Horayot 4b — the Talmud in English

Rav Yosef raised a question:

The court ruled that

there is no

prohibition of the work of

plowing

is not forbidden

on Shabbat; what is the law?

Do we say: since the court acknowledges

the court

in the entire matter,

that the other works on Shabbat are prohibited, and only with regard to one work did they rule permissively —

it is like nullification of part and upholding of part,

since the prohibition includes many acts, and only one of them was uprooted, and therefore they are liable?

Or perhaps,

each and every work is judged as a prohibition in itself, and

since they uprooted it

the work of

plowing entirely,

and through their ruling permitted a prohibited act in its entirety, the fact that additional acts were prohibited under this prohibition is of no avail, rather

like the uprooting of

the entire

body it is considered.

And this is not included among the rulings of a court that obligate a bull for an unintentional matter.

And the Gemara proceeds to resolve the question:

Come and hear

from what we learned: The court ruled that

there is

a prohibition of

a menstruant woman in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman who observes one day corresponding to one day is exempt;

they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted

through their ruling

the

law of

a woman who observes one day corresponding to one day entirely,

and nevertheless they are liable for a sacrifice on account of this ruling. This proves that it is not considered uprooting the entire body, but only when they uprooted all the details of the mitzva. And we reject this:

Rav Yosef could say to you,

this is no proof. For it can be explained that

the woman who observes one day, as they say

concerning whom they ruled permissively, does not mean that they entirely annulled the law of a woman with an issue of discharge in the case of a woman who observes one day, but

as we answered

above: they permitted only the initial penetration. Or they ruled that if she saw blood at night, she does not have the law of a woman who observes one day corresponding to one day. But they did not entirely uproot the law of a woman who observes one day corresponding to one day; and if she saw blood during the day and he completed his intercourse with her, they agree that it is prohibited, and he is liable to karet even according to their ruling.

Come and hear,

from what we learned: The court ruled

there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out from a private domain into a public domain

is exempt; they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted the

work of

carrying out entirely.

Resolve Rav Yosef’s doubt: it is proven that if they uprooted only plowing, it is not considered uprooting the entire body, and they are liable.

And we reject this:

There too,

it is not referring to a case in which they uprooted the entire work of carrying out, but

as we answered above,

they permitted only carrying in, or they permitted transferring and throwing, but actual carrying out remains prohibited.

Come and hear

from what we learned: The court said

there is

a prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah, but one who bows

to an idolatrous worship

is exempt;

they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted bowing entirely,

and this law resembles the uprooting of the work of plowing.

And we reject this:

They say: concerning bowing also,

it is not referring to a case in which they entirely uprooted bowing and ruled that it is not considered a service prohibited in idolatry, but

as we answered above,

it is referring to a case in which they permitted only bowing not in the usual manner, but they did not permit bowing in the usual manner.

Rabbi Zeira raised a question:

The court ruled that

there is no

prohibition of the work of

Shabbat in

the year

of the seventh

—the sabbatical year—but in the other years,

what is the law? [The sides of the doubt will be explained below.]

The Gemara explains:

And the Gemara explains:

In what did they err?

What was the source of the court’s error in issuing such a novel ruling? —

In this verse,

as it is written [Exodus 34]: “

From plowing and harvesting you shall rest.”

And in their error they interpreted the word “you shall rest,” whose meaning is: rest from work on the day of Shabbat! And they expounded the verse as follows:

When there is

permission for

plowing, there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat. And when there is no

permission for

plowing,

that is, in the seventh year,

there is no

prohibition of

Shabbat.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the sides of Rabbi Zeira’s doubt:

Do we say: since

in their ruling they

uphold it

the prohibition of Shabbat

in the other years of the seven-year cycle,

and only in the seventh year did they err in ruling that Shabbat does not apply,

it is like nullification of part and upholding of part,

and they are liable?

Or perhaps, since they have uprooted it

the prohibition of Shabbat entirely

in

the year

of the seventh, like the uprooting of the entire body

itself

it is considered,

and they are exempt?

Ravina said: Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

A prophet

who at the beginning of his career was a true prophet,

who prophesied

a false prophecy

to uproot a matter from the matters of the Torah

entirely,

is liable

for strangulation.

But if he prophesied

for nullification of part

of a mitzva

and for upholding of part

of it, and not to annul it entirely,

Rabbi Shimon says: He is exempt.

And the Rabbis also agree with him.

However, this law—that he is not liable until he prophesies to uproot the entire mitzva—was stated specifically concerning the other mitzvot. But

concerning idolatry, even

if he prophesied to annul only part of it, such as when he

said

in his prophecy:

“Today worship it,”

one must worship the idolatrous worship,

“and tomorrow annul it,”

and do not worship it

—he is liable! [According to the Rabbis, he is liable to stoning, and according to Rabbi Shimon, to strangulation.] For the law of idolatry is different, as it says concerning it, “to lead you astray from the way,” and we expound “from”—even part—to tell you that even if the prophet tells you to transgress only part of the prohibition of idolatry, he becomes liable to death for this.

Since we find that even a prophecy of “today worship it and tomorrow annul it” is considered in the beraita nullification of part and upholding of part, therefore,

if so,

deduce from here,

the same applies when the court says,

“There is no Shabbat in the seventh year,”

but there is a prohibition of Shabbat in the other years of the seven-year cycle: this ruling, which resembles “today worship it and tomorrow annul it,” is considered

like nullification of part and upholding of part,

and they are liable.

And we conclude: Indeed,

deduce from here!

Mishna:

The court ruled

to permit a prohibited matter in error,

and one of them knew

—one of the judges—

that

his fellow judges

had erred

in the law.

And he said to them:

Know that

you are erring!

But the judges did not accept his words, and they decided and ruled permissively according to their view, because they follow the majority of the judges; they are exempt from bringing a bull for an unintentional matter. For their ruling is not considered a complete ruling that obligates them to bring a sacrifice for an unintentional matter on account of it, when one of the judges does not agree with the ruling.

Or if the mufla of the court was not there,

the head of the Sanhedrin,

there,

in the court, ,

at the time when they issued this ruling, even though he does not need to be included among the seventy-one judges,

nevertheless, if he did not participate in this ruling, they do not bring the bull for an unwitting matter.

Or if one of them was

among the judges who issued the erroneous ruling,

a convert, a mamzer, or a netin [

the netinim are the Gibeonites who converted in the days of Joshua],

or an elder who is not fit to have children,

for all these are unfit to issue rulings,

he is exempt

from bringing the bull for an unwitting matter of the public.

And from where is it derived that if one of them was a convert, a mamzer, a netin, or an elder who is not fit to have children, they are exempt?

For it is stated here,

concerning the unwitting ruling of a court,

“assembly” —

“If the entire assembly of Israel shall err,”

and it is stated there,

concerning judges who judge capital cases,

“assembly” —

“And the assembly shall judge,” “And the assembly shall rescue.”

Just as the assembly mentioned there,

concerning capital cases, must have

all of them fit to issue rulings,

as we expound below in the Gemara,

so, the assembly mentioned here,

concerning the ruling of a court, they are not liable to bring the bull mentioned in the passage

until all of them are fit to issue rulings.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

“Or if the mufla of the court was not there”

at the time when the judges issued this unwitting ruling, they are exempt from bringing a bull.

From where do we know this?

Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught:

the reason for this law is like the reason that we find concerning another law, as it was taught in a beraita:

“For what reason did they say

the Sages [above, 4a] that if they

ruled

the court that something was prohibited

in a matter concerning which the Sadducees agree,

they are

exempt

from bringing a bull?

Because they had

the judges

to learn, but they did not learn,

and they are not considered complete unwitting offenders, but close to willful offenders.

And the same law applies in a case where

the mufla of the court was not there

at the time of the ruling:

they are likewise exempt

for the same reason,

because they had to learn

and consult with the mufla,

but they did not learn,

rather, they issued the ruling in error according to their own judgment, and through this they are considered close to willful offenders.

We learned in our Mishna that for an unwitting ruling of a court, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, for

it is stated there,

concerning capital cases,

“assembly,” and it is stated here

concerning the ruling of a court

“assembly”;

just as the assembly mentioned in connection with appointing judges to judge capital cases must

be until all of them are fit to issue rulings,

so here, their ruling does not make them liable for the bull for an unwitting matter until all of them are fit to issue rulings, and not a convert, a netin, or a mamzer.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

And there,

in appointing a court to judge capital cases, from which you learn here that they are liable for a sacrifice only if all of them are fit to issue rulings,

from where do we know

that it is required there that all of them be fit to issue rulings?

And we explain:

For Rav Hisda said, the verse states

concerning Moses our teacher, when he established the Sanhedrin,

“And they shall stand there with you.”

And we expound

“with you” — similar to you,

that all of them should be fit to issue rulings like you. And from there they learned that in every Great Sanhedrin all of them must be fit to issue rulings.

And again we learn by the gezerah shavah “assembly, assembly” that even liability for the sacrifice of the bull for an unwitting matter, for a ruling of the court, depends upon this condition: that the ruling emerge from a court in which all are fit to issue rulings.

But we reject this: from where do you know to expound “with you” as “similar to you”?

And say,

the Holy One, blessed is He, did not say to Moses, “And they shall stand

with you”

in order to expound “with you” as “similar to you,” but according to the plain meaning of the verse, to say that they should stand there out of respect

for the Divine Presence,

so that they should not enter further inward, into the place of the Divine Presence. And it was necessary to warn about this, since He said to him, “Gather for Me,” whose meaning is that they should enter into the place of the Divine Presence; therefore He informed him that they should stand with him and not enter.

Rather, Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said,

indeed, even concerning capital cases, they did not learn that judges fit to issue rulings are required from “with you,” but from what

the verse states

to Moses:

“And they shall bear with you,”

and we expound

“with you” — similar to you,

that they should be fit to issue rulings like you.

Mishna:

If the court issued a ruling

to permit a prohibited matter, when they were

unwitting

in this ruling,

and the entire community performed

the act that the court ruled was permitted, when they were

unwitting,

because they relied upon the ruling of the court,

the court brings

a

bull

for an unwitting matter.

But if the court ruled to permit what is prohibited, and issued this ruling when they were

willful,

knowing that this was not the law, and nevertheless ruled that it was permitted,

and

the community acted on their instructions

unwittingly, because

they relied upon the ruling of the court and did not know that this was not the law ,

they bring,

each member of the community,

a female sheep or a female goat,

according to the law of an individual who sinned unwittingly. But the court does not bring a bull, as it is stated: “If the entire assembly of Israel shall err,” teaching us that there is no liability to bring a bull for the unwitting act of the public until the court also is unwitting.

If the court issued a ruling

unwittingly,

for they erred in the law,

and

the community acted according to the ruling of the court when they were

willful,

for the community knew that the court had erred in this ruling, and nevertheless acted according to its ruling,

then these —

the court and the community —

are exempt

from every sacrifice. The court does not bring the bull for an unwitting matter, since the community was not unwitting. And each member of the community does not bring a sin-offering, since they were willful, and a willful offender is not atoned for by a sacrifice.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The court issued a ruling

in error, and they acted

the congregation

intentionally; they are exempt.

And the Gemara infers: It follows that specifically when the congregation acted with complete intent, they are exempt from a sacrifice,

but an unwitting act similar to an intentional act,

that is, when he does not actually base his actions on the court,

is liable

for an individual sacrifice.

And

what is the case of an unwitting act similar to an intentional act, for which he is liable to a sacrifice? For example,

that the court ruled that a certain fat

of forbidden fat

is permitted [and not that they ruled that all forbidden fat is permitted, because by doing so they uproot the entire matter, and it was explained above that this is not considered a ruling], and each member of the congregation wished to eat ordinary fat,

and it was exchanged for him,

and he exchanged it

this forbidden fat concerning which they ruled permission

for ordinary fat, and they ate

that forbidden fat. In this case, the reason that he ate the forbidden fat was not that he based his permission on the court, but that he erred, thinking that it was ordinary fat.

And this matter is considered “similar to an intentional act,” because it resembles an intentional act in that one who acts intentionally does not perform his actions because he relies upon the court; and likewise this unwitting person: what he ate, the forbidden fat, was not because he relied upon the court. And concerning such a case we learned in the Mishna that each individual must bring a sin-offering, because he is not considered one who relies upon the court, for although the court ruled that this forbidden fat was permitted, nevertheless he did not eat this forbidden fat on the basis of their ruling, but because the forbidden fat was exchanged for ordinary fat.

And on the basis of this inference,

let us say that you can resolve that which Rami bar Hama asked

[above, 2a], who was uncertain concerning this case in which ordinary fat was exchanged for forbidden fat, concerning which the court mistakenly ruled permission: is he considered one who relies upon himself, or one who relies upon the court? And let us resolve from here that he is considered one who relies upon himself, and is liable to a sacrifice.

And we reject this:

he can say to you

Rami bar Hama: We did not learn in the Mishna “they acted in error, and they acted intentionally, they are exempt” in order to infer from this that if it was exchanged for him, he is liable.

And if you will argue: If so, it would have been appropriate to teach in the Mishna that even in this case, which is considered an unwitting act similar to an intentional act, he is liable, and he is not considered one who relies upon the court; and we would know that if they had acted with complete intent, it is obvious that they are not considered to rely upon the court, and are exempt from a sin-offering.

Concerning this I say to you that what we learned in the latter clause, “they acted in error, and they acted intentionally,” is

because the tanna

of the Mishna taught in the

first clause, “they acted intentionally, and they acted in error,”

and therefore

the tanna

also

taught in the latter clause, “they acted in error, and they acted intentionally.”

And nothing at all can be inferred from here to resolve Rami bar Hama’s uncertainty.

Mishna:

The court ruled

in error to violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah,

and the entire congregation or its majority acted on their instruction, they bring a bull

for their atonement.

And if they ruled permission

concerning idolatry, they bring a bull and a goat; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

As it is stated in the section of Shelach: “And if you err and do not perform all these mitzvot,” and it is referring to idolatry, as we expound: “Which is the mitzva that is equivalent to all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idolatry.” And it is further stated there: “And the entire congregation shall offer one bull of the herd as an elevation-offering, for a pleasing fragrance to the Lord, together with its meal-offering and libation according to the regulation, and one goat for a sin-offering.” And we learn from this that for an unwitting transgression of the prohibition of idolatry on the basis of the court’s ruling, they bring a bull and a goat.

Rabbi Judah says:

In the case of an erroneous ruling, the court does not bring the bull, because the obligation to bring the bull is not imposed upon the court, but is an obligation upon the public; therefore

the twelve tribes bring twelve bulls,

because each tribe by itself is called “a congregation.” Therefore, each tribe must bring a sacrifice separately for its unwitting transgression.

And if there was a ruling of permission

concerning idolatry, they bring

the twelve tribes

twelve bulls and twelve goats 18 .