Horayot 4a — the Talmud in English

And the doubt is whether he is considered one who depends on himself, is

and it is not necessary according to the one who says that the community brings [the offering],

they are the ones who bring the bull for an erroneous matter, for according to his words, since they collect the cost of the offering from the community, consequently

the matter becomes public

that the court retracted its ruling, and there is room to doubt whether he is one who depends on himself.

But even according to the one who says that the court brings

the bull, and not the community, and according to his words

the matter does not become public

that they retracted, nevertheless it is possible that he is considered one who depends on himself, since

if he had asked, they would have told him.

If he had inquired and asked, they would have informed him that they had erred and retracted their ruling; therefore he brings a provisional guilt-offering because of the doubt.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida,

to explain the reason of Sumakhos, who exempts:

The case of Sumakhos: to what is it comparable? To a person

who is liable for a sin-offering

who brought his atonement,

whose sin-offering blood was placed on the horns of the altar

at twilight,

so that there is here a

doubt:

perhaps

during the day

the sin-offering blood was placed on the altar, and

he was atoned for,

the atonement took effect,

and a doubt

perhaps

he was atoned for after nightfall [the blood was placed on the altar], and the atonement did not take effect. For it is stated concerning a sin-offering, “on the day of his commandment,” and we expound from here that the blood must be placed on the altar specifically during the day. And the law in this situation is

[when its blood was placed on the altar], and the atonement did not take effect. For it is stated concerning a sin-offering, “on the day that he commanded,” and we expound from this that its blood must be placed on the altar specifically during the day. In such a case,

that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering.

And this is because during twilight there is no clear side of liability, for “twilight” is the blink of an eye, and a person cannot determine whether it belongs to the day or to the night .

And the same is true here: there is no clear side of liability, for he certainly was also one who depended on the court; therefore he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering .

And the side of the doubt that he is one who depends on the court is:

It is not necessary according to the one who says that the court

are the

ones who bring

the bull for an erroneous matter, for according to his words it is certain

that the matter did not become public

that the court retracted its ruling.

But even according to the one who says that the community brings

the bull,

for the matter becomes public

that the court retracted its ruling,

and

if he had asked and clarified, certainly

they would have told him

that the court had retracted,

for here,

he is considered one who depends on the judgment of the court, and his law is

like a doubt

whether he was atoned for

during the day, a doubt

whether he was atoned for

after nightfall,

and he is exempt. For

if he had asked,

if he had asked, they would not have told him; therefore he would not be considered one who depends on himself, because

a person does not find someone to ask,

and therefore he is considered one who depends on the court and is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering .

We learned in our Mishna:

Ben Azzai said

to Rabbi Akiva,

what is different

about this one who went to a country overseas

from one who sits

in his home? And Rabbi Akiva answered him that one who sits in his home could have heard, whereas this one could not have heard; therefore one who went to a country overseas is considered one who depends on the court, for although they retracted, nevertheless we presume that he did not hear.

And we challenge:

Rabbi Akiva has answered Ben Azzai properly,

explaining that one who went to a country overseas is exempt, because he is considered one who depends on the court since he did not know; so in what did Ben Azzai disagree with him?

And we answer:

Rava said,

indeed, it is certainly true that one who went to a country overseas and acted according to the ruling of the court after they retracted has a reason to exempt him, since he did not know, and in this they both agree. However, here we are not speaking of a situation in which he is already in a country overseas, but he is still at home, and only

has set out on the road,

that is, he is preparing to go but has not yet gone .

And this situation

is the point of difference between them.

According to Ben Azzai —

he is liable, for he is in his home,

and he should have heard that they retracted, and therefore he is considered one who depends on himself.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Akiva —

he is exempt, for he has set out on the road,

and he was preoccupied with the needs of the journey; therefore it was impossible for him to hear that they had retracted. Accordingly, he is one who depends on the court and is completely exempt.

We learned in our Mishna:

If the court ruled to uproot the entire body [of a mitzva],

they are exempt:

The Sages taught: “And a matter was hidden”

from the eyes of the court,

but not that

the law of

the entire mitzva

was uprooted through their error, for in such a case they are exempt from the bull for an erroneous matter!

How so? They said: There is no

prohibition of

menstruation in the Torah,

or

there is no

prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah,

or

there is no

prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah—could they perhaps be liable?

The text says: “And a matter was hidden,” but not that an entire mitzva became hidden.

Therefore, if they ruled to uproot the entire mitzva,

they are exempt.

But

if

they said, “There is menstruation in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman observing one day corresponding to one day is exempt,”

or they said,

“There is Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out from a private domain to a public domain is exempt,”

or they said,

“There is idolatry in the Torah, but one who bows down is exempt”—could they perhaps be exempt?

The verse states: “And a matter was hidden,” but not the entire body.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita

: The Master said

in the latter clause

: “Perhaps they will be exempt”

when they did not uproot the entire mitzva.

And

this is apparently difficult

: If

also

when they fulfill part and nullify part they are exempt, and

so too

when they uproot the entire body they are exempt,

if so

in what,

in what manner is the law stated in the Torah that they are

obligated

to bring the bull for the hidden matter?

And we explain

: The tannaitic authority found this difficult as follows: Say

that the verse in the Torah, “And a matter was hidden,”

means the entire matter,

and let it be said that, on the contrary, specifically when the entire matter was hidden from the eyes of the court are they obligated, but when only part of a mitzva was hidden from them, they should be exempt. Therefore we expound

: The verse states: “And a matter was hidden,”

to teach you that only when they uprooted part are they obligated, but when they uprooted everything they are exempt.

And we object

: What does this indicate?

How can it be heard from the expression “And a matter was hidden” that it is speaking of a case in which part of the matter was hidden?

And we answer

: Ulla said: Read in it, “And it was hidden from the matter.”

That is, the letter mem written at the end of the word “was hidden” is expounded both with what precedes it and with what follows it, as though “from the matter” were written, whose meaning is part of the matter and not all of it.

Hezekiah said,

the intention of the beraita is not to expound from the words “And a matter was hidden,” but from the end of the verse. For

the verse says: “And they performed one of all the mitzvot.”

And we expound

“of all the mitzvot,” but not all the mitzvot!

And we object to this exposition: On the contrary,

“mitzvot” indicates two!

That is, its meaning is that they erred concerning one mitzva out of many mitzvot, such as menstruation, Shabbat, and idolatry. Apparently, the explanation of the verse is as follows: “And he performed one of all the mitzvot of the Lord”—he transgressed one of these mitzvot, such as Shabbat or idolatry or menstruation, and it is always speaking of one who uprooted the entire body.

And we answer

: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: “Mitzvot” is written

with one vav, and its meaning is one mitzva. The intention is that they transgressed only part of the one mitzva, and the verse excludes the case in which they transgressed and nullified one mitzva in its entirety, in which case they are exempt.

Rav Ashi said,

the tannaitic authority in our Mishna did not expound from the word “matter” itself, for in truth this word does not indicate that the case is specifically one in which they transgressed part of a mitzva and did not nullify the entire mitzva. Rather,

he derives

a gzera shava

“matter

—matter” from the rebellious elder.

For it is written concerning the rebellious elder: “When a matter is too difficult for you,

do not turn away

from the matter that they tell you, right or left.”

Just as

an

rebellious elder

is liable only when he ruled against the majority concerning

“the matter,”

only concerning part of the mitzva,

and not the entire matter,

for if he ruled that there is no Torah mitzva to don phylacteries, he is exempt; and only if he ruled concerning part of the mitzva, such as if he ruled that one must make five compartments in the phylacteries, adding to the words of the Sages, is he liable—so too with a ruling,[ [A0066]]there is no liability upon the court for it unless they ruled in error concerning part of the

matter, part of the mitzva, and not that they ruled to nullify the entire body completely. The same law applies

also to a ruling:

the court is liable for it only if they ruled in error concerning part of the

matter,

part of the mitzva,

and not

that they ruled to nullify

the entire body

completely.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The court is not liable

for the bull for the hidden matter

until they rule

that something is permitted concerning

a matter concerning which the Sadducees do not concede,

that is, a matter that is not explicit in the Torah.

But

if they mistakenly ruled that something is permitted

concerning a matter concerning which the Sadducees concede

that it is forbidden—that is, concerning a matter that is explicitly stated in the Torah as forbidden—they are

exempt.

For a ruling concerning such a matter is not considered an erroneous ruling.

What is the reason? Go and read it in the schoolhouse.

Since the judges could study and know that this matter is forbidden, their error is not considered an error but something close to intentionality; therefore this ruling of theirs is not considered a ruling.

And we ask: Indeed,

And we object: For

we learned

in our Mishna: If the court said,

“There is

a prohibition of menstruation in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day is exempt,”

they are liable.

And why?

Does not

a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day,

although this is not the uprooting of the entire body, nevertheless count as a matter whose prohibition the Sadducees acknowledge, since

it is written

in the Torah

“And she shall count for herself,”

and it is a tradition in the hands of the Sages that the Sadducees too expound the superfluous word “for herself,”

teaching that she counts

one

day corresponding to one

day—one clean day corresponding to the day on which she saw blood? And we answer: It is not speaking of a case in which the court said that there is no law at all of a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day.

Rather,

that they say that initial penetration is permitted

with a woman who must observe one day

, and

only

completion of intercourse is forbidden.

And we reject this:

This too is written

explicitly in the Torah:

“He exposed her source.”

And this is the source that initial penetration is forbidden.

Therefore we answer in another manner: For example,

that they say

that if one has intercourse with a woman who must observe one day, even with completion of intercourse, only

in the usual manner

is it

forbidden,

but

not in the usual manner,

even completion of intercourse

is permitted.

And again we reject this:

And again we reject this:

But

also

“the intercourse of a woman” is written!

Its meaning is that two forms of intercourse are forbidden, one in the usual manner and one not in the usual manner. And we answer: Rather, in truth their error is that they distinguished between initial penetration and completion of intercourse,

saying

that if one has intercourse with her

in the usual manner, it is forbidden even with initial penetration,

but if one has intercourse with her

not in the usual manner,

then specifically

completion of intercourse is forbidden, but initial penetration is permitted.

And they erred in learning that the verse “He exposed her source” refers only to the manner in which he has intercourse with her in the usual manner, whereas in truth they expounded it even concerning the manner in which he has intercourse with her not in the usual manner.

And we object: It is impossible to say that the Mishna intended this error. For

if so,

this error does not exist specifically concerning the law of a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day, but

even concerning a menstruating woman as well

they would err and permit initial penetration not in the usual manner, since even concerning a menstruating woman the Torah did not explicitly state a prohibition in this manner.

And we answer

: Rather, always,

it is speaking of a case in which they ruled that initial penetration is permitted with a woman who must observe one day even

in the usual manner.

And concerning what we asked—that initial penetration was explicitly forbidden in the Torah, and even the Sadducees acknowledge it—it may be said that

the Sadducees say

that this prohibition was stated specifically concerning an ordinary menstruating woman and not concerning a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day, because

“initial penetration is written concerning a woman who flows” 12 .

And if you wish, say

to answer the first question: The Sadducees acknowledge that a woman who must observe one day is forbidden by the Torah:

It may be said that it is speaking of a case

that they say

the court

that a woman with a discharge is only

if she saw blood

in the daytime

and not at night. And they erred and expounded that what

is written

concerning menstruation

“all the days of her flow”

comes to say that she must have a sighting specifically during “days,” that is, if she saw during the nightsof the eleven days fit for “the days of the flow,” she is pure, and likewise she does not have the law of a woman who must observe one day corresponding to one day.

However, the truth is that even if she saw at night, she becomes a menstruating woman and one who must observe one day. And concerning this law the Sadducees do not acknowledge the prohibition, for only “the days of her flow” is written in the Torah.

And we raise another objection against Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel:

We learned:

the court said

there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries from one domain to another is exempt,

these are liable!

And why?

The prohibition of

carrying out—is it not written

explicitly [in Jeremiah 17]

“You shall not carry a burden out of your houses.”

And we answer: It is not speaking of a situation in which they permitted the labor of carrying out entirely, but rather

that they said: carrying out

from the private domain to the public domain

is what is forbidden.

But

bringing in

from the public domain to the private domain

is permitted,

and this is not explicitly written in the Torah as forbidden.

And if you wish, say: They said that carrying out and bringing in

are what is forbidden,

but

extending

from this domain to that domain, or

throwing

from this domain to that domain,

is permitted,

and this is not explicitly written in the Torah as forbidden.

And we raise another objection:

We learned

in our Mishna: They said

there is

a prohibition of

idolatrous worship in the Torah, but one who bows down

to idolatry

is exempt,

these are liable.

And why?

After all, the prohibition of

one who bows down

to idolatry

is it not written

in the Torah,

as it is written: “You shall not bow down to another deity”?!

And we answer: It is not speaking of a situation in which they permitted every bowing, but rather

that they said: when bowing is forbidden,

that is specifically

in its customary manner,

for example, with ordinary idolatry, for this is its manner of worship,

but not in its customary manner,

for example, bowing to Pe'or or to Markulis, whose manner of worship is not through bowing,

is permitted.

And this is not explicitly written in the Torah as forbidden.

And if you wish, say:

It is speaking of a situation

in which they said

that specifically

bowing itself

to idolatry whose manner is so is forbidden only

in its customary manner

of bowing;

that is what is forbidden, because it includes spreading out the hands and feet. But bowing

not in its customary manner, for example,

when it does not include spreading out the hands and feet, is permitted 15 .