Horayot 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yosef raised a dilemma:

The court ruled that

there is no

prohibition against the labor of

plowing

is not forbidden

on Shabbat—what is the halakha?

Do we say: Since they acknowledge

the court

with regard to the entire matter,

that the other labors on Shabbat are prohibited, and they permitted only one labor—

it is analogous to permitting part and upholding part,

since the prohibition encompasses many acts and only one of them was uprooted; therefore, they are liable?

Or perhaps,

each labor is considered a prohibition in its own right, and

since they uproot the

labor of

plowing entirely,

and through their ruling they permitted a prohibited act in its entirety, the fact that additional acts are prohibited under this prohibition is of no avail; rather,

it is analogous to uprooting

the entire

substance.

And this is not included in a ruling of the court that obligates the offering for an erroneous ruling.

The Gemara proceeds to resolve the dilemma:

Come and hear

from what we learned: The court ruled that

there is

a prohibition of

a menstruating woman in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman who observes one day clean after one day of bleeding is exempt;

they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted

through their ruling

the

law of

a woman who observes one day clean after one day of bleeding entirely,

and nevertheless they are liable to bring an offering for this ruling. This proves that it is not considered uprooting the entire substance, unless they uprooted all the details of the mitzva. And we reject this:

Rav Yosef can say to you:

This is no proof, for it can be explained that

the woman who observes one day clean whom they mention

as having been permitted does not mean that they completely annulled the law of a woman with a discharge who observes one day clean. Rather,

as we explained

above, they permitted only ha’araha, the initial stage of intercourse. Or they ruled that if she saw blood at night, she does not have the status of a woman who observes one day clean after one day of bleeding. But they did not completely uproot the law of a woman who observes one day clean after one day of bleeding; if she saw blood during the day and he completed intercourse with her, they agree that it is prohibited and that he is liable to karet, even according to their ruling.

Come and hear,

from what we learned: The court ruled that

there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out from a private domain into a public domain

is exempt; they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted the

labor of

carrying out entirely.

Resolve Rav Yosef’s dilemma: It is evident that if they uprooted only plowing, it is not considered uprooting the entire substance, and they are liable.

We reject this:

There too,

the case does not involve uprooting the entire labor of carrying out, but rather

as we explained above,

they permitted only carrying in, or they permitted the acts of carrying an object from domain to domain by means of passing it or throwing it, while actual carrying out remains prohibited.

Come and hear

from what we learned: The court said

there is

a prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah, but one who bows

to an idol

is exempt;

they are liable.

And why? They have uprooted bowing entirely,

and this law is analogous to uprooting the labor of plowing.

We reject this:

They say: With regard to bowing as well,

the case does not involve completely uprooting bowing and ruling that it is not an act of worship prohibited in the context of idolatry. Rather,

as we explained above,

the case involves one in which they permitted only bowing not in the customary manner, but did not permit bowing in the customary manner.

Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma:

The court ruled that

there is no

prohibition against the labor of

Shabbat in

the

seventh

year—that is, the Sabbatical year—but only in the other years;

what is the halakha? [

The sides of the dilemma will be explained below].

The Gemara explains:

In what did they err?

What was the source of the court’s error in issuing such a novel ruling?

In this verse,

as it is written [Exodus 34],

“In plowing and in harvest you shall rest.”

In their error, they interpreted the word “you shall rest,” whose meaning is to rest from labor on the day of Shabbat, and expounded the verse as follows:

When there is

permission for

plowing, there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat. And when there is no

permission for

plowing,

that is, in the seventh year,

there is no

prohibition of

Shabbat.

The Gemara now returns to explain the sides of Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma:

Do we say: Since

in their ruling they

uphold it

the prohibition of Shabbat

during the other years of the Sabbatical cycle,

and they erred only with regard to the seventh year, ruling that Shabbat does not apply then,

it is analogous to permitting part and upholding part,

and they are liable?

Or perhaps, since they uproot it

the prohibition of Shabbat entirely

in

the

seventh year, it is analogous to uprooting the entire substance

of it

entirely,

and they are exempt?

Ravina said: Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

A prophet

who at the outset was a true prophet,

who prophesied

a false prophecy

to uproot a matter from the matters of the Torah

completely

is liable

by strangulation.

But if he prophesied

to permit part

of a mitzva

and uphold part

of it, rather than abolishing it entirely,

Rabbi Shimon says: He is exempt.

And the Rabbis also agree with him.

However, this law—that he is not liable unless he prophesies to uproot the entire mitzva—applies specifically to the other mitzvot. But

with regard to idolatry, even if

he prophesies to abolish only part of it, such as when he

says

in his prophecy:

“Today worship it,

you must worship the idol,

and tomorrow abolish it”

and do not worship it

—he is liable. [According to the Rabbis, he is liable to stoning, and according to Rabbi Shimon, to strangulation]. For the law of idolatry is distinct, as it is stated concerning it: “To lead you astray from the way,” and we expound “from”—even part—to teach that even if the prophet tells you to violate only part of the prohibition of idolatry, he is liable to death for it.

Since we find that even a prophecy of “today worship it and tomorrow annul it” is considered in the beraita nullification of part and upholding of part, therefore,

Since we find that even a prophecy of “Today worship it and tomorrow abolish it” is considered in the beraita to be permitting part and upholding part, therefore

infer from this

that the same applies when the court says,

“There is no Shabbat in the seventh year,”

but there is a prohibition of Shabbat during the other years of the Sabbatical cycle. This ruling is analogous to “Today worship it and tomorrow abolish it,” and is considered

analogous to permitting part and upholding part,

and they are liable.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this!

Mishna:

The court ruled

to permit a prohibited matter in error,

and one of them knew

—one of the judges—

that

his fellow judges

were mistaken

in the law.

And he said to them:

Know that

you are mistaken!

But the judges did not accept his words, and they decided and ruled to permit the matter according to their position, since the majority of the judges is followed; they are exempt from bringing the bull for an erroneous ruling. For their ruling is not considered a complete ruling that obligates them to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling, when one of the judges does not agree with the ruling.

or if the mufla of the court was not present,

the head of the Sanhedrin,

there,

in the court,

at the time when they issued this ruling, even though he does not need to be included among the seventy-one judges;

nevertheless, if he did not participate in this ruling, they do not bring the bull for an unwitting communal transgression.

Or if one of them was

among the judges who issued the unwitting ruling,

a convert, a mamzer, or a Natin [

the Natinim are the Gibeonites who converted in the days of Joshua],

or an elderly man who is not fit to have children,

as all of these are unfit to issue rulings,

he is exempt

from bringing the bull for an unwitting communal transgression.

And from where is it derived that if one of them was a convert, a mamzer, a Natin, or an elderly man who is not fit to have children, they are exempt?

As it is stated here,

with regard to an unwitting ruling of the court,

“assembly”—“If the entire assembly of Israel shall err”;

“If the entire congregation of Israel shall err.”

and it is stated elsewhere,

with regard to judges who adjudicate capital cases,

“assembly”—“And the assembly shall judge” and “And the assembly shall save.”

“And the congregation shall judge” and “And the congregation shall rescue.”

Just as the assembly mentioned there,

with regard to capital cases, must consist of judges who are

all fit to issue rulings,

as we will expound below in the Gemara,

so too, the assembly mentioned here,

with regard to a court’s ruling, is not liable to bring the bull mentioned in the passage

until all of them are fit to issue rulings.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

“Or if the mufla of the court was not present”

when the judges issued this unwitting ruling, they are exempt from bringing a bull.

From where do we derive this?

Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

The reason for this law is analogous to the reason we find regarding another law, as it was taught in a beraita:

For what reason did

the Sages say [above, 4a] that if

the court ruled

that something was prohibited

in a matter to which the Sadducees concede,

they are

exempt

from bringing a bull?

Because they should have

the judges

studied but did not study,

and they are not considered completely unwitting, but rather close to intentional.

The same law applies when

the mufla of the court was not present

at the time of the ruling:

they are likewise exempt

for the same reason,

because they should have studied

and consulted the mufla,

but did not study;

rather, they issued an erroneous ruling according to their own reasoning, and they are therefore considered close to intentional.

We learned in our Mishna that in the case of an unwitting ruling of the court, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, as

it is stated there,

with regard to capital cases,

“assembly,” and it is stated here

with regard to a court’s ruling,

“assembly.”

Just as the assembly mentioned in connection with appointing judges to adjudicate capital cases must consist of judges

until all of them are fit to issue rulings,

so too here, their ruling does not render them liable to bring the bull for an unwitting communal transgression until all of them are fit to issue rulings, and not a convert, Natin, or mamzer.

We raised an objection:

And there,

regarding appointing a court to adjudicate capital cases, from which you derive the law here—that they are liable to bring a sacrifice only if all of them are fit to issue rulings—

from where

do we derive that there, too, all of them must be fit to issue rulings?

And we explain:

For Rav Hisda said: The verse states

with regard to Moses our Teacher, when he established the Sanhedrin,

“And they shall stand there with you.”

And we expound

“with you” to mean, similar to you,

that all of them must be fit to issue rulings as you are. From there they derived that in every Great Sanhedrin all of them must be fit to issue rulings.

We then derive by means of the gezeira shava “assembly–assembly” that liability to bring the bull for an unwitting communal transgression due to a court’s ruling likewise depends on this condition: The ruling must issue from a court in which all the judges are fit to issue rulings.

But we reject this: From where do you know that “with you” is to be expounded as “similar to you”?

And say:

The Holy One, blessed be He, did not say to Moses, “And they shall stand

with you,” in order to expound “with you” as “similar to you”; rather, the verse is to be understood according to its simple meaning, namely, that they should stand there out of honor for

in order to expound “with you” as “similar to you,” but rather according to the simple meaning of the verse: they should stand there out of respect

the Divine Presence,

so that they would not enter farther into the place of the Divine Presence. It was necessary to warn them about this because He had said to him, “Gather for Me,” which implies that they should enter the place of the Divine Presence. Therefore, He informed him that they should stand with him and not enter.

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Indeed, even in capital cases they did not derive the requirement that the judges be fit to issue rulings from “with you,” but from what

the verse states

to Moses:

“And they shall bear the burden with you,”

and we expound

“with you” to mean, similar to you,

that they must be fit to issue rulings as you are.

Mishna:

If the court issued a ruling

permitting a prohibited matter, when they were

unwitting

in this ruling,

and the entire community acted

in accordance with what the court had ruled permissible, when they were

unwitting,

because they relied on the court’s ruling,

the court brings

the

bull

for an unwitting communal transgression.

But if the court ruled that a prohibited matter was permitted, and issued this ruling when they were

intentional,

knowing that this was not the law but nevertheless ruling that it was permitted,

and

the community acted on their instruction while

unwitting,

because they relied on the court’s ruling and did not know that the law was otherwise,

they bring,

each member of the community,

a female sheep or a female goat,

as is the law for an individual who sins unwittingly. The court does not bring a bull, as it is stated: “If the entire assembly of Israel shall err,” teaching us that there is no liability to bring a bull for the community’s unwitting act until the court, too, is unwitting.

If the court issued a ruling

unwittingly,

having erred in the law,

and

the community acted in accordance with the court’s ruling while

intentional,

knowing that the court had erred in this ruling but nevertheless acting in accordance with it,

these—

the court and the community—

are exempt

from every sacrifice. The court does not bring the bull for an unwitting communal transgression, since the community was not unwitting. And each member of the community does not bring a ḥatat sacrifice, since they acted intentionally, and one who acts intentionally cannot attain atonement through a sacrifice.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The court issued an erroneous ruling

and they acted

the people

intentionally; they are exempt.

The Gemara infers: This indicates that it is specifically when the people acted with full intent that they are exempt from bringing an offering.

But if the unintentional act is analogous to an intentional act,

meaning that he did not actually base his actions on the court, he is

liable

to bring an individual offering.

And what are the circumstances

of an unintentional act analogous to an intentional act, for which he is liable to bring an offering? For example,

the court ruled that a certain type of forbidden fat

was

permitted [and did not rule that all forbidden fat was permitted, because by doing so they would uproot the entire body of the Torah, and it was explained above that such a ruling is not considered a valid ruling], and each member of the community wished to eat ordinary fat,

but it was exchanged for him: this forbidden fat concerning which the court had ruled that it was permitted, he mistook

for ordinary fat,

and he ate

it

—that forbidden fat. In this case, the reason that he ate the forbidden fat was not that he based its permissibility on the court, but rather that he erred, thinking that it was ordinary fat.

This is considered “analogous to an intentional act,” because it resembles an intentional act in that one who acts intentionally does not act because he bases himself on the court; likewise, this unintentional offender did not eat the forbidden fat because he based himself on the court. And concerning such a case we learned in the Mishna that each individual must bring a sin offering, because he is not considered to have based himself on the court. For although the court ruled that this forbidden fat was permitted, nevertheless, he did not eat it on the basis of their ruling, but because he mistook forbidden fat for ordinary fat.

On the basis of this inference,

shall we say that we can resolve the matter that Rami bar Ḥama raised

[above, on page 2a], when he was uncertain about the law in a case where a person mistook ordinary fat for forbidden fat concerning which the court had erroneously ruled that it was permitted: Is he considered to rely on himself, or to rely on the court? We could resolve from here that he is considered to rely on himself, and is liable to bring an offering.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rami bar Ḥama could say:

We did not learn in the Mishna that when the court acted unintentionally and the people acted intentionally they are exempt in order to infer from this that if a person mistook one substance for another, he is liable.

And if you would claim: If so, it would have been appropriate for the Mishna to teach that even in this case, which is considered an unintentional act analogous to an intentional act, he is liable and is not considered to rely on the court; and we would know that if they had acted with full intent, it is obvious that they would not be considered to rely on the court and would be exempt from a sin offering.

To this I would say to you that the reason we learned in the latter clause, “They acted unintentionally and the people acted intentionally,” is

because the tanna

of the Mishna first taught in

the first clause, “They acted intentionally and the people acted unintentionally,”

and therefore the

tanna

also

taught in the latter clause, “They acted unintentionally and the people acted intentionally.”

No inference can be drawn from here to resolve Rami bar Ḥama’s uncertainty.

Mishna:

If the court ruled

in error that it was permitted to violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah,

and the entire people or the majority acted on the basis of their ruling, they bring a bull offering

for atonement.

And if they ruled that it was permitted

to engage in idolatry, they bring a bull offering and a goat offering; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

As it is stated in the portion of Shelach: “And if you err and do not perform all these mitzvot,” and this refers to idolatry, as we expound: “Which mitzva is equivalent to all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idolatry.” It is further stated there: “And the entire assembly shall offer one bull of the herd as a burnt offering, for a pleasing fragrance to the Lord, with its meal offering and libation according to the law, and one goat as a sin offering.” We learn from this that for an unintentional violation of the prohibition against idolatry on the basis of the court’s ruling, they bring a bull offering and a goat offering.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

For an erroneous ruling, the court does not bring the bull offering, because the obligation to bring the bull offering does not rest upon the court; rather, it is an obligation incumbent upon the community. Therefore,

the twelve tribes bring twelve bulls,

because each tribe is itself called “a community.” Therefore, each tribe must bring an offering separately for its unintentional act.

And if the ruling that it was permitted

to engage in idolatry, they bring

the twelve tribes

twelve bulls and twelve goats 18 .