Gittin 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

3.

And all documents

that are presented in non-Jewish courts—

that were executed in the courts

of non-Jews, even though their signatories

of these documents are

non-Jews,

they are

valid,

except for bills of divorce for women and bills of manumission for slaves,

which are disqualified by the signatures of non-Jews. In a woman’s bill of divorce they are disqualified because they are not subject to keritut, since the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal do not apply to them. For this reason they are also disqualified from signing bills of manumission, since with regard to any disqualification that is of Torah origin, the law of a slave’s manumission is equivalent to that of a woman’s divorce, based on the derivation “la, la” by means of a gzera shava.

And the beraita adds:

And in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir [

that is, according to Rabbi Meir’s view], they are equal

in four respects.

As brought in the Mishna below [page 11b]:

If one says

to an agent,

“Give this bill of divorce to my wife” [

or]

“and this bill of manumission to my slave,” [

and his intention was that the agent acquire the bill of divorce or the document on their behalf], if

the husband wishes

the husband

to retract with regard to both

before the bill of divorce reached the woman’s hand or the bill of manumission reached the slave’s hand,

he may retract; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

For in his view, it is a loss and a liability for a woman to be divorced from her husband, and likewise for a slave to be freed from his master. One may not impose a liability on a person except in his presence. That is, a person cannot appoint himself as another’s agent in order to cause him a loss, unless that person appointed him as his agent.

But the Sages, who counted only three ways, disagree with Rabbi Meir in the Mishna and maintain that, with regard to manumission, from the moment the master hands the document to the agent, the master can no longer retract. Even though the slave did not appoint him as his agent, they reason that it is a benefit for the slave to leave his master’s control and go free.

it is beneficial for the slave in that he leaves free from the authority of his master .

And since one may acquire a benefit for a person even in his absence, as soon as the agent receives the bill of manumission, the slave goes free.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Granted, according to the Rabbis [

it is clear and understandable according to the view of the Rabbis], the fact that the Mishna states

a number,

the number of ways—three—in order

to exclude

the following—

this,

the view

of Rabbi Meir [

that is, specifically three and not four].

But according to Rabbi Meir,

it is difficult:

the number—to exclude what?

What does the number come to exclude? [Why is it necessary to state the number of ways?]

The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Meir, the number comes

to exclude that which was taught—

that which we learned in a beraita:

Witnesses who do not know how to sign have lines incised for them,

they scratch and make marks with a knife

on blank paper,

and mark their names.

And

afterward they

fill the incisions—

the grooves—

with ink.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what circumstances are these matters

these

said,

that this procedure is effective?

With regard to bills of divorce for women,

for in their case the Sages were lenient and validated them with these signatures, because they wished to save women from remaining chained to their husbands. For example, when the divorcing husband is in a hurry to set sail and is unwilling to wait for other witnesses, or when he is dying and has no sons, thereby saving her from having to undergo yibbum

. But in the case of bills of manumission for slaves and all other documents, if the witnesses know

the witnesses

how to read and sign, they should sign. And if not, they may not sign.

If so, according to Rabbi Meir, the number comes to exclude this leniency of the Sages, which applies only to bills of divorce for women, but not to bills of manumission for slaves.

The Gemara analyzes the concluding wording of the beraita:

Reading—

the act of reading,

who mentioned it—

who mentioned it previously, such that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel needed to mention it?!

The Gemara explains:

The text is incomplete—

the wording of the beraita is missing something—

and this is what it teaches—

and this is how it should be taught:

Witnesses who do not know how to read—

one reads before them, and they sign. And those who do not know how to sign—

lines are incised

for them—

for them

on the paper, and they fill the hollow spaces in the paper with ink:

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the beraita:

And is there nothing else

that is, are there no additional ways in which bills of divorce for women and bills of manumission for slaves are equal?

But there is—

is there not the law that we learned in the Mishna [below, page 13a]:

If one says, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife”

or

“this bill of manumission to my slave,” and he dies,

before the bill of divorce reached the woman’s hand or before the document reached the slave’s hand, the law is that

they may not give it

to them

after his death,

because there is no bill of divorce after death. But if he said:

“Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so,” and he died,

the law is:

they should give it after his death,

because

for the words of a person on his deathbed [one who is dying] are considered as though written in a document and delivered to the recipient. The Gemara answers:

When it teaches—

the beraita teaches only

a matter,

a matter [a law]

that is absent

from

other documents. But

But

a matter

a matter

that is present—

that exists

in

other

documents,

it does not teach—it does not mention it. As we find

it does not state it. As we find

that Ravin sent

a letter

in the name

of

Rabbi Abbahu: Know that Rabbi Elazar sent to the Diaspora

a halakhic ruling

in the name of

our master:

“A person on his deathbed who said, ‘Write

a document,

and give one hundred dinars

from my property

to so-and-so,’ and died

before they wrote the document, the law is:

they do not write

a document for him,

and they do not give

the one hundred dinars, because there is concern

that perhaps he did not fully intend

the person on his deathbed

to transfer it only through a document

and not orally.

And there is no document after death,

because at that point the donor’s authority has already lapsed and his property has passed to his heirs.

The Gemara raises another objection:

But is there not—

there is another matter in which the laws of a woman's get and a deed of emancipation are the same, namely the requirement of

“lishmah,”

that just as with regard to a woman the get must be written for her sake, so too, with regard to a slave, the deed of emancipation must be written for his sake?

Granted, according to Rabba—

who holds above (2b) that the reason for the enactment requiring the agent to make the declaration is the requirement of “lishmah”—this is not difficult, because that is the first matter mentioned in the beraita, in which the laws were stated to be the same

for one who brings and one who takes.

But according to Rava,

who says that the reason is that witnesses are not readily available to ratify it,

it is difficult—

why does the beraita not mention that they are alike with regard to the requirement of “lishmah”?

And there is an additional difficulty according to both of them:

Furthermore—

in addition—

according to both Rabba and Rava, is there not—

the disqualification of writing the get or the deed on something

attached

to the ground, which is the same in both cases?

The Gemara answers:

When it teaches—

what we learned in the beraita—it refers only to matters involving a

rabbinic disqualification,

a disqualification

by rabbinic ordinance,

such as the case of one who brings or takes, concerning whom the Sages required the agent to say “It was written and signed in my presence.” And likewise, a Samaritan witness is not disqualified with regard to other documents except by rabbinic ordinance, because they are presumed to lie in this regard. But matters in which the disqualification is

by Torah law—

from the Torah—

it does not teach.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

But—

is it not so that

the courts of gentiles involve a disqualification—

they are

disqualified by Torah law—

and

yet it teaches—

the beraita nevertheless taught them as well!

The Gemara answers: This beraita, which validates the signatures of gentiles on other documents but disqualifies them on women's bills of divorce and deeds of emancipation, is speaking

in

a case where there are

Jewish delivery witnesses

who saw the get being delivered into the woman's hand and the deed being delivered to the slave.

And

this is the method of

Rabbi Elazar, who says: Delivery witnesses effect the divorce.

According to him, there is no need for witnesses to sign the get.

But the Gemara returns and raises an objection:

But—

is it not so that

from the fact that the latter clause teaches—

from the fact that the beraita teaches at its end—

“Rabbi Shimon says: These too” [

women's bills of divorce]

are valid. And

concerning this

Rabbi Zeira said: Rabbi Shimon followed

in this matter

the view of Rabbi Elazar, who says: Delivery witnesses effect the divorce,

and he validated the bills of divorce when there were delivery witnesses and a Jewish scribe had written them.

By implication—

it follows—

that the first tanna holds

that delivery witnesses

do not

effect the severance; only signing witnesses do. If so, these bills of divorce are disqualified by Torah law!