Horayot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps

they do not bring a bull, since

we require knowledge of the court that issued the erroneous ruling,

and the matter depends on the judges. If the court that issued the ruling did not become aware of its error and did not retract its ruling, the law that they bring a bull does not apply. Here, however, the judges of the first court have already died, and they will never become aware that they erred; therefore, they do not bring a bull.

And we conclude:

The question remains unresolved.

Rabbi Yonatan said:

even

one hundred

judges

who sat to issue a ruling

in the Great Court in Jerusalem, and issued an erroneous ruling permitting the violation of one of the Torah’s mitzvot,

are not liable

to bring the bull for an unrecognized matter,

until all of them issue the ruling.

But if only the majority of the one hundred judges issued the ruling, although the law is decided according to the majority, they are exempt from bringing the bull for an unrecognized matter.

Although the Great Sanhedrin requires only seventy-one judges, here, since one hundred judges sat to issue the ruling, even though they are not all needed for the Sanhedrin, nevertheless they do not become liable to bring a bull until all of them issue a ruling permitting the act.

As it is stated: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall err.”

The verse teaches that they are not liable

until they all err—

until the ruling spreads throughout the entire assembly of Israel,

that is, among all the judges who sat to issue the ruling.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Hoshaya, said: This too is logically evident,

that they are not liable until all of them issue the ruling, even if they number one hundred.

For

throughout

all the laws of

the entire Torah, we hold that “the majority is equivalent to the whole.” And

if

here,

with regard to the court’s ruling,

it is written, “the entire assembly.”

If a ruling by the majority of the court were sufficient to incur liability for an offering for an unrecognized matter, the verse should have stated, “And if the assembly of Israel shall err,” without the word “entire,” and we would understand on our own that this means the majority of the judges. Since the Merciful One wrote “the entire”—

accordingly,

we learn that in order to incur liability for an offering due to an erroneous ruling,

even if they number one hundred,

they must all issue a ruling permitting the violation.

And we challenge this:

We learned

in our Mishna:

If the court issued a ruling and one of them knew

of the judges

that they had erred, or a student who was fit to issue a ruling

who knew that the court had erred,

and he went

—the one who knew that the court had erred in its ruling—and violated the prohibition,

and acted on their instruction

of the court that permitted it,

whether they acted

and the court itself acted according to its ruling

and he acted

as well

with them, or whether they acted

—the court—

and he acted

—this person—

after them

one after the other,

or whether they did not act

—the court did not act at all—

and he acted,

this person,

he is liable

for a sin-offering,

because he did not rely entirely on the court

since he knew that they had erred; and anyone who relies on himself is liable.

And we infer:

This

judge

is the one who is liable

for a sin-offering, since he himself knew that his fellow judges had erred, and he relied on himself. It follows that

another,

a judge who did not know that the court had erred and acted on its instruction, even though he acted in a case where another judge knew that his colleagues had erred,

is exempt,

because the judge who acted relied on the court.

But why? The ruling was not concluded!

Since they did not all issue a ruling permitting the act, for one judge held that his fellow judges had erred.

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here? With a case in which one of them nodded

—moved

that

—one of the judges who knew that his fellow judges had erred—

his head,

and it appeared that he agreed with their words. Therefore, it is considered as though they all issued the ruling and the ruling was concluded.

And we challenge further:

Come and hear,

from what we learned below [4b]:

If the court issued a ruling

to violate the prohibition,

and one of them knew that they had erred

in their ruling,

and said to them

—to his fellow judges—

“You are mistaken”

in your ruling—

then they

—the court—

are exempt

from bringing a bull.

And we infer:

The reason is that he said to them

that judge, “

You are mistaken,”

and that is why they

are exempt. But

if

that judge remained completely silent

and did not point out their error,

they are liable,

the court, to bring a bull, and it is considered

that their ruling was concluded,

even though one judge did not issue a ruling with them permitting the act. Seemingly, this is difficult:

Why? They did not all issue a ruling,

since one of them remained silent.

And we answer:

They say: Here too,

this Mishna is speaking

of a case in which

the judge who remained silent

nodded

and moved

his head

in agreement with their words, so that he was considered to have agreed with them.

And we challenge further:

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection

from what the Sages said [Avoda Zara 36b] concerning the prohibition against gentile oil. The Sages had prohibited it through one of the eighteen decrees, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi investigated and saw that the decree prohibiting the oil had not spread among most of Israel, who did not practice this prohibition; so they arose and permitted the oil.

And our Sages relied

—Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi—

on the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and on the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok, who would say: “A decree may be enacted upon the community only if the majority of the community is able to abide by it.”

And Rav Adda bar Abba said: What verse

teaches us this principle, that a decree may not be enacted upon the community when they cannot abide by it? [Malachi 3] “

‘You are cursed with a curse, yet you rob Me—the entire nation.’”

That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, says to Israel: “‘You are cursed with a curse’”—you accept upon yourselves a decree accompanied by a curse and malediction, and it becomes prohibited to you; and afterward, “‘yet you rob Me’”—you rob Me, because you again derive benefit from those very things that you prohibited to yourselves.

All this applies specifically when “the entire nation” has accepted this prohibition upon itself. But when the entire nation has not accepted this prohibition upon itself, it is possible to annul the decree, and this is not considered “robbing Me.” From here we learn that when a decree has not spread among most of Israel because they are unable to accept it, such a decree should not be enacted, or the decree that was enacted should be annulled.

And we challenge this:

But here it is written, “the entire nation,”

and nevertheless the force of the decree depends on the majority of the community rather than on literally all of it, because

the majority is considered equivalent to the whole.

This proves that even where “all” is explicitly written, we follow the majority. If so, the same should apply concerning the verse about the bull for an unrecognized matter, “the entire assembly of Israel shall err”; one cannot derive from this that they are not liable until all of them issue the ruling, even if they number one hundred!

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rabbi Yonatan; a refutation.

Indeed, it is not necessary for all of them to issue the ruling in order to become liable for an offering.

And we challenge this:

But what then does “the entire assembly of

Israel

that the Merciful One said”

mean? Why did the verse not say, “And if the assembly of Israel shall err,” without saying “entire”?

And we answer:

This is what the Merciful One means:

He said:

If all are present,

all seventy-one members of the Sanhedrin,

it is a ruling,

even if not all those who sat to issue the ruling permitting the act issued it, but only the majority; nevertheless, they are liable to bring a bull.

But if not,

if there are not seventy-one judges in the Sanhedrin,

it is not a ruling.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: Ten who sit in judgment

are like

a gallows

—the hanging rope, which is the punishment for perverting judgment—

hanging from the neck of all of them.

Although a case may be judged by three judges, nevertheless, here all of them are responsible for the perversion of justice.

And it asks:

Is it obvious

that anyone who adjudicates a distorted judgment is punished? And we answer:

This comes to teach us that even a student

sitting

before his teacher,

when a case comes before his teacher, and he knows and understands that his teacher is mistaken but remains silent, is punished.

When Rav Huna would go to the court,

when he would leave and go to sit in court,

he would bring ten scholars from the house of his teacher before him,

he would bring ten Torah scholars before him, and would say that he did so

so that it would reach them,

so that if he made an error in judgment, he would not bear the entire punishment alone, but only that portion of the punishment that would be his,

“that would come from the chip,”

like a small shaving that breaks off from a large beam. In other words, if he erred in judgment, the punishment would be divided among all of them, so that the guilt would hang upon all their necks, thereby lessening his punishment.

When Rav Ashi would have a question concerning an animal with a fatal defect brought before him,

when questions concerning terefot came before him,

he would bring ten butchers,

he would bring before him ten people expert in terefot,

from Mata Meḥasya,

from the city of Mata Meḥasya,

and seat

them

before him. He said:

I do this

so that it will reach them

and the punishment that would come upon me if I erred would be only

“that which comes from the chip,”

and I would not bear the entire punishment alone.

Mishna:

1.

If the court ruled

to permit the violation of one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah, and the majority of the public acted on their ruling,

and

again

they realized that they had erred and retracted,

and ruled that the matter was prohibited,

whether

they had already

brought their atonement offering

[the bull for the unwitting error of the public]

or whether

they had still

not brought their atonement offering, and

the individual, who did not know that they had retracted, went

and acted on their ruling,

Rabbi Shimon exempts him.

Since he acted with the authorization of the court, for he still did not know that they had erred and retracted. And since he relied upon the court’s ruling, the individual is exempt from an individual sin offering.

And Rabbi Eliezer says:

His status is

uncertain,

for it is uncertain whether he is like one who relies upon the court and is exempt, or like one who relies upon himself, since in practice the court retracted its ruling and he is liable to bring a sin offering. Therefore, he brings a provisional guilt offering, as required of one who is uncertain whether he committed an error that would obligate him to bring a sin offering.

What is

the case considered to be an

uncertainty,

and why is it considered uncertain?

If he remained in his house

and acted on the basis of their original ruling,

he is liable

to bring a provisional guilt offering, because there is reason for uncertainty: He could have ascertained whether the court had retracted.

But if

he traveled overseas

and acted on their ruling, he is

exempt

entirely, since it was not possible for him to ascertain whether they had retracted.

Rabbi Akiva said: I concede in this case

that he traveled overseas

that he is close to being exempt from the obligation,

and he is exempt.

Ben Azzai said to him: How is this case different from one who remained in his house,

whom you hold liable?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Because

one who remained in his house could have heard

and learned that the court had retracted its ruling, and he is therefore considered to have relied upon himself and is liable.

But this one,

who traveled overseas,

could not have heard

of their retraction, and is therefore exempt.

The Gemara will explain in what the Sages disagree and what Rabbi Akiva adds to Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

b.

If the court ruled to uproot the entire substance —

that they said to abolish the mitzva in its entirety.

For example,

they said: There is no

prohibition of

menstruation in the Torah.

Or they said:

There is no

prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah.

Or they said:

There is no

prohibition of

idolatry in the Torah.

Even though the majority of the public acted on their ruling,

these —

the court —

are exempt.

For their ruling is not considered a ruling, since every Israelite knows that these prohibitions are explicitly stated in the Torah.

But if

they ruled to abolish part

of the mitzva

while upholding part of it, they are liable.

How so?

They said

the court:

There is

a prohibition of

menstruation in the Torah, but one who has intercourse with a woman observing one day corresponding to one day is exempt.

That is, if they erred and the court ruled that on that day she was permitted to her husband, this is a ruling that obligates them to bring the bull for the unwitting error. Since they did not uproot the substance of the prohibition of menstruation, but only one detail among the prohibitions of menstruation,

and likewise if they said:

There is

a prohibition of

Shabbat in the Torah, but one who carries out an object from a private domain into a public domain

is not performing one of the labors prohibited on Shabbat and is

exempt.

Or they said:

There is a prohibition of idolatry in the Torah, but one who bows down

to it is not thereby performing one of the prohibited forms of worship, and is

exempt.

In all these cases and similar ones,

they are liable,

since they did not uproot the prohibition in its entirety.

But if they uprooted the prohibition in its entirety, they are exempt,

as it is stated

in the passage concerning the bull for the unwitting error,

“and a matter was hidden.”

And we derive that this applies specifically when

“a matter,” and not

when

the entire substance

of the prohibition was hidden from them.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon,

who exempts one who acts on the basis of the court even after it has retracted?

Since he is acting with the authorization of the court,

for he did not learn that they had retracted.

Some say: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Shimon would say: Any ruling that was issued,

that became known and spread

among the majority of the public, an individual who acts upon it

even after the court retracted its ruling

is exempt.

Because a ruling was given only

in order

to distinguish between an unwitting offender and a deliberate offender.

In other words, since one who acts in accordance with the instruction of the court does so on its authority, the degree of inadvertence in his error does not obligate him to bring a sin-offering, since he acted on their authority. The same applies to one who acted inadvertently because he did not know that they had retracted their ruling: he is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, since he acted on their authority.

We raise an objection to the explanation given for Rabbi Shimon’s view, according to which he exempts an individual who acts after the court has retracted its ruling, even when the court has already brought its atonement, since he acts in accordance with the court’s ruling without knowing that it had retracted it:

The Gemara raises an objection:

We learned the following with regard to the source of the funds used to purchase communal sacrifices:

the bull for an unwitting communal sin,

which is brought when the community transgresses a Torah prohibition in accordance with the court’s ruling, because of an error in the court’s ruling,

and the goats for idolatry,

which are brought when the people unwittingly worship idols in accordance with an erroneous ruling of the court: according to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, these sacrifices come from communal funds; they disagree, however, as to how the funds are collected from the community:

“At first, funds are collected for them; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.”

That is, money is collected from all Israel specifically for the purchase of the bull and the goats for idolatry, to effect their atonement.

Rabbi Yehuda

disagrees

and says: Fr

om the

chamber collection

—from the money that the community weighs out and gives as the half-shekel once a year, in the month of Adar, for the needs of communal sacrifices—

they are brought.

They did not make a separate collection for the bull and the goat for idolatry.

From this Mishna, we raise an objection to the explanation stated above, that Rabbi Shimon exempts an individual who relied upon the court and did not know that the court had retracted its ruling, even when the court had already brought its atonement, because he did not know of the retraction and acted with the court’s authorization:

Why? And

indeed,

since

he himself says

that they collect for them,

that money is collected from the entire community specifically for this atonement, it is reasonable that they collect from that individual as well. If so,

“it should have become known to him”!

For those collecting the money for the purpose of bringing the bull for an unwitting communal sin would thereby inform him that the court had already retracted its ruling, and he would therefore bring a sacrifice. Reliance upon the court would no longer apply.

We answer:

Alternatively,

Rabbi Shimon exempted the individual in our Mishna only in a case where

they collected

from him

without specification,

and did not inform him for what purpose they were collecting.

Alternatively,

our Mishna is discussing a case

such as one in which that individual was not

in the city

at that time,

because he was not in the city when the money was collected, and therefore did not know that they had retracted their ruling.

Alternatively, Rav

who explained Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning as being that he acts with the court’s authorization

held in accordance with another tanna,

who held the view of the tanna who transmitted Rabbi Shimon’s statement regarding the manner of collection in a different form.

As it was taught in a beraita: “At first, funds are collected for them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: From the chamber collection they are brought!”

They do not make a special collection for them. Since Rabbi Shimon holds that they come from the chamber collection, it is understandable why that individual did not know that the court had retracted its ruling.

It was taught:

A beraita teaches four positions of the tannaim concerning this law:

Rabbi Meir obligates

the individual who acted in accordance with the court’s ruling after they had retracted it to bring a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts

him from everything.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The matter is uncertain.

In the name of Somkhus they said: It is suspended.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

What is the practical difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Somkhus, despite the fact that according to both of them the matter is uncertain?

An asham talui is the difference between them!

According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is uncertain whether he is considered to have relied upon himself and is obligated to bring a sin-offering, or is considered to have relied upon the court and is exempt; therefore, he brings an asham talui.

According to Somkhus, however, there is no uncertainty as to whether he relied upon himself; rather, his act is considered suspended. He certainly relied both upon the court and upon himself, and therefore it is impossible to obligate him to bring a sacrifice. For there is no side of the uncertainty on which he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, since he did not rely solely upon himself.

Rabbi Zeira said,

explaining Rabbi Eliezer’s statement:

Rabbi Eliezer’s analogy

for saying that he is considered uncertain with regard to whom he relied

is comparable to what?

To a person who ate

a piece that was

of uncertain ḥelev or uncertain fat,

and he thought it was fat,

and it became known to him

that it had been uncertain ḥelev,

who brings an asham

talui, since it is uncertain whether he unwittingly transgressed a matter for which he would be liable to bring a sin-offering.

The same applies to the case discussed in our Mishna: it is uncertain whether he relied upon himself and is obligated to bring a sin-offering, or relied upon the court and is exempt; therefore, he brings an asham talui.