Horayot 3a — the Talmud in English

The Torah said [Leviticus 6

“This is the law of the burnt offering; it”

is the burnt offering.

These are three exclusions.

And if so, it is reasonable that the first beraita as well, which derived three exclusions from the verse “if a soul,” is the statement of Rabbi Judah.

Alternatively,

actually there is no proof from the derivation of the three exclusions that Rabbi Judah stated this beraita. But since “an anonymous Sifra is Rabbi Judah,” we establish the first beraita as his statement, for the second beraita, that of

“I still say,” cannot be established as Rabbi Judah’s.

For

it

teaches

in it:

“If the majority of the congregation sinned, the court brings a bull on their behalf. And

it is impossible to establish it as Rabbi Judah,

because

if it is Rabbi Judah’s, he said

Rabbi Judah,

it is the congregation that brings

the bull of the hidden matter, and

the court does not

bring a bull.

For we learned

below [5a]:

“Rabbi Judah says: Seven tribes”

which are the majority of the tribes of Israel, out of the twelve tribes,

“that sinned”

because of an erroneous ruling of the court,

“bring seven bulls.”

And necessarily, it is the congregation that brings its atonement through these bulls, and not the court. For if the court were the one bringing the offering, it would be difficult: why would the court bring seven bulls? Is not the atonement of the court sufficiently achieved through the atonement of one bull? Rather, necessarily, Rabbi Judah holds that the congregation brings the bull for its atonement, and therefore each tribe brings a bull for itself. And when seven tribes sinned, they bring seven bulls.

And necessarily, the second beraita, in which we learned that the court brings the bull, is not Rabbi Judah’s. And if so, necessarily, the first beraita is the statement of Rabbi Judah.

And Rav Nahman said in the name of Samuel

disagrees with Rav Judah in the name of Samuel, who established our Mishna as Rabbi Judah, and holds that what we learned in our Mishna, that an individual who acts upon the ruling of the court is exempt,

is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Rabbis

disagree, and

say: An individual who acted upon the ruling of the court is liable.

The Gemara now discusses the explanation of the words of Rav Nahman in the name of Samuel:

What is Rabbi Meir, and what are the Rabbis?

Where do we find that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed this matter?

For it was taught: “They ruled”

the court issued an erroneous ruling,

“and they acted”

on their basis,

“Rabbi Meir exempts, and the Rabbis render liable.”

And we raised it: In what manner is this speaking?

Who,

who are those who

acted

and unwittingly transgressed?

If you say

that it is speaking of a case in which

the court

acted unwittingly, according to its own ruling, and they disputed whether it brings a bull for its own action.

If so, it is difficult:

what is the reason of the Rabbis, who render them liable

to bring a bull?

But it was taught: “One might have said”

that the law should be that

the court ruled

an erroneous ruling,

and acted

and transgressed,

the court

itself according to its own ruling,

one might have said

that they

would be liable

to bring the bull of the hidden matter?

The verse says “And it was hidden from the eyes of

the

congregation —

and they acted”!

The action

of the transgression is what

depends upon the congregation, and

whereas the

ruling

that they issued in error

depends upon the court!

And the explanation of the beraita’s derivation is as follows: The meaning of “And it was hidden from the eyes of the congregation” is that the halakha was hidden from the “eyes of the congregation,” which are the court, which are called thus [as we derive elsewhere through a gzera shava, “from the eyes” and “from the eyes,” that “the eyes of the congregation” are the court].

And from here they learned that the ruling depends upon the court.

Whereas from the words of the verse, “the congregation, and they acted,” we derive that the action depends upon the congregation. That is, the obligation of the offering for the hidden matter applies only if the court issued an erroneous ruling and the congregation acted unwittingly on their basis. But if the court both issued the ruling and acted according to its own ruling, they are exempt.

And

rather,

if we establish the dispute in the beraita in a case

where the court ruled and the majority of the congregation acted

on their basis, and Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed whether, in such a case, they bring the bull of the hidden matter, then

what is the reason of Rabbi Meir, who exempts?

Is this not the ordinary case for which the bull of the hidden matter is brought?

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of a case in which

the court ruled, and a minority

of the

congregation

acted on their basis,

and this is where they dispute

Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis:

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds: An individual who acted upon the ruling of the court is exempt

from a sin offering.

And one master,

the Rabbis,

holds: An individual who acted upon the ruling of the court is liable

for a sin offering!

And it is proven that our Mishna, in which we learned that an individual who acted upon the ruling of the court is exempt from a sin offering, is Rabbi Meir’s, and not the Rabbis’!

And we reject this:

Rav Pappa said:

It is impossible to infer from this beraita that the Rabbis render an individual who acted upon the ruling of the court liable. For one can say

that everyone,

both the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir, holds like our Mishna, that

an individual who acted upon the ruling of the court is exempt.

Rather,

they disputed one of the following four possibilities:

One possibility is that they disputed a case in which a minority of the congregation acted, and the court acted together with them, and, when the judges of the court are combined with them, they become a majority of the congregation. And regarding the question of

whether the court completes the majority of the congregation, they dispute.

One master (

the Rabbis)

holds that the court completes the majority of the congregation

and therefore they are liable for a bull,

and one master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds that the court does not complete the majority of the congregation,

and they are a minority that acted, and are exempt from bringing a bull.

B.

Alternatively,

it is possible to explain that the beraita is dealing with a case

where the court ruled and the majority of the congregation acted

on their basis. And the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disputed whether the congregation also brings a bull, or only the court brings a bull and not the congregation. And even Rabbi Meir, who exempts, does not intend to exempt them entirely from the law of the bull; rather, he intends to exempt the congregation from bringing a bull, in accordance with his position below, that only the court brings a bull and not the congregation.

And

according to this it must be explained that

who are the Rabbis

who render the congregation also liable to bring a bull?

It is Rabbi Simeon, who said

below:

the congregation brings

a bull,

and

likewise

the court brings

a bull.

C.

Alternatively,

it may be said that they disputed the law of

one tribe

that

acted upon the ruling of the court of its tribe

and not according to the ruling of the Great Court. According to Rabbi Meir, they do not bring a bull, since they did not transgress according to the ruling of the Great Court; whereas the Rabbis hold that they bring one even for the ruling of the court of the tribe.

And who

are those

Rabbis

who hold this way?

It is Rabbi Judah! For it was taught

[5b], in the Mishna below:

“A tribe that acted upon the ruling of the court of its tribe” —

that tribe is liable

for the bull of the hidden matter, the statement of Rabbi Judah!

D.

Alternatively,

this beraita is speaking

for example, when six

tribes sinned,

and they are the majority of the congregation

[with regard to the count of all the members of the twelve tribes],

or seven

tribes,

even though they are not the majority of the congregation.

According to Rabbi Meir they are exempt, because he renders liable only when the majority of the tribes and the majority of the congregation sinned.

And

according to this it must be explained that the Rabbis of

our Mishna,

who rendered all the tribes liable for the offering,

who are they? It is Rabbi Simeon ben Elazar!

For it was taught: Rabbi Simeon ben Elazar says in his name

of Rabbi Meir:

“Six

tribes

sinned, and they are the majority of the congregation; or seven, even though they are not the majority of the congregation, they are liable

[and below, at the end of the chapter, it explains his reason].

And since it is possible to establish the beraita in which Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed in all the manners explained, we have no proof that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed regarding the law of an individual who acted upon the ruling of the court, whether he is liable or exempt!

Rav Asi said:

What they required

“and according to the ruling”

that the majority of the congregation sin according to the ruling of the court, in this majority,

follow the majority of those dwelling in the Land of Israel,

and those dwelling outside the Land are not included in the count.

As it is stated,

[I Kings 8]

“And Solomon made the festival at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath to the Brook of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, fourteen days.”

And apparently it is difficult:

now,

for it is

written, “and all Israel with him, a great congregation,”

and the meaning of the verse is that all Israel were with him; if so, what need is there for what is said there, that also the people dwelling in the places

“from the entrance of Hamath to the Brook of Egypt”

were with him?

Why do I need

to say this? Is it not obvious that these too are included in the congregation of Israel?

Rather,

infer from this:

specifically

these

who dwell within the borders of the Land of Israel, which are “from the entrance of Hamath to the Brook of Egypt,”

are called

called and included under the designation of

“congregation.” But those,

the inhabitants of outside the Land,

are not called

by the name of

“congregation.”

And after we concluded that the minority who sinned according to the ruling of the court are exempt from an offering, the Gemara now discusses what the law is when the numerical situation of those who sinned changed, and they changed from a minority to a majority, during the period between the performance of the sin and the time when those who sinned became aware that they had sinned.

And the Gemara clarifies the possibilities relevant to this law:

This is certainly

obvious,

that if they were

a majority

at the time of the sin,

and became fewer

afterward, for example, some of those sinners died and a minority remained ,

this is the dispute between Rabbi Simeon and the Rabbis,

who disputed in the Mishna below regarding an anointed priest and a ruler [for if they sinned unwittingly, their law differs from that of an ordinary person: an ordinary person brings a female sheep or female goat, whereas an anointed priest who sinned brings a bull, and a ruler who sinned brings a male goat].

And in the case where a anointed koen and a nasi sinned before they were appointed, and they did not manage to bring their offering until they were appointed, the Sages hold that they bring an offering as ordinary people. For according to the Sages, one follows the time of the sin, and at the time of the sin he was an ordinary person. And the same law applies if they were numerous and became few: their law is as numerous, as they were at the time of the sin, and they bring a bull.

However, according to Rabbi Shimon, who said below that if they became aware of their sin before they were appointed, they are liable for a sin-offering as ordinary people, whereas if they became aware of it after they were appointed, they are entirely exempt from an offering [and his position is that in order to make one liable for an offering, the status of the sinner must not change from the time of the sin until the time of awareness], if so, here too the law should be thus: if they became aware of it before they became few, they are liable to bring a bull, but if they did not become aware that they had sinned until they became few, they are entirely exempt, even from a sin-offering because their law was not equal at the time of the sin and at the time of awareness. And in Avi Ezri [Laws of Kings, chapter 3, law 7] discussed whether, according to the Sages, when the status changes from liability to complete exemption, one follows the time of the sin to make them liable or not, and from the words of Tosafot [s.v. “Those who were few”] it is proven that they understood that in such a case the Sages agree to exempt. [And see there in note 3.] And he was astonished, for it is obvious to us in our sugya that the Sages make liable even those who were numerous and became few. For when they became few, they became entirely exempt, according to the one who exempts an individual who relies upon the court even from a sin-offering. And he differentiated: in the case of those who were numerous and became few, the exemption of the few is not a complete exemption, because they are fit for the liability of an offering had they constituted the majority of the congregation; their exemption is only like that of people compelled by the instruction of the court. And according to this, the proof from Tosafot is also rejected; see there carefully. And below in the note

But in the case where they were

few

at the time of the sin

and became numerous,

for example, some of the rest of the congregation who had not sinned died, and the sinners were found to be numerous, this requires discussion —

what

is the law? Did Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree also in this case?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Should we say that

Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of awareness,

as will be seen from his words below, in the case where they became aware of it before they were appointed, that they are liable as ordinary people because the awareness occurred while they were still ordinary people, and should we say that the same law applies to those who were few and became numerous, so that Rabbi Shimon

makes liable,

since at the time of awareness they were already numerous, and they bring a bull?

And

if

the Sages, who always follow

the

time of

the

sin, exempt,

even those who were few and became numerous, since at the time of the sin they were few.

Or not,

for their law is not entirely equal. For below, concerning a koen and a nasi, both at the time when they sinned, before they were appointed, and at the time of awareness, namely after they were appointed, they are liable for an offering; only the law of their offering changed: in the case of a nasi, from a female sheep or female goat to a male goat, and in the case of an anointed koen, from a female sheep or female goat to a bull.

But here, where at the time of the sin they were few and entirely exempt from an offering, one can say that the law does not depend upon the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon. For here even the Sages will make them liable, since the time of the sin determines only when some liability was created, but not where there was complete exemption. Therefore one follows the time of awareness, and then they were numerous and liable to bring a bull .

What,

what is the law in this case?

But the Gemara raised an objection concerning the first side: that according to Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of awareness, even if they were few at the time of the act and afterward became numerous, they bring a bull, since at the time of awareness they were numerous.

And can you understand it thus: Granted that you hear from Rabbi Shimon that he follows even the time of awareness,

that is specifically

where awareness and sin were under liability,

as below, concerning an ordinary person who was appointed nasi or anointed koen, where Rabbi Shimon holds that if they became aware of it before they were appointed, they are liable, since both awareness and sin occurred while they were ordinary people.

But in a case where only the

awareness

was at a time of liability,

and not the sin

at a time of liability,

do you hear this from him!?

And is it not proven from the matter itself that in such a case Rabbi Shimon exempts!

For if so,

if he held that the time of awareness alone suffices to make one liable, why, if they became aware of it after they were appointed, are they exempt?

Let them bring according to their

law

now!

An anointed koen, a bull, and a nasi, a male goat.

Rather,

necessarily,

Rabbi Shimon requires sin and awareness,

that both of them be at a time of liability. And if so, when they were few and became numerous, although at the time of awareness they were fit for liability, nevertheless they are exempt, because Rabbi Shimon does not follow only the time of awareness; rather, he requires that both the awareness and the sin be at a time of liability, and here at the time when they sinned they were few.

And the Gemara remained with a doubt: did Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree concerning this law?

They raised a problem: If the court ruled

that

forbidden fat is permitted, and a minority of the congregation acted

on their ruling,

and the court retracted from it,

and ruled that forbidden fat is prohibited, and then they again erred, and

ruled

that it is permitted,

and another minority acted

according to their second ruling. These two minorities together constitute the majority of the public:

what is the law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Should we say

since they are two acts of awareness,

for initially the court became aware that it had erred after its first ruling, and it erred a second time, and again it became aware that it had erred after its second ruling, therefore

they do not join

these two minorities who sinned to form a majority; rather, the matter is considered as though only a minority sinned separately each time, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since both this and that —

the two minorities of the congregation — sinned through an erroneous ruling permitting

forbidden fat,

therefore

they join,

their sins being counted together as the sin of many.

And if you should say

that in this case,

since both this and that are forbidden fat,

and

they join

for the prohibition, there is still a doubt concerning a case where a

minority

sinned and ate, according to the ruling of the court, the

forbidden fat upon the kidneys, and a minority

sinned and ate

forbidden fat upon the intestines; what is the law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Should we say,

here, certainly, since they are derived from two verses,

for the prohibitions of forbidden fat upon the kidneys and forbidden fat upon the intestines were learned from two separate verses,

they do not join,

and their law is like that of a minority who sinned through the ruling of the court, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since both this and that,

forbidden fat upon the kidneys and forbidden fat upon the intestines,

are forbidden fat,

and it is one prohibition, for that reason

they join,

the two minorities who sinned join to form a majority, a majority, and they bring a bull.

And if you should conclude

that forbidden fat upon the kidneys and forbidden fat upon the intestines are both

one name of forbidden fat

and

they

join.

There is still a doubt concerning a case where a

minority

of the congregation sinned

with forbidden fat, and a minority

sinned

with blood; what is the law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Whether

here certainly

we say

that they are two prohibitions.

And since their prohibition is not identical, they do not join,

and they are considered like a minority who sinned, and they do not bring a bull.

Or perhaps, since their offering is the same,

since for both of them an individual brings a female sheep, therefore

they combine,

and they constitute a majority who sinned, and they bring a bull.

And if you should say, since their offering is the same, they combine,

there is still room to question in a case where

a minority sinned with fat, and a minority

sinned

with idolatry,

and their offering is not the same, since individuals bring a female sheep for fat, whereas for idolatry they bring a she-goat,

what is the law?

Shall we say that

here, certainly,

since

their prohibitions are not the same and their offering is not the same,

they do not combine, and they do not bring a bull,

or perhaps, since both this and that

are sins for which one is liable for

karet, they combine.

And we conclude:

teyku 15 .

They raised a question before them: If the court ruled that fat is permitted, and a minority of the people

ate according to their ruling,

and that court died, and another court arose, and they again

also

ruled

permission concerning this prohibition, just as the first court had ruled permission concerning it,

and

transgressed

another minority

on the basis of their ruling—and in these two minorities together there is a majority of the people—is this considered that a majority of the people transgressed on the basis of one ruling, and they bring a bull, or not?

According to the one who says that the court brings

a bull, and not the community itself,

you need not ask this,

there is no need to question whether the obligation to bring a bull applies to the first court,

for they are not present

now, since they have already died. And as for the second court, it is obvious that it does not bring a bull, since a majority of the people did not act on the basis of its ruling .

Rather, when you do ask, it is according to the one who says that the community brings

a bull for an unwitting matter,

what is the law?

Do they bring a bull, since

the community, behold, remains

and exists now, for they did not die? And since the majority transgressed according to the ruling of the court, they should bring a bull , for the matter depends on the community.