Horayot 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

The Torah says [Leviticus 6:

“This is the law of the burnt offering; it”

the burnt offering.

These are three restrictive expressions.

And if so, it stands to reason that the first beraita as well, which expounded three restrictive expressions from the verse “if a person,” is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Alternatively,

there is indeed no proof from the exposition of the three restrictive expressions that Rabbi Yehuda stated this beraita. However, since “an anonymous Sifra is Rabbi Yehuda,” we establish the first beraita as his statement, for the second beraita, which says

“I would still say,” cannot be established as Rabbi Yehuda’s.

For

it

teaches

in it:

“If the majority of the congregation sinned, the court brings a bull on their behalf. And

it is impossible to establish this as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

because

if it is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, he said

Rabbi Yehuda:

It is the congregation that brings

the bull for the unwitting sin of the matter, but

the court does not

bring a bull.

As we learned (below, 5a):

below [5a]:

Rabbi Yehuda says: “Seven tribes”

[which are the majority of the tribes of Israel, out of the twelve tribes]

“that sinned”

because of an erroneous ruling of the court,

“bring seven bulls.”

It necessarily follows that the congregation brings atonement through these bulls, and not the court. For if the court brought the offering, it would be difficult: Why would the court bring seven bulls? Surely, for the atonement of the court, the atonement of a single bull would suffice. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda necessarily holds that the congregation brings the bull for its atonement; therefore, each tribe brings a bull for itself. And when seven tribes sinned, they bring seven bulls.

It necessarily follows that the second beraita, in which it is taught that the court brings the bull, is not Rabbi Yehuda’s. If so, it necessarily follows that the first beraita is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

And Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel

disagrees with Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, who established our Mishna as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. He holds that what we learned in our Mishna—that an individual who acts on the instruction of the court is exempt—

“is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages”

disagree and

“say: An individual who acted on the instruction of the court is liable.”

The Gemara now analyzes Rav Naḥman’s statement in the name of Shmuel:

What is Rabbi Meir, and what are the Sages?

Where do we find that Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute this matter?

As it was taught: “The court issued”

an erroneous ruling,

“and they acted”

on its basis;

Rabbi Meir exempts, and the Sages obligate.

And we raised the following question concerning it: In what circumstances is this speaking?

Who

are those who

“acted”

and unwittingly transgressed?

If you say

that it speaks of a case in which

the court

itself acted unwittingly, on the basis of its own ruling, and they dispute whether it brings a bull for its own action,

then it would be difficult:

What is the reasoning of the Sages, who obligate

the court to bring a bull?

But wasn’t it taught: “One might have thought”

that the law would be that

the court issued

an erroneous ruling,

“and acted,”

that is, transgressed,

“the court”

itself on the basis of its own ruling;

“one might have thought”

that they

“would be liable”

to bring a bull for the unwitting sin of the matter?

The verse therefore states: “And it was hidden from the eyes of

the congregation

—and they acted”!

“And they acted”

The

act

depends on the congregation, while the

erroneous

ruling

depends on the court;

the ruling depends on the court!

The exposition of the beraita is as follows: The meaning of “and it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation” is that the halakha was hidden from the “eyes of the congregation,” meaning the court, which is called by this term [as we expound elsewhere, by means of a gzera shava, “from the eyes” and “from the eyes,” that “the eyes of the congregation” refers to the court].

From here they derived that the ruling depends on the court.

Whereas from the words of the verse, “the congregation, and they acted,” we expound that the action depends on the congregation. That is, the obligation to bring the offering for the unwitting sin of the matter applies only when the court issued an erroneous ruling and the congregation acted unwittingly on its basis. But if the court both issued the ruling and acted on the basis of its own ruling, they are exempt.

And

rather,

if we establish the dispute in the beraita as referring to a case in which

the court issued a ruling and the majority of the congregation acted

on its basis, and Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute whether in such a case a bull for the unwitting sin of the matter is brought, then

what is the reason of Rabbi Meir, who exempts?

Is this not the ordinary case for which a bull for the unwitting sin of the matter is brought?

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of a case in which

the court issued a ruling, and a minority

of the

congregation

acted on its basis?

And in this they disagree,

Rabbi Meir and the Sages:

One

of them, Rabbi Meir,

holds: An individual who acted on the instruction of the court is exempt

from a sin-offering.

And the other,

the Sages,

holds: An individual who acted on the instruction of the court is liable

for a sin-offering!

And it follows that our Mishna, in which we learned that an individual who acted on the instruction of the court is exempt from a sin-offering, is Rabbi Meir’s opinion and not that of the Sages!

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Pappa said:

It is impossible to infer from this beraita that the Sages obligate an individual who acted on the instruction of the court. It can be said

that everyone,

both the Sages and Rabbi Meir, agrees with our Mishna, that

an individual who acted on the instruction of the court is exempt.

Rather,

they dispute one of the following four possibilities:

One possibility is that they dispute a case in which a minority of the congregation acted, and the court acted together with them; with the judges of the court included, they constitute a majority of the congregation. They dispute whether

the court completes the majority of the congregation.

One

of them, the Sages,

holds that the court completes the majority of the congregation

and therefore they are liable to bring a bull.

And the other,

Rabbi Meir,

holds that the court does not complete the majority of the congregation,

and they are a minority that acted and are exempt from bringing a bull.

2.

Alternatively,

the beraita may be explained as referring to a case in which

the court issued a ruling, and the majority of the congregation acted

on its basis. The Sages and Rabbi Meir dispute whether the congregation also brings a bull, or whether only the court brings a bull and not the congregation. Even Rabbi Meir, who exempts, does not intend to exempt them entirely from the law of the bull; rather, he intends to exempt the congregation from bringing a bull, in accordance with his view below, that only the court brings a bull, and not the congregation.

And

accordingly, it must be explained that

who are the Sages

who obligate the congregation as well to bring a bull?

It is Rabbi Shimon, who said

below:

The congregation brings

a bull,

and

likewise

the court brings

a bull.

3.

Alternatively,

they may be said to dispute the law of

a tribe

that

acted on the instruction of its tribal court,

rather than on the instruction of the Great Court. According to Rabbi Meir, a bull is not brought, since they did not transgress on the basis of the ruling of the Great Court, whereas the Sages hold that a bull is brought even for acting on the instruction of the tribal court.

And who

are those

Sages

who hold this?

It is Rabbi Yehuda! As it was taught

[5b], in the Mishna below:

“A tribe that acted on the instruction of its tribal court”—

“that tribe is liable”

for a bull for the unwitting sin of the matter; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda!

4.

Alternatively,

this beraita speaks of a case

in which six

tribes sinned,

and they constitute the majority of the congregation

[with regard to the count of all the members of the twelve tribes]

; or seven

tribes,

even though they do not constitute the majority of the congregation.

According to Rabbi Meir, they are exempt, because he obligates them only when the majority of the tribes and the majority of the congregation sinned.

And

accordingly, it must be explained: The Sages of

the Mishna,

who obligated all the tribes to bring an offering,

who are they? It is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar!

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in his name,

the name of Rabbi Meir:

“If six

tribes sinned

and they constitute the majority of the congregation, or seven even though they do not constitute the majority of the congregation, they are liable”

[and below, at the end of the chapter, his reasoning is explained].

Since the beraita in which Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute can be established in all the ways explained, we have no proof that Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute the law of an individual who acted on the instruction of the court, whether he is liable or exempt!

Rav Asi said:

The reason that the majority of the congregation is required

“with regard to the ruling”

to sin on the basis of the court’s ruling is that, for this majority,

follow the majority of those residing in the Land of Israel,

while those residing outside the Land of Israel are not included in the count.

As it is stated

[I Kings 8]:

“Solomon made the festival at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the approach to Hamath to the Brook of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, fourteen days.”

And apparently it is difficult:

Now,

it is

written, “and all Israel with him, a great congregation,”

and the meaning of the verse is that all Israel was with him. If so, when it says there that even those dwelling in the places

“from the approach to Hamath to the Brook of Egypt”

were with him,

why do I need

to say this? Is it not obvious that these people too are included among the congregation of Israel!?

Rather,

infer from this

that

these

who dwell within the borders of the Land of Israel, which are “from the approach to Hamath to the Brook of Egypt,”

are the ones who are called

and included under the designation

“congregation.” But those

who dwell outside the Land of Israel

are not called

by the name

“congregation.”

Having concluded that a minority who sinned on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt from bringing an offering, the Gemara now discusses the law when the numerical status of those who sinned changed, and they went from being a minority to a majority, during the period between the performance of the sin and the time when those who sinned learned that they had sinned.

The Gemara clarifies the circumstances relevant to this law:

This is certainly

obvious:

If they were

a majority

at the time of the sin,

and became a minority

afterward—for example, some of those who sinned died, leaving a minority —

this is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages

in the Mishna below, concerning an anointed priest and a ruler [if they sinned unwittingly, their laws differ from those of an ordinary person: An ordinary person brings a female sheep or female goat, whereas an anointed priest who sinned brings a bull, and a ruler who sinned brings a male goat].

And similarly, if a kohen mashiach and a nasi sinned before they were appointed, and did not have time to bring their offerings until after they were appointed, the Sages hold that they bring an offering as ordinary individuals. For according to the Sages, one follows the time of the sin, and at the time of the sin he was an ordinary individual. The same law applies if they had been numerous and then became fewer: their status is that of the numerous, as they were at the time of the sin, and they bring a bull.

However, according to Rabbi Shimon, who says below that if they became aware of their sin before they were appointed, they are obligated to bring a sin-offering as ordinary individuals, whereas if they became aware of it after they were appointed, they are entirely exempt from an offering [and his position is that in order to obligate one to bring an offering, the status of the sinner must not change from the time of the sin until the time of awareness], the same law should apply here as well: If they became aware of the sin before they became fewer, they are obligated to bring a bull; but if they did not become aware that they had sinned until after they became fewer, they are entirely exempt, even from a sin-offering since their status was not the same at the time of the sin and at the time of awareness.

But in a case where they were

few

at the time of the sin

and then became numerous,

for example, some of the rest of the community, who had not sinned, died, and the sinners were thereby found to constitute the majority, this case requires clarification—

what

is the law? Did Rabbi Shimon and the Sages also disagree in such a case?

The sides of the doubt are as follows:

Should we say that

Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of awareness,

as is evident from his statement below, holds that when they became aware of the sin before they were appointed, they are liable as ordinary individuals, because the awareness occurred while they were still ordinary individuals; and should we say that the same law applies to those who were few and then became numerous, so that Rabbi Shimon

obligates

them, since at the time of awareness they were already numerous and therefore bring a bull?

And

if

the Sages, who always follow

the

time of

the

sin, exempt

even those who were few and then became numerous, since they were few at the time of the sin.

Or not,

because their cases are not precisely comparable. For below, concerning a kohen and a nasi, both at the time when they sinned, before they were appointed, and at the time of awareness, after they were appointed, they are obligated to bring an offering; only the type of their offering changes: In the case of a nasi, from a female sheep or female goat to a male goat, and in the case of a kohen mashiach, from a female sheep or female goat to a bull.

But here, since at the time of the sin they were few and entirely exempt from an offering, one might say that the law is not dependent on the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon. Here, even the Sages would obligate them, since the time of the sin determines the law only when some liability was created at that time, but not when the person was entirely exempt. Therefore, one follows the time of awareness, at which point they were numerous and obligated to bring a bull.

What,

is the law in this case?

But the Gemara raises an objection to the first possibility: According to Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of awareness, even if they were few at the time of the act and became numerous afterward, they should bring a bull, since at the time of awareness they were numerous.

But can this be so? Granted that you have heard Rabbi Shimon say that he follows even the time of awareness,

that is only

where the awareness and the sin occurred under a liability,

as in the case below of an ordinary individual who was appointed nasi or kohen mashiach. In such a case Rabbi Shimon holds that if they became aware of the sin before they were appointed, they are liable, since both the awareness and the sin occurred while they were ordinary individuals.

But in a case where only the

awareness

occurred at a time of liability

but not the sin

at a time of liability,

would you have heard him say that!?

It is in fact evident from the very statement cited above that in such a case Rabbi Shimon exempts them!

For if so,

if he held that the time of awareness alone is sufficient to create liability, why, if they became aware of the sin after they were appointed, would they be exempt?

Let them bring the offering according to

their

current status!

A kohen mashiach should bring a bull, and a nasi a male goat.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case

that Rabbi Shimon requires both the sin and the awareness,

that both occur at a time of liability. If so, when they were few and then became numerous, although at the time of awareness they were subject to liability, they are nevertheless exempt, because Rabbi Shimon does not follow only the time of awareness. Rather, he requires both the awareness and the sin to have occurred at a time of liability, whereas here, at the time they sinned, they were few.

The Gemara remains uncertain whether Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree concerning this law.

They raised a dilemma: If the court ruled

that

forbidden fat is permitted, and a minority of the community acted

on the basis of its ruling,

and the court retracted its ruling,

ruling that forbidden fat is prohibited, and then erred again and

ruled

that it is permitted,

and another minority acted

on the basis of its second ruling—and these two minorities together constitute the majority of the community—

what

is the law?

The sides of the doubt are as follows:

Should we say that

since there were two instances of awareness,

they do not combine

the two minorities who sinned into a majority? For the court initially became aware that it had erred after its first ruling, then erred a second time, and again became aware that it had erred after its second ruling. Rather, each time is considered as though only a minority sinned independently, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since both this and that—

the two minorities of the community—sinned because of an erroneous ruling permitting

forbidden fat,

therefore their sins

combine

to be considered together as the sin of a multitude.

And if you should say

that in this case,

since both this and that concern forbidden fat,

and they

combine

for purposes of the prohibition, there is still a doubt concerning a case in which a

minority

sinned and ate, on the basis of the court's ruling, the

forbidden fat over the kidneys, while another minority

sinned and ate

the forbidden fat over the intestines—what

is the law?

The sides of the doubt are as follows:

Should we say that

here, certainly, since they derive from two verses,

they do not combine,

because the prohibitions of the forbidden fat over the kidneys and the forbidden fat over the intestines are derived from two separate verses? Their law is therefore like that of a minority who sinned because of the court's ruling, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since both this and that,

the forbidden fat over the kidneys and the forbidden fat over the intestines,

are forbidden fat,

and constitute one prohibition, therefore

they combine:

the two minorities who sinned join together to constitute a majority, and they bring a bull.

And if you should say

that the forbidden fat over the kidneys and the forbidden fat over the intestines are both

one designation of forbidden fat

and they combine,

there is still a doubt concerning a case in which a

join.

There is still a doubt concerning a case where a

minority

of the community sinned

with forbidden fat, while another minority

sinned

with blood—what

is the law? The sides of the doubt are as follows:

Is it the case that

here, certainly,

we say

that they are two prohibitions.

And since their prohibitions are not the same, they do not combine,

and they are considered like a minority who sinned, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since their offerings are the same,

since in both cases an individual brings a female sheep, therefore

they combine,

and they constitute a majority who sinned, and they bring a bull.

And if you would say that, since their offerings are the same, they combine,

there is still room to raise the question in a case where

a minority sinned through forbidden fat, and a minority

sinned

through idolatry,

and their offerings are not the same, since individuals bring a female sheep for forbidden fat, whereas for idolatry they bring a female goat.

What is the law?

Should we say that

here, certainly,

since

their prohibitions are not the same and their offerings are not the same,

they do not combine, and they do not bring a bull,

or perhaps, since both this and that

are sins for which one is liable to

karet, they combine.

And we conclude:

teiku 15.

They raised a question before them: If a court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and a minority of the people acted

and ate on the basis of their ruling,

and that court died, and another court arose and again

also

ruled

that this prohibition was permitted, just as the first court had ruled that it was permitted,

and acted

and transgressed

another minority

on the basis of their ruling, and these two minorities together constitute a majority of the people: is this considered a case in which a majority of the people transgressed on the basis of a single ruling, so that they bring a bull, or not?

According to the one who says that the court brings

a bull, and not the people themselves,

you need not raise the question,

there is no need to question whether liability to bring a bull falls upon the first court,

for they are no longer present,

as they have already died. And as for the second court, it is obvious that it does not bring a bull, since a majority of the people did not act on the basis of its ruling.

Rather, when you raise the question, it is according to the one who says that the community brings

a bull for an unwitting matter,

what is the law?

Do they bring a bull, since

the community is present

and remains present now, as its members did not die? And since a majority transgressed on the basis of a court’s ruling, they should bring a bull , for the matter depends on the community.