Horayot 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection: Abaye said to him:

But if that is so,

since you hold that the priests are considered a “community” in their own right, then

let them bring

the tribe of priests as well

a bull

for an unwitting communal sin-offering when the community transgressed one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah

through an erroneous ruling

of the court. For earlier we said that the reason a bull is brought for each tribe is that each tribe is called a “community.” If so, a bull should also be brought for the priests separately—meaning, in addition to the bull brought by the tribe of Levi, even though the priests are included in it, because the priests are called a community in their own right.

And if you would say that this is indeed so,

that the priests also bring a bull separately, this is difficult:

That would make more tribes!

It would follow that there are more than twelve tribes bringing a bull for an unwitting communal sin-offering—namely, thirteen tribes, since the tribe of priests, as a community in its own right, is not included in the count of the twelve tribes—and they would bring thirteen bulls. Yet in our Mishna we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: “They bring thirteen bulls: a bull for each tribe, and a bull for the court.” It is thus evident that bulls are brought for only twelve tribes, not thirteen. Necessarily, then, the priests are not called a community and therefore do not bring a bull separately.

Rather,

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said:

Indeed, the priests are not considered a community and therefore do not need to bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin-offering. The reason they are not called a “community” is that

the tribe of Levi was not called a “community,”

as it is written:

“Behold, I will make you fruitful and multiply you, and I will make you a community of peoples.

And I will give this land to your offspring after you as an everlasting possession.”

And the Sages derived a general principle from this verse:

Anyone who has a territorial possession,

an inheritance in the Land of Israel,

is called a community. And anyone

who

who has no territorial possession,

an inheritance in the Land,

is not called a community.

Now the entire tribe of Levi, including the priests, has no portion or territorial possession in the Land. Therefore, they were not called a community.

And we raise an objection: If the tribe of Levi is not called a community,

then the tribe of Levi is lacking

from

the twelve tribes

for the bringing of the bulls! For it follows that there are only eleven tribes called communities, and they are the ones who bring the bulls.

How, then, could Rabbi Shimon say in our Mishna that twelve bulls are brought for the twelve tribes?

And we answer:

Abaye said:

The tribe of Joseph is considered two tribes, as it is stated concerning it:

“Ephraim and Manasseh shall be mine as Reuben and Simeon.”

Therefore, although the tribe of Levi is not considered a community and does not bring a bull, there are nevertheless twelve tribes that bring bulls.

He said,

Rava challenged:

But it is written

in this verse that Ephraim and Manasseh “shall be mine as Reuben and Simeon.

They shall be called by the name of their brothers in their inheritance.”

And we derive that only

with regard to inheritance were they equated

to be like two tribes, taking portions in the inheritance of the Land as two tribes inherit,

but not with regard to anything else!

If so, with regard to a bull brought for an erroneous ruling, they are considered one tribe and bring only one bull. Once again it is proven that the tribe of Levi is called a community, for otherwise one of the twelve tribes would be missing.

Necessarily, then, the priests are not considered a “community.” And when Rabbi Shimon said that the priests’ sin-offering on Yom Kippur does not die even if they attained atonement through another offering, this is because a partners’ sin-offering does not die. If so, it is impossible to explain the beraita in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

And we ask:

A

re

not

Ephraim and Manasseh equated with regard to anything else, but considered one tribe?

But

we find that they

were divided

even

with regard to the standards,

the standards in the wilderness: when they encamped in the wilderness, every three tribes encamped on one side, and each group of three tribes had a central standard. It is stated there: “The standard of the camp of Ephraim, with the tribe of Manasseh.” This proves that they were considered two tribes in this regard as well.

And we answer: With regard to the standards they were divided into two tribes because

as is their inheritance, so is their encampment.

Jacob our forefather commanded these two matters, in which Ephraim and Manasseh would be like two tribes. For Jacob apportioned the Land to them and also instructed them how to encamp under their standards in the wilderness.

In order to accord honor to the standards Rashi apparently did not have these words in his version; this is the version of Rabbeinu Ḥananel. Its explanation is as follows: Each standard had three princes. If the tribe of Joseph had not been divided into two, one standard would have remained with only two princes, since the tribe of Levi was not counted among the tribes, as it is stated: “And the Levites were not counted.” It would be disrespectful to that standard for it to have only two princes. Therefore, although with regard to other matters Manasseh and Ephraim are considered one tribe, with regard to the standards they were divided into two, for the honor of the standards.

Rashi apparently did not have these words in his text; they are the version of Rabbeinu Ḥananel. This is its meaning: Each banner had three princes. If the tribe of Joseph had not been divided into two, one banner would have had only two princes, since the tribe of Levi was not counted among the tribes, as it is stated: “The Levites were not counted.” It would be disrespectful to that banner for it to have only two princes. Therefore, although in other matters Manasseh and Ephraim are considered one tribe, with regard to the banners they were divided into two, for the honor of the banners].

And we raise another objection:

But

we find that Manasseh and Ephraim were

divided

also

with regard to the princes,

as it is stated: “On the seventh day, the prince of the children of Ephraim, Elishama son of Ammihud. On the eighth day, the prince of the children of Manasseh.”

And we answer:

That

was in order

to accord honor to the princes.

Since they were divided with regard to the standards, and a separate prince was appointed for Manasseh and a separate prince for Ephraim, if one offered and the other did not offer, this would be considered disrespectful to the tribe whose prince had not offered.

As

it was taught in a beraita: Solomon made seven days of dedication

for the dedication of the Temple.

And why did Moses make twelve days of dedication

for the dedication of the Tabernacle? Rather, certainly it was

in order to accord honor to the princes,

for each prince offered on one day, and had there been only seven days, it would have been disrespectful to the other princes who would not have offered.

The conclusion is that the priests were not called a community. If so, Abaye’s proof from the beraita concerning the bull and goat of Yom Kippur apparently returns: Rabbi Shimon holds that a partners’ sin-offering does not die, for even after the priests attained atonement through other bull and goat offerings, Rabbi Shimon said that the original bull and goat that were found do not die.

And we say:

What was concluded,

is Abaye correct that this is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, because a partners’ sin-offering has the status of a communal sin-offering, which does not die?

Come and hear

that this is indeed Rabbi Shimon’s opinion:

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: We find five sin-offerings that die,

and they are not sacrificed. These are:

A.

The offspring

born from an animal designated

as a sin-offering.

B.

The substitute of a sin-offering,

an unconsecrated animal concerning which one said: “This is the substitute for the sin-offering animal,” thereby imparting to it the sanctity of a sacrifice called “the substitute of a sin-offering.”

C.

A sin-offering

designated as an offering,

whose owners died

before they managed to sacrifice it.

D.

The animal of a

sin-offering

that was lost, and another was designated in its place, and its owners attained atonement through the latter, after which the first was found.

E.

A sin-offering whose year has passed.

A sin-offering animal must be sacrificed when it is one year old. If it enters its second year, it may no longer be sacrificed.

All these sin-offerings are not sacrificed; rather, they are sent to die.

Rabbi Shimon said concerning this:

And you cannot say

and apply this law in all five of these cases except with regard to an individual’s sin-offering, but not with regard to a communal sin-offering. For

“the offspring of a sin-offering,”

whose law is to die, cannot exist

with regard to a community,

because

a community does not designate a female animal,

since all communal sin-offerings are a male bull or goat, which has no offspring.

And

likewise,

you cannot say “the substitute of a sin-offering” with regard to

a

communal

sin-offering, because

the

law of

“substitution” does not apply to a community.

For the verse concerning substitution, “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it,” is stated in the singular, teaching that only an individual who substituted an individual’s offering with an unconsecrated animal causes the sanctity of substitution to rest upon the unconsecrated animal, but not a community.

And

likewise,

you cannot say “a sin-offering whose owners died” with regard to a community,

whose law is to die, because

a community does not die!

That is, even if part of the community died, since some of its members remain alive, this sin-offering is sacrificed on their behalf.

But with regard to a communal sin-offering

whose owners attained atonement, and

a communal sin-offering

whose year has passed, we have not heard

whether they die like an individual’s sin-offering or not.

It could

be that you might say that their law is that they

die,

like an individual’s sin-offering, and are not left to graze until they develop a disqualifying defect.

You must say: Let the ambiguous be derived

—the unresolved law of a communal sin-offering whose owners attained atonement and the unresolved law of a communal sin-offering whose year has passed [as it has not been explained whether communal sin-offerings follow the law of an individual’s sin-offering and die or not]—

from

the

explicit

law [concerning the other communal sin-offerings that were not sacrificed]:

What do we find,

as we find

with the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and

a

sin-offering whose owners died,

that the matter is stated only

with regard to an individual, and not with regard to a community,

since such communal sin-offerings cannot exist.

So too,

with regard to a communal sin-offering

whose owners attained atonement, and

a communal sin-offering

whose year has passed,

the matter is stated only

with regard to an individual,

so that they die,

and not with regard to a community,

for the law of sin-offerings that die does not apply to a communal sin-offering at all.

And we raise an objection:

Can one derive what is possible from what is impossible!?

The offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, and a sin-offering whose owners died cannot exist among communal offerings, and therefore their law does not apply to the community—not because their law was excluded from communal offerings. If so, how can we derive from them that the law of death does not apply to a communal sin-offering whose owners attained atonement or whose year has passed, when such cases can in fact exist with communal offerings?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shimon learned it in a single place.

When Israel was commanded concerning the law of sin-offerings that die, they learned that these laws would apply in only one context, either to an individual or to a community. Rabbi Shimon inferred that they apply to an individual and not to a community, since it is impossible for all five sin-offerings that die to exist in the context of a community. Necessarily, then, the entire law of sin-offerings that die was stated with regard to an individual and not with regard to a community.

This is the intent of his derivation of the ambiguous from the explicit: that a sin-offering whose owners attained atonement and a sin-offering whose year has passed likewise have the law of death specifically with regard to an individual, and not with regard to a community.

This beraita proves Abaye’s position: according to Rabbi Shimon, a partners’ sin-offering, when one of the partners dies, does not go to die. Just as Rabbi Shimon inferred that the law of sin-offerings that die applies only to an individual and not to a community, because we do not find all of them among communal offerings, so too one should infer that he holds that the law of the five sin-offerings that die applies only to an individual and not to partners, because we do not find all five among partners. [For partners—namely, a court—do not bring a female sin-offering; we find them bringing only a bull or a goat. Likewise, the law of substitution does not apply to a court’s sin-offering, because they are partners, and partners cannot effect substitution.]

This proves what Abaye said: according to Rabbi Shimon, a partners’ sin-offering whose one owner died does not go to die!

We have completed Chapter “They Issued an Erroneous Ruling,”

Mishna:

If a kohen mashiach issued a ruling for himself

in error, and he was

unwitting

in his ruling,

and he performed

an act on the basis of his mistaken ruling for himself,

unwittingly,

he

brings a bull

for the unwitting matter of the kohen mashiach. [For example, he ruled that the fat of the kidneys is permitted, and he ate the fat on the basis of his mistaken ruling] .

But if he was

unwitting

in his ruling,

and he performed

an act

intentionally,

without relying at the time of the act on his ruling. Or if he was

intentional

at the time of issuing his ruling—he knew that the act was forbidden, but nevertheless ruled that it was permitted for himself—and ultimately, at the time of the act, forgot why he had permitted it,

and he performed

an act

unwittingly,

he

is exempt

both from the bull for the unwitting matter and from the female sheep or goat of an individual, because it is stated concerning the sin-offering, “from among the people,” and the Sages exclude from this a kohen mashiach who sinned with an unwitting act alone, who is not liable to bring a sin-offering!

The reason that a kohen mashiach is liable only when he acted unwittingly on the basis of his unwitting ruling is

that the ruling of a kohen mashiach for himself

is like

a court’s ruling for the public,

as it is stated: “If the kohen mashiach sins, to the guilt of the people.” The mashiach is like the public. Just as a court brings a bull for the unwitting matter only if it ruled unwittingly and the public acted unwittingly on the basis of its ruling, so too a kohen mashiach is liable only if he ruled for himself unwittingly and acted unwittingly on the basis of his ruling .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“Unwittingly, and he acted unwittingly, he brings a bull.”

And we ask:

“Is it obvious,

for this is a completely unwitting case, for which a kohen mashiach is liable to bring a bull for the unwitting matter”?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a case in which he ruled

in error,

and forgot

afterward

for what reason he had ruled

thus,

and at the time he acted he said, “I am acting on the basis of my ruling,”

but now I do not remember the reason for the ruling. There is a novelty in this case:

Lest you say, since if he were informed

at the time of the act of the reason for which he had ruled,

perhaps

he would have

retracted,

for he would have realized his error and refrained from acting—and now that he says that although he does not remember the reason for his ruling, he relies upon it and performs the act, without concern that, had he known the reason for the ruling now, he might have retracted—one might have said that he is

considered intentional and is not liable

to bring a sacrifice.

It teaches us

that nevertheless he is considered unwitting, because at the time of the act he is unaware of his error and performs the act while relying on his earlier ruling .

We learned in the Mishna:

“He ruled intentionally and acted unwittingly,”

he is exempt. And we inquire:

“From where are these matters derived,”

that a kohen mashiach is liable only when he ruled unwittingly and acted unwittingly?

As the Sages taught:

“If the kohen mashiach sins” –

“to the guilt of the people.”

And they derive from the comparison between the sin of the mashiach and the guilt of the people

that

the law of the

mashiach

is

like

the law of the

public. Just as a public that acted in accordance with the ruling of a court does not bring a bull for the unwitting matter unless the court erred in its ruling, so too a kohen mashiach does not bring a bull unless he was unwitting in his ruling and unwitting in his sin.

Just as a public that acted according to a court’s ruling does not bring the bull for the matter not known unless the court was unaware when it issued its ruling, so too an anointed koen does not bring the bull unless he was unaware when he issued his ruling and unaware when he committed his sin.