Horayot 7b — the Talmud in English

Rav Pappa said:

Our Mishna is referring to a case

where both were distinguished authorities,

the court and the anointed kohen.

The Mishna is teaching us that even though the court issued a ruling and now brings a bull as an offering for an unwitting error in a matter affecting the community, the anointed kohen does not achieve atonement through that offering, because his ruling concerned a different prohibition, as will be explained below.

But if his ruling concerned the same matter as the ruling issued by the court, then although he issued the ruling independently, he achieves atonement through the communal offering, as we derive from the verse: “for his sin.”

Abaye thought to say

that this rule—that if the anointed kohen ruled that one prohibition was permitted while the court ruled that a different prohibition was permitted, the anointed kohen does not achieve atonement through the communal offering—applies specifically when he

sinned

[the correct reading should be: ruled]

independently and acted independently.

The Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances?

For example,

the anointed kohen and the court were sitting

in

two locations

separate from one another,

and they were issuing rulings concerning two different prohibitions

separate from one another.

But if they were both sitting in one place, the anointed kohen achieves atonement through the communal offering, even though he ruled concerning a different prohibition. Since the court heard what he had ruled and did not protest, he is considered not to have sinned independently. [Explanation of Rabbeinu Hananel]

Rava said to

Abaye:

Does

that mean that

the fact that they were in two locations causes

the anointed kohen to bring an offering independently?

Rather,

it must be that

even if the anointed kohen and the court were sitting

in

one place, since they were issuing rulings concerning two different prohibitions,

the

sin

of the anointed kohen is considered a sin

committed independently!

The Gemara now explains the matter at length:

1.

It is obvious

that if

he,

the anointed kohen,

sinned through forbidden fat, while they

the court mistakenly ruled that the community was permitted

to engage in idolatry,

then certainly

his sin was committed independently.

For forbidden fat and idolatry differ

from one another

in their rationale,

since they are derived from two different verses.

And they also differ

in the

offerings required for them.

He,

who erred concerning forbidden fat, is required to bring

a bull. But they,

who erred concerning idolatry, are required to bring

a bull and a goat.

The difference between them is clear,

for they bring

the court that erred concerning idolatry

a goat

as a sin-offering for the community, in addition to the bull brought as an elevation-offering.

But

if

he,

the anointed kohen,

does not bring

a goat, but only a bull.

2.

And all the more so in

a case where

he

sinned

through idolatry, while they sinned through forbidden fat,

for he is considered to have sinned independently, because in this case the difference between them is even clearer,

as their offerings are completely different. He

brings

a female goat,

as required for an individual’s offering,

while they bring a bull.

Therefore, in both of these cases, it is obvious that the anointed kohen achieves atonement independently.

3.

Rather,

the uncertainty concerns a case in which

he

mistakenly permitted something to himself and sinned

through the fat covering the innards,

while they

mistakenly ruled that it was permitted

to eat the fat on the intestines; what is the law?

The two sides of the uncertainty are as follows:

Can it be said that although their offerings are the same

[since both the anointed kohen, who brings a bull, and the court, whose atonement is through a bull, bring a bull], nevertheless,

since they derive their rulings from two verses,

these prohibitions are learned from two different passages,

they differ in their rationale?

Each side would then be considered to have ruled and sinned independently, and the anointed kohen would not achieve atonement through the people’s offering.

Or perhaps the term “forbidden fat” refers to one category,

and they are considered to have ruled concerning one prohibition, so that the anointed kohen achieves atonement through the people’s offering?

4.

If you reach the conclusion that “the term ‘forbidden fat’ refers to one category,”

and the anointed kohen achieves atonement through the community’s bull, there is still the following uncertainty:

He

himself

ruled that it was permitted

to eat forbidden fat, while they

ruled that it was permitted

to eat blood; what is the law?

Can it be said that they differ in their rationale,

since these are two different categories of prohibition?

Or perhaps, since they are the same

—forbidden fat and blood—

with regard to the offering,

since a bull is brought for both of them, whether by the anointed kohen or by the court,

we follow the offering,

and the kohen is considered to have ruled together with the community, thereby achieving atonement through the communal offering?

And we conclude:

the question remains without a resolution!

We learned in the Mishna:

The court is not liable until it rules that part of the prohibition is to be nullified while part is to be upheld,

and so on.

The Gemara asks:

From where do we know that until it rules that part is to be nullified while part is to be upheld,

the court is not liable?

We explain:

As we said in the other chapter

[above, 4b]: We derive from the verse

“A matter was hidden”—

“a matter,” but not the entire body of the prohibition!

If the entire substance of the prohibition was hidden from them, they are not liable to bring the bull for an unwitting error in a matter affecting the community.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise the anointed kohen

is not liable until he rules that part is to be nullified while part is to be upheld.

From where do we know this?

As it is written:

“If the anointed kohen sins,”

“to the guilt of the people”—the anointed kohen is like the community!

That is, the parameters of his sin are the same as the parameters of the community’s sin resulting from the court’s ruling, and the liability of both depends on a ruling that nullifies only part of the prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna:

And not in the case of idolatry

until the court rules that part is to be nullified while part is to be upheld.

From where do we know this? The Sages taught: Since idolatry

was singled out

to be judged separately,

so that a bull and a goat are required for an erroneous ruling concerning it,

one might have thought that they would be liable

for it even

for uprooting an entire mitzva.

It is stated here

concerning idolatry, “And if it was

hidden from the eyes

of the congregation,”

and it is stated there

concerning the other mitzvot, “And a matter was hidden

from the eyes

of the assembly.” We learn one from the other through a conclusion based on an identical expression:

Just as there,

concerning the other mitzvot, the verse is speaking

of

a ruling issued by

the court,

as it is written, “And a matter was hidden from the eyes of the assembly—and they acted,” meaning that the ruling was hidden from “the eyes of the assembly,” namely, the court, while the assembly committed the sin unknowingly on the basis of that ruling,

so too here,

in the case of idolatry,

also

the matter concerns

a ruling by

the

court.

[The verse concerning idolatry does not itself prove that the matter concerns a ruling by the court, since it says, “And if it was done unknowingly from the eyes of the congregation,” and “done” refers not to the court but to the community. Only through the conclusion based on the identical expression did we learn that the matter concerns a ruling by the court.]

And just as there,

concerning the other mitzvot, we say that what was hidden was

“a matter”—

and not the entire body of the prohibition, so too here,

in the case of idolatry,

also

we say that what was hidden was

“a matter”—

and not the entire body of the prohibition!

Mishna:

The court is liable

for an offering

only for an error concerning a matter

of law on the part of the court

together with an unwitting act

on the part of the community.

And likewise the anointed kohen

is not liable for an unwitting act alone; he is liable only when it was preceded by a ruling that he mistakenly issued for himself. There is a further novelty regarding the anointed kohen: For an unwitting act alone, he does not even bring an individual offering!

And

even

in the case of idolatry, they are not liable

—the court to bring a bull and a goat, or the anointed kohen to bring a bull—

except for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act.

Gemara:

From where do we know

that the court brings the bull for an unwitting error in a matter only when the error in the ruling occurred together with an unwitting act?

For the Sages taught:

“And if the entire congregation of Israel

errs.”

One might have thought that they would be liable

to bring the bull for an unwitting error in a matter

for an unwitting act

alone.

The verse states: “They shall err, and a matter was hidden”

—they are liable only for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act!

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise the anointed kohen.

From where do we know this?

As it is written:

“If the anointed kohen sins,”

“to the guilt of the people”—

the anointed kohen is like the community!

That is, the parameters of his sin are the same as the parameters of the community’s sin resulting from the court’s ruling, and the liability of both depends on an unwitting ruling, namely, an error concerning a matter.

We learned in the Mishna:

And not in the case of idolatry, except for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act.

From where do we know this?

For the Sages taught: Since idolatry was singled out to be judged separately

—to make a bull and a goat mandatory for it—

one might have thought that they would be liable

for it even

for an unwitting act

without an error in the ruling.

It is stated here

concerning idolatry,

“from the eyes,” and it is stated there

concerning the other mitzvot,

“from the eyes.” Just as there they are liable only for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act, so too here they are liable only for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act!

The Gemara analyzes the wording of our Mishna: In the first clause we learned that in the case of the other mitzvot, the court is not liable except for an error concerning a matter together with an unwitting act, and likewise the anointed kohen in the case of the other mitzvot is liable only when a ruling is combined with an unwitting act. By contrast, in the final clause, concerning idolatry, we learned only that the court is liable for a ruling together with an unwitting act,

whereas

the

anointed kohen

is not liable

in the case of idolatry

only for a ruling together with an unwitting act—

it does not state this!

Apparently, it follows that

our Mishna

which holds that an anointed priest is liable for idolatry merely for an unwitting act, without an instruction, must be

whose opinion is it?

It is Rabbi’s!

For it was taught: With regard to an anointed [koen] who committed idolatry—

Rabbi says

even if he sinned

through the inadvertence of the act

alone, he is liable, and even if he did not first issue a ruling permitting it to himself, and there was no unawareness of the matter.

And the Sages say

that the law of the anointed [koen] with regard to idolatry is like his law regarding the other mitzvot, and he is not liable for the inadvertence of the act alone, but

with the unawareness of the matter

together with the inadvertence of the act.

And they agree

the Sages and Rabbi in this, that the offering of the anointed [koen] for idolatry is

with a she-goat. And they agree

also in this

that the

anointed koen

does not bring

any

conditional guilt-offering

[for the reason that will be explained below].

And we reject the proof from the precision of the wording of the Mishna:

And can you understand it?

Does it say below [8a], in the Mishna in whose opening clause we learned that the court is liable only

for

a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose inadvertence entails a sin-offering,

“and likewise the anointed [koen],”

and in the concluding clause we learned that the same law applies to idolatry, that they are liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose inadvertence entails a sin-offering,

does it teach

there “and likewise the anointed [koen,”] that with regard to idolatry he is liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose inadvertence entails a sin-offering [even though this is indeed his law]?

Rather

it is necessarily necessary to say there:

Teach this,

and since in the opening clause of the Mishna we learned that they are liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose inadvertence entails a sin-offering, and likewise the anointed [koen], it is automatically known to us that

the same law applies to this,

that the anointed [koen] has the same law as the community, and also with regard to idolatry he is liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose inadvertence entails a sin-offering.

If so,

here,

in our Mishna

too, he taught

in the opening clause, concerning the other mitzvot,

this,

that the law of the anointed [koen] is like that of the community, and both of them are liable to bring a bull only for the unawareness of the matter together with the inadvertence of the act,

and

it is automatically known to us that

the same law applies to this,

that the anointed [koen] is like the community also with regard to idolatry, and also there they are liable only for the unawareness of the matter together with the inadvertence of the act.

And if so, there is no basis for inferring that our Mishna follows Rabbi from the fact that the Mishna did not repeat that also with regard to idolatry the law of the anointed [koen] differs from the law of the court, because the opening clause relied on the concluding clause. And it is possible that our Mishna follows the Sages, and that even the anointed [koen] is liable for idolatry only for the inadvertence of the act together with the unawareness of the matter.

And we inquire about it:

What is Rabbi’s reason

for distinguishing in the liability of the anointed [koen] for an offering between idolatry and the other mitzvot? For it should be learned by a gzera shava that the anointed [koen] was equated with the community in every respect.

And we answer:

The verse says, with regard to

idolatry: “

And the koen shall atone for the person who errs in his sin through inadvertence.”

And we expound: “

The person”—

this is the anointed [koen].

“Who errs”—

this is the ruler.

“In his sin through inadvertence.”

Rabbi holds

that the intent of the verse is to say:

This sin,

which the anointed [koen] or the ruler committed with regard to idolatry,

through inadvertence

of the act, even without a ruling of the court,

shall be

liable for it.

And the Rabbis hold

that the intent of the verse is to say:

One whose sin-offering

for the other mitzvot is

through inadvertence

alone [that is, an ordinary individual who sinned] shall bring a she-goat for his sin with regard to idolatry;

the anointed [koen] is excluded, for his sin-offering is not

for the other mitzvot

through inadvertence

alone, for with regard to the inadvertence of the act alone the anointed [koen] is exempt, and he is liable

only with the unawareness of the matter

that joins with it. Therefore, if he sinned with regard to idolatry through the inadvertence of the act alone, he is entirely exempt from an offering.

And the Gemara discusses the continuation of the beraita: “

And they agree

the Sages and Rabbi

that

the anointed [koen] who sinned with regard to idolatry has the law of

with a she-goat”—

like an ordinary individual!

From where do we know

this?

For the verse says, “And if one person”—

both an ordinary individual, both a ruler, and both an anointed [koen] are all included within “one person,”

and its liability is made clear in the verse as being a she-goat!