Horayot 8b — the Talmud in English

The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught:

It is stated: “And if you err and do not perform all these mitzvot,

from the day that the Lord commanded

and onward, for your generations,”

and its meaning is: if you err and do not perform the first mitzva that the Lord commanded you through Moses, which preceded all the mitzvot that were stated from then onward!

And

which is the mitzva that was stated at the beginning 1 ,

in the Ten Commandments? —

You must say: this is idol worship,

which was stated at the beginning of the Ten Commandments, “I am” and “You shall have no other gods,” that is, idol worship!

And we raise an objection:

But the Master said: Israel were commanded ten mitzvot at Marah!

That is, before the giving of the Torah, and it follows that idol worship is not the first mitzva!?

Rather, it is clear as we answered initially,

that the necessity to say that these verses refer to idol worship is as Rabbi Joshua ben Levi or Rabbi explained above, and not as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael.

Mishna:

A court is not obligated

if it erred in its ruling

for a positive commandment or for a prohibition concerning the Temple,

that is, if they mistakenly ruled concerning matters of the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things, they are not obligated to bring a bull for an unrecognized matter.

Because the obligation for the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things when committed inadvertently is a sliding-scale sin offering [so called because the wealthy person brings a female sheep or female goat, whereas the poor person brings a bird, and the poorest brings a meal offering], and a court is obligated to bring a bull only if it ruled concerning a matter whose inadvertent violation obligates a fixed sin offering . [The “positive commandment and prohibition” mentioned here are the positive commandment “They shall send out from the camp every leper,” which was stated to prohibit an impure person from entering the Temple, and they permitted him to enter . The prohibition is “They shall not defile their camps,” which was stated concerning one who became impure in the Temple, that he should leave by the shorter route and not by the longer route, and they permitted him to leave by the shorter route.

And

likewise

they do not bring,

each individual,

a provisional guilt offering

when there is uncertainty whether they violated

a positive commandment or a prohibition concerning the Temple.

Since the obligation of a provisional guilt offering is for uncertainty, and it comes only in a case where for a definite sin one is obligated to bring a fixed sin offering, whereas for the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things, for a definite violation one is obligated only to bring a sliding-scale offering. [And a court and an anointed koen do not bring a provisional guilt offering even in a case where, certainly, one is obligated to bring a fixed sin offering!]

But they are obligated

a court through its ruling, and an anointed koen who sinned through an error in action,

for a positive commandment and a prohibition concerning menstruation, and they bring

the individuals who are uncertain whether they sinned

a provisional guilt offering for a positive commandment and a prohibition concerning menstruation,

since an inadvertent violation of it obligates a fixed sin offering.

What is the positive commandment concerning menstruation

for which a court is obligated if it erred in its ruling? —

Separate from a menstruant.

For they are obligated to separate from a pure woman near the time of her expected menstrual period, lest she become impure during intercourse [and they derived this from the verse, “And you shall warn the children of Israel”].

And they ruled that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with his wife near her expected menstrual period; and when he engaged in intercourse with her, she began menstruating. At that point it is forbidden for him to separate, because he derives pleasure through his withdrawal as through his entry, and they permitted him to withdraw. It follows that there is karet for the intentional violation resulting from their permitting this positive commandment .

And the prohibition —

do not engage in intercourse with a menstruant !

Gemara:

And we inquire into it:

From where are these words, that the community

which acted on the ruling of the court

is generally not obligated for a sacrifice,

whether they certainly sinned or whether they sinned in a case of uncertainty , but only if they sinned concerning a matter for which, generally, one is obligated to bring a fixed sin offering? And from where do we know that

an individual is likewise not obligated for a provisional guilt offering

unless he sinned concerning a matter for which one is obligated to bring a fixed sin offering?

This is how Rashi reads it:

Rav Isaac bar Avdimi said: Here, in the fixed sin offering

of an individual, it is stated “and he shall bear guilt,”

and in a provisional guilt offering, and “and they shall bear guilt” is stated concerning the community.

And we derive the sin offering of the community from the sin offering of the individual:

Just as “and he shall bear guilt,”

which is stated

concerning an individual,

deals

with a fixed sin offering, so too “and they shall bear guilt,”

which is stated

concerning the community, —

deals with a fixed sin offering

!

And now we derive the law of an individual’s provisional guilt offering from the law of the community’s sin offering:

And just as the community

is not obligated unless its ruling was

with regard to a fixed sin offering, so too a provisional guilt offering does not

come

come except for uncertainty concerning a fixed sin offering!

For we derive “and he shall bear guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering, from “and they shall bear guilt,” written concerning the community.

They said: If so,

that we derive from “and he shall bear guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering, why did you not say the opposite: that a provisional guilt offering comes even in a place where one is not obligated to bring a fixed sin offering? For regarding

a sliding-scale offering too, is it not written

in it the expression “guilt,”

“And it shall be, when he incurs guilt for one of these”?

And the verse refers to each of the three “guilt” cases explained in the portion of the sliding-scale offering [in Leviticus]: the oath of testimony, the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things, and the oath of utterance, for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale sin offering!?

And we answer:

One derives

a gzera shava from words that resemble one another, such as

“guilt”

stated concerning a provisional guilt offering,

from

the word

“their guilt”

stated concerning the community.

But one does not derive “guilt”

stated concerning a provisional guilt offering,

from “he incurs guilt”

stated concerning a sliding-scale offering.

But the words “guilt” and “their guilt” resemble one another, and we do not care that “their guilt” is written, since it is as though “his guilt” were written. But “he incurs guilt” does not include the word “guilt.”

And we challenge this:

And what practical difference is there

whether “guilt” or “he incurs guilt” is written? Surely one may derive a gzera shava even when the words do not correspond precisely, but only resemble one another in their meaning.

For

the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught:

That which is written concerning the afflictions of houses,

“And the koen shall return” and “And the koen shall come” —

this returning is that coming.

For the meaning is not that the koen returns to his home, but that he returns to the afflicted house. We derive through a gzera shava “returning” from “coming,” even though the words are not identical, but only resemble one another in their content!?

And furthermore,

there is another objection:

Let us derive “

“guilt,” stated concerning a provisional guilt offering,

from “and he shall bear guilt,”

stated

concerning the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things, as it is written

concerning it,

“And he is impure and bears guilt,”

for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering. And let us derive from this that one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering even in a place where the sin offering obligation is not fixed!?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: We derive “and he shall bear guilt” and “the mitzva of Hashem”

that are stated with regard to the conditional guilt-offering,

from “and he shall bear guilt”

and “the mitzva of Hashem”

that are stated with regard to the community; but we do not derive by a gzera shava from impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things, for “the mitzva of Hashem” is not written there, but only guilt-offering.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: And let us derive “and he shall bear guilt” and “bearing iniquity”

that are stated with regard to the conditional guilt-offering,

from “and he shall bear guilt” and “bearing iniquity”

that are stated with regard to the variable offering; and do not derive a gzera shava from the communal offering, for “bearing iniquity” is not written there, but only guilt-offering!?

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We derive “and he shall bear guilt” and “the mitzva of Hashem that they shall not do”

that are stated with regard to the conditional guilt-offering,

from “and he shall bear guilt” and “the mitzva of Hashem that they shall not do”

that are stated with regard to the community.

And let there be no proof

that is, to exclude

hearing a voice, expression of the lips, and impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things, in which “and he shall bear guilt and the mitzva of Hashem that they shall not do” was not stated.

Mishna:

A.

A court is not obligated to bring a bull for an unwitting decision unless their ruling concerned a matter for which an individual is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering, but not a matter for which an individual is liable to bring a variable offering.

And therefore,

they are not liable for

their ruling concerning

hearing a voice,

namely, in the section concerning witnesses under oath who do not know testimony,

and for

an oath of

expression of the lips, and for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things

since an individual who sinned in any of these brings a variable offering.

B.

And the nasi—

the same as them,

who is exempt from bringing an offering for a matter for which an individual brings a variable offering,

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

13. Rabbi Akiva says: The nasi is liable for all of them, except for hearing a voice,

for a nasi is not liable for it at all, because

the king neither judges nor is judged, neither testifies nor is testified against, and one who is not included in the section of testimony is not liable for the offering for an oath of testimony.

anyone who is not included in the passage concerning testimony is not liable for the offering brought for an oath of testimony.

Gemara:

Ulla said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who exempted a nasi concerning a matter for which an individual is liable to bring a variable offering?

The verse says: “And it shall be, when he is guilty of one of these,”

one of the three sins enumerated in the section concerning the variable offering [which are hearing a voice, an oath of expression, and impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things]. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili understands that this is what the verse said:

Everyone who becomes liable for

each

one

and one,

becomes liable for all of them. But one who does not become liable for one

of these, such as a nasi, who does not become liable for an oath of testimony because he does not testify,

does not become liable for all of them.

And we object:

But say: “when he is guilty of one of these”

has this meaning: it is possible that he will be

liable for one of them, even though he does not become liable for all of them!

And we answer:

Rather, the reason of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is from here: