Horayot 2a — the Talmud in English

Introductory words to Tractate Horayot Three passages were written in the Torah concerning the sin-offering. Two of them deal with a “fixed sin-offering,” in which the poor and the wealthy are equal, and one deals with a “descending and ascending sin-offering” [for which the wealthy brings an animal offering, the poor turtledoves or young pigeons, and the poorest of all brings a meal-offering]. The two passages of the fixed sin-offering are: The first, in the passage of Vayikra, in which the laws of a sin-offering brought for a sin committed inadvertently are written, and for which, had it been committed intentionally, he would have been liable to karet, except for the sin of idolatry. And the second, in the passage of Shelach, in which the law of a sin-offering for the inadvertent sin of idolatry is explained. And in these two passages it is also explained that if the majority of the public sinned because of an erroneous ruling issued by the Great Court, each individual does not bring a sin-offering; rather, they bring a public offering, called the bull of concealment of the matter, and are atoned through it. However, there is a distinction between the other mitzvot and idolatry. For the other mitzvot, they bring only a bull for a sin-offering, whereas for idolatry they bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering! Mishna: a.

The Great Court

issued an erroneous ruling, because they erred, and mistakenly ruled that it was permitted

to transgress

one particular matter from

any one of the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

For example, regarding the prohibition against eating the fat of an animal: if it happened that the Great Court erred and thought that a certain type of animal fat had the status of ordinary fat and not the status of forbidden fat, and ruled that it was permitted to eat, whereas in truth it was forbidden fat, and it is forbidden to eat, and its punishment is karet for one who eats it intentionally.

And the individual went and acted,

acting according to the ruling of the court, and he is

inadvertent,

since he committed the transgression because he relied

upon their word,

he is exempt from bringing an individual sin-offering for his inadvertence.

And this exemption is

whether they acted,

the court itself performing an act according to its error,

and he acted,

that individual also,

with them,

for example, he ate this forbidden fat together with them.

Whether they acted,

they first acted according to their erroneous ruling,

and he acted,

the individual

after them.

Whether they did not act

at all, the court, according to its error,

and he acted,

the individual alone in all these circumstances, he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering,

because

his inadvertence was because

he relied on the court.

And anyone who performs an act of transgression because he relied on the ruling of the court is exempt from a sin-offering.

b.

The court

issued an erroneous ruling,

and one of them knew [

of the judges],

that they had erred,

his colleagues, in their ruling.

Or

a student recognized that error,

and he was fit to issue a ruling.

But that judge [who knew of the Sanhedrin’s error], or that student fit to issue a ruling, made another error: he thought that there is a mitzva to obey the words of the Sages in a matter of transgression, even if he himself knows that they are mistaken,

and he went and acted

in deed

on the basis of their ruling,

he is liable for an individual sin-offering. This is because his error was not that he relied on a ruling issued by the court; rather, his error was that he mistakenly thought that it was necessary to obey them and transgress, even if he recognized their error.

And this judge’s liability too is

whether they acted,

the court performing an act,

and he acted

himself

with them. Whether they acted and he acted after them. Whether they did not act

they

and he acted

himself—

he is liable

for a sin-offering,

because he did not rely on the court,

for he knows that their ruling is erroneous; rather, he erred in thinking that despite this there is a mitzva to obey their words.

c.

This is the general rule —

one who relies upon himself,

whose error is his own,

is liable

for a sin-offering for it.

And one who relies upon the court,

whose error derives from their ruling,

— is exempt

from a sin-offering.

And since he relied on the court, he is included with the public who act on the ruling of the court, and joins them in making them liable for the bull of concealment of the matter [whose liability applies only if the majority of the public acted according to the court’s error].

Gemara:

The Gemara brings a dispute between Shmuel and Rav Dimi concerning what sort of ruling by the court makes them liable to bring the bull of concealment of the matter and exempts each individual from a sin-offering:

Shmuel said: The court is never liable

to bring the bull of concealment of the matter for a ruling that they issued in error and the majority of the people acted according to them,

until they say to them,

the court to the public:

You are permitted!

But if they formulate their ruling merely as a halakhic ruling, without saying to them, “You are permitted,” they are not liable for the bull of concealment of the matter, because their ruling has still not been completed.

Likewise, an individual who acted according to their ruling is exempt from an individual sin-offering only if the court said, “You are permitted.” For if they did not say, “You are permitted,” the individual who acts according to them is not considered to have relied on their ruling.

But it is not necessary that they say, “You are permitted to act.”

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said:

The court is not liable for the offering of concealment of the matter for its ruling even if they said, “You are permitted,”

until they say to them: You are permitted to act!

What is the reason?

Why must the ruling be directed toward an act in order to make them liable for the offering of concealment of the matter, and is their ruling itself not sufficient? —

Because the ruling has not been completed

until they say, “You are permitted to act.”

Abaye said:

Even

we too have learned this

in accordance with Rav Dimi: that the ruling was not completed until they say, “You are permitted to do.”

For we learned concerning a judge who is a “rebellious elder,” who disagreed with the court in his place and issued a ruling different from theirs, that he and those who disagree with him go up to Jerusalem and come before the great court. And if the great court rules that he is mistaken, and nevertheless he continues to rebel against their words and issue a ruling according to his error, he is liable to death. But he is not liable to death until his ruling is a ruling to perform an action.

And thus we learned in tractate Sanhedrin [86b]: If

the rebellious elder returned

from Jerusalem

to his city,

and remained in his rebellion, but did not rule that an action should be performed according to his words, but only

repeated and taught in the manner in which he had taught

previously, he is

exempt

from death. But if

he ruled that an action should be performed

according to his mistaken ruling, he is

liable

to death, according to the law of a rebellious elder.

And it is proven from here that there is liability for a ruling only if his ruling was completed—that is, that he ruled that an action should be performed.

Rabbi Abba said: We too have learned

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, that only a ruling to perform an action causes one to be liable or exempt from an offering, for thus we learned in the Mishna in tractate Yevamot [87b]:

If one witness came and testified that the husband of a woman had died, and the court accepted his testimony and ruled that she was permitted, and therefore

the court ruled that she should marry,

but she did not act according to their words, that is, she did not marry, but rather

she went and acted immorally

through adultery, and afterward her husband came, she is

liable to bring an offering

a sin-offering. And although included in the ruling permitting her to marry was also a ruling that she is not considered a married woman, nevertheless she is not exempt from an offering for her sin, as one who attributes his action to the court,

for

they

did not permit her

to commit adultery,

but

only ruled that she was permitted

to marry.

And from the fact that the tanna stated, “the court ruled that she should marry,” and did not say, “they permitted her,” it is proven that the court’s ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they rule that an action should be performed!

Ravina said: We too have learned

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, that a court’s ruling is considered a ruling specifically when the court ruled that one should act according to its ruling. For it teaches in our Mishna:

“The court ruled that one should violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah”

and the individual went and so on, he is exempt. And from the fact that it teaches that the court ruled “to violate,” and does not teach merely, “the court ruled,” it is proven that their ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they say, “You are permitted to do.”

And the Gemara’s conclusion: Indeed, these proofs are conclusive proofs,

and nothing more!

There is nothing to answer concerning these proofs.

And the halakha is according to Rav Dimi: the court is not liable for a bull for an erroneous matter until they say, “You are permitted to do.”

There are those who say:

Shmuel and Rav Dimi of Nehardea did not disagree in this way, but rather the opposite; and this is how their dispute should be stated:

Shmuel said: The court is not liable

for a bull for an erroneous matter

until they say to them

the public:

“You are permitted to do”

according to this ruling that we have issued! But if they said, “You are permitted,” and did not say, “to do,” this is not a complete ruling, and they are not liable for a bull for an erroneous matter.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: Even

if the court said

“You are permitted”

alone,

the ruling is completed,

and the court is liable to bring a bull for an erroneous matter.

And according to this version, all those Mishnayot that Abaye and the other amoraim brought above as assistance for Rav Dimi now constitute a difficulty against his words. Therefore, in the words of Abaye and the other amoraim, one should not read, “We too have learned,” but rather they should be read in an expression of astonishment. And this is how their words were taught:

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi:

But we did not learn so

as you say, for we learned:

“The rebellious elder returned

from Jerusalem

to his city

and remained in his rebellion, but did not rule that an action should be performed according to his words, but only

repeated and taught in the manner in which he had taught

previously, he is

exempt

from death. But if

he ruled that an action should be performed

according to his mistaken ruling, he is

liable

to death, according to the law of a rebellious elder! And it is proven that there is liability for a ruling only if his ruling was completed, to perform an action, and this is not according to Rav Dimi, who makes a ruling liable even without their having ruled that an action should be performed.”

And likewise

Rabbi Abba said: But we did not learn so

according to the words of Rav Dimi, for we learned concerning testimony that a woman’s husband had died, that if

the court ruled that she should marry

on the basis of the testimony of one witness,

and

she did not marry but rather

went and acted immorally

through adultery, and afterward her husband came, she is

liable to bring an offering

a sin-offering,

“for they permitted her only to marry!”

And from the fact that the tanna stated in his wording that the court ruled for her “to marry,” and did not state merely that they permitted her, it is proven that their ruling is not considered a ruling until they rule that an action should be performed, but permitting her alone is not a ruling, and this is not according to Rav Dimi.

And likewise Ravina said: But we did not learn so!

For it teaches in our Mishna:

“The court ruled that one should violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah”

and the individual went and so on, he is exempt. And from the fact that it teaches that the court ruled “to violate,” and does not teach merely that the court ruled, it is proven that their ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they say, “You are permitted to do.”

And we conclude:

There is nothing more.

Indeed, there is nothing to answer concerning these proofs.

We learned in our Mishna: The court ruled that one should violate and so on,

and the individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority

and so on, he is exempt.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let it teach

only, “And the individual went

and acted on their authority,

he is exempt.”

The word

“unwittingly,” why do I need it

for the tanna to state it? After all, if the individual acted on the authority of the court, he is certainly unwitting in this respect!?

Rava said:

Our Mishna comes to teach us that there are two ways in which an individual transgressed a prohibition, and nevertheless is exempt from a sin-offering. One is when he acted and transgressed precisely on the basis of the court’s ruling. The second is when his own error was also joined to his action [as will be explained]:

That is, through the superfluity of the word

“unwitting,”

our Mishna

comes to include,

to bring and say that even in a case where

the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted,

and the individual ate the forbidden fat not because the court ruled that there was permission concerning it, but because of a circumstance in which he erred and

mistook forbidden fat

for [the fat]

that the court had permitted, and ate it,

so that the eating of that forbidden fat was through his own error, for he did not do so because the court had ruled that the matter was permitted, but because he thought it was permitted fat that he was eating, nevertheless he is

exempt

from a sin-offering. For even if he had known that it was forbidden fat, he would not have refrained from eating it, on account of the court’s ruling permitting this forbidden fat; and this is what the tanna teaches us by the word “unwitting.”

And with what we learned in our Mishna, “and acted

on their authority,”

the tanna comes to teach us the first law: that when the individual acted

precisely on their authority,

for example, they ruled that this forbidden fat was permitted, and he knew that it was forbidden fat and ate it, since his own error was not joined to his action, he is exempt because he attributed it to the court’s ruling.

And there are those who say: Rava said:

One should infer from the superfluous word “unwitting” the opposite:

Only if he was

unwitting on their authority

alone is he

exempt. But

if he was unwitting not on their authority, for example,

he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it, he is liable

for a sin-offering, because he does not attribute his action to the court.

A matter that was obvious to Rava

[the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat: according to the first version it was obvious to Rava that he is exempt, and according to the second version it was obvious to Rava that he is liable],

was a question for Rami bar Hama.

For Rami bar Hama asked: The court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and he mistook

forbidden fat

permitted fat and ate it—

what is the law?

And now the Gemara brings again the two versions according to Rava:

The first version:

Rava said: Come and hear,

from our Mishna, in which we learned:

“The individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority, and so on.”

And one should infer:

“Unwittingly,” on their authority—why do I need it?

Why did the tanna need to add the word “unwittingly”? After all, since he acted on their authority, he is certainly unwitting.

Rather,

is it not

necessarily that the tanna intended

to include,

to bring and say that even if he ate because he was unwitting, and not because he relied on the court’s ruling, for example,

the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it, he is exempt.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the intention of the tanna is to teach the opposite, that specifically when he is

unwitting

only

on their authority is he exempt. But

if

he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it, he is liable,

since he is not considered to have attributed his action to the court.

And according to this version, Rava came to prove from our Mishna that if he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it, he is exempt. As he said above in the first version, his proof is rejected.

The Gemara brings the second version according to Rava, which is the opposite:

There are those who say: Rava said

to prove the opposite from our Mishna, that he is liable:

Come and hear: The individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority.

And Rava infers:

Is it not

specifically

when he is unwitting on their authority that he is exempt? But if he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it, he is liable.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the intention of the Mishna is to say that an individual who acts on the court’s ruling is exempt in every case:

either

when he is

unwitting,

having mistaken forbidden fat for permitted fat,

or

when he knew that it was forbidden fat and ate it

on their authority,

because the court had ruled that the matter was permitted.

And now the Gemara says that this issue—whether he is liable or exempt when his own error was joined to the court’s ruling—is dependent

on a dispute

of amoraim.

And thus we learned:

“The court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, and he mistook forbidden fat for permitted fat and ate it: Rav said he is exempt, and Rabbi Yohanan said he is liable” 7 .

He raised an objection

against Rabbi Yohanan, who holds him liable, from that which is taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning a sin-offering [Leviticus 4]: “If one person sins unwittingly

from among the people, in performing

one of the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed, and he incurs guilt.”

From the fact that Scripture said, “from among the people,” we expound: “from among,” but not all of the people,

to exclude an apostate,

who does not bring an offering for his unwitting transgression.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei said in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

This law is learned only from here:

Behold, it

is

written

there, in the section of the sin-offering:

“Which he may not perform unwittingly, and he incurs guilt,”

and the verse is juxtaposed to it:

“Or it became known

to him the sin that he committed, and he shall bring his guilt-offering.”

And it implies that specifically in a case concerning which I say, “which he may not perform”—that he would not have sinned had he known that it was a forbidden matter, and the reason he sinned was that he was unwitting, because he did not know that it was prohibited—then he brings a sin-offering for his sin. But in a case where even if he had known that it was a prohibited matter he still would not have withdrawn, like an apostate, then he does not bring an offering.

For this is the rule:

“One who would withdraw upon knowledge,

that if he had known, he would have withdrawn and refrained from sinning,

brings an offering for his unwittingness.

But where

he would not withdraw upon knowledge,

for even if he had known that it was prohibited he still would not have withdrawn from it,

he does not bring an offering for his unwittingness! And if it is so

according to the words of Rabbi Yohanan, that where the court’s ruling joins with his unwittingness he is liable for a sin-offering, this is difficult:

here,

in such a case,

he would not withdraw upon knowledge!

For even if he had known that it was forbidden fat, he still would not have withdrawn from it, since the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted !?

Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Yohanan holds

that even when he mistook one thing for another, he is considered one who would withdraw upon knowledge.

Since when

if it had been

made known,

it had become known to

the court

that they had erred in this ruling,

they would retract,

they would retract and say that forbidden fat is prohibited,

and

then

he too

would

retract,

and would withdraw from this forbidden fat, therefore properly

“one who would withdraw upon knowledge” applies to him, and he is liable

for a sin-offering for his unwittingness in mistaking one thing for another, since he did not completely attribute his action to the court.

Rava said: Rav concedes,

although according to his view that individual who had the court’s ruling joined with his own unintentional act is not judged as an individual who sins unintentionally, and is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, nevertheless, he concedes

that he does not complete the majority of the public.

That is to say, the court brings a bull for an unwitting matter only if the majority of the public sinned according to its ruling; and if only half of the public acted according to the court, and together with that individual there is a majority of the public, he does not join with half of the public to complete them to a majority, so that it would be considered that the majority of the public acted unintentionally according to the court’s ruling .

What is the reason? —

The verse says,

with regard to a bull for an unwitting matter,

“in error.”

And we derive that a bull for an unwitting matter is not brought

until all of them are

sinning

in one error,

so that the unintentional act of all of them is equal; whereas here, that individual also erred in another unintentional act, for he thought that it was permitted fat that he was eating.

We learned at the beginning of our Mishna:

“Whether they acted and he acted with them,

whether he acted after them, or whether he alone acted, he is exempt from an individual sin-offering.”

And the Gemara discusses:

“Why was it necessary to teach all these,

the three cases?”

Granted, the first clause,

it was properly taught in it that he is exempt in all these cases, because this is the way of the Mishnayot,

“This one is not necessary, and this one too” it teaches,

that is to say, it is not necessary for the first case, such as when he acted with them, which is certainly considered attributing the matter to the court, and it is obvious that he is exempt; rather, even in the second case, such as when he acted after them, this too is considered attributing the matter to the court, and he is exempt. And the Mishna further teaches us even the third case: his exemption is not specifically when he acted with them or after them, but even if the court did not act at all and he alone acted according to its ruling, nevertheless he too is considered one who attributes the matter to the court, and is exempt.

But the latter clause, which

teaches us

liability,

for it taught: “The court issued a ruling, and one of them knew that they had erred,” and the Mishna again teaches these three cases, in all of which he is liable because he is not one who attributes the matter to the court, seemingly this is difficult: surely

it should have taught the opposite

in the following manner: “The court issued a ruling, and one of them knew that they had erred, and he went and acted according to their ruling”—whether they did not act and he acted, he is liable, for he does not attribute himself so greatly to the court; and even when they acted and he acted after them, which is considered more an attribution to the court, nevertheless he is liable; and even when he acted with them, he is likewise liable!