Horayot 5a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says:

Twelve tribes bring

thirteen bulls.

One bull for each and every tribe, and one bull for the court.

And in the case of idolatry, thirteen bulls and thirteen goats—

a bull and a goat for each and every tribe, and a bull and a goat for the court.

And his reason is that the obligation of atonement through the bull for an unwitting matter rests both upon the community and upon the court.

And Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yehuda in what he said, that each tribe is called a “congregation”; therefore, each tribe brings for itself, whereas the court brings an additional bull, for atonement for itself.

If the court ruled

to transgress,

and seven tribes, or the majority of them, acted,

the majority of each and every tribe,

on the basis of their ruling, they bring

the court

a bull. And in the case of idolatry they bring a bull and a goat; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Ra’avad explained “seven tribes, which are the majority by number of the tribes, even though they are a minority of Israel, or the majority by number of Israel, even though they are a minority by number of the tribes, and even if one tribe acted and it is the majority of Israel,” and so on. [And the glossator there brought that the commentators on the Mishna understood that the words of the Ra’avad refer to the words of Rabbi Yehuda, but he applied them to the words of Rabbi Meir.] According to him, the explanation of the Mishna is: seven tribes that are a minority of Israel; “or the majority of them” means the majority of Israel, which is a minority of the tribes. See the commentary on the Mishna by Maimonides and Tiferet Yisrael, who adopted the ruling of the Ra’avad, but explained the Mishna according to Rashi: “or the majority of them” means the majority of each tribe, which is a minority of Israel. At first glance, it appears that they explained Rabbi Meir’s view in the Mishna according to what Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in his name, while in the Gemara below their words were brought as a dispute; they held that Rabbi Meir’s words mentioned in the Gemara contradict our Mishna. It is possible that they disagreed over the version: the Ra’avad followed Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, because he read “the majority of them,” meaning the majority of Israel, and consequently explained that “seven acted” means with a minority of the congregation. Whereas Rashi followed Rabbi Meir, because he read “its majority,” meaning the majority of a tribe, and “seven acted” means seven tribes and the majority of the congregation. At first glance, it could be said that they explained the words of Rabbi Meir himself, and explained the distinction between Rabbi Meir’s words and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s words in his name, as Tosafot of the Rosh [ above, 3a] brought in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud: according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, a majority among the tribes and among the congregation is not required, but he agrees that if there was less than half in one of them, they do not bring a bull. The Ra’avad held that Rabbi Meir himself obligates bringing a bull even when there is a minority in one respect and a majority in the other. But this explanation is contradicted by the explicit discussion above, 3a, which established the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages in a case where half the tribes and the majority of the congregation acted, and the Sages obligate, like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. It is demonstrated that Rabbi Meir exempts when there is a minority in one respect. And we shall demonstrate this below, on page b; see there. Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees and

says: Seven tribes that sinned bring seven bulls,

because each tribe is called a congregation.

And

also

the remaining tribes that did not sin bring on their behalf

because of them,

a bull.

For even those that did not sin bring because of

because of those who

sinned. Rabbi Shimon

disagrees and

says:

They bring

eight bulls. And in the case of idolatry, eight bulls and eight goats: a bull and a goat for each and every tribe, and a bull and a goat for the court.

In accordance with his view, that the obligation to bring a bull rests both upon the congregation and upon the court.

And Tosafot in Menahot [45, s.v. “with seven”] held that if in each tribe only a minority acted, even though a majority of the tribes acted, since they are not the majority of the congregation of Israel, according to Rabbi Yehuda they bring one bull. It is explained that although they are not a congregation—neither the congregation of Israel nor the congregation of a tribe—they bring a bull because of the majority of the tribes. That is, the court’s obligation is for the sin of the majority, even though this is not the majority of the congregation, whereas the tribes’ obligation applies only where each tribe became liable in itself, since they are liable even for the ruling of a tribal court. See below, page b, notes 3–5. And Rashi read: “the remaining tribes bring a bull, a bull on their behalf,” meaning that each and every tribe that did not sin brings a bull separately. And the Rashash wrote that this is only when the majority of the tribes sinned, because if only a minority sinned, there is no drawing along of each and every one; rather, all the tribes that did not sin bring one bull for all of them. And he compared this law to what Rabbi Shimon said [on page b], that if six tribes sinned, each one does not bring separately; rather, all of them bring one bull, and Rashi explained there that they are considered one tribe. If so, according to Rabbi Yehuda too they should bring one offering. [Rashi’s view on this will be explained below.] We already brought above [in the notes to Tosafot, 3a] that Tosafot in Yoma [50a] wrote that when they ruled concerning idolatry, they bring only one bull as a burnt-offering. And the Rashash wondered from our Mishna, which says that they bring twelve bulls, and Mahari”l Diskin explained that Tosafot’s intention is that only the sinful tribes bring, and the principle of drawing along was stated only regarding the sin-offering, but not regarding the bull of the burnt-offering. However, Maimonides [12:1] explicitly wrote that even if one tribe sinned and it is the majority of the congregation, they bring twelve bulls, and in the case of idolatry twelve bulls and twelve goats. It is evident that he disagreed with the Tosafot cited above, and likewise did not accept the words of the Rashash in this discussion; rather, one tribe obligates each and every tribe separately. At first glance, there is an explicit discussion below [6a] according to Maimonides’ view: there it was proposed that when the people of Babylonia went up from the exile, they brought twelve bulls and twelve goats to atone for the sin of idolatry of seven tribes that had sinned, implying that there is drawing along even with burnt-offerings. Necessarily, all the words of Tosafot refer only to the drawing along of a minority of tribes, which is drawing along through the offering, and a burnt-offering does not draw along. But the drawing along of a majority of tribes takes place through the very sin of the majority of the public; with regard to this, there is no distinction whether the offering is a sin-offering or a burnt-offering. Thus Tosafot will explain our Mishna, which specifically stated seven tribes. See below [there, note 1], for this is also precise in that discussion. If they ruled

only

the court of one of the tribes,

and the Great Court did not rule,

and that tribe acted on the basis of their ruling, that tribe is

alone

liable

to bring a bull,

and all the remaining tribes are exempt; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

And the Sages say: They are liable

for the bull for an unwitting matter

only for the rulings of the Great Court, as it is stated, “And if the entire congregation of Israel errs,”

and we expound: only where the congregation of Israel errs, meaning the Great Court, do they bring a bull,

and not

for the ruling of

the congregation of that tribe,

for if it issued a mistaken ruling, they do not bring a bull for its ruling .

Gemara:

Regarding the passage about the bull for an unwitting matter, it is stated: “And the sin concerning which they sinned shall become known. And the congregation shall offer a young bull as a sin-offering.” The Gemara brings a beraita that expounds and derives laws from this verse:

The Sages taught:

The court ruled that something permitted with regard to one of the mitzvot of the Torah was permitted—for example, they ruled concerning the eating of forbidden fat, or they ruled concerning the eating of blood, that it is permitted to eat. And the congregation acted on their ruling, except that the congregation unwittingly ate both fat and blood. It turns out that the eating of one of them was an unwitting act, not performed on the basis of the court’s ruling, whereas the eating of the other was performed on the basis of the court’s ruling.

And ultimately

they knew

the court

that

by mistake

they had ruled

concerning one of these prohibitions, fat or blood, ,

but

they erred

and forgot, and did not know

what they had ruled

to be permitted—whether the prohibition of fat or of blood.

One might have thought that they would be liable

for a bull, since with regard to one of the prohibitions—fat or blood—the people certainly erred through the court’s ruling?

The verse therefore states, “And the sin shall become known

concerning which they sinned, and they shall offer.” The verse teaches that the obligation of the bull for an unwitting matter applies only where the sin became known to the court, so that they knew precisely concerning what they had ruled in error—whether concerning fat or concerning blood.

And not

is knowledge sufficient

that the sinners became known,

that, in any event, they transgressed one of the prohibitions on the basis of the court’s ruling. And we expound the continuation of the verse: “

concerning which they sinned,”

to say that if

two tribes sinned, they bring two bulls.

And if

three tribes sinned, they bring three [

and the same law applies when one tribe sinned: it brings one bull; rather, the tanna mentioned two tribes to teach us that they are not atoned for with one bull].

Sefer Ha-Hinukh wrote [in mitzva 120] that accordingly the explanation of the verse “and the sin shall become known” is: and it shall become known to them, and not that others inform them. An additional explanation is necessary in the words of Maimonides, since the court must know that a majority acted on its ruling, and this is impossible unless they inform it. Necessarily, his intention is only to knowledge of what they ruled, and only concerning this knowledge was it innovated that they must know it themselves. But with regard to the other details of the sin, the knowledge required is like knowledge of any sin. And below, on page 8a, we shall prove that Maimonides distinguishes between knowledge in other sins, where the sin creates the obligation and knowledge is required only for the obligation of the offering, and an unwitting ruling, where it was innovated that the sin creates no obligation unless it became known to the court what they had ruled; the knowledge is considered part of the act that creates the obligation; see there. And from the words of Rashi it is clear that he follows the meaning of our version, “not that the sinners became known”: that is, it did not become known to the court and the congregation concerning which sin they had ruled in error, but only who had sinned. This is the plain meaning of the verse, which requires “and the sin shall become known,” so that it becomes known in which sin they erred. According to him, knowledge by the public is sufficient, and only in order to bring a sin-offering is knowledge by the bringing court required. But it is not the cause of the obligation. Therefore, he explained above [3b] that the Gemara’s doubt concerning two courts that ruled is a case in which it did not become known to the first court, and nevertheless the second court will bring together with the knowledge of the congregation. But Maimonides explained that the doubt concerns the combination of rulings of two courts that learned of them in the interim. And it is necessary to discuss whether, if it subsequently became known to the court, the public would be exempt from the sin-offering in which they had become obligated—both according to Rashi, who holds that one definite sin-offering obligation had already taken effect upon them, while the second has no court bull for it [according to the one who obligates an individual who relies upon a court], and according to Maimonides, when it became known to the public and they became certainly obligated in two sin-offerings, and afterward it became known to the court. [We already brought above the explanation of Rabbi Hayyim that they are not exempt through the public’s act unless they bring a bull for the unwitting ruling]. And in Minhat Hinukh [there] held that even if it became known to the court after the individuals had offered their sin-offerings, they bring the bull. And although the individuals are exempted through their offerings, they do not retroactively transgress by bringing unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard, because they were liable for them as long as it had not become known to the court concerning what they had erred. And Rabbeinu Hananel in his commentary on the beraita in Sifra brought below [7a], “A public offering of a bull, and they do not bring a provisional guilt-offering,” explained that if the public acted on the basis of the court and they were uncertain whether it had ruled, the public does not bring a bull, for it is written, “and the sin shall become known”; but each individual brings a provisional guilt-offering. It follows from his words that they are exempt from a sin-offering, because the sin is not considered the sin of an individual; rather, it is uncertain whether the public acted on the basis of the court, in which case they are exempt for the act of the public, or whether they acted through an unwitting act, in which case they are liable. This is unlike Maimonides, who held that they bring an individual sin-offering, since the sin of the many does not exempt from a sin-offering except when accompanied by the atonement of the public’s bull. It is possible that Maimonides follows his own view: he excluded the bringing of a bull even when it became known to the public, since it had not become known to the court; necessarily, he held that the court’s bull exempts the public, and not the public’s act. But Rabbeinu Hananel explains according to Rashi, that the exclusion applies only when it did not become known to the court and the congregation concerning what they had sinned; for if it became known, they are exempt through the public’s act on the basis of the court. And from where do you know that “they sinned” means that two tribes sinned?

Or does the verse not say

the following

but

that if

two individuals sinned, they bring two bulls 7 ,

and if

three

individuals

sinned, they bring three

bulls?

The verse therefore states

further,

“the congregation.”

The verse teaches that only

“the assembly” is obligated

—

And

it further implies from the expression “the assembly”:

each assembly is obligated,

meaning that all the tribes, even those that did not sin, must bring a bull for an erroneous ruling because of the sinful assembly, even though the assembly bringing the offering did not sin, as will be explained.

How so? If two tribes sinned,

they bring

the two tribes

two bulls.

But if

seven tribes sinned,

which is a majority of the tribes,

they bring,

the seven sinful tribes,

seven

bulls,

, and

also

the other tribes that did not sin

themselves

bring because of them—

on their account,

one bull

for each tribe.

For even those that did not sin bring because of those that sinned, and therefore it is stated

in this verse

“assembly,” to obligate each assembly

to bring a bull separately,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says: When seven tribes sinned, they bring seven bulls, and

also

the court brings a bull because of them, as it is stated below

in the continuation of the verse

“assembly,” [“and the assembly shall sacrifice”],

[“and the assembly shall offer”],

and it is stated above

earlier in the verse,

“assembly,” [“and the matter was hidden from the eyes of the assembly.”] And

we derive:

Just as the assembly mentioned above

means

the court together with the assembly,

because the matter was hidden from all of them,

so too the assembly mentioned below,

with regard to those bringing the offering, means

the court together with the assembly.

This teaches that both the assembly and the court bring a bull.

Rabbi Meir says: When seven tribes sinned,

only

the court brings a bull because of them, and

as for

—

the assembly,

they are exempt.

He too expounded “assembly” through “assembly,” like Rabbi Shimon, but he understood the derivation differently, as follows:

“Assembly” is stated below, and “assembly” is stated above. Just as the assembly mentioned above

—“and the matter was hidden from the eyes of the assembly”—is

the court and not the public,

for the verse does not say that the matter was hidden “from the assembly,” but “from the eyes of the assembly,” implying that it was hidden from the court of the assembly,

so too the assembly mentioned below,

“and the assembly shall sacrifice,” means

the court,

which teaches that the court sacrifices

and not the public.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name

of Rabbi Meir: If

six tribes sinned and they constitute the majority of the people

of Israel,

or

if

seven

tribes sinned,

even though they do not constitute the majority of the people, they bring a bull.

For even though they are only a minority of the people, they are a majority of the tribes.

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, now explains the sources for the laws stated in the beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

The Master said: “And the sin becomes known”—

but not that the sinners become known.

Who is the tanna

who said that in this situation, when the court does not know what erroneous ruling it issued, the court is exempt from the offering for an erroneous ruling?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say that Rava said:

This tanna is

not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. For it was taught

in tractate Keritot (19b): If forbidden fat and notar meat were before a person, and the law concerning both was the same—that one who eats either of them unwittingly must bring a sin-offering—and he ate one of them but does not know which one he ate, Rabbi Eliezer obligates him to bring a sin-offering, while Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

And it was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer said: “Whichever way you look at it,”

he must be obligated to bring a sin-offering, since

if he ate forbidden fat, he is liable

for a sin-offering, and

if he ate notar meat, he is liable

for a sin-offering.

The same should apply here: when the court does not know in which ruling it erred, according to Rabbi Eliezer it should be obligated in any event, since whether it erred regarding forbidden fat or whether it erred regarding blood, it brings a bull. It follows that this beraita, which exempts the court, necessarily does not follow Rabbi Eliezer, because he would obligate it in any event.

Rav Ashi said: Even if you say

that this beraita follows

Rabbi Eliezer,

there is no difficulty for you, because a distinction must be made:

Here it is different, as it is written:

“And the sin becomes known

for which they sinned,

and they shall bring it.” This implies that they are not liable until they know the sin for which the public sinned because of their ruling. But with regard to an ordinary sin-offering, this law was not stated, and therefore Rabbi Eliezer said that the person brings a sin-offering in any event.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

There,

with regard to a sin-offering,

is it not also written

“or his sin becomes known to him,

for the sin that he committed,”

from which it is learned that even an individual who sins is not liable until he knows which sin he committed?

And we answer:

That

expression “for the sin that he committed,” which is stated with regard to a sin-offering, is not superfluous, because

it is needed

to derive from its meaning that liability for a sin-offering applies only to one who intended to perform the sinful act,

excluding one who was merely engaged in another activity,

meaning that he thought he was performing a permitted action, but it turned out that, inadvertently, he performed a different prohibited action. For example, he intended to lift a detached plant on Shabbat, but cut a plant still attached to the ground. They derive from the meaning of the word “for” that he is exempt from an offering, because he did not intend to perform the act that he performed.

The Gemara now explains the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Meir, who disagree in the Mishna about who is liable to bring a bull.

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda?

He holds that four instances of “assembly” are written: “assembly,”

“the assembly,” “assembly of the assembly.”

That is, “and it was hidden from the eyes of the assembly” is stated, and “and the assembly shall sacrifice” is also stated. Since it would have been possible to write “assembly” in both places without the additional letter heh, but the verse says “the assembly,” it is as though the word “assembly” had been written twice in each place. Since “the assembly” appears twice, this is equivalent to the word “assembly” having been written four times, teaching the following:

One: to obligate each assembly,

so that each tribe brings a bull.

And one, to

teach that

the ruling depends on the court, while the act depends on the assembly.

The obligation to bring a bull applies only when the public sinned, and not when only the court sinned.

And one, for the drawing along,

teaching that even the other tribes that did not sin bring a bull, because they are drawn into the obligation on account of those that sinned.

And one

to teach that

a tribe that

made an unwitting error and

acted on the ruling of its court,

must bring a bull, even though the Great Court did not issue such a ruling.

And as for Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that the court also brings a bull, his reason is that

three instances of “assembly” are written.

He expounded

“the assembly,” “assembly,” “the assembly,”

but did not expound the letter heh in

“the eyes of the assembly,”

because

it is the normal usage of the verse:

when the verse wishes to say “the eyes of an assembly,” it normally adds the definite article and says “the eyes of the assembly,”

as people say, “the eyes of so-and-so.”

Thus, he expounded the three instances of “assembly”:

One: to obligate each assembly,

agreeing here with Rabbi Yehuda, who said that each tribe brings a bull.

And the other two

are for the identical-expression derivation, as explained in the beraita:

“Assembly” is stated below, and “assembly” is stated above. Just as there the court is together with the assembly, so here the court

brings a bull

together with the assembly.

And as for Rabbi Meir,

who holds that each assembly does not bring a bull, his reason is that

“assembly”

and “the assembly”—he does not expound them;

he does not expound the additional letter heh at all.

Therefore,

in his view, only

two instances of “assembly” are written

for derivation, and

it is needed

for the identical-expression derivation taught in the beraita:

“Assembly” is stated below, and “assembly” is stated above. Just as there the court and not the public, so here

only

the court

brings a bull

and not the public.

And as for Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

who holds that if six tribes sinned and they constitute the majority of the people, or seven tribes sinned even though they do not constitute the majority of the people, they bring a bull,

what is his reason?

He found a difficulty between the verses:

For it is written

with regard to a court that mistakenly permitted idolatry,

“And it shall be, if it is from the eyes of the congregation.” This indicates a minority

of the people that sinned brings a bull,

as it is written, “from the eyes,”

meaning “from the eyes,” but not all the eyes.

And

on the other hand,

it is written, “For all the people acted unwittingly,” indicating that if the majority sinned, yes,

only then do they bring an offering, but

a minority

that sinned

does not

bring an offering.

How then

should these apparently contradictory verses be explained and reconciled?

It must be said that these verses concern two different situations. The verse “For all the people,” whose meaning is that the obligation applies only when a majority of the people sinned, refers to a case in which only six tribes transgressed, but they constituted a majority of the entire public. The statement “from the eyes,” whose meaning is that an offering is brought even when the error was hidden from only a minority of the people, refers to a case in which seven tribes transgressed but constituted a minority of the public. In that case they bring a bull, even though only a minority sinned.

From here Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar concluded that if

six acted and constituted the majority of the people, or seven even though they did not constitute the majority of the people, they are liable. 13 .

And the Gemara now discusses:

The Gemara now discusses: