Horayot 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir,

who derived two instances of “assembly” for a gzera shava, and according to them no instance of “assembly” remains to teach that the ruling depends on the court—how do they derive this law, that

the ruling depends on the court and the action depends on the people?

Abaye said:

They derived it from what

the verse states

concerning the public that erred in the matter of idolatry:

, “And it shall be, if it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, and it was done unwittingly.”

And this is how they expounded it: If the act constituting the unwitting error resulting from the court’s ruling was performed by others—that is, as a result of the court’s unwitting ruling, the people performed the prohibited act.

Rava said:

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir derived this principle from the verse

“for all the people, unwittingly,”

and expounded that all must have a connection to the sin: the court through the ruling, and the people through the act.

And it is necessary

to have both of these verses for this exposition.

For had the Merciful One written

only

“And it shall be, if it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation and it was done unwittingly,” one might have thought that even

if

a minority

sinned, they would bring a bull, since “from the eyes” implies a minority;

therefore, it is written: “for all the people, unwittingly,”

to teach that they are not liable until a majority sins.

And had it been written

only

“for all the people, unwittingly,” one might have thought

that they would not be liable to bring a bull

until the court itself performed

the sinful act unwittingly

together with the majority,

on the basis of its ruling.

Therefore, it is written: “And it shall be, if it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation and it was done unwittingly,”

rather than “and they performed,” to teach that it is sufficient for the transgression to have been “done” by others on the basis of the court’s ruling; it is not necessary for the court itself also to sin and act in accordance with its ruling in order to make it liable for an offering.

And we challenge this:

But when these verses were written,

“And it shall be, if it was hidden from the eyes” and “for all the people, unwittingly,” they were written in the passage concerning

idolatry,

and from where did they derive that these laws also apply to a court’s ruling concerning the other mitzvot?

And we answer:

We derive it

through a gzera shava:

“from the eyes” –

“from the eyes.”

For “from the eyes of the assembly” is stated concerning the other mitzvot, and “And it shall be, if it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation” is stated concerning idolatry.

We learned in our Mishna:

If the court of one

of the tribes issued a ruling and that tribe acted on the basis of its ruling, that tribe is liable, while all the other tribes are exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

This implies that if one tribe sinned on the basis of the ruling of its court and brings a bull, the other tribes do not bring a bull as a consequence of its action.

They raised a dilemma: According to Rabbi Yehuda, if one tribe

transgressed one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court, do the other tribes bring,

although they did not sin, a bull for the unwitting communal error as a consequence of that tribe’s action,

or not? 2 .

And these are the sides of the dilemma:

Do we say

that only

seven tribes

that sinned

are the ones whose fellow tribes bring

a bull

with them, because there is a majority

of the tribes that sinned, although they are not an actual majority of the entire people?

But one tribe,

that sinned,

when there is no majority

of the entire people that sinned,

does not create consequence?

Or perhaps, it makes no difference.

Even when only one tribe sinned, the other tribes that did not sin bring a bull as a consequence of its action?

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in a beraita:

What do they bring

when the people sinned unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling?

One bull.

Rabbi Shimon says: Two bulls.

And we analyze this:

What are we dealing with? If we say that seven

tribes sinned, and the first tanna is Rabbi Meir, who in such a case requires only one bull, then

according to Rabbi Shimon, eight

[eight] bulls

are required!

For he says in our Mishna that when seven tribes sinned, each of the seven tribes brings a bull, and the court also brings a bull, making a total of eight bulls. Yet here he says that they bring only two bulls. It must therefore not be referring to such a case.

Rather,

the beraita must be dealing with a case in which

only one tribe

sinned.

And on what basis? On the basis of the ruling of which court did this tribe sin?

If it was on the basis of the ruling of its court,

and the first tanna is Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one tribe is liable for an offering when it acted on the basis of the ruling of its court,

it is impossible to say this.

For Rabbi Shimon

surely

does not hold this law!

For he disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda’s statement in the Mishna and holds that a tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of its court does not bring a bull. According to him, no instance of the word “assembly” remains from which to derive this exposition—that even a tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of its court brings a bull.

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the beraita is dealing with a tribe that sinned

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court?

And in such a case Rabbi Shimon holds that the tribe brings one bull and the court brings an additional bull, making two.

The Gemara continues to clarify the words of the beraita in order to establish the law, according to Rabbi Yehuda, regarding one tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court:

And the first tanna,

in the beraita, who disagreed with Rabbi Shimon and said that they bring only one bull,

who is he!?

If we say

that he is

Rabbi Meir,

this cannot be said.

For Rabbi Meir

requires a majority!

For this is his opinion in our Mishna: there is an obligation to bring a bull only when a majority of the people sinned, but not when one tribe sinned.

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the first tanna in the beraita is

Rabbi Yehuda.

If so, it is proven that according to him, one tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court brings one bull, while the other tribes do not bring a bull.

The dilemma is thus resolved, and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that specifically when a majority of the people or a majority of the tribes sinned, the others bring a bull through consequence. But if only one tribe sinned, it does not create consequence for the other tribes, making them liable for an offering.

And we reject this: There is no proof from this beraita, because it is not dealing with a case in which one tribe sinned on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court. Rather,

what are we dealing with here? For example, six tribes sinned, and they constitute a majority of the people, and

the first tanna in the beraita follows the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name

of Rabbi Meir:

If six

tribes

sinned, and they constitute a majority of the people, or

if

seven

tribes

sinned, even though they do not constitute a majority of the people, they bring one bull.

He does not hold like Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a bull is brought for each and every tribe. [

Rabbi Shimon said that they bring only two bulls, not a number corresponding to the number of tribes. Although in our Mishna he stated, like Rabbi Yehuda, that each and every tribe that sinned brings a bull, this must be understood as applying specifically when seven tribes sinned and they constitute a majority of the people. But when a majority of the people sinned without being a majority of the tribes, or a majority of the tribes sinned without being a majority of the people, they bring only two bulls: one bull for all those who sinned and one bull for the court, in accordance with his opinion that the court also brings a bull] .

Come and hear: Rabbi Yehuda says: A tribe that acted

and sinned

on the basis of the ruling of its court, that tribe is liable, while all the other tribes are exempt.

And if that tribe sinned

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court, even the other tribes are liable.

It is explicit that Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that even if one tribe sinned, the other tribes bring an offering through consequence.

And we conclude: Indeed, from this beraita

derive

that the other tribes, as well, bring offerings.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna also indicates this

as follows.

As it teaches:

“If the court of one of the tribes issued a ruling,

and that tribe acted on the basis of its ruling, that tribe is liable and all the other tribes are exempt.”

Apparently, this is difficult:

Why do I need the Mishna to teach, ‘and the other tribes are exempt’?

It already

taught, ‘that tribe is liable,’ and once it taught, ‘that tribe is liable,’ we know automatically

that

the other tribes are exempt.

Rather,

necessarily,

this teaches us that

only if that tribe sinned

on the basis of the ruling of its own court is it that the other tribes are exempt. But

if it sinned

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court—

even the other tribes are liable!

And we conclude:

derive from this.

They raised a dilemma before them: If one tribe acted

and sinned

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court, according to Rabbi Shimon, does it bring

a bull

or not?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Does everything Rabbi Shimon said—that a bull is brought for each community and each community—because one tribe is called a community, apply specifically when, for example, seven tribes sinned, which constitute a majority? But when there is no majority, are they considered individuals and exempt, as is the law with regard to an individual who acted on the basis of the ruling of the court, who is exempt?

Or perhaps, since one tribe is called a community, even if only one tribe sinned, that tribe brings one bull, and the court also brings one bull.

Come and hear

from the beraita cited above:

“What do they bring

when they sinned on the basis of the ruling of the court?

One bull; Rabbi Shimon says: Two bulls.”

We inquire:

What are we dealing with? If you say that seven

tribes sinned, would Rabbi Shimon in such a case say that they bring only

two bulls

—and yet

eight bulls are required,

one for each tribe and one for the court, as he said in our Mishna?

Rather,

necessarily,

one tribe sinned.

And on the basis of whose

ruling did they sin?

If you say, on the basis of the ruling of its court,

of that tribe, but

Rabbi Shimon does not hold

that a tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of its own court brings a bull.

Rather,

necessarily, the case is one in which that tribe sinned

on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court,

and concerning this Rabbi Shimon said that they bring two bulls: one for the tribe that sinned and one for the court.

It is therefore proved that one tribe that acted on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court brings a bull.

We reject this:

Can you understand it

in this way? Is it possible to establish the beraita as referring to a tribe that sinned on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court?

For if we explain it in this way, the following difficulty arises:

Who is the first tanna,

who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon in the beraita and says that they bring only one bull?

Who is he?

If it is Rabbi Meir,

then according to him

a majority

of the public

is required

to act on the basis of the ruling of the court.

And if it is Rabbi Yehuda,

we already proved above that according to him

the other tribes also bring

bulls through the extension of the obligation from one tribe. How, then, could he say that only one bull is brought?

Necessarily, the beraita is not dealing with a case in which only one tribe sinned.

Rather,

we must say that

this—

the first tanna in this beraita—

is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

as we concluded above concerning the dilemma according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And the case is one in which six tribes sinned, constituting the majority of the community, or seven tribes sinned, even though they do not constitute the majority of the community.

As it was taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If six sinned and they constitute the majority of the community, or seven sinned, even though they do not constitute the majority of the community, they bring a bull.

It follows that the beraita proves only that they do not bring more than one bull, since it was established as referring to six tribes and a majority of the community, and Rabbi Shimon obligated them to bring only one bull for the tribes.

Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Shimon, there is still room for uncertainty in a case where a minority of the tribes and a minority of the community sinned on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court: Do they bring one bull, or are they entirely exempt?

Come and hear

from our Mishna:

And the Sages

[who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one tribe that acted on the basis of the ruling of its own court brings a bull]

say: It is never liable

—that tribe—

except

when they transgressed

against

the basis of

the ruling of the Great Court.

But if they transgressed on the basis of the ruling of their own court, they are exempt.

We inquire:

Who

are

“the Sages”?

If you say Rabbi Meir,

then according to him

a majority

of the tribes that sinned

is required

in order to create an obligation to bring a bull.

Rather, it is Rabbi Shimon.

And if so, it is proved that he holds that even one tribe that acted on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court brings a bull.

The Gemara analyzes:

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,

who derived

“one tribe is called a community,”

and therefore said that each and every tribe brings a bull,

from where do they derive

this principle?

They say: For it is written

[in II Chronicles 20]

“And Jehoshaphat stood—

in the assembly of Judah—

and Jerusalem

in the House of the Lord before the new courtyard—

the new one.”

This proves that the tribe of Judah by itself is called a community.

Once this verse has been cited, the Gemara explains the expression in it, “the new courtyard.”

What is the meaning of “new”?

Rabbi Yohanan said: They instituted

in it

the following rulings, and said: One who has immersed that day

[an impure person who immersed to purify himself but whose sun has not yet set]

may not enter the Levite camp!

Rather, his status is that he must be excluded from two camps, both the camp of the Divine Presence and the Levite camp; he is permitted to enter only the Israelite camp.

Rabbi Aḥa bar Ya’akov challenged

the proof from this source, which they cited to prove that one tribe is called a community:

From where

is this matter proven from this verse?

Perhaps Jerusalem is different,

since

there was also

the tribe of

Benjamin

in Jerusalem together with the tribe of Judah. This proves only that two tribes are called a community; but from where do we know that one tribe is called a community?!

Rather, Rabbi Aḥa bar Ya’akov said:

The source that one tribe is called a community is

as it is written

in Parashat Vayehi, where Jacob said to Joseph, “El Shaddai appeared to me at Luz in the land of Canaan [after I departed from Laban’s house, before Benjamin was born], and He blessed me, and He said to me: ‘Behold, I will make you fruitful and multiply you, and I will make you a community of peoples,’” and so on.

saying to me:

‘I will make you fruitful and increase you, and I will make you a congregation of peoples,’ and so on.”

Who

was destined

to be born to Jacob at that time? Benjamin.

Derive from this that this is what the Merciful One said

to Jacob:

“A different community will now be born to you.”

This proves that one tribe, such as Benjamin, is called a community.

Rav Shava said to Rav Kahana:

This is not a proof, for

perhaps this is what the Merciful One said to him: Once Benjamin is born to you, then there will be twelve tribes, by whom you will be called

that is, you will be called by virtue of them,

“a community.”

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

Rather,

if it is as you say, it follows that only

twelve tribes are called a community,

but

eleven tribes,

who existed before Benjamin was born,

were not called a community.

But it is impossible to say this, for the eleven tribes were certainly called a community, as we proved above from the verse, “the assembly of Judah and Jerusalem,” that even two tribes are called a community. If so, it is impossible to explain the verse as you do, that only after Benjamin was born were all twelve tribes called a community.

Rather, necessarily, the verse means that Benjamin would be born to you, and that he would himself be called a community. This proves that one tribe is called a community.

The Gemara cites a beraita that contradicts from the biblical verses the view of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the court brings the bull rather than the public:

It was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: What is the meaning of the verse

in the passage concerning the inauguration of the Levites [Parashat Beha’alotekha], “And they shall take one bull of the herd,

and the second bull of the herd you shall take as a sin offering”?

If

the verse came

to teach that they are two,

meaning that they must bring two bulls,

but it has already been stated

later in that passage

“And he shall make one a sin offering and the other a burnt offering to the Lord,”

which indicates that there are two.

Rather,

one must say that the verse came to teach that, lest you think

this sin offering could be eaten

by

the Levites

[the kohanim], like the other sin offerings that are eaten,

the verse states: “And the second bull.”

And we derive that it is

second to

the first bull, which was

a burnt offering,

to tell you that this second bull, too, has the status of a burnt offering:

just as a burnt offering is not eaten,