Horayot 3b — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps

they do not bring a bull, since

we require knowledge on the part of that court that issued the ruling,

and the matter depends upon the judges. If the error was not made known to the court that issued the ruling, and they did not retract, the law that they bring a bull does not apply. Here, however, the judges of the first court have already died, and they will never know that they erred; therefore, they do not bring a bull.

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

Rabbi Yonatan said:

even

one hundred

judges

who sat to issue a ruling

in the Great Court in Jerusalem, and issued an erroneous ruling to violate one of the mitzvot of the Torah,

are not liable

for a bull for the concealment of the matter,

until they all issue the ruling.

But if only the majority of the one hundred judges issued this ruling, although the law is determined according to the majority, they are exempt from bringing a bull for the concealment of the matter.

And although a Great Sanhedrin requires only seventy-one judges, here, since one hundred judges sat to issue the ruling, even though they are not all needed for the Sanhedrin, nevertheless they do not become liable to bring a bull until they all issue the ruling permitting [the act].

As it is stated: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall err.”

The verse teaches that they are not liable

until they all err—

until the ruling spreads throughout the entire assembly of Israel,

that is, among all the judges who sat to issue the ruling.

Rav Huna son of Rav Hoshaya said: This too is logically indicated,

that they are not liable until they all issue the ruling, even if they are one hundred.

For

in all

the laws of

the entire Torah, it is established that “the majority is like the whole.” And

if

here,

regarding a court’s ruling,

it is written, “the entire assembly.”

And if a ruling by the majority of the court were sufficient to become liable for an offering for the concealment of the matter, it would have been appropriate to write, “And if the assembly of Israel,” and we would know on our own that this means the majority of the judges. Since the Merciful One wrote, “the entire...”

Since this is so,

infer that in order to become liable for an offering for an erroneous ruling,

even if they are one hundred,

they must all issue the ruling to violate [the prohibition].

And we challenge:

We learned

in our Mishna:

If the court issued a ruling and one of them knew

of the judges

that they had erred, or a student who was fit to issue a ruling

who knew that the court had erred,

and he went

—the one who knew that the court had erred in its ruling—and transgressed,

and acted according to their word,

of the court that permitted [the act],

whether they acted

and the court transgressed according to its ruling,

and he acted

he too

with them, or whether they acted

the court

and he acted

this one

after them,

one after the other,

or whether they did not act

the court at all

and he acted,

this one,

he is liable

for a sin-offering,

because he did not rely upon the court

completely, for he knew that they had erred; and anyone who relies upon himself is liable.

And we infer:

This one [A0090][this judge]

judge

is liable

for a sin-offering, since he himself knew that his fellow judges had erred, and he relies upon himself. It follows that

another one,

a judge who did not know that the court had erred and acted according to their word, even though he acted in a case in which another judge knew that his colleagues had erred,

is exempt,

since the judge who acted relied upon the court.

But why? The ruling was not completed!

Since they did not all issue the ruling to violate [the prohibition], for one judge held that his fellow judges had erred.

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here? With a case in which one of them nodded

[moved]

his head

[of the judges, who knew that his fellow judges had erred]

at them,

and it appeared that he agreed with their words; therefore, the matter is considered as though they all issued the ruling and the ruling was completed.

And we challenge further:

Come and hear,

from what we learned below [4b],

If the court issued a ruling

to transgress,

and one of them knew that they had erred

the court in its ruling,

and said to them,

to his fellow judges,

“You are mistaken”

in your ruling,

“Behold, these”

the court

are exempt

from bringing a bull.

And we infer:

The reason is that he said to them

that judge, “

You are mistaken,”

he

is exempt. But

if

he remained completely silent,

that judge, and did not alert them to their error,

they are liable

the court to bring a bull, and it is considered

that their ruling was completed,

even though one judge did not issue the ruling together with them to transgress. Apparently, this is difficult:

Why? They did not all issue the ruling,

for one of them remained silent.

And we answer:

They said: Here too,

this Mishna is speaking

of a case in which

that judge who remained silent

nodded

and moved

his head

in agreement with their words, so that he was like one who agreed with their words.

And we challenge further:

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection

from what the Sages said [Avoda Zara 36b] concerning the prohibition of gentile oil: the Sages prohibited it through the decree of the Eighteen Matters, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi examined the matter and saw that the decree prohibiting the oil had not spread among the majority of Israel to observe it as a prohibition; they arose and permitted the prohibition of the oil.

And our Rabbis relied

[Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi]

upon the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and upon the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok, who would say: A decree is not issued upon the community unless the majority of the community are able to endure it.

And Rav Adda bar Abba said: What verse

teaches us this matter—that one does not decree upon the community something which they cannot endure? [Malachi 3]

“

With a curse you are cursed, and Me you are robbing, the entire nation.”

That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, says to Israel: “With a curse you are cursed”—you accept upon yourselves a decree with a curse and imprecation, and it becomes forbidden to you; and afterward, “Me you are robbing”—you steal, for you again derive benefit from those very things that you prohibited to yourselves.

And all this applies specifically when it says, “the entire nation,” when the entire people accepted this prohibition upon themselves. But when the entire people did not accept this prohibition upon themselves, it is possible to annul the decree, and this is not considered “you are robbing Me.” From here we learn that any decree that did not spread among the majority of Israel because they are unable to accept it is not decreed in such a manner, or the decree that they issued is annulled.

And we challenge:

But here, where it is written, “the entire nation,”

nevertheless the force of the decree depends upon the majority of the community and not upon all of it literally, because

the majority is considered like the whole.

And it is proven that even where “all” is explicitly written, we follow the majority. If so, also regarding what is written concerning the bull for the concealment of the matter—“the entire assembly of Israel shall err”—we cannot learn from this that they are not liable until they all issue the ruling, even if they are one hundred!

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rabbi Yonatan; a refutation.

In truth, it is not necessary that they all issue the ruling in order to become liable for an offering.

And we challenge:

But if so, what is the meaning of “the entire assembly

of

Israel” that the Merciful One says?

Why did the verse not say, “And if the assembly of Israel shall err,” without saying “the entire”?

And we answer:

This is what the Merciful One said:

He said:

If all are present,

the entire Sanhedrin of seventy-one,

it is a ruling,

even though not all those who sat to issue the ruling permitting [the act] issued it, but only the majority; they are liable for a bull.

But if not,

if there are not seventy-one judges in the Sanhedrin,

it is not a ruling

Rabbi Yehoshua said: Ten who sit in judgment

—it is as though

a gallows-rope

[the hanging rope], which is the punishment for perverting judgment,

hangs around the necks of them all.

And although it is possible to judge with three judges, nevertheless here all of them are responsible for the distortion of judgment.

And he objects:

It is obvious

that anyone who renders a corrupted judgment is punished. And we answer:

This teaches us that even a student

who sits

before his teacher,

and a case comes before his teacher, and he knows and understands that his teacher is mistaken, yet remains silent, is punished.

When Rav Huna would go out to the court,

when he would go out and proceed to sit in court,

he would bring ten students of the school of Rav before him,

he would bring before him ten Torah scholars, and he would say that he did so

so that it would reach them,

so that if he should err in judgment, he would not receive the entire punishment alone, but only that from the punishment would come to him

“that which comes from the chip,”

like a small shaving that separates from a large beam. That is, if he should err in judgment, the punishment would be divided among all of them, so that the collar would hang upon the necks of all of them, and thereby his punishment would be eased for him.

When Rav Ashi would have a tereifa brought before him,

when questions concerning tereifot would come before him,

he would bring ten slaughterers,

he would bring before him ten men expert in tereifot,

from the town of Mahuza,

from the city of Mahuza,

and he would seat

them

before him. He said:

I do this

so that it would reach them

and the punishment would come upon me if I should err, only

“that which comes from the chip,”

and I would not bear the entire punishment alone.

Mishna:

a.

If the court instructed

the people to transgress one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah, and the majority of the public acted on their word,

and

again

they knew that they had erred, and withdrew from their ruling,

and instructed that it was prohibited,

whether

they had already

brought their atonement

the bull for the concealment of the matter of the public,

or whether

they had still

not brought their atonement, and there went

the individual who did not know that they had withdrawn,

and acted on their word,

Rabbi Shimon exempts him.

Since he acted with the authorization of the court, for he still did not know that they had erred and withdrawn. And since he relied on the ruling of the court, the individual is exempt from an individual sin-offering.

And Rabbi Eliezer says:

his law is

uncertain,

for it is uncertain whether he is like one who relies upon the court and is exempt, or like one who relies upon himself, since in practice the court withdrew from its ruling, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Therefore, he brings a suspensive guilt-offering, as is the law of one who is uncertain whether he committed an error requiring a sin-offering.

What is

the case considered to be an

uncertainty,

and why is it considered an uncertainty?

If he remained in his house

and acted according to their first ruling,

he is liable

to bring a suspensive guilt-offering, because there is a basis for uncertainty, since he could have clarified whether the court had withdrawn.

But if

he went to a land overseas

and acted on their word, he is

exempt

entirely, since it was not possible for him to clarify whether they had withdrawn.

Rabbi Akiva said: I concede in this case

that of one who went to a land overseas,

that he is close to being exempt from the obligation,

and he is exempt.

Ben Azzai said to him: What is different about this one from one who remains in his house

whom you hold liable?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Because

it was possible for the one who remained in his house to hear

and know that the court had withdrawn from its ruling, and he is considered one who relied upon himself; therefore, he is liable.

But this one

who went to a land overseas

could not hear

of their withdrawal; therefore, he is exempt.

And in the Gemara it will be explained in what they disputed and what Rabbi Akiva adds to the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

b.

If the court instructed to uproot the entire substance —

that they said to abolish the entire substance of the mitzva.

For example,

they said: There is no

prohibition in general of

Niddah in the Torah.

Or they said,

there is no

prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah.

Or they said,

there is no

prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah.

Even though the majority of the public acted on their word,

these

—the court—

are exempt.

For their ruling is not a ruling, since every person of Israel knows that these prohibitions are explicitly stated in the Torah.

But if

they instructed to abolish part

of the mitzva

and to uphold part of it, these are liable.

How so?

They said

the court:

There is

a prohibition of

Niddah in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman who observes one day corresponding to one day is exempt.

That is, if they erred and the court instructed that on that day she was permitted to her husband, this is a ruling that obligates the bringing of the bull for the concealment of the matter. Since they did not uproot the substance of the prohibition of Niddah, but only one detail of the prohibitions of Niddah,

and likewise if they said

there is

a prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out from a private domain into a public domain

is not performing one of the labors prohibited on Shabbat and

is exempt.

Or they said

there is a prohibition of idolatry in the Torah, but one who bows down

to it is not thereby performing one of the prohibited forms of worship, and

is exempt.

In all these cases, and similar ones,

these are liable,

since they did not uproot the entire substance of the prohibition.

But if they uprooted the entire substance of the prohibition, they are exempt,

as it is stated

in the section concerning the bull for the concealment of the matter,

“and the matter was concealed.”

And we derive specifically: if there was concealed from them

“a matter,” and not

that there was concealed from them

the entire substance

of the prohibition.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon

who exempts one who acts according to the court even after it has withdrawn?

Since he acts with the authorization of the court,

for he did not learn that they had withdrawn.

Some say: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Shimon would say: Every ruling that went forth,

that became known and spread

among the majority of the public, an individual who acts upon it

even after the court withdrew from its ruling,

is exempt.

For a ruling was given only

in order

to distinguish between one who errs and one who acts deliberately.

In other words, since one who acts on the basis of the ruling of the court is not considered sufficiently negligent in his error to be required to bring a sin offering, because he acted on their authority, the same applies to one who acted in error because he did not know that they had retracted their ruling: he is not required to bring a sin offering, because he acted on their authority.

The Gemara raises an objection to the reason given for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, according to which he exempts an individual who acts after the court has retracted its ruling, even when the court has already brought its atonement offering, since the individual acted on the basis of the court’s ruling without knowing that it had been retracted:

They raise an objection from a source:

We learned the following concerning the source of the money used to purchase communal offerings:

The bull for an error in a matter of law by the community,

which is brought when the community transgressed a Torah prohibition on the basis of the court’s ruling, because of an unwitting error by the court,

and the goats for idolatry,

which are brought when the people unwittingly worshipped idols on the basis of the court’s erroneous ruling, come from communal funds [according to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda]. They disagreed only about how the money is collected from the community:

“At first, money is collected for them; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.”

That is, money is collected separately from all Israel for the purchase of the bull and the goats for idolatry, to atone for them.

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees

and says: From the money

collected from

the chamber donation,

the funds that the community contributes by giving a half-shekel once a year, in the month of Adar, for communal offerings—

they come.

They did not make a separate collection for the bull and the goat for idolatry.

The Gemara raises an objection from this Mishna to the reason given above: Rabbi Shimon exempts an individual who relied on the court and did not know that the court had retracted its ruling, even when the court had already brought its atonement offering, because he did not know of the retraction and acted with the court’s authorization.

Why? And

it is

since

he himself says

that money is collected for them,

meaning that money is collected from the entire community in a special collection for this atonement, it is reasonable that money is collected from that individual as well. If so,

“It should be considered that he became aware”!

For he would have learned from those collecting the money for the bull for an error in a matter of law by the community that the court had already retracted its ruling, and therefore they were bringing an offering. His reliance on the court would no longer apply.

The Gemara answers:

And if you wish, say:

Rabbi Shimon exempted the individual in our Mishna only in a case

where they collected

from him

without specification,

and did not inform him what the collection was for.

And if you wish, say:

Our Mishna is discussing a case

such as one in which that individual was not

in the city

at that time,

meaning that he was not in the city when the money was collected, and therefore did not know that the court had retracted its ruling.

And if you wish, say: Rav

who explained Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning as being that the individual acts with the court’s authorization,

held according to another tan্নaitic source,

who held the view of the tanna who transmitted Rabbi Shimon’s statement regarding the manner of collection in a different form.

As it was taught in a source with the opinions reversed: “At first, money is collected for them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: From the chamber donation they come!”

There is no special collection for them. Since Rabbi Shimon holds that they come from the chamber donation, it is understandable why that individual did not know that the court had retracted its ruling.

A source taught:

A beraita taught four opinions of tannaim concerning this law:

Rabbi Meir holds him liable

for a sin offering—the individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling after the court had retracted it.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him

from everything.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The matter is uncertain.

In the name of Somkhus they said: His status is suspended.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

What practical difference is there between Rabbi Eliezer and Somkhus, even though according to both of them the matter is uncertain?

An offering for uncertain guilt is the difference between them!

According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have relied on himself and is liable for a sin offering, or whether he is considered to have relied on the court and is exempt. Therefore, he brings an offering for uncertain guilt.

According to Somkhus, however, there is no uncertainty as to whether he relied on himself; rather, his act itself is considered suspended. He certainly relied both on the court and on himself, and therefore it is impossible to hold him liable for an offering. There is no possible side on which he is liable for a sin offering, since he did not rely only on himself.

Rabbi Zeira said

to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s statement:

Rabbi Eliezer’s illustration

of his statement that the person’s reliance is uncertain

can be compared to what?

To a person who ate

a piece that was

possibly forbidden fat and possibly permitted fat,

and he thought it was permitted fat,

and he later learned

that it might have been forbidden fat,

he brings an offering

for uncertain guilt, since he is uncertain whether he unwittingly transgressed a matter for which he would be liable to bring a sin offering.

The same applies to the case discussed in our Mishna: it is uncertain whether he relied on himself and is liable for a sin offering, or relied on the court and is exempt. Therefore, he brings an offering for uncertain guilt.