Horayot 2b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves:

The Mishna states one case, and it goes without saying that the other case is included.

This is therefore the explanation of the latter clause of the Mishna: If one of the judges or one of the students knew that the court had erred, and he acted together with them, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering. It goes without saying that if he acted after them, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering, since he does not entirely attribute his action to the court. And it goes without saying that if he acted on his own, he is liable, since he does not attribute his action to the court at all.

We learned in our Mishna: “The court issued a ruling,”

and one of them knew that they had erred, or a student who is qualified to issue rulings knew that they had erred,

and he acted on the basis of their ruling, he is liable.

The Gemara asks:

Why state both cases,

the two cases , that of a judge who knows, and that of a student who knows,

why do I need

both of them to be stated in the Mishna? Since we learned in the Mishna that if one of the judges knew that they had erred and acted on the basis of their ruling, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering, because he does not attribute his action to the court [as he knows the law], we will necessarily also know that a student qualified to issue rulings who knew that they had erred is liable to bring an individual sin-offering, because he too does not attribute his sin to the court! And the Gemara answers:

Rava said: It was necessary

to state the law in both cases:

For if the Mishna had stated only, “One of the judges knew

that they had erred,” it might have entered your mind to say: This applies

because the reason he is not considered to be relying on the court is that he is

learned and capable of reasoning independently,

meaning that he has studied and also understands matters through his own reasoning.

But

a student qualified to issue rulings, who is

learned but not capable of independent reasoning, would not

be subject to this law. Since he is “not capable of independent reasoning,” he can attribute his action to the court’s ruling, as his knowledge is not sufficient to decide against the court’s ruling.

Therefore, the Mishna needed to teach us that even one who is learned but not capable of independent reasoning is not exempt under the law of one who relies on the court; rather, he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering!

Abaye said

to Rava: How could you say that the Mishna is speaking of a student who is learned but not capable of independent reasoning? The plain meaning of the Mishna’s wording defines this student as one who is

“

qualified

to issue rulings.”

A student who is

both learned and capable of independent reasoning, is implied!

Rava said

to him: Indeed, from the mere implication of the Mishna’s wording “qualified to issue rulings,” it is impossible to learn as I said—that the Mishna came to make a student who is only learned but not capable of independent reasoning liable to bring an individual sin-offering.

,

Rather, this is what I am saying:

This can be learned from the fact that the Mishna added the student and specified that he is “qualified to issue rulings.”

For apparently these words are superfluous, as will be explained. Necessarily, they were stated to teach that even a student who is only learned but not capable of independent reasoning is liable to bring an individual sin-offering.

This is my proof:

If we had only that,

from what the Mishna said only, “One of the judges knew that they had erred,” I would not learn from there that a student who is learned but not capable of independent reasoning is also liable. For

I might have said

that

this applies

in the case of one who is not considered to be relying on the court, specifically when the student is

both learned and capable of independent reasoning. But

one who is

learned but not capable of independent reasoning,

or capable of independent reasoning but not learned,

would not be included.

That is, I would have thought that he is not liable; rather, he is considered to be relying on the court and is exempt.

Therefore,

the Mishna also taught

“a student who is

qualified to issue rulings,”

in order to teach us

through this additional wording in the Mishna

even

even

a student who is

learned but not capable of independent reasoning,

or

capable of independent reasoning but not learned,

he too is liable to bring an individual sin-offering and is not considered to be relying on the court . Although the definition of “a student qualified to issue rulings” in itself remains one who is both learned and capable of independent reasoning.

Nevertheless, the Mishna’s additional wording also comes to teach about one who is learned but not capable of independent reasoning, or capable of independent reasoning but not learned.

We learned in our Mishna: “A student

who is qualified to issue rulings”

and so on.

For example, who

is called “qualified to issue rulings”?

Rava said: For example, Shimon ben Azzai and Shimon ben Zoma,

who sat before the Sages and were qualified to issue rulings. As they said in tractate Sanhedrin [17b]: “Those who deliberate before the Sages are Shimon ben Azzai and Shimon ben Zoma.”

Abaye said:

How could you say that the Mishna is speaking about such Sages? Surely a Sage

of this sort has acted intentionally!

For it is certain to him that the court erred, and if he acted nevertheless, he acted intentionally. People as great as these cannot attribute their inadvertent action to any court. How, then, could he be liable to bring a sin-offering?

Rava said to Abaye:

According to your reasoning,

since you said that he acted intentionally, how will you explain

that which was taught:

It is written in the passage concerning an individual’s sin-offering [Leviticus 4]: “If a person sins inadvertently, by doing one of the commandments of the Lord that may not be done, and incurs guilt.” We derive from the wording of the verse,

“ by doing one,”

and it does not say, “He sins, and he does one,” that the verse comes to teach you that even if the court mistakenly issued a ruling to violate one of the commandments, and one person went and acted in accordance with their ruling, but not because he relied upon them; rather, he was

“ an individual who acts on his own authority,”

then he is

liable

to bring an individual sin-offering. For only one who acted inadvertently

because of the court’s ruling

is

exempt

from bringing an offering.

How

is one considered “an individual who acts on his own authority”?

If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and one of the judges learned

from among them

that they had erred, or

if there was

a student sitting before them who was qualified to issue rulings, such as Shimon ben Azzai—might it be

that this judge or student, who acts on the basis of their ruling,

exempt

from bringing an offering?

The verse states: “By doing one.”

An individual who acts on his own authority is liable

to bring an offering! Only one who acts

because of the court’s ruling,

because he did not know of their error,

is exempt!

It is thus proven that even a student such as Shimon ben Azzai can be considered to have acted inadvertently and can be liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rather, how can you find

a case in which, according to your view, Abaye, a person who acts on his own authority is liable to bring a sin-offering, when he has acted intentionally? It must be

a case in which

he indeed

knew that the matter was prohibited, but

nevertheless

he erred concerning the commandment to heed the words of the Sages.

He thought that there is always a commandment to heed the words of the Sages, even where he himself knows that they erred in their ruling. With such an error, even Shimon ben Azzai is considered to have acted inadvertently.

,

So too, according to my view,

since I explained that “one qualified to issue rulings” in our Mishna refers to someone such as Shimon ben Azzai, I will establish the case in the same manner: they are considered to have acted inadvertently when, for example,

they erred

concerning the commandment to heed the words of the Sages. 6 .

We learned in our Mishna:

“ This is the general rule: One who relies on himself is liable.”

We ask concerning this: “This is the general rule,” which is an expression indicating inclusion,

What does it come to include?

What additional case does it include? And the Gemara explains:

It comes to include

one who went and ate forbidden fat after the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, but he

disregards the ruling,

as he habitually pays no attention to and does not act according to the court’s rulings. Therefore, he too is considered to have acted on his own authority and is liable to bring a sin-offering, like any individual who sinned inadvertently.

And this is what we learned: “This is the general rule,” regarding one who

relies upon the court

and is exempt—that it

comes to include

even if

the court ruled

to permit one of all the mitzvot,

and knew

afterward

that they had erred, and

already

retracted

from their ruling,

and only afterward did the individual transgress and act on their instruction—he is considered one who relied upon the court, and is exempt, because he did not know that they had retracted.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

but

this law

is explicitly taught

in the Mishna below [3b]!? The Gemara explains: This is the tanna’s method: he first

teaches a general rule—“This is the general rule”—

“This is the general rule,”

and afterward

and subsequently he returns and

explains

the law in the following Mishna.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

what we learned in our Mishna—that an individual who acted according to the instruction of the court, even though the court does not bring on his account a bull for an erroneous ruling, nevertheless he himself is exempt from an offering—

these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

But the Sages say: an individual who acted on the instruction of the court is liable

to bring a sin-offering!

And the Gemara explains:

What is Rabbi Yehuda?

Where do we find that this is Rabbi Yehuda’s method?

For it was taught:

it is stated in the passage concerning a sin-offering:

“If one person sins unwittingly, when he does it.”

And apparently it would have been sufficient to write, “If he sins unwittingly.”

Therefore we expound as though it had been written: “a person sins,” “one sins,” “when he does it, he sins,” and

these are three exclusions.

And from one of the exclusions we expound: specifically,

one who acts on his own initiative is liable.

But one who acts

on the instruction of the court is exempt.

And below the Gemara will explain how we know that this beraita is the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara continues and explains:

What is the view of the Sages?

For it was taught:

we learned in the Torat Kohanim, concerning the word “when he does it,” a beraita divided into two parts: the first deals with a minority who sinned, and the second with the majority of Israel who sinned. And so we learned:

It might have been thought that specifically an individual who acted and transgressed a sin unwittingly is liable for a sin-offering, but two [or several people] who sinned together through the same unwitting act should be exempt. The verse therefore says, “of the people of the land.” The verse teaches that even several people who transgressed together through the same unwitting act are liable, each one to bring an individual sin-offering for his unwitting act.

The beraita in the Torat Kohanim continues and says:

I would still say

that only

a minority of the congregation who sinned

together through the same unwitting act

are liable

for an individual sin-offering, because

the court does not bring on their account

of the minority of the public

a bull

for an erroneous ruling.

But

the majority of the congregation who sinned [

and below it will be explained how they erred and sinned],

shall be exempt

from an individual sin-offering,

for the court brings on their account

of the majority of the public

a bull

for an erroneous ruling.

The verse therefore says: “of the people of the land”—

even its majority, and even all of it!

The Gemara analyzes:

In what circumstance,

in what kind of unwitting act is this beraita, which deals with a minority and a majority, speaking?

If you say

that this entire beraita, in both its parts, concerning the minority and the majority, deals with a case in which there was no instruction of the court, but the congregation transgressed and acted

through an unwitting act,

for example, each individual among the public confused forbidden fat with permitted fat and ate unwittingly, and this was not at all according to an instruction of the court—and the beraita came to teach, on the basis of the exposition from the verse, that not only when one individual acts unwittingly does he bring a sin-offering, but even when several people sinned through the same unwitting act, or even when the majority of the public acted through the same unwitting act, nevertheless they are liable [each one] for an individual sin-offering, and they are not atoned for by a bull for an erroneous ruling—

It is impossible to establish the beraita in such a manner! For this beraita said that when the majority of the congregation sinned, the court brings on their account a bull for an erroneous ruling. And if we say that their sin was through an unwitting act, not according to the instruction of the court, it is difficult:

What is the court’s involvement?!

For if the public sinned

without the instruction of the court—

Does the court bring it,

do they indeed bring

a bull

for an erroneous ruling when the public sinned

without an instruction?!

But the court brings a bull only when the public sinned on the basis of the court’s instruction!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that this entire beraita, in both its parts, indeed deals with a case in which they erred and transgressed

on the basis of an instruction

of the court. And the beraita teaches that one should not say that only when individuals erred on the basis of the court’s instruction are they liable [each one for an individual sin-offering]; rather, there is a special derivation from the verse revealing a novel law, that even if several members of the public, or even the majority of the public, acted on the basis of the court’s instruction, even then they are not exempt from an individual sin-offering, despite the fact that the court brings on their account a bull for an erroneous ruling!

But the Gemara rejects: even so, it is impossible to explain it!

For this verse, “of the people of the land,” from which the beraita expounds, does not speak at all of a case in which they erred on the basis of the court’s instruction, for

when the verse

was written:

“of the people of the land,”

it was written concerning an unwitting act!

If so, how can one learn from here to make the majority of the public liable for an individual offering even when there was an instruction of the court?!

Rather, necessarily,

one must say that the entire beraita does not deal with one circumstance, but is divided in its two parts into two circumstances. And

this is what

the tanna of this beraita is saying:

a.

A minority of the congregation

[several people]

who sinned

[together]

through an unwitting act—

are liable

for an individual offering,

for

so

the court does not bring on their account

[of the minority of the public]

a bull

for an erroneous ruling

through an instruction.

And it is proven from the words of the beraita, which says, “the court does not bring on their account a bull for an erroneous ruling,” that specifically the court does not bring a bull for an erroneous ruling when a minority of the public sinned.

But they,

the minority of the public itself, which sinned unwittingly on the basis of the court, indeed

are liable

to bring, each one, a female sheep or female goat.

And the beraita comes to say as follows: just as the minority of the public is not exempt from an individual offering even if the court ruled that it was permitted for them and they acted on its instruction, so the minority of the public [several people who sinned together through the same unwitting act] is not exempt from an individual offering when they themselves erred through an unwitting act alone; rather, they are liable for an individual sin-offering, like an individual who sinned.

That is, in this part of the beraita we find a novel law also concerning an unwitting act based on an instruction: an individual who acts on the instruction of the court is liable for an individual offering.

If so, here we find the method of the Sages, as stated by Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel: an individual who acts on the instruction of the court is liable for a sin-offering.

b.

It might have been thought

that

the majority of the public who acted through an unwitting act shall be exempt

all of them from an individual sin-offering

, for the court brings on their account,

on account of the majority of the public,

a bull

for an erroneous ruling when they made the public act

on the basis of an instruction

that the court had issued.

And according to this, one might continue and say: just as the majority of the congregation is exempt from an individual sin-offering when it sinned on the basis of an instruction, so it should be exempt from an individual sin-offering also when it sinned through an unwitting act.

That is, there was room to say [were it not for the special derivation from the verse, as will be explained in the beraita below] that a new law was established concerning the atonement of the public: it is specifically through a public bull and not through a female sheep of each and every individual. Therefore, even where the public’s unwitting act was an act and not an instruction, in which case they have no atonement through a bull, nevertheless the public should not bring an individual sin-offering; rather, they should be entirely exempt from bringing an offering, because they have no other atonement than through a bull.

The verse therefore says [

in the verse speaking of an unwitting act!],

“of the people of the land.”

The verse teaches [which speaks of an unwitting act!] that

even

if

its majority

of the congregation sinned through an unwitting act [not through an unwitting instruction], each one of the congregation brings a female sheep or female goat for an individual sin-offering. We do not say that the public has no atonement except through a bull for an erroneous ruling, and therefore it has no atonement at all through an unwitting act; rather, each one of the public is liable to bring an individual offering, because exemption from an individual offering was stated only concerning a public that erred because of the court’s instruction, for they are atoned for through a bull for an erroneous ruling, and not concerning a public that erred through an unwitting act.

If so, in this beraita we find the words of the Sages, who hold [at the beginning of the beraita] that an individual, and even a minority of people, who acted according to the court’s instruction are liable for a sin-offering!

And we reject this:

Rav Pappa said: From where

did you prove that this beraita holds that an individual who acted according to the court’s instruction is liable for a sin-offering? You proved it from what they said at the beginning of the beraita, that a minority of the congregation who sinned through an unwitting act is liable for a sin-offering, just as we find that the court does not bring a bull for an instruction on behalf of a minority of people. And you inferred from the wording of the beraita: “but they,” the minority of people who acted on the basis of an instruction, are liable for a sin-offering.

But from where do you have this to infer: “but they [the minority themselves] are liable”?

Perhaps

the intention of the beraita is to say that if a minority acted on the basis of an instruction, they are not liable to bring an offering—

neither they nor the court!

And in fact, an individual or a minority who acted on the instruction of the court is exempt from an offering, because an individual who relies upon the court is exempt even according to the Sages!

And the explanation of the beraita, according to Rav Pappa, is as follows:

a. Individuals who acted through an unwitting act are liable for a sin-offering. For only when they acted on the basis of an instruction do they have no need for atonement, since they relied upon the court; but through an unwitting act, they require atonement by bringing an individual sin-offering.

b. However, when the majority of the congregation acted, since even if they acted on the basis of an instruction they require atonement, and the atonement of the public was established through a bull for an erroneous ruling, therefore even through an unwitting act they will have no atonement through an individual sin-offering, and they will be entirely exempt.

But the Gemara did not understand it in this way, and therefore it challenges Rav Pappa:

If so,

as you say, that the intention of this beraita is to say that an individual who acted on the basis of an instruction is exempt, this is difficult:

Why specifically does he return,

in the second part of the beraita to derive from the verse

concerning the majority

who sinned through an unwitting act, without an instruction,

to make them liable?

Is it not

that you heard

by implication

of these words of the tanna

that the minority

who sinned

on the basis of an instruction—it is established for him

by the tanna

that they are liable

for an individual sin-offering even when they did so

on the basis of an instruction.

Therefore, all that the tanna returns to seek in the second part of the beraita is a source from the verse that even the majority of the public who sinned without relying on a ruling are liable to bring an individual offering.

It is thus evident that it is obvious to the tanna that an individual who acted on the basis of a ruling is liable.

And there is another difficulty according to Rav Pappa:

Let the tanna return

in the

first clause,

in the first part of the beraita, to find a source from the verse

concerning the minority

of several people

that they are liable

when they sinned together

through an unwitting act.

For if the tanna held as Rav Pappa said—that even a minority of people who acted on the basis of a ruling are exempt—then just as the tanna needed to expound in the second part of the verse concerning the public who sinned through an error in action, teaching that they are liable, so that one would not say that they are exempt just as they are exempt when they act through an error based on a ruling, so too the tanna should have expounded the verse in the first part, concerning a minority who sinned without relying on a ruling, to say that they are liable, so that one would not say that they are exempt from a sin-offering, just as they are exempt when they act on the basis of a ruling [according to Rav Pappa’s view].

And

only

finally,

after the tanna teaches in the first part from the verse that a minority is liable when they sinned through an inadvertent act,

he will return

and teach also

that the majority is liable,

when they sinned

through an inadvertent act.

For regarding a majority of the community, we find that they achieve atonement through a bull offering; all the more so, it is reasonable to hold them liable for a sin offering than to hold a minority of individuals who sinned liable, since the latter do not require atonement at all when they acted mistakenly on the basis of a ruling. If so, the tanna should first have to find a source from the verse for the liability of the minority of individuals, more than he needs a source for the liability of the community, which is more obvious.

Rather, from the fact that he did not return

to expound first

that a minority are liable for an inadvertent act, and

only

at the end

did he

return to teach that the majority is liable

when they sinned

through an inadvertent act, you may learn

that the explanation of the beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—is in accordance with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

the minority

who sinned

on the basis of a ruling

was obvious to the tanna that

they are liable to bring a female sheep or female goat,

because an individual who relies on the court is not exempt from a sin offering.

Therefore, even when they sinned

without relying on a ruling, through an inadvertent act,

it was obvious to the tanna that they are

liable,

because we find that they achieve atonement through a sin offering even when they acted on the basis of a ruling. It follows that this beraita proves that the view of the Sages is that an individual who acts on the basis of a ruling of the court is liable.

The Gemara now discusses what was said: that Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna of the earlier beraita, which states that an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt, whereas the Sages are the ones who hold him liable in the second beraita, as the Gemara inferred from the two beraitot.

At first glance this is difficult:

Since

how do we know that we should infer this? After all,

both

the beraitot

are stated anonymously,

and it is not explained who said these beraitot.

And although the anonymous Sifra [Torat Kohanim] is attributed to Rabbi Yehuda, it is still difficult:

From where

do you prove

that the

beraita

first,

in which we learned that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt,

is Rabbi Yehuda’s,

and

that the

beraita

second,

from which we proved that an individual who acted on the basis of the court’s ruling is liable,

is that of the Sages

?

Say the opposite!

Let us say that according to the Sages he is exempt, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable, since both of these beraitot were taught anonymously, and both are found in the Torat Kohanim.

And we answer:

Who do you find

elsewhere

expounds exclusions in this manner,

as they expounded in the first beraita: “If one person sins inadvertently, when he performs it”—these are three exclusions

? It is Rabbi Yehuda!

For we find that he expounds in this way in other matters as well.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: