Horayot 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Introductory Remarks to Tractate Horayot Three passages concerning the sin-offering are written in the Torah. Two of them discuss a fixed sin-offering, for which the poor and the wealthy bring the same offering, while the third discusses the offering that varies according to one’s means, in which the wealthy bring an animal, the poor bring turtledoves or young pigeons, and the very poorest bring a meal-offering. The two passages concerning the fixed sin-offering are: The first, in the portion of Vayikra, where the laws of the sin-offering brought for an inadvertent transgression are written—one for which, had it been committed deliberately, the offender would have been liable to karet, with the exception of the sin of idolatry. And the second, in the portion of Shelach, where the law of the sin-offering for inadvertent idolatry is explained. These two passages also explain that if the majority of the community sinned because of an erroneous ruling issued by the Great Sanhedrin, each individual does not bring a sin-offering. Rather, a communal offering, called the bull for an unwitting matter, is brought, and atonement is achieved through it. However, there is a distinction between the other mitzvot and idolatry. For the other mitzvot, they bring only a bull as a sin-offering, whereas for idolatry they bring a bull as an elevation-offering and a goat as a sin-offering! Mishna: 1.

The Great

court issued an erroneous ruling because they erred, ruling mistakenly that it was permitted

to transgress

one particular prohibition from

any one of the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

For example, concerning the prohibition against eating the forbidden fat of an animal: if the Great Court happened to err and thought that a certain type of animal fat had the status of permitted suet rather than that of forbidden fat, and ruled that it was permitted to eat, although in truth it was forbidden fat and prohibited to eat, and one who eats it deliberately is liable to karet.

And the individual proceeded and acted,

performing an act in accordance with the court’s ruling, and he was

inadvertent,

since he committed the transgression because he relied

on the word

of the Sanhedrin; he is therefore exempt from bringing an individual sin-offering for his inadvertence.

This exemption applies

whether they acted

—the court themselves carrying out an act in accordance with their error—

and he acted

the individual also

with them,

for example, he ate this forbidden fat together with them;

whether they acted

first in accordance with their erroneous ruling

and he acted

after

them.

Whether the court did not act

at all in accordance with their error

and he acted

alone in any of these ways, he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering

because

his inadvertence resulted from

relying on the court.

Anyone who performs a transgressive act because he relied on a court’s ruling is exempt from a sin-offering.

2.

The court

issued an erroneous ruling,

and one of them knew

of the judges],

that they had erred

in their ruling.

Or

a student recognized that same error,

and he was fit to issue rulings.

However, that judge [who knew of the Sanhedrin’s error], or that student fit to issue rulings, made a different error: He thought that there is a mitzva to obey the words of the Sages concerning a transgression, even when he himself knows that they are mistaken.

And he proceeded and acted

in practice

on the basis of their ruling,

and he is liable to bring an individual sin-offering. This is because his error did not result from relying on a ruling issued by the court. Rather, his error was that he thought one must obey their voice and transgress even when he recognizes their mistake.

This judge’s liability likewise applies

whether they acted

—the court carrying out an act—

and he acted

also

with them; whether they acted and he acted after them; whether they did not act

at all

and he acted

alone—

he is liable

for a sin-offering

because he did not rely on the court,

for he knew that their ruling was erroneous and merely erred in thinking that there was nevertheless a mitzva to obey their words.

3.

This is the general rule:

One who relies on himself,

whose error is his own,

is liable

for a sin-offering because of it.

But one who relies on the court,

whose error results from their ruling,

is exempt

from a sin-offering.

Since he relied on the court, he is included among the community that acts on the basis of the court’s ruling, and he joins them in making them liable to bring the bull for an unwitting matter [whose liability applies only when the majority of the community acted on the basis of the court’s error].

Gemara:

The Gemara presents a dispute between Shmuel and Rav Dimi concerning the nature of the court’s ruling that makes it liable to bring the bull for an unwitting matter and exempts each individual from a sin-offering:

Shmuel said: The court is never liable

to bring the bull for an unwitting matter for a ruling that it issued in error, even when the majority of the people acted on the basis of it,

until they say to them

—the court to the community—

“You are permitted!”

But if they issue their ruling merely as a halakhic decision, without saying to them, “You are permitted,” they are not liable for the bull for an unwitting matter, because their ruling has not yet been finalized.

Likewise, an individual who acted on the basis of their ruling is exempt from an individual sin-offering only if the court said, “You are permitted.” If they did not say, “You are permitted,” the individual who acts on their authority is not considered to have relied on their ruling.

However, it is not necessary for them to say, “You are permitted to act.”

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said:

The court is not liable for the offering for an unwitting matter even if it said, “You are permitted,”

until they say to them: “You are permitted to act!”

What is the reason?

Why must the ruling concern an actual deed in order to make them liable for the offering for an unwitting matter, and is the ruling itself not sufficient?

Because the ruling has not been finalized

until they say, “You are permitted to act.”

Abaye said:

Even

we too have learned

in accordance with Rav Dimi: The ruling is not considered concluded until they say, “You are permitted to perform” the act.

For we learned with regard to a judge who is a “rebellious elder,” who disagreed with the court in his locality and ruled differently from them, that he and those who disagree with him go up to Jerusalem and appear before the Great Court. If the Great Court rules that he is mistaken, and nevertheless he continues to defy their words and issue rulings according to his error, he is liable to receive the death penalty. However, he is not liable to receive the death penalty until his ruling is one to perform an act.

And so we learned in tractate Sanhedrin [86b]: If

the rebellious elder returned

from Jerusalem

to his city,

and remained defiant, but did not rule that an act should be performed in accordance with his words, and only

reviewed and taught in the manner in which he had taught

previously, he is

exempt

from the death penalty. But if

he ruled that an act should be performed

in accordance with his mistaken ruling, he is

liable

to receive the death penalty, as is the law concerning a rebellious elder.

This proves that there is liability for a ruling only when the ruling has been concluded—that is, when he ruled that an act should be performed.

Rabbi Abba said: We too have learned

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, that only a ruling to perform an act renders one liable or exempt from a sacrifice, as we learned in the Mishna in tractate Yevamot [87b]:

If one witness came and testified that a woman’s husband had died, and the court accepted his testimony and ruled that she was permitted, and therefore

the court instructed her to marry,

but she did not act in accordance with their words—that is, she did not marry—but

went and engaged in illicit relations,

and afterward her husband came, she is

liable to bring a sacrifice

for a sin-offering. Although the ruling permitting her to marry also included a ruling that she is not considered a married woman, nevertheless she is not exempt from a sacrifice for her sin as one who attributes his actions to the court,

for

they

did not permit her

to engage in illicit relations,

but

only ruled that she was permitted

to marry.

And from the fact that the tanna stated, “The court instructed her to marry,” rather than saying, “They permitted her,” it is proven that a court’s ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they instruct that an act be performed!

Ravina said: We too have learned

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, that a court’s ruling is considered a ruling specifically when the court instructed people to act in accordance with its ruling. For it is taught in our Mishna:

The court instructed the people to violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah

and an individual went and acted, etc., he is exempt. And from the fact that it teaches that the court instructed them “to violate,” rather than merely teaching, “The court instructed them,” it is proven that their ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they say, “You are permitted to perform” the act.

The Gemara concludes: Indeed, these proofs are conclusive proofs,

and there is nothing more to say!

There is no response to these proofs.

And the halakha follows Rav Dimi: The court is not liable to bring a bull for an unwitting decision of the court until they say, “You are permitted to perform” the act.

There are those who say:

Shmuel and Rav Dimi of Nehardea did not disagree in this manner; rather, they disagreed in the opposite manner, and their dispute should be stated as follows:

Shmuel said: The court is not liable

to bring a bull for an unwitting decision of the court

until they say to them

the public:

You are permitted to perform

the act in accordance with this ruling that we issued. But if they said, “You are permitted,” and did not say, “to perform,” this is not a complete ruling, and they are not liable to bring a bull for an unwitting decision of the court.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: Even

if the court said

“You are permitted”

alone,

the ruling has been concluded,

and the court is liable to bring a bull for an unwitting decision of the court.

According to this version, all those mishnayot that Abaye and the other amoraim cited above as support for Rav Dimi now constitute a difficulty against his words. Therefore, in the words of Abaye and the other amoraim, one should not read, “We too have learned,” but rather a formulation expressing wonder. Their words were taught as follows:

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi:

But we did not learn this!

For we learned:

The rebellious elder returned

from Jerusalem

to his city

and remained defiant, but did not instruct that an act be performed in accordance with his words, and only

reviewed and taught in the manner in which he had taught

previously, he is

exempt

from the death penalty. But if

he instructed that an act be performed

in accordance with his mistaken ruling, he is

liable

to receive the death penalty, as is the law concerning a rebellious elder! This proves that there is liability for a ruling only when the ruling is concluded with an instruction to perform an act, and not in accordance with Rav Dimi, who imposes liability for a ruling even without an instruction to perform an act.

And likewise,

Rabbi Abba said: But we did not learn this

in accordance with the words of Rav Dimi, for we learned with regard to testimony concerning a woman whose husband died that if

the court instructed her to marry

on the basis of the testimony of one witness,

and

she did not marry but

went and engaged in illicit relations,

and afterward her husband came,

she is liable to bring a sacrifice

for a sin-offering,

for they permitted her only to marry!

And from the fact that the tanna stated in his wording that the court instructed her “to marry,” rather than stating merely that they permitted her, it is proven that their ruling is not considered a ruling until they instruct that an act be performed; but permitting her alone is not a ruling, contrary to Rav Dimi.

And Ravina likewise said: But we did not learn this!

For it is taught in our Mishna:

The court instructed the people to violate one of all the mitzvot stated in the Torah

and the individual went, etc., and is exempt. And from the fact that it teaches that the court instructed them to violate, rather than teaching merely, “The court instructed them,” it is proven that their ruling is not considered a complete ruling until they say, “You are permitted to perform” the act.

And we conclude:

There is nothing more to say.

Indeed, there is no response to these proofs.

We learned in our Mishna: The court instructed the people to violate, etc.,

and the individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority

etc., and is exempt.

And the Gemara asks:

Let it teach

only, “And the individual went

and acted on their authority,

and is exempt.”

The word

“unwittingly”—why do I need it

for the tanna to teach it? After all, surely if the individual acted on the basis of the court, he was unwitting in doing so!?

Rava said:

Our Mishna comes to teach that there are two ways in which an individual transgresses a prohibition and nevertheless is exempt from a sin-offering. One is when he acted and transgressed directly on the basis of the court’s ruling. The second is when his own error was also joined to his act [as will be explained]:

That is, through the redundancy of the word

“unwitting,”

our Mishna comes

to include

and teach that even when

the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted,

and the individual ate the forbidden fat not because the court had ruled it permitted, but because he mistakenly

confused the forbidden fat

that the court had permitted

with suet and ate it,

so that his eating of that forbidden fat was due to his own error—he did not do so because the court had ruled the matter permitted, but because he thought it was suet—nevertheless, he is

exempt

from a sin-offering. For even if he had known that it was forbidden fat, he would not have refrained from eating it, because of the court’s ruling permitting this fat. This is what the tanna teaches with the word “unwitting.”

And with what we learned in our Mishna, “and acted

on their authority,”

the tanna teaches us the first law: When the individual acted

directly on their authority,

for example, they ruled that this forbidden fat was permitted, and he knew that it was forbidden fat and ate it, since his own error was not joined to his act, he is exempt because he attributed his action to the court’s ruling.

And there are those who say: Rava said:

The redundancy of the word “unwitting” should be understood in the opposite manner:

Only when he was

unwitting on their authority

alone is he

exempt. But

if he was unwitting without relying on their authority—for example, he

confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it, he is liable

to bring a sin-offering, because he did not attribute his action to the court.

What was obvious to Rava

[that the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted and he confused forbidden fat with suet—according to the first version it was obvious to Rava that he is exempt, while according to the second version it was obvious to Rava that he is liable]

was a question to Rami bar Ḥama.

For Rami bar Ḥama asked: If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and he confused

the forbidden fat

with suet and ate it—

what is the law?

The Gemara now brings the two versions again according to Rava:

The first version:

Rava said: Come and hear

from our Mishna, in which we learned:

The individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority, etc.

And one should infer:

“Unwittingly,” on their authority—why do I need it?

Why did the tanna need to add the word “unwittingly”? Since he acted on their authority, he was certainly unwitting.

Rather,

is it not

necessarily the tanna’s intention

to include

and teach that even if he ate because he was unwitting, and not because he relied on the court’s ruling—for example,

the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and he confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it—he is exempt.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the tanna’s intention is to teach the opposite: He is exempt only when he is

unwitting

solely

on their authority. But

if he

confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it, he is liable,

since he is not considered one who attributes his action to the court.

According to this version, Rava sought to prove from our Mishna that if he confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it, he is exempt, as he said above in the first version, and his proof was rejected.

The Gemara brings the second version according to Rava, which is the opposite:

There are those who say: Rava said

to prove the opposite from our Mishna, that he is liable:

Come and hear: The individual went and acted unwittingly on their authority.

And Rava infers:

Is it not

specifically

when he is unwitting on their authority that he is exempt, but if he confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it, he is liable?

But the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the Mishna means to say that an individual who acts on the basis of the court’s ruling is exempt in every case:

either

when he is

unwitting,

having confused forbidden fat with suet,

or

when he knew that it was forbidden fat and ate it

on their authority,

because the court had ruled the matter permitted.

The Gemara now says that this issue—whether he is liable or exempt when his own error is joined to the court’s ruling—is dependent

on a dispute

among the amoraim.

And so we learned:

If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and he confused forbidden fat with suet and ate it: Rav said he is exempt, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said he is liable 7 .

A challenge was raised

against Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that he is liable, from what is taught in a beraita:

It is written with regard to a sin-offering [Leviticus 4]: “If one person sins unwittingly

from among the people of the land, when he performs

one of the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed, and he incurs guilt.”

From the fact that the verse says “from among the people of the land,” we expound: “from among,” but not all the people of the land

—to exclude an apostate,

who does not bring a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

This law is learned only from here:

Behold, it

the verse

says

there, in the passage concerning a sin-offering:

“Which may not be performed unwittingly, and he incurs guilt,”

and the following verse is juxtaposed to it:

“Or his sin became known

to him, which he committed, and he shall bring his guilt-offering.”

This indicates that specifically in a case where I can apply the phrase “which may not be performed”—that is, he would not have sinned had he known that the matter was prohibited, and the reason he sinned was that he was unwitting and did not know that it was prohibited—does he bring a sin-offering for his sin. But in a case where even if he had known that it was prohibited he still would not have refrained, as with an apostate, he does not bring a sacrifice.

For this is the principle:

One who would turn back upon learning,

meaning that had he known, he would have turned back and refrained from sinning,

brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression.

But where he

would not turn back upon learning,

meaning that even had he known that it was prohibited, he would not have turned back and refrained from it,

he does not bring a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression! And if it is so

as Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that when the court’s ruling joins with his own error he is liable for a sin-offering, this is difficult:

Here

in such a case

he would not turn back upon learning!

For even if he had known that it was forbidden fat, he still would not have refrained from it, since the court had ruled that forbidden fat was permitted !?

Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds

that even when he confused the substances, he is considered one who would turn back upon learning.

Since if,

had it

become known

to them

in the court

that they had erred in this ruling,

they would retract,

they would retract their ruling and say that forbidden fat is prohibited,

and

then

he too

would have

retracted,

and would have refrained from this forbidden fat; therefore, properly

“one who would turn back upon learning” applies to him, and he is liable

for a sin-offering for his error in confusing the substances, since he did not rely entirely on the court.

Rava said: Rav concedes,

even though according to him, that individual in whose case the ruling of the beit din was joined with his own act of unawareness is not treated as an individual who sinned unwittingly and is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, nevertheless, he concedes

that he does not join them to constitute the majority of the community.

That is, the beit din brings a bull for an unwitting matter only if the majority of the community sinned in accordance with its ruling. If only half of the community acted in accordance with the beit din, and together with that individual they constitute a majority of the community, he does not join the half of the community to complete the majority, so that it would be considered that the majority of the community acted unwittingly in accordance with the ruling of the beit din .

What is the reason? —

The verse states,

with regard to the bull for an unwitting matter,

“unwittingly.”

And we derive that a bull for an unwitting matter is not brought

until they are all

sinners

through a single act of unawareness,

so that the act of unawareness of all of them is the same. Here, however, that individual also acted unwittingly in another manner, since he thought that the forbidden fat was permitted fat .

We learned at the beginning of our Mishna:

“Whether they acted and he acted with them,”

whether he acted after them, or whether he alone acted, he is exempt from an individual sin-offering.

The Gemara asks:

Why was it necessary to teach all these,

all three cases?

Granted, the first clause,

it was properly taught there that he is exempt in all these cases, because this is the manner of Mishna formulations:

“Not only this, but even that” is what it teaches.

That is, not only in the first case, such as when he acted with them, is he certainly considered one who attributes his action to the beit din, and it is obvious that he is exempt; but even in the second case, such as when he acted after them, he is also considered one who attributes his action to the beit din and is exempt. The Mishna further teaches that this exemption applies even in the third case: his exemption is not limited to when he acted with them or after them; even if the beit din did not act at all and he alone acted on the basis of its ruling, he is nevertheless also considered one who attributes his action to the beit din and is exempt.

But the latter clause, which

teaches us

liability,

for it teaches: “The beit din issued a ruling, and one of its members knew that they had erred,” and the Mishna again teaches these three cases, in all of which he is liable because he is not considered one who attributes his action to the beit din—seemingly, there is a difficulty:

it should have taught the opposite:

“The beit din issued a ruling, and one of its members knew that they had erred, and he went and acted on the basis of its ruling: whether they did not act and he acted, he is liable, because he does not rely so heavily on the beit din; and even when they acted and he acted after them, in which case he is considered more clearly one who attributes his action to the beit din, nevertheless he is liable. And even when he acted with them, he is also liable!”