Horayot 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

The beraita asks: Why is it necessary to learn through a comparison that the law of the mashiach is like that of the public?

Is it not logically derived

that the law of the kohen mashiach should require an unwitting ruling and an unwitting act, since

the public is distinguished from the category of an individual [

for the public’s obligation is a bull, whereas an individual’s obligation is a female sheep or goat],

and the mashiach

also

is distinguished from the category of an individual [

for the mashiach’s sacrifice is a bull] .

Just as the public is liable only for an unwitting matter together with an unwitting act, so too the mashiach should be liable only for an unwitting matter together with an unwitting act.

If so, why do I need the comparison? This law can be known through an av binyan, as we explained ?!

And if you argue:

“Or proceed along this path”:

From where do we know that it is preferable to derive the law of the mashiach from the public? Why not derive the mashiach by analogy from the ruler? He too is distinguished from the category of an individual, in that he is liable to bring a male goat as a sin-offering. Thus one could say:

“The ruler is distinguished from the category of an individual, and the mashiach is distinguished from the category of an individual. Just as the ruler brings

his special sin-offering

for an unwitting act

alone,

without an unwitting matter, so too the mashiach brings

his special bull

for an unwitting act, without an unwitting matter!”

This is not a valid argument. For

“See whom the priest resembles,”

the public or the ruler.

The public:

their law

is

a bull

and the public does not

bring

a provisional guilt-offering

for an uncertain sin.

The same law applies to

the Mashiah,

whose law is

that he brings a bull

for a definite sin;

and

likewise

he does not

bring

an uncertain-guilt offering

for a doubtful sin—as will be explained below].

By contrast, a nasi does not bring a bull for a definite sin; yet he does bring an uncertain-guilt offering for a doubtful sin.

Therefore, it would be preferable to derive the law of the Mashiah from that of the community and say:

Just as the community is liable only for forgetting a matter together with an unwitting act, so too the Mashiah should be liable only for forgetting a matter together with an unwitting act!

If so, the question returns: Why was a verse needed for the hekesh, to teach us that a priest anointed for war is liable only for an unwitting act together with an unwitting ruling? After all, the Mashiah resembles the community, and this could be learned from the community by means of a binyan av.

However, it can still be argued:

Or take this path: A nasi brings a female goat

as a sin-offering for a sin that he committed

in the worship of idols, and he brings a definite-guilt offering

such as a guilt offering for robbery or a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, in which the term “person” is stated, thereby including a nasi or a Mashiah.

And the Mashiah

also

brings a female goat for the worship of idols, and brings a definite-guilt offering,

and in this respect he resembles the nasi.

The community, however, does not bring a female goat when it sins in the worship of idols; rather, it brings a bull and a goat. Similarly, the law of a definite-guilt offering does not apply to the community, because the community is not called a “person,” and is therefore excluded from liability for a guilt offering.

If so, with regard to the other mitzvot as well, it would be preferable to derive the law through a case in which we find a comparable rule:

Just as a nasi brings

the offering of a nasi for the other mitzvot, namely, a male goat,

for an unwitting act

without forgetting a matter,

so too the Mashiah brings

the bull designated for him

for an unwitting act

alone, without forgetting a matter!?

Therefore,

the verse states: “

If the anointed priest sins

to the guilt of the people.”

The verse teaches you, through the hekesh of the Mashiah to the community, that

he—the Mashiah—is like the community.

Just as the community does not bring

a bull

except for forgetting a matter together with an unwitting act, so too the Mashiah does not bring

his bull

except for forgetting a matter together with an unwitting act!

And perhaps you will say,

“Let us say,”

that another matter may also be derived from this hekesh:

Just as the community,

if

the court ruled

and

the community acted

after it, in accordance with its ruling,

is liable,

the court must bring a bull for forgetting a matter,

so too the Mashiah, when he ruled and others acted after him in accordance with his ruling, should be liable

to bring a bull,

even though he himself did not act!?

The verse states: “And he shall bring for his sin that he committed”

The verse’s use of the words “that he committed” teaches that only

for what he himself committed

the priest anointed for war

brings

a bull;

and he does not

bring

bring

a bull

for what others committed

on the basis of his ruling.

The Gemara now analyzes the words of the tanna in the beraita:

The Master said,

explaining why the law of the Mashiah should not be derived from that of the nasi, resulting in the Mashiah being liable for an unwitting act alone:

The Mashiah brings a bull, and does not bring an uncertain-guilt offering,

whereas a nasi brings a male goat and also brings an uncertain-guilt offering.

The Gemara asks:

From where do we know that

the priest anointed for war

does not bring an uncertain-guilt offering?

The Gemara explains:

As it is written

with regard to an uncertain-guilt offering: “

And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he committed.”

And we expound:

Anyone whose sin and unwitting act are identical,

meaning that in his case everything depends on an unwitting act alone, is the one who is liable for an uncertain-guilt offering.

This excludes the Mashiah, whose unwitting act and sin are not identical,

for the unwitting act also depends upon forgetting a matter, because

it is written, “to the guilt of the people,”

which establishes a hekesh between the Mashiah and the community, teaching that

the Mashiah is like the community.

Just as the community is liable only for forgetting a matter and an unwitting act, so too the Mashiah is liable only for forgetting a matter and an unwitting act. Therefore, the Mashiah is also excluded from liability for an uncertain-guilt offering, like the community.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the tanna’s words, at the beginning of the derivation in the beraita, be explained as meaning that the priest anointed for war does not have identical unwitting acts and sin because of the hekesh between the priest anointed for war and the community, based on the verse

“to the guilt of the people”?

This argument was made at the beginning of the derivation in the beraita, when the tanna was explaining why this hekesh was necessary. If so,

the tanna could not have said

that this hekesh is the source of the ruling.

For the entire question was how to equate the law of the Mashiah with that of the community without the hekesh, relying only on a binyan av, since the Mashiah resembles the community: He too brings a bull and does not bring an uncertain-guilt offering, like the community. Only in the conclusion, after the tanna rejected the possibility of deriving the law by means of a binyan av, did he turn to deriving it from the hekesh!

Therefore, the Gemara says that the tanna indeed did not derive this law from the hekesh.

Rather,

the essential comparison between the Mashiah and the community concerns only the bringing of a bull, which is not the case with a nasi, who brings a male goat. As for the tanna’s comparison between them also in that both are exempt from an

uncertain-guilt

offering, whereas a nasi is liable,

he mentioned it gratuitously!

He said it without purpose or benefit, since in the initial supposition we have no source for exempting the Mashiah from it.

Mishna:

1.

If

a priest anointed for war issued an erroneous ruling for himself concerning one prohibition,

independently,

while the court issued an erroneous ruling to the community concerning another prohibition,

and

the priest anointed for war acted on the basis of his ruling

independently,

he achieves atonement

through his bull

independently,

and he does not achieve atonement through the bull for forgetting a matter that the community brings on account of the court’s ruling concerning the other prohibition.

But if he

issued the same ruling together with the community

concerning the same matter about which the court issued its ruling,

and acted together with the community,

he does not bring his bull; rather,

he achieves atonement together with the community.

The reason is that he achieves atonement through the community’s offering, despite having an independent obligation to bring a bull for his unwitting act, because the atonement of the Mashiah resembles that of the community in many respects , for example:

the court is not liable

for a bull for forgetting a matter

until it rules to annul part

of the mitzva

and uphold part

of the mitzva; this does not apply when it rules to uproot the entire mitzva.

And likewise the Mashiah,

his law is like that of the community, in that he is liable to bring a bull for his sin only when he ruled for himself to uphold part of the mitzva and annul part of it.

And

likewise,

the court is not

liable to bring a bull as an elevation-offering and a goat as a sin-offering for an unwitting ruling

concerning the worship of idols, until it rules to annul part and uphold part.

Similarly, the priest anointed for war is not liable to bring his offering for the worship of idols—a female goat—until he errs in his ruling by upholding part and annulling part.

It follows that the laws of a priest anointed for war are identical to those of the community in two respects. The later Mishnayot will present additional respects in which they are equated.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

From where are these matters,

stated by the Mishna:

1. If the priest anointed for war issued a ruling concerning a prohibition independently and acted independently, he achieves atonement independently.

2. If the priest anointed for war issued a ruling together with the community and acted together with the community, he achieves atonement with them and does not bring his bull.

The Sages taught: If

the priest anointed for war

issued a ruling together with the community and acted together with the community, one might have thought that he should bring a bull for himself.

It is logically established that he does not bring one for himself:

A nasi is excluded from the category of an individual,

as he brings a male goat as a sin-offering for his unwitting act, rather than a female sheep or female goat;

and

likewise

the Mashiah is excluded from the category of an individual,

as he brings a bull.

Just as with a nasi,

only if he

sinned independently does he bring independently.

But if the nasi

sinned together with the community, he achieves atonement together with the community [because his liability for a male goat is for an unwitting act without a ruling, and therefore, when he sins on the basis of the court’s ruling, he is like an individual who achieves atonement through the community’s atonement].

So too with the Mashiah,

we derive from him

that if he

sinned independently, he brings independently.

And if he

sinned together with the community, he achieves atonement together with the community!

Perhaps you can refute this binyan av and say:

No,

the Mashiah is not comparable to the nasi, and therefore the law of the Mashiah cannot be derived from that of the nasi.

For

if you say with regard to a nasi

that he achieves atonement together with the community, this is because

he likewise achieves atonement together with the community

through the goat brought to atone for their sins

on Yom Kippur.

Can you say the same with regard to the Mashiah, who does not achieve atonement together with the community on Yom Kippur,

but brings a special bull for his atonement on Yom Kippur?

If so, since he does not achieve atonement together with the community on Yom Kippur,

one might have thought that he should bring a bull for himself

for this reason.

The verse therefore states: “For his sin that he committed.”

The verse’s use of the words “that he committed” teaches that the priest anointed for war is obligated to bring his bull only when he sinned because of his own erroneous ruling, and only for that reason—not when he sinned because the court also issued a ruling concerning the matter, in addition to his own ruling.

How so?

1.

If he sinned independently, he brings

a bull

independently.

2.

If he sinned together with the community, he achieves atonement together with the community

through the bull for the community’s forgetting of a matter.