Horayot 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

The mishna teaches this case, and there is no need to state that case.

And this is the explanation of the latter clause of the Mishna: If one of the judges or one of the students knew that the court had erred, and he acted together with them, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering. And there is no need to state that if he acted after them, in which case he is not relying entirely on the court, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering. And there is no need to state that if he acted on his own, he is liable, since he is not relying on the court at all.

We learned in our Mishna: The court issued a ruling

and one of them knew that they had erred, or a student who was fit to issue rulings,

and he acted on the basis of their ruling, he is liable.

And the Gemara asks:

Why

are both cases, the judge who knows and the student who knows,

necessary

to teach in the Mishna? Since we learned in the Mishna that if one of the judges knew that they had erred and acted on the basis of their ruling, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering, because he is not attributing his action to the court [since he knows the law], we will automatically also know that a student fit to issue rulings who knows that they have erred is liable to bring an individual sin-offering, because he too is not attributing his sin to the court! And the Gemara answers:

Rava said: It was necessary

to teach the law in both cases:

For if we had learned in the Mishna only “one of the judges knew,”

you might have thought,

that the reason he is not considered to be relying on the court is that he

is learned and perceptive,

having both studied and understood through his own reasoning.

But

a student fit to issue rulings, who

is learned but not perceptive, would not

be subject to the same law, because since he is “not perceptive,” he can attribute his action to the court’s ruling, since his knowledge is insufficient to decide against the court’s ruling.

Therefore, the Mishna needed to teach us that even one who is learned but not perceptive is not exempt under the law of one who relies on the court; rather, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering!

Abaye said

to Rava: How could you say that the Mishna is referring to a student who is learned but not perceptive? After all, the plain meaning of the Mishna, which defined this student as one who is

“

“fit

to issue rulings”

means a student who

is learned and perceptive!

Rava said

to him: Indeed, from the mere implication of the Mishna’s expression “fit to issue rulings,” it is impossible to derive what I said, namely, that the Mishna came to make a student who is merely learned but not perceptive liable to bring an individual sin-offering.

Rather,

this is what I meant:

This can be learned from the fact that the Mishna added, regarding the student, that he was “fit to issue rulings.”

For these words appear to be superfluous, as will be explained, and it is necessarily the case that they came to teach that even a student who is merely learned but not perceptive is liable to bring an individual sin-offering.

And this is my proof:

Had it been only from that,

from what the Mishna stated merely, “one of the judges knew that they had erred,” I would not have learned from there that a student who is learned but not perceptive is also liable. For

I might have thought

that

this applies

only to one who is not considered to be relying on the court, namely, a student who is

learned and perceptive. But

one who is

learned but not perceptive,

or perceptive but not learned,

is not

so; that is, I would have thought that he is not liable, but is considered to be relying on the court and is exempt.

Therefore, the

tanna

also stated “a student who is

fit to issue rulings,”

to teach us

from the superfluous wording of the Mishna

[by adding “a student fit to issue rulings” in addition to “one of the judges knew”] that

even

a student who is

learned but not perceptive,

or

perceptive but not learned,

is also liable to bring an individual sin-offering and is not considered to be relying on the court . [Although the definition that “a student fit to issue rulings” in itself means one who is learned and perceptive remains.

But its superfluous wording in the Mishna also comes to teach about one who is learned but not perceptive, or perceptive but not learned].

We learned in our Mishna: “A student

and fit to issue rulings”

and so on.

For example, whom

is called “fit to issue rulings”?

Rava said: For example, Shimon ben Azzai and Shimon ben Zoma,

who would sit before the Sages and were fit to issue rulings. As they said in tractate Sanhedrin [17b]: “Those who deliberate before the Sages: Shimon ben Azzai and Shimon ben Zoma.”

Abaye said:

How could you say that the Mishna is referring to sages of this caliber? Surely a sage

of this sort is intentional!

For it is certainly clear to him that the court has erred, and if he nevertheless acted, he acted intentionally, since such great men cannot attribute their unwitting action to any court. How, then, could he be liable to bring a sin-offering?

Rava said to Abaye:

According to your reasoning,

that you said he is intentional, how will you explain

that which was taught:

It is written in the passage concerning an individual sin-offering [Leviticus 4]: “And if a single person sins unwittingly, when he performs one of the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed, and he incurs guilt.” And we derive from the wording of the verse

“when he performs one,”

rather than “he sins and performs one,” that the verse comes to teach you that even if the court issued an erroneous ruling to violate one of the mitzvot, and one person went and acted according to their ruling, but not because he relied on them; rather, he was

“an individual acting on his own authority,”

then he is

liable

to bring an individual sin-offering. For only one who sinned unwittingly

because of the court’s ruling

is

exempt

from bringing an offering.

How

is one considered “an individual acting on his own authority”?

If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and one of the judges became aware

of

the error, or

if there was

a student sitting before them and fit to issue rulings, such as Shimon ben Azzai, might it be

that the judge or student who acts on the basis of their ruling is

exempt

from bringing an offering?

The verse states: “When he performs one”

An individual acting on his own authority is liable

to bring an offering! But only one who acts

because of the court’s ruling,

because he did not know of their error, is

exempt!

It is thus demonstrated that even in the case of a student like Shimon ben Azzai, it is possible for him to be unwitting and liable to bring a sin-offering .

Rather, how can you find such a case,

in what manner can you, Abaye, find the possibility that one who acts on his own authority would be liable to bring a sin-offering, when he is intentional? Necessarily,

it is a case where

he indeed

knew that it was prohibited, but

nevertheless

he erred concerning the mitzva to heed the words of the Sages.

He thought that there is always a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages, even when he himself knows that they have erred in their ruling. In such an error, even Shimon ben Azzai is considered unwitting.

And if so,

according to my view as well,

where I explained that “one fit to issue rulings” in our Mishna is someone such as Shimon ben Azzai, I will establish it in the same manner: They are considered unwitting in a case where

they erred

concerning the mitzva to heed the words of the Sages 6 .

We learned in our Mishna:

“This is the general principle: One who relies on himself is liable.”

And we raised the question concerning it: “This is the general principle,” which is an expression of inclusion;

what does it come to include?

And the Gemara explains:

It comes to include

one who went and ate forbidden fat after the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, but he

rejects the ruling,

as he is accustomed neither to take the court’s rulings into consideration nor to act according to them. Therefore, he too is considered to have acted on his own authority and is liable to bring a sin-offering, like any individual who sinned unwittingly .

And this is what we learned with regard to the phrase “This is the principle” concerning

one who relies on the court

who is exempt:

to include

that even if

the court ruled

to permit one of all the mitzvot,

and they knew

afterward

that they had erred, and

already

retracted

from their ruling, ,

and only afterward did the individual transgress and act on their authority, he is considered one who relies on the court and is exempt, because he did not know that they had retracted.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

but

this law

is explicitly taught

in the Mishna below [3b]!? The Gemara explains: This is the tanna’s method: he

teaches a principle, “This is the principle,”

and then

afterward

he returns and

explains

the law in the following Mishna.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

What we learned in our Mishna—that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling, although the court does not bring a bull for an erroneous ruling on his behalf, is nevertheless himself exempt from bringing an offering—

is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

But the Sages say: An individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable

to bring a sin-offering! In Shabbat [93a], Rashi explained the reason of the one who exempts him by saying that he is coerced, and Tosafot there wrote that according to the view that he is coerced, no verse is needed to exempt him. It is clear from Rashi’s words that the dispute concerns the interpretation of the verse itself: does the verse’s implication that he is exempt teach that he is considered coerced, or not? It appears that the law of “Do not stray” indeed depends on this dispute. According to the one who exempts an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling, he expounds the verse, “And if a person sins unwittingly,” to exclude an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling [Shabbat 93a according to Ramban; see there and below, 3b, note 13]. This itself is what is derived: although the court’s ruling was shown to be erroneous, it made “Do not stray” binding until they retracted. But the Sages, who hold that the individual is liable even though he relied on the court, maintain that retroactively it becomes clear that there was no valid ruling, and he is liable because he sinned unwittingly. [Ramban’s words came to explain our Mishna, which follows the view that exempts an individual who relies on the court; therefore, he held that “Do not stray” remains binding until they retract.] According to this explanation, we can understand the established ruling concerning a married woman who remarried on the basis of a court ruling [Yevamot 92a], in accordance with Ze’iri, who holds that the court’s ruling is retroactively shown to have been erroneous. Seemingly, since the halakha follows the one who holds that the individual is liable, even if the ruling is considered valid until that point, she should be liable for a sin-offering; why, then, is it necessary to say that it is considered an error? However, according to the above, since the one who holds that the individual is liable maintains that once the court retracted, it becomes clear retroactively that “Do not stray” was not binding, she is therefore liable for a sin-offering. In the case of a married woman, however, when the court did not err in its legal ruling, as long as her husband has not appeared, the ruling remains valid, and she is exempt from an offering because of the obligation of “Do not stray” that applies to it. Ze’iri therefore had to say that the court does not determine the woman’s legal status; rather, it determines the fact of the husband’s death, and this fact is retroactively shown to have been erroneous. Thus, even according to the one who holds that every individual is liable, she is exempt. [See the notes on Tosafot, folio 1, note 5.]

The Gemara explains:

What is Rabbi Yehuda’s view?

Where do we find that this is Rabbi Yehuda’s method?

As it was taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning a sin-offering:

“If one person sins unwittingly, when he performs it.”

Seemingly, it would have been sufficient to write, “If he sins unwittingly.”

Therefore, we expound the verse as though it had said: “A person sins,” “one sins,” and “when he performs it, he sins,”

and these are three exclusions.

One of the exclusions is expounded as follows: specifically,

one who acts on his own initiative is liable.

But one who acts

on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt.

The Gemara will explain below how we know that this beraita is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara continues and explains:

What is the view of the Sages?

As it was taught:

We learned in the Torat Kohanim, concerning the word “when he performs it,” a beraita divided into two parts: the first deals with a minority who sinned, and the second with the majority of Israel who sinned. This is what we learned:

It might have been thought that only an individual who acted and committed a sin unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering, but that two [or several people] who sinned together in the same unwitting act would be exempt. The verse therefore states: “Of the people of the land.” The verse teaches that even several people who acted together in the same unwitting act are each liable to bring an individual sin-offering for his unwitting transgression.

The beraita in the Torat Kohanim continues and says:

I would still say

that only

a minority of the congregation who sinned

together in the same unwitting act

are liable

for an individual sin-offering, because

the court does not bring on their behalf

of the minority of the community

a bull

for an erroneous ruling.

But

a majority of the congregation who sinned [

and below it will be explained how they erred and sinned],

shall be exempt

from an individual sin-offering,

for the court brings on their behalf

of the majority of the community

a bull

for an erroneous ruling.

The verse therefore states: “Of the people of the land”—

even the majority, and even the entire congregation!

The Gemara analyzes this:

In what circumstances

does this beraita, which deals with a minority and a majority, speak of an unwitting act?

If you say

that the entire beraita, in both its parts, concerning the minority and the majority, deals with a case in which there was no ruling of the court, but the congregation transgressed and acted

through an unwitting act,

for example, each member of the community mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it unwittingly, and this was not at all based on a ruling of the court, and the beraita comes to teach, on the basis of its derivation from the verse, that not only when a single person errs does he bring a sin-offering, but even when several people sin through the same unwitting act, or even when the majority of the community acts through the same unwitting act, they are nevertheless liable [each] for an individual sin-offering and are not atoned for through a bull for an erroneous ruling.

This cannot be the way to understand the beraita! For this beraita said that when the majority of the congregation sins, the court brings a bull for an erroneous ruling on their behalf. If their sin was through an unwitting act, not on the basis of the court’s ruling, this is difficult:

What business would the court have here?!

According to the text and explanation of the Rosh.

If the community sinned

without a ruling of the court—

would the court bring

a bull? Would it bring

a bull

for an erroneous ruling when the community sinned

without a ruling?!

After all, the court brings a bull only when the community sins on the basis of the court’s ruling!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the entire beraita, in both its parts, indeed deals with a case in which they erred and transgressed

on the basis of a ruling

of the court. The beraita teaches that one should not say that only when individuals err on the basis of the court’s ruling are they liable [each for an individual sin-offering]. Rather, there is a special derivation from the verse teaching us the novel point that even if several members of the community, or even the majority of the community, acted on the basis of the court’s ruling, they are still not exempt from an individual sin-offering, even though the court brings on their behalf a bull for an erroneous ruling!

But the Gemara rejects this: even so, it cannot be explained in this manner!

For this verse, “of the people of the land,” from which the beraita derives its law, does not speak at all of a case in which they erred on the basis of the court’s ruling, since

when the verse

was written,

“of the people of the land,”

it was written concerning an unwitting act!

If so, how can one derive from here that the majority of the community is liable for an individual offering even when there was a ruling of the court?!

Rather, necessarily,

it must be said that the entire beraita does not deal with one circumstance; rather, its two parts are divided between two circumstances.

And this is what

the tanna of this beraita is saying:

1.

A minority of the congregation

[several people]

who sinned

[together]

through an unwitting act—

are liable

for an individual offering,

for

indeed

the court does not bring on their behalf

[on behalf of the minority of the community]

a bull

for an erroneous ruling

based on a ruling.

It is evident from the words of the beraita, which says, “The court does not bring on their behalf a bull for an erroneous ruling,” that specifically the court does not bring a bull for an erroneous ruling when a minority of the community sins.

But they,

the minority of the community itself, which sinned unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, indeed

are liable

to bring, each one, a female sheep or female goat.

The beraita is saying as follows: Just as a minority of the community is not exempt from an individual offering even when the court ruled that the act was permitted and they acted on its authority, so too a minority of the community [several people who sinned together through the same unwitting act] is not exempt from an individual offering when they themselves erred through an unwitting act alone. Rather, they are liable for an individual sin-offering, like an individual who sinned.

That is, in this part of the beraita we find a novel law even with regard to an erroneous ruling: an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable for an individual offering.

If so, here we find the view of the Sages, in accordance with the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel, that an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable for a sin-offering.

2.

It might

be said that

the majority of the community who acted through an unwitting act shall be exempt

entirely from an individual sin-offering

, for the court brings on their behalf,

on behalf of the majority of the community,

a bull

for an erroneous ruling when the community acted

on the basis of the ruling

issued by the court.

Accordingly, one might continue and say: Just as the majority of the congregation is exempt from an individual sin-offering when it sinned on the basis of a ruling, so too it should be exempt from an individual sin-offering when it sinned through an unwitting act.

That is, it might have been thought [were it not for the special derivation from the verse, as the beraita will explain below] that a new law was established concerning the atonement of the community: it is specifically through a communal bull and not through the female sheep of each individual. Therefore, even where the community’s error was an unwitting act rather than an erroneous ruling, in which case it cannot attain atonement through a bull, the community would nevertheless not bring individual sin-offerings; rather, it would be entirely exempt from bringing an offering, because it has no other means of atonement than the bull. However, one may say, as we explained in the main text, that once it has been established that the community’s atonement is through a bull and that its members do not each bring an individual sin-offering, it is reasonable to say that even where they have no atonement through a bull, when they sinned through an unwitting act, they likewise have no atonement through a sin-offering.

And the Hazon Ish proved from here that when the majority of the community acts on the basis of the court’s ruling, its exemption from an individual sin-offering does not result from the atonement provided by the bull-offering brought on its behalf, since in every case of many people acting through an unwitting act there is no bull. Rather, when the majority acts, there is no atonement for each individual separately. Therefore, here an unwitting act is compared to an erroneous ruling in order to exempt them from a sin-offering. This is also explained by Rashi below [7a], who explained that a community that acted through an unwitting act is exempt from a bull because it did not act on the basis of the court’s ruling: “They are divided from one another,” and are like individuals. That is, although they did not act on the basis of the court, the act of a community is nevertheless not atoned for in the same manner as the act of an individual. It is only because they are treated as individuals that their atonement is not through a bull but through a sin-offering. This itself is derived from the verse “of the people of the land”: the act of the community is exempt from a sin-offering only when they acted on the basis of the court and are considered one majority of the community. Even if the majority of the community acted and the court then retracted, an individual may join them even if he committed his sin afterward, because the essential community acted on the basis of the ruling. But when they do not act on the basis of the court, they are treated as individuals and are liable for a sin-offering. [See below, 3b, note 12.] All this is unlike the fundamental principle of Rabbi Chaim mentioned above: that a communal offering exempts individuals from a sin-offering [and that one who joined them after the court retracted is also exempt because he joined a sin that obligates the community to bring an offering]. His proof is from the words of Rambam [14:4], who says that if the court did not know what they had sinned, each individual brings his own sin-offering. He explained that the reason is that there is no communal offering to atone for them. This was also the position of the Noda BiYehuda [ Second Series, Yoreh De’ah 96], but their words are difficult in light of our sugya. The verse therefore states [

concerning the verse dealing with an unwitting act!],

“of the people of the land.”

The verse teaches [which deals with an unwitting act!] that

even

if

the majority

of the congregation sinned through an unwitting act [and not through an erroneous ruling], each member of the congregation brings a female sheep or female goat as an individual sin-offering. We do not say that the community’s atonement is only through a bull for an erroneous ruling, and therefore that it has no atonement at all in the case of an unwitting act. Rather, each member of the community is liable to bring an individual offering, since the exemption from an individual offering was stated only with regard to a community that erred because of the court’s ruling, for which it receives atonement through a bull for an erroneous ruling, and not with regard to a community that erred through an unwitting act.

If so, in this beraita we find the words of the Sages, who hold [at the beginning of the beraita] that an individual, and even a minority of people, who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling are liable for a sin-offering!

We reject this:

Rav Pappa said: From where

do you prove that this beraita holds that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable for a sin-offering? You proved it from what they said at the beginning of the beraita: that a minority of the congregation who sinned through an unwitting act is liable for a sin-offering, just as we find that the court does not bring a bull for an erroneous ruling on behalf of a minority of people. You inferred from the wording of the beraita: “But they”—the minority of people who acted on the basis of the ruling—are liable for a sin-offering.

But from where do you know to infer: “But they [the minority themselves] are liable”?

Perhaps

the intention of the beraita is to say that if a minority acted on the basis of a ruling, they are not liable to bring an offering,

neither they nor the court!

Indeed, an individual or a minority who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt from an offering, because even according to the Sages an individual who relies on the court is exempt!

According to Rav Pappa, the explanation of the beraita is therefore as follows:

1. Individuals who acted through an unwitting act are liable for a sin-offering. Only when they acted on the basis of a ruling do they have no need for atonement, since they relied upon the court. But in the case of an unwitting act, they require atonement by bringing an individual sin-offering.

2. However, when the majority of the congregation acted, since even when they act on the basis of a ruling they require atonement, and the community’s atonement was established as being through a bull for an erroneous ruling, they likewise have no atonement through an individual sin-offering in the case of an unwitting act, and are entirely exempt.

But the Gemara did not understand the beraita in this manner, and therefore raises an objection to Rav Pappa:

If so,

as you say, that the intention of this beraita is to say that an individual who acted on the basis of a ruling is exempt, this is difficult:

why specifically does he return,

why does the tanna, in the second part of the beraita, return to derive from the verse

with regard to the majority

who sinned through an unwitting act, without a ruling,

that they are liable?

Is it not

apparent from

the general implication

of these words of the tanna

that a minority

who sinned

on the basis of a ruling is held

by the tanna

to be liable

for an individual sin-offering even when they did so

on the basis of a ruling.

Therefore, all that the tanna returns to do in the second part of the beraita is to find a source in the verse that even the majority of the community who sinned without a ruling are liable for an individual offering.

It is thus evident that it is obvious to the tanna that an individual who acted on the basis of a ruling is liable.

There is another difficulty with Rav Pappa’s words:

Let the tanna return

in the

first clause,

the first part of the beraita, to find a source in the verse

concerning the minority

of several people

who are liable

when they sinned together

through an unwitting act.

For if the tanna held as Rav Pappa said—that even a minority of people who acted on the basis of a ruling is exempt—then just as the tanna had to expound the verse in the second part with regard to a community that sinned through an unwitting act, teaching that they are liable, so that we would not say that they are exempt just as they are exempt when they act through an erroneous ruling, so too the tanna should have expounded the verse in the first part, with regard to a minority that sinned without a ruling, to say that they are liable, so that we would not say that they are exempt from a sin-offering just as they are exempt when they act on the basis of a ruling [according to Rav Pappa’s view].

And

only

ultimately,

after the tanna teaches in the first part, from the verse, that a minority is liable when they sinned due to an error in action,

we will return,

then he will also return to teach

that the majority is liable,

when they sinned

due to an error in action.

For with regard to the majority of the community, we find atonement through a bull, and it is all the more reasonable to hold them liable to bring a sin-offering than to hold a minority of individuals who sinned liable, since the latter require no atonement at all when they acted erroneously on the basis of a ruling. If so, the tanna should first have sought and found a scriptural source for the liability of the minority of individuals, more than he needs a source for the liability of the community, which is more obvious.

Rather, is it not

because the tanna did not initially expound

that the minority are liable when they sinned due to an error in action, and

only

at the end

did he

return to derive that the majority is liable

when they sinned

due to an error in action—learn from this

that the explanation of the beraita follows Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel:

the minority

who sinned

on the basis of a ruling

were obvious to the tanna as people who

are liable to bring either a female sheep or a female goat,

because an individual who relies upon the court is not exempt from a sin-offering.

And therefore, even when they sinned

without relying on a ruling, due to an error in action,

it was obvious to the tanna that they are

liable,

because we find that they have atonement through a sin-offering even when they acted on the basis of a ruling. It thus emerges that this beraita proves that the opinion of the Rabbis is that an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable.

And now the Gemara proceeds to discuss what they said: that Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna of the earlier beraita, which states that an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt, whereas the Rabbis are the ones who hold him liable in the second beraita, as the Gemara inferred from the beraitot.

This is seemingly puzzling:

Granted,

for from where do we know that this is the correct inference? After all,

both of them,

the two beraitot,

were taught anonymously,

and it was not explained who stated these beraitot.

And although the anonymous Sifra [Torat Kohanim] is attributed to Rabbi Yehuda, it is still difficult:

from where

do you prove

that the

beraita

first,

in which we learned that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt,

is Rabbi Yehuda’s

beraita,

and

the

later

beraita, from which we proved that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable,

is that of the Rabbis

?

Say the reverse!

Let us say that according to the Rabbis he is exempt, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable, since these two beraitot were taught anonymously, and both are in the Torat Kohanim.

And we answer:

who is the one you find

in other contexts

expounding minority terms in this manner,

as they expounded in the first beraita: “If one person sins, unwittingly, in performing it”—these are three exclusions

It is Rabbi Yehuda!

For we find that he expounds in this manner in other matters as well.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: