Horayot 6b — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection: Abaye said to him,

“But if it is so,”

since you hold that the priests are considered a “congregation” in their own right, then

let them bring

also the tribe of the priests

a bull

of an unwitting transgression when the people transgressed one of all the commandments stated in the Torah

through a ruling

of the court. For earlier we said that the reason they bring a bull for each tribe is that each tribe is called a “congregation”; and if so, the priests too should bring a bull separately [that is, in addition to the bull brought by the tribe of Levi, even though the priests are included in it, because the priests are called a congregation in their own right].

And if you would say that this is indeed so,

that they indeed also bring a bull separately, there is a difficulty:

the tribes would be more numerous!

It follows that there are more than twelve tribes bringing a bull of an unwitting transgression, namely, thirteen tribes [because the tribe of the priests, as a congregation in its own right, is not included in the count of the twelve tribes], and they bring thirteen bulls. Yet in our Mishna we learned: Rabbi Shimon says, “They bring thirteen bulls, a bull for each tribe, and a bull for the court.” And it is proven that they bring bulls for only twelve tribes and not thirteen tribes. Necessarily, the priests are not called a congregation, and therefore they do not bring a bull separately.

Rather,

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said:

Indeed, the priests are not considered a congregation, and therefore they do not need to bring a bull of an unwitting transgression. And the reason they are not called a “congregation” is that

the tribe of Levi was not called a “congregation,”

as it is written:

“Behold, I will make you fruitful and multiply you, and I will make you a congregation of peoples.

And I will give this land to your offspring after you as an everlasting possession.”

And the Sages learned a principle from this verse:

Anyone who has a possession,

an inheritance in the Land of Israel,

is called a congregation. And anyone

who

does not have a possession,

an inheritance in the land,

is not called a congregation.

But the entire tribe of Levi, including the priests, has no portion or possession in the land. Therefore they were not called a congregation.

And we raise an objection: If the tribe of Levi is not called a congregation,

then they are lacking

the tribe of Levi

from the twelve tribes

for bringing the bulls! For it follows that there are only eleven tribes called a congregation, and they are the ones bringing the bulls.

And how did Rabbi Shimon say in our Mishna that they bring twelve bulls for twelve tribes?

And we answer:

Abaye said:

The tribe of Joseph is considered two tribes, as it is stated concerning it,

“Ephraim and Manasseh shall be to me as Reuben and Simeon.”

Therefore, although the tribe of Levi is not considered a congregation and does not bring a bull, nevertheless there are twelve tribes bringing bulls.

He said:

Rava raised an objection:

But it is written

in this verse that Ephraim and Manasseh “shall be to me as Reuben and Simeon.

They shall be called by the name of their brothers in their inheritance.”

And we derive that only

for inheritance were they equated

to be like two tribes, taking an inheritance in the land as two tribes inherit,

but not for anything else!

And if so, with regard to a bull brought for a ruling, they are considered one tribe and bring only one bull. And again it is proven that the tribe of Levi is called a congregation, for if not, one is lacking from the twelve tribes .

Necessarily, the priests are not considered a “congregation.” And what Rabbi Shimon said—that the priests’ sin-offering on Yom Kippur does not die even if they gained atonement through another one—is because a partners’ sin-offering does not die. And if so, it is impossible to explain the beraita in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And we ask:

A

if

not

were Ephraim and Manasseh equated for anything else, but they are considered one tribe?

But

we find that they were

divided

even

in the standards,

the standards of the wilderness: when they camped in the wilderness, every three tribes camped on one side, and each three tribes had a central standard. And it is stated there: “The standard of the camp of Ephraim, and upon it the tribe of Manasseh.” This proves that they were considered two tribes also in this regard.

And we answer: In the standards they were divided into two tribes because

as their inheritance, so was their encampment.

For in these two matters our father Jacob commanded that Ephraim and Manasseh be two tribes: our father Jacob apportioned the land to them, and he also commanded them how they should camp according to their standards in the wilderness.

In order to apportion honor to the standards [A0092]][It appears that Rashi did not have these words in his version, and this is the version of Rabbeinu Ḥananel. And this is its explanation: Each standard had three princes, whereas if the tribe of Joseph had not been divided in two, one standard would have remained with only two princes, since the tribe of Levi was not counted at all among the tribes, as it is stated: “And the Levites were not counted.” This would be a slight to that standard, that it would have only two princes; therefore, although with regard to other matters Manasseh and Ephraim are considered one tribe, with regard to the standards they divided them into two, for the honor of the standards].

Rashi apparently did not have these words in his text; they are the version of Rabbeinu Ḥananel. This is its meaning: Each banner had three princes. If the tribe of Joseph had not been divided into two, one banner would have had only two princes, since the tribe of Levi was not counted among the tribes, as it is stated: “The Levites were not counted.” It would be disrespectful to that banner for it to have only two princes. Therefore, although in other matters Manasseh and Ephraim are considered one tribe, with regard to the banners they were divided into two, for the honor of the banners].

And we raise another objection:

But

we find that Manasseh and Ephraim were

divided

also

with regard to the princes,

as it is stated: “On the seventh day, the prince for the sons of Ephraim, Elishama son of Ammihud. On the eighth day, the prince for the sons of Manasseh.”

And we answer:

That

was in order

to apportion honor to the princes.

Since they were divided in the standards, and a prince was appointed separately for Manasseh and a prince separately for Ephraim, if one offered and the other did not offer, this would be considered a slight to the tribe whose prince had not offered.

As

it was taught in a beraita: Solomon made seven days of inauguration

for the inauguration of the Temple. And

why did Moses see fit to make twelve days of inauguration

for the inauguration of the Tabernacle? Rather, certainly

in order to apportion honor to the princes,

for each prince offered on one day, and if there had been only seven days, it would have been a slight to the other princes who would not have offered .

And it follows as a conclusion that the priests were not called a congregation. If so, apparently Abaye’s proof returns, from the beraita concerning the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, that Rabbi Shimon holds that a partners’ sin-offering does not die; for even after the priests gained atonement through other bull and goat offerings, Rabbi Shimon said that the first bull and goat that were found should not die.

And we say:

What has become of the matter,

is Abaye correct that this is Rabbi Shimon’s view, because a partners’ sin-offering has the status of a communal sin-offering, which does not die ?

Come and hear

that this is indeed Rabbi Shimon’s view:

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says, We find five sin-offerings that die,

and are not offered. And these are:

A.

The offspring

born from an animal that was designated

for a sin-offering.

B.

And the substitute of a sin-offering,

a non-sacred animal concerning which he said, “This is the substitute of a sin-offering animal,” thereby transferring to it the sanctity of an offering called a “substitute of a sin-offering.”

C.

And a sin-offering

that he designated as an offering,

and its owners died

before they managed to offer it.

D.

And the animal of a

sin-offering

that was lost, and another was designated in its place, and its owners gained atonement through it, and then this one was found.

E.

And a sin-offering whose year passed.

A sin-offering animal must be offered when it is one year old. And if it entered its second year, it may no longer be offered.

All these sin-offerings are not offered; rather, they are taken out to die.

And Rabbi Shimon said concerning this:

And you cannot say

and uphold this law in all five of these cases except with regard to an individual’s sin-offering, and not with regard to a communal sin-offering. For

“the offspring of a sin-offering,”

whose law is that it dies, cannot exist

in a community,

because

a community does not designate a female,

for all communal sin-offerings are a bull or a male goat, which has no offspring.

And

likewise,

you cannot say “the substitute of a sin-offering” with regard to

a

communal

sin-offering, because

there is no

law of

“substitution” with regard to a community.

For the verse concerning substitution, “He shall not exchange it and he shall not substitute it,” is stated in the singular, teaching us that only an individual who substitutes an individual’s offering with a non-sacred animal causes the sanctity of substitution to rest upon the non-sacred animal, but not a community.

And

likewise,

you cannot say “a sin-offering whose owners died” with regard to a community,

whose law is that it dies, because

a community does not die!

And that is to say, even though part of the community died, since part of it remains alive, this sin-offering is offered on their behalf.

But a communal sin-offering

whose owners gained atonement, and

a communal sin-offering

whose year passed, we have not heard

whether they die like an individual’s sin-offering, or not.

It might be

that you say: Their law is that they

die,

like the law of an individual’s sin-offering, and they are not left to graze until they become blemished?

You must say: Let the concealed be learned

the concealed law of a communal sin-offering whose owners gained atonement, and the concealed law of a communal sin-offering whose year passed [for it was not explained whether the law of an individual’s sin-offering applies to a communal sin-offering, and they die, or not]

from

the

explicit

[law concerning the other communal sin-offerings that were not offered]:

What do we find,

as we find

with the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and

a sin-offering

whose owners died,

that only with an individual

are these matters stated, and not with a community,

for such communal sin-offerings cannot exist.

So too,

with regard to a communal sin-offering

whose owners gained atonement, and

a communal sin-offering

whose year passed,

only

with an individual are these matters stated,

that they die,

and not with a community,

for the law of sin-offerings that die does not apply to a communal sin-offering at all.

And we raise an objection:

Can one infer the possible from the impossible!?

The offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and a sin-offering whose owners died cannot exist among communal offerings, and for that reason their law does not apply to a community—not because their law has been excluded from communal offerings. If so, how can we learn from them concerning a sin-offering whose owners gained atonement and a sin-offering whose year passed, that the law of death does not apply to them in a community, when in their case such a situation can exist?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shimon learned in one place.

When Israel were commanded concerning the law of sin-offerings that die, they learned that these laws would apply to them in only one category, either to an individual or to a community. Rabbi Shimon inferred that it does not apply to a community but only to an individual, since it is impossible for all five sin-offerings that die to exist in a community. Necessarily, the entire law of sin-offerings that die was stated with regard to an individual, and not with regard to a community.

And this is his intention in learning the concealed from the explicit: that a sin-offering whose owners gained atonement and a sin-offering whose year passed likewise have the law of death specifically with an individual, and not with a community .

And it is proven from this beraita in accordance with Abaye, who said that according to Rabbi Shimon, a partners’ sin-offering when one of the partners dies does not go to death. For just as Rabbi Shimon inferred that the law of sin-offerings that die was stated only with regard to an individual and not with regard to a community, because we do not find all of them in a community, so one should infer that he holds that the law of the five sin-offerings that die applies only to an individual and not to partners, because we do not find all five among partners. [For partners have no offspring of a sin-offering, since we do not find partners—that is, a court—bringing a female sin-offering, but only a bull or a male goat. And likewise, substitution of a sin-offering does not apply to a court’s sin-offering, since they are partners, and partners do not perform substitution].

And it is proven as Abaye said: according to Rabbi Shimon, a partners’ sin-offering whose one owner died does not go to death!

We have completed the chapter “They issued a ruling, the court.”

Mishna:

If an anointed priest gave a ruling for himself

a mistaken ruling, and was

unwitting

in his ruling,

and performed

an act on the basis of his mistaken ruling for himself, in

unwittingness,

he

brings a bull

for the unwittingness of a matter of the anointed priest. [For example, he ruled that kidney fat is permitted, and ate the fat on the basis of his mistaken ruling] .

And in Minhat Hinukh [120] inclined to make an anointed priest who permitted a forbidden sexual relation liable for each body that transgressed on the basis of his ruling, like an individual whose obligation depends on the division of bodies, whereas a court that ruled for the public is liable for only one bull for all the bodies in which the public transgressed. This is as explained: the court’s obligation depends on the ruling, while the priest’s obligation depends on his sin, except that the sin must have been according to his ruling. [And in the notes on Tosafot it will be explained that the category of the obligation of an anointed priest is like the obligation of the public for a bull for the unwittingness of a matter, and not like the obligation of the court; and so it also implies below, 7a, where they derived by a mah matzinu from the bull for the unwittingness of a matter to the bull of the anointed priest, implying that they do not differ in the essence of the obligation]. But if he was

unwitting

in the ruling,

and performed

an act

intentionally,

for he did not rely at the time of the act on his ruling. Or if he was

intentional

at the time of his ruling, knowing that the act was forbidden, but nevertheless ruled permission for himself, and in the end, at the time of the act, forgot why he had permitted it,

and performed

an act in

unwittingness,

he

is exempt

both from the bull for the unwittingness of a matter and from the female sheep or female goat of an individual, because it is stated concerning a sin-offering, “from the people of the land,” and from this they exclude an anointed priest who sinned through unwittingness of the act alone, who is not liable to a sin-offering!

And the reason for this matter—that an anointed priest is liable only when he acted unwittingly on the basis of his ruling given unwittingly—is because

the ruling of an anointed priest for himself

is like

the ruling of a court for the public,

as it is stated: “If the anointed priest sins—to the guilt of the people!” The anointed priest is like the public. And just as a court brings a bull for the unwittingness of a matter only if it ruled unwittingly and the public acted unwittingly on the basis of its ruling, so too an anointed priest is liable only if he ruled for himself unwittingly and acted unwittingly on the basis of his ruling .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“Unwitting and acted unwittingly, he brings a bull.”

And we raise the difficulty:

“It is obvious,”

for this is complete unwittingness, for which an anointed priest becomes liable to bring a bull for the unwittingness of a matter!?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Here, with what are we dealing? For example, he ruled

in error,

and forgot

afterward

for what reason he ruled

so,

and at the time he acted he said, “I am acting on the basis of my ruling,”

but now I do not remember the reason for the ruling! And there is an innovation in this case:

For it might enter your mind that, since if he had become aware

at the time of the act of the reason for which he had ruled,

perhaps

he would have

retracted,

for he would have recognized his error and refrained from acting; and now that he says that although he does not remember the reason for his ruling, he relies upon it and performs the act, and is not concerned that perhaps, if he now knew the reason for the ruling, he would retract, it could be said that he is

considered intentional and is not liable

for a sacrifice.

It teaches us

that nevertheless he is considered unwitting, because at the time of the act he does not know of his error and performs the act while relying on his earlier ruling .

We learned in the Mishna:

“Intentional and acted unwittingly”

he is exempt. And we ask about it:

“From where are these matters”

that an anointed priest is liable only when he ruled unwittingly and acted unwittingly?

For the Sages taught:

“If the anointed priest sins” —

“to the guilt of the people.”

And they expounded from the comparison of the sin of the anointed priest to the guilt of the people:

Behold,

the law of

the anointed priest

is

like

the law of the

public.

And just as the public that acted according to the ruling of the court does not bring a bull for the unwittingness of a matter unless the court erred in its ruling, so too the anointed priest does not bring a bull unless he was unwitting in his ruling and unwitting in his sin.