Horayot 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is stated: “And when you unwittingly fail to observe all these mitzvot,

from the day that the Lord commanded

and onward throughout your generations,”

and its meaning is: If you unwittingly fail to observe the first mitzva that the Lord commanded you through Moses, which preceded all the mitzvot that were stated from that point onward

—

Which mitzva was stated at the beginning 1 ,

in the Ten Commandments?

You must say that this is the prohibition against idolatry,

which was stated at the beginning of the Ten Commandments: “I am” and “You shall have no other gods,” that is, idolatry!

And we raise an objection:

But the Master said: Israel were commanded ten mitzvot at Marah!

That is, before the giving of the Torah; it follows that idolatry was not the first mitzva

Rather, it is clear as we answered initially,

that the necessity of interpreting these verses as referring to idolatry is as explained above, either by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi or by Rabbi, and not according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael.

Mishna:

A court is not liable

if it erred in its ruling

for a positive or a negative mitzva concerning the Temple,

that is, if it mistakenly ruled concerning matters of ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, it is not liable to bring a bull for an unwitting communal transgression.

This is because the offering required for unwittingly causing ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods is an ascending-and-descending sin offering [so called because a wealthy person brings a female sheep or goat, whereas a poor person brings a bird, and the poorest person brings a meal offering], and a court is liable to bring a bull only if it ruled concerning a matter whose unwitting violation requires a fixed sin offering . [The “positive and negative mitzvot” mentioned here are the positive mitzva “They shall send out from the camp every leper,” which prohibits an impure person from entering the Temple, and they permitted him to enter . The negative mitzva is “They shall not defile their camps,” which is stated concerning one who became impure in the Temple: He must leave by the shortest route and not by a longer route, and they permitted him to leave by the shortest route.

And

likewise

they do not bring,

each individual,

a provisional guilt offering

when there is uncertainty whether they violated

a positive or a negative mitzva concerning the Temple.

This is because the obligation to bring a provisional guilt offering applies in a case of uncertainty, and it is brought only in a case where, for a definite transgression, one would be liable to bring a fixed sin offering, whereas for ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, for a definite transgression one is liable only to an ascending-and-descending offering. [A court and an anointed priest do not bring a provisional guilt offering even in a case where they would certainly be liable to a fixed sin offering!]

But they are liable

—a court for its ruling, and an anointed priest who sinned through an unwitting act—

for a positive or a negative mitzva concerning a menstruating woman, and they bring

individuals who are uncertain whether they sinned

a provisional guilt offering for a positive or a negative mitzva concerning a menstruating woman,

because an unwitting violation of it requires a fixed sin offering.

What is the positive mitzva concerning a menstruating woman

for which a court is liable if it erred in its ruling?

Separate from a menstruating woman.

One is obligated to separate from a ritually pure woman when the time of her expected period is near, lest she become impure during intercourse [and this was derived from the verse “And you shall warn the children of Israel”].

They ruled that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with one’s wife when the time of her expected period is near, and when he engaged in intercourse with her, she began menstruating. At that point, he is prohibited from withdrawing, because he derives pleasure from withdrawal just as he did from penetration; they permitted him to withdraw, and it follows that there is liability for karet for an intentional violation resulting from their having permitted this positive mitzva .

And the negative mitzva is:

Do not engage in intercourse with a menstruating woman !

Gemara:

And we inquire:

From where are these matters derived—that the community

that acted on the basis of a court’s ruling

is not generally liable for an offering,

whether when it certainly sinned or when it sinned in a case of uncertainty , but only when it sinned concerning a matter for which, ordinarily, one is liable to bring a fixed sin offering? And from where do we know that

an individual is likewise not liable for a provisional guilt offering,

unless he sinned concerning a matter for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin offering? [

This is Rashi’s reading.]

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: Here, “and he bears guilt” is stated concerning

a fixed sin offering of an individual

and a provisional guilt offering, and “and they shall bear guilt” is stated concerning the community.

And we derive the sin offering of the community from the sin offering of an individual:

Just as “and he bears guilt,”

which is stated

concerning an individual,

refers

to a fixed sin offering, so too “and they shall bear guilt,”

which is stated

concerning the community,

refers to a fixed sin offering

!

Now we derive the law of an individual’s provisional guilt offering from the law of the community’s sin offering:

Just as the community

is liable only when its ruling concerned

a fixed sin offering, so too a provisional guilt offering does not

come

except for uncertainty concerning a fixed sin offering!

For we derive “and he bears guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering, from “and they shall bear guilt,” written concerning the community .

They said: If so,

since we derive from “and he bears guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering, why did you not say the opposite—that a provisional guilt offering is brought even where one is not liable to bring a fixed sin offering? For concerning

an ascending-and-descending offering, too, is it not written

in it the expression “guilt,”

“And it shall be when he bears guilt for one of these matters,”

referring to each of the three “guilt” cases described in the passage concerning an ascending-and-descending offering [in Leviticus]: an oath concerning testimony, ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, and an oath of utterance, for which one is liable to bring an ascending-and-descending sin offering

?

We answer:

We derive

“guilt”

stated concerning a provisional guilt offering

from

the word

“their guilt”

stated concerning the community.

But we do not derive “guilt”

stated concerning a provisional guilt offering

from “he bears guilt,”

stated concerning an ascending-and-descending offering. [

But the words “guilt” and “their guilt” resemble one another, and it makes no difference that “their guilt” is written, since it is as though “his guilt” were written. However, “he bears guilt” does not include the word “guilt.”]

And we challenge this:

What difference does it make

whether “guilt” or “he bears guilt” is written? After all, a gzera shava may be derived even when the words are not exactly identical, but only similar in meaning

.

For the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

Regarding what is written concerning the afflictions of houses,

“And the koen shall return” and “And the koen shall come,”

this return is the same as that coming.

The meaning is not that the koen returns to his home; rather, he returns to the afflicted house. We derive “return” by means of a gzera shava from “come,” despite the fact that the words are not identical, but only similar in meaning

Furthermore,

there is another way to refute this:

Let us derive “

“guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering ,

from “and he bears guilt,”

stated

concerning ritual impurity of the Temple and its sacrificial foods, as it is written

there:

“And he is impure and bears guilt,”

for which one is liable to bring an ascending-and-descending offering. From this we should derive that a provisional guilt offering is brought even where the sin offering required is not a fixed one

! And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: We derive “and he incurs guilt” and “the mitzvot of the Lord”

that are stated with regard to the provisional guilt-offering,

from “and he incurs guilt”

and “the mitzvot of the Lord”

that are stated with regard to the community. But we do not derive this by means of a gzera shava from the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, since “the mitzvot of the Lord” is not written there, but only “guilt.”

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: Let us derive “and he incurs guilt” and “bearing iniquity”

that are stated with regard to the provisional guilt-offering,

from “and he incurs guilt” and “bearing iniquity”

that are stated with regard to the sliding-scale offering; and let the communal offering not serve as proof, since “bearing iniquity” is not written there, but only “guilt”!?

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We derive “and he incurs guilt” and “the mitzvot of the Lord that one shall not perform”

that are stated with regard to the provisional guilt-offering,

from “and he incurs guilt” and “the mitzvot of the Lord that one shall not perform”

that are stated with regard to the community.

And let them not serve as proof

that is, to exclude

hearing a voice, utterance of the lips, and the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, in which “and he incurs guilt” and “the mitzvot of the Lord that one shall not perform” are not stated.

Mishna:

a.

The court is not obligated to bring a bull-offering for unwitting communal error unless their ruling concerned a matter for which an individual who transgresses is liable to a fixed sin-offering, but not a matter for which an individual who transgresses is liable to a sliding-scale offering.

Therefore,

they are not liable for

their ruling concerning

hearing a voice,

namely, the passage concerning witnesses under oath who do not know the testimony,

and for

an oath of

utterance of the lips, and for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects,

since an individual who sins in any of these matters brings a sliding-scale offering.

b.

And the ruler—

is likewise,

exempt from bringing an offering for a matter for which an individual brings a sliding-scale offering;

these are the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

13. Rabbi Akiva says: The ruler is liable in all of them, except for hearing a voice,

since a ruler is not liable for it at all, because

the king neither judges nor is he judged, neither testifies nor is testimony given against him, and

anyone who is not included in the passage concerning testimony is not liable for the offering brought for an oath of testimony.

Gemara:

Ulla said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who exempted a ruler with regard to a matter for which an individual is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering?

The verse states: “And it shall be, when he incurs guilt in one of these,”

one of the three sins enumerated in the passage concerning the sliding-scale offering [which are hearing a voice, an oath of utterance, and the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects]. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili understands the verse as saying:

Anyone who is liable for

each

one

and every one

is liable for all of them. But one who is not liable for one

of these—for example, a ruler, who is not liable for an oath of testimony because he does not testify—

is not liable for all of them.

And we challenge this:

But perhaps

“when he incurs guilt in one of these” should be understood as follows: It is possible that he will be

liable for one of them, even though he is not liable for all of them!

And we answer:

Rather, the reason of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is derived from here: