Horayot 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

And the doubt whether he is considered one who relied upon himself is present

and this is not necessary according to the one who says that the community brings

the bull for an unwitting decision, since according to his view, because the money for the offering is collected from the community, it follows that

the matter becomes public knowledge

that the court retracted its ruling, and there is reason to doubt whether he is considered one who relied upon himself.

Rather, even according to the one who says that the court brings

the bull, and not the community, and according to his view

the matter does not become public knowledge

that they retracted their ruling, nevertheless it is possible that he is considered one who relied upon himself, since

if he had asked, they would have told him.

If he had inquired and asked, they would have informed him that they had erred and retracted their ruling. Therefore, he brings an asham talui because of the doubt.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said, and some say Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida,

to explain the reason for Sumakhos’s exemption:

What is Sumakhos’s analogy? To what can this be compared? To a person

who is obligated to bring a sin-offering,

who brought his atonement-offering,

whose sin-offering’s blood was placed on the horns of the altar

during twilight,

so that there is

a doubt:

perhaps

while it was still day

the sin-offering’s blood was placed on the altar, and

he attained atonement,

meaning that the atonement took effect,

and a doubt

perhaps

he attained atonement after nightfall [the blood was placed on the altar], and the atonement did not take effect. For it is stated concerning a sin-offering: “On the day that he commands,” and we derive from here that the blood must be placed on the altar specifically during the day. And in such a case, the law is

[when its blood was placed on the altar], and the atonement did not take effect. For it is stated concerning a sin-offering, “on the day that he commanded,” and we expound from this that its blood must be placed on the altar specifically during the day. In such a case,

that he does not bring an asham talui. [

Or Sameah Shabbat, chapter 5], or because the doubt does not concern the time itself but its legal status, and the presumption of the time cannot clarify that status [ Ra" A, beginning of Berakhot]. How, then, could the Rosh write that we establish the day according to its presumptive status? And in Chazon Yehezkel he added a further difficulty from the Tosefta in Keritot [chapter 2, halakha 7], where it is taught that one who lacks atonement and offered his offering when there was a doubt whether it was already dark must again bring a bird sin-offering because of the doubt. He distinguished between our sugya, in which he knew when he brought his offering but was uncertain whether it was day or night—and in this case the presumption of day is effective—and the Tosefta, in which he was uncertain when he sprinkled the blood, and concerning that the presumption is not effective. [See there, where he explained the words of Rabbeinu Hananel likewise.] It is possible that the Rosh intended the words of Tosafot Rid in our sugya: Sumakhos exempts him because the prohibition was not established. This accords with the words of Tosafot in Keritot [17b], that only at the conclusion of Shabbat do we say that the prohibition was established, because the entire day had been prohibited. Concerning this, the Rosh wrote that when the presumption of the day is one of permissibility, there is no obligation to bring an asham talui. See Magen Avraham [ 342]. But the Tosefta follows the view that an asham talui is required only when the prohibited status itself was established. The reason is that, since in the case of twilight there is no clear basis for liability—for “twilight” lasts only the blink of an eye, and a person cannot determine whether it belongs to the day or to the night—

The same applies here: there is no clear basis for liability, since it is certain that he also relied upon the court; therefore, he does not bring an asham talui.

And the basis for the doubt that he relied upon the court is as follows:

It is not necessary according to the one who says that the court

itself

brings

the bull for an unwitting decision, for according to his view it is certain

that the matter did not become public knowledge

that the court had retracted its ruling.

Rather, even according to the one who says that the community brings

the bull,

the matter does become public knowledge

that the court had retracted its ruling,

and

if he had asked and investigated, they certainly

would have told him

that the court had retracted its ruling.

Here,

he is nevertheless considered one who relied upon the court, and his status is

a doubt

whether he attained atonement

while it was still day, a doubt

whether he attained atonement

after nightfall,

in which case he is exempt. For

if he had asked,

if he had asked, they would not have told him; therefore, he would not be considered one who relied upon himself, because

no one would think to ask about it,

and consequently he is considered one who relied upon the court and is exempt from an asham talui.

We learned in our Mishna:

Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva,

to Rabbi Akiva,

“What is different

about this person who went to an overseas country

from one who remains

at home?” Rabbi Akiva answered him that one who remains at home could have heard, whereas this person could not have heard. Therefore, one who went to an overseas country is considered one who relied upon the court, because although they retracted their ruling, we nevertheless presume that he did not hear.

And we challenge this:

Rabbi Akiva has answered Ben Azzai well;

he explained that the one who went to an overseas country is exempt because, since he did not know, he is considered one who relied upon the court. What, then, was Ben Azzai’s objection?

And we answer:

Rava said:

Indeed, it is certainly true that one who went to an overseas country and acted on the basis of the court’s ruling after they had retracted it has a rationale for exemption, since he did not know, and both of them agree on this. However, here we are not dealing with one who was already in an overseas country, but with one who was still at home and merely

had set out on the road,

meaning that he was preparing to leave but had not yet gone.

And this is the practical difference

between them.

According to Ben Azzai—

he is liable, for he is at home,

and he should have heard that they had retracted their ruling; therefore, he is considered one who relied upon himself.

Whereas

according to Rabbi Akiva—

he is exempt, for he had set out on the road,

and he was preoccupied with the needs of the journey. Consequently, it was impossible for him to hear that they had retracted their ruling; therefore, he is one who relied upon the court and is entirely exempt.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If the court ruled to uproot the entire substance

of the mitzva, they are exempt”:

The Sages taught: “And the matter was hidden”

from the eyes of the court,

but not if

the law of

the entire mitzva

was uprooted through their error, for in such a case they are exempt from bringing the bull for an unwitting decision!

How so? They said: There is no

prohibition of

menstruation in the Torah,

or

there is no

prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah,

or

there is no

prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah—could they be liable?

The verse states: “And the matter was hidden,” but not when an entire mitzva became hidden.

Therefore, if they ruled to uproot the entire mitzva,

they are exempt.

But

if

they said: “There is menstruation in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman observing the day opposite the day is exempt,”

or they said,

“There is Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out an object from a private domain to a public domain is exempt,”

or they said,

“There is idolatry in the Torah, but one who prostrates himself is exempt”—could they be exempt?

The verse states: “And a matter was hidden,” but not the entire matter.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

The Master said

in the latter clause:

“One might have thought that they would be exempt”

when they did not uproot the entire mitzva.

And

this is seemingly difficult:

If

they are

exempt even when they fulfilled part and nullified part, and

likewise

when they uprooted the entire matter they are exempt,

then

in what case

does the Torah state that they are

liable

to bring the bull for an unwitting decision of the court?

And we explain:

The tanna found this difficult as follows: Let us say

that the verse’s wording, “and a matter was hidden,”

indicates the entire matter,

and say that, on the contrary, they are liable specifically when the entire matter was hidden from the eyes of the court; but if only part of a mitzva was hidden from them, they should be exempt. Therefore, we expound:

The verse states: “And a matter was hidden,”

to teach you that they are liable only when they uprooted part of the mitzva, but if they uprooted the entire mitzva, they are exempt.

And we challenge this:

What indication is there?

How do we hear from the wording “and a matter was hidden” that the verse is referring to a case in which part of the matter was hidden?

And we answer:

Ulla said: Read it as though it said, “and [something] was hidden from the matter.”

That is, the letter mem written at the end of the word “was hidden” is expounded both with the preceding word and with the following one, as though the verse had said “from the matter,” whose meaning is part of the matter and not all of it.

Ḥizkiya said:

The beraita does not intend to derive this from the words “and a matter was hidden,” but rather from the end of the verse.

For the verse states: “And they performed one of all the mitzvot.”

And we expound:

“Of all the mitzvot,” but not all the mitzvot!

And we challenge this exposition: On the contrary,

“mitzvot” indicates two things!

That is, the meaning is that they erred regarding one mitzva out of many mitzvot, such as nidda, Shabbat, or idolatry. Seemingly, this is the meaning of the verse: “And he performed one of all the mitzvot of the Lord”—he transgressed one of these mitzvot, such as Shabbat or idolatry or nidda, and the case could indeed involve uprooting the entire matter.

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: “Mitzvot” is written

with one vav, and its meaning is one mitzva. The intention is that they transgressed only part of the one mitzva, and the verse excludes a case in which they transgressed and nullified one mitzva in its entirety, in which case they are exempt.

Rav Ashi said:

The tanna of our Mishna did not expound the word “matter” itself, for this word does not actually indicate specifically that they transgressed part of a mitzva without nullifying the entire mitzva. Rather,

he derives

a gzera shava:

“Matter

[and] matter,” from the rebellious elder.

For it is written concerning the rebellious elder: “If a matter is too difficult for you,

do not deviate

from the matter that they tell you, right or left.”

Just as

the rebellious

elder

is liable only when he ruled against the majority

“concerning the matter,”

only regarding part of the mitzva,

and not the entire matter,

for if he ruled that there is no Torah mitzva to don phylacteries, he is exempt; he is liable only when he ruled regarding part of the mitzva, such as when he ruled that one must make five compartments in the phylacteries, adding to the words of the Scribes.

The same law applies

also to a ruling:

the court is liable for it only if they erred regarding part of the

matter,

part of the mitzva,

and not

if they ruled to nullify

the entire matter

completely.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A court is not liable

for the bull for an unwitting decision of the court

until they rule

that something is permitted

that the Sadducees do not acknowledge as forbidden,

that is, a matter not explicitly stated in the Torah.

But

if they mistakenly ruled that something is permitted

that the Sadducees acknowledge as forbidden,

that is, something explicitly stated in the Torah as prohibited, they are

exempt.

For a ruling concerning such a matter is not considered an unwitting ruling.

What is the reason? Go and read it in the schoolhouse;

since the judges could have learned and known that this matter is prohibited, their error is not considered an error but something close to intentionality. Therefore, this ruling is not considered a ruling .

And we challenge this: Indeed,

we learned

in our Mishna: If the court said

there is

a prohibition of

nidda in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity is exempt,

they are liable.

And why?

Is it not the case that

a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity,

although this is not the uprooting of the entire matter , is nevertheless considered a matter that the Sadducees acknowledge to be prohibited? For

it is written

in the Torah:

“And she shall count for herself,”

and it is an established tradition transmitted by the Sages that the Sadducees also expound the extra word “for herself”:

“It teaches that she counts

one

day corresponding to one

day”—one clean day corresponding to the day on which she saw blood?! And we answer: The court’s ruling did not concern a case in which they said that there is no law at all of a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity.

Rather,

they said that only the initial penetration is permitted

with regard to a woman who must observe one clean day

, and

only

complete intercourse is prohibited.

And we reject this:

This too is written

explicitly in the Torah:

“She has exposed her source.”

This is the source establishing that initial penetration is prohibited.

Therefore, we answer differently: For example,

they said

that if one has intercourse with a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity, even through complete intercourse, only

in the usual manner

is it

prohibited,

but

not in the usual manner,

even complete intercourse

is permitted

And again we reject this:

And we again reject this:

But

also

“the beds of a woman” is written!

Its meaning is that both forms of intercourse are prohibited, one in the usual manner and one not in the usual manner. And we answer: Rather, their error truly consisted in distinguishing between initial penetration and complete intercourse.

They said

that if one has intercourse with her

in the usual manner, it is prohibited even through initial penetration,

but if one has intercourse with her

not in the usual manner,

then specifically

complete intercourse is prohibited, but initial penetration is permitted.

They erred because they understood that the verse “She has exposed her source” refers only to intercourse in the usual manner, whereas in truth they should have expounded it even with regard to intercourse not in the usual manner.

And we challenge this: It is impossible to say that the Mishna was referring to this error. For

if so,

this error would not exist specifically with regard to the law of a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity;

even with regard to a woman in a state of nidda as well

they would err and permit initial penetration not in the usual manner, since the Torah also did not explicitly state a prohibition in this form.

And we answer:

Rather, in fact,

the case concerns their ruling that initial penetration is permitted with a woman who must observe one clean day, even

in the usual manner.

As for our question—that initial penetration is explicitly prohibited in the Torah, and even the Sadducees acknowledge this—we can say that

they said

that the prohibition was stated specifically with regard to an ordinary woman in a state of nidda, and not with regard to a woman who must observe one clean day, because

“initial penetration is written with regard to a menstruating woman.” 12 .

Alternatively, if you wish,

we can answer the first question—that the Sadducees acknowledge that a woman who must observe one clean day is prohibited by Torah law—as follows:

It can be said that the case is one

in which they said

that a woman is a zava

only

if she saw blood

during the daytime

and not at night. They erred and expounded that what

is written

regarding nidda:

“All the days of her flow,”

teaches that she must see specifically during the “days”—that is, if she saw at night during one of the eleven days designated as “days of flow,” she is pure, and she likewise does not have the status of a woman who must observe one clean day corresponding to one day of impurity.

However, the truth is that even if she saw at night, she becomes a woman in a state of nidda who must observe one clean day. And regarding this law, the Sadducees do not acknowledge the prohibition, since the Torah says only “the days of her flow.”

And we further challenge Rav Yehuda, who said that Shmuel said:

We learned:

the court said

there is

a prohibition

of Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries from one domain to another is exempt,

yet these are liable!

And why?

The prohibition

of carrying out—is it not written

explicitly [in Jeremiah 17] “

You shall not carry a burden out of your houses.”

And we answer: It is not referring to a case in which they permitted the labor of carrying out entirely; rather,

they said that carrying out

from the private domain to the public domain

is what is prohibited.

But

carrying in

from the public domain to the private domain

is permitted,

and this is not explicitly stated in the Torah as prohibited.

Alternatively, if you wish, say that they said that carrying out and carrying in

are what is prohibited,

but

passing

from one domain to another, or

throwing

from one domain to another,

is permitted,

and this is not explicitly stated in the Torah as prohibited.

We raise another difficulty:

We learned

in our Mishna: They said

there is

a prohibition

of idolatry in the Torah, but one who prostrates himself

to idolatry

is exempt,

yet these are liable.

And why?

The prohibition of

one who prostrates himself

to idolatry

is it not written

in the Torah,

as it is written: “You shall not bow down to another god”?!

And we answer: It is not referring to a case in which they permitted every form of prostration; rather,

they said: When prostration is prohibited,

that means specifically

in its customary manner,

for example, in the case of ordinary idolatry, for which this is the manner of its worship;

but not in its customary manner,

for example, prostration before Pe'or or Markulis, for which prostration is not the manner of its worship,

it is permitted.

And this is not explicitly stated in the Torah as prohibited.

Alternatively, if you wish,

the case is one in which

they said

that specifically

prostration itself

before idolatry whose worship is performed in that manner—only

in its customary manner

of prostration

is what is prohibited, as it includes spreading out the hands and feet. But prostration

not performed in its customary manner, such as

one that does not include spreading out the hands and feet is permitted 15 .