation is not punished by karet and whose unwitting violation does not entail a sin-offering,

such as one who embraces or kisses an idol, whose liability is not karet but merely a negative commandment?

It is stated here

in the ruling concerning idolatry, “

from the eyes,” and it is stated there

concerning the other mitzvot, “

from the eyes.” Just as there, it is a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so here it is a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering. We have found concerning the public that they

are not liable even concerning idolatry except for a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering;

as for an individual, a ruler, and an anointed priest, from where do we know

that their sacrificial liability concerning idolatry is only for a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

The verse says

concerning the sin-offering of an individual [Numbers 15],

“And if one person”—

one individual, one ruler, and one anointed priest—all are included in “one person,” and let the lower one be learned [an individual, a ruler, and an anointed priest, written last]

[the ordinary individual, the king, and the anointed priest, who are written later]

from the upper one [the public, written first]. And we know that just as the public is not liable for an offering concerning idolatry except when they sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering, so too the ruler and the anointed priest are not liable for an offering unless they sinned concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

[the community, which is written first]. We therefore know that just as the community is not liable to bring an offering for idolatry unless it sinned with regard to a matter for which intentional violation is punishable by karet and unwitting violation by a sin-offering, so too the king and the anointed priest are not liable to bring an offering unless they sinned with regard to a matter for which intentional violation is punishable by karet and unwitting violation by a sin-offering.

The Gemara now returns to clarify the basis of the derivation that the court is not liable until it issues a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

And it objects:

This works according to the one who derives “for it” for a verbal analogy,

who does not need it for another exposition; it is possible to say

as we said,

that this verse teaches us through a verbal analogy that they are not liable until they issue a ruling concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

But according to the Sages, who derive “for it”

for another exposition, to teach

concerning forbidden relations and their rival wives,

which are exempt from yibbum—namely, to teach that if his brother’s wife, who fell before him for yibbum, is forbidden to him as a forbidden relation [apart from the prohibition of a brother’s wife], she is exempt from yibbum, and likewise the rival wife of this forbidden relation, who was married to his brother, is exempt from yibbum, even though she herself is not a forbidden relation to him. And according to them, it is impossible to derive through a verbal analogy the ruling of the court from the section of forbidden sexual relations; if so,

from where do they derive a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

And we answer:

They derive it from what Rabbi Joshua ben Levi taught his son,

for in the verse stated concerning idolatry,

“There shall be one law for you for one who acts unwittingly. But the person who acts with a high hand ...” it was likened

here

the entire Torah to idolatry: just as idolatry

mentioned in this section is a matter

for whose intentional violation one is liable to karet [as it is stated concerning it, “shall surely be cut off”]

[as it is stated with regard to it, “he shall surely be cut off”]

and for whose unwitting violation one is liable for a sin-offering, so here

concerning the other mitzvot

for which they are liable [the individual, the ruler, and the anointed priest]

to bring a sin-offering, they are liable only

for

a matter whose

intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering.

We have found

a source that

an individual

and

a ruler and an anointed priest

do not bring their sin-offerings unless they performed a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering

whether

they sinned

concerning idolatry or concerning the other mitzvot,

for all the mitzvot of an individual were likened in this section to idolatry; nevertheless,

from where do we know concerning the public

that it is liable for a bull only for a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering?

It derives,

the public written

above,

at the beginning of the section,

from the lower one,

from the individual written at its end. And it is learned from it that for the public too there is no sacrificial liability, whether for idolatry or for the other mitzvot, except when the sin involves karet when intentional and a sin-offering when unwitting .

And we raise an objection:

As for Rabbi,

who derived through the verbal analogy “for it—for it” from forbidden sexual relations that one is liable for an offering only for a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet and whose unwitting violation entails a sin-offering,

this teaching of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi,

who derived through a juxtaposition, whereby the entire Torah was likened to idolatry,

what does he do with it ?

And we answer:

He derives it for that which was taught in a beraita: Since we find

concerning the inhabitants of an apostate city who worshipped idolatry intentionally

that Scripture distinguished between

the law of

many

who worshipped

and

between the law of

individuals

who worshipped, for if

many [the majority of the city]

worshipped, they are executed

by the sword, and their property is destroyed,

whose punishment is burning, whereas if only

individuals [a minority of the city]

worshipped, their death is

by stoning, and their property is spared,

it remains,

might we also distinguish

also

concerning their offerings

when they worshipped unwittingly, and the many who worshipped should bring an offering that is unlike an individual’s offering and unlike the public offering of all Israel .

The Torah states: “There shall be one Torah”

and so on, to teach us that all those who act without an instruction have one law. Therefore, too, the many people of an apostate city are considered as individuals, and each one of them brings a female goat as a sin-offering.

Rav Helkiah of Hagrunya challenged this:

It follows that the reason for equating the offering of an individual with that of the many is only because

the verse did not distinguish

between the numerous and the few inhabitants of an apostate city, but included them together in “one Torah.”

This—

if we had no teaching from “one Torah,” but the verse

had distinguished

between the many and the few,

we would have said that we should distinguish

between their offerings, and if the majority of the inhabitants of the city worshipped idols, we would obligate them to bring a special offering, different from the offering of an individual and different from the offering of the community that acted on the instruction of the court; and if so, it would be difficult either way:

What shall they bring?

If we say

“Let them bring a communal bull,”

then this is not a special offering, since

it is brought by the community for other commandments; and it is impossible that the offering of the majority of the inhabitants of an apostate city should be equated with the offering of the majority of Israel, for if the majority of Israel worshipped idols, they would not become an apostate city, and necessarily their offering is different .

and it cannot be that the offering of most of the residents of a condemned city should be equated with the offering of most of the Jewish people. For if most of the Jewish people worshipped idols, they would not become a condemned city; necessarily, their offering must be different.

and if we say

“Let them bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering,”

then this, too, is not a special offering, since

the community brings it for idolatry.

And if we say

“Let them bring a goat,”

then

a ruler

who sinned unintentionally

brings it for other commandments.

And if we say

“Let them bring a female goat,”

then

is this not also the offering of an individual?!

And we answer: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

for the verse to write “one Torah,” because

it might enter your mind to say: The community brings a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering,

whereas

these,

the majority of the inhabitants of an apostate city who acted unintentionally,

should bring the reverse—

a bull for a sin-offering and a goat for a burnt-offering.

Alternatively,

were it not for the analogy from “one Torah,” we would say that these many people would remain in a state in which

“it is necessary

to distinguish in the offering

and there is no remedy for it,”

since it is impossible to distinguish in their offering, and they would not bring any offering at all. Therefore,

it teaches us

the analogy from “one Torah”: that each of them must bring a female goat as a sin-offering, according to the law of every individual who worshipped idols unintentionally.

And we inquire about this:

Everyone

at least held

that when these verses were written—

“And if you err” and “one Torah” [which are stated in the portion of Shelach]—

they were written concerning an instruction regarding idolatry. What indicates this—

from where is it proven that these verses speak of idolatry?

And we answer:

Rava said—and some say Rabbi Joshua ben Levi, and some say it was stated without attribution

the name of an amora]: In this portion the verse says,

“And if you err and do not perform all these commandments,”

and its meaning is that it refers to a commandment that is considered like all these commandments—

which commandment is equal to all the commandments? You must say: This is idolatry.

For whoever acknowledges idolatry is as one who denies the entire Torah .

The school of Rabbi taught: The verse says:

“And if you err and do not perform all these commandments

which the Lord spoke to Moses,”

and this implies that the Children of Israel heard the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses,

and it is written

on the other hand,

“which the Lord commanded you through Moses,”

which implies that the Children of Israel did not hear the speech of the Lord with Moses, but only commandments were stated “through Moses.”

Which commandment was in the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He,

which the Children of Israel themselves heard at Mount Sinai,

and He commanded

them also

through Moses,

without their themselves hearing the commandment from the mouth of Moses?

You must say: This is idolatry,

for all Israel heard directly from the Holy One, blessed be He, at the revelation at Mount Sinai, the first two commandments: “I am” and “You shall have no other gods.”

And this is

as Rabbi Ishmael taught: “I am” and “You shall have no other gods”—we heard them from the mouth of the Almighty!

In addition, they were commanded about this many further times through Moses, such as, “You shall not bow down to another god.”