Gittin 9b — the Talmud in English

3.

And all documents ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

that are produced in the courts—

that were made in the courts—

of idolaters, even though their signatories

of these documents are

idolaters,

they are

valid,

except for bills of divorce for women and documents of emancipation of slaves,

which are invalidated by the signature of gentiles. In a bill of divorce for a woman they are invalid because they are not subject to severance, since they do not belong to the law of bills of divorce and betrothal. And for this reason they are also disqualified from signing documents of emancipation of slaves, since with regard to every disqualification that is from the Torah, the law of the emancipation of a slave is equal to that of a woman’s bill of divorce, from the derivation “her, her” by means of a gezeira shava.

And the beraita adds:

And in accordance with the words of Rabbi Meir

that is, according to Rabbi Meir’s view, they are equal

in four.

And as brought in the Mishna below [page 11b]:

One who says

to an agent,

“Give this bill of divorce to my wife”

or

“this document of emancipation to my slave,”

and his intention was that the agent should acquire the bill or document on their behalf, if

the husband wishes

the owner

to retract concerning both

before the bill reached the woman’s hand or the document of emancipation reached the slave’s hand,

he may retract; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

For in his view, it is a loss and an obligation for the woman to be divorced from her husband, and likewise for the slave to be emancipated from his master. And one may not impose an obligation upon a person except in his presence. That is, a person does not become an agent on his own for another person in order to cause him a loss, unless that person made him his agent.

But the Sages, who counted only three ways, disagree with Rabbi Meir in the Mishna and hold that, with emancipation, from the moment he gave it into the agent’s hand, the master cannot retract. And this is so even though the slave did not appoint him to be his agent. And their reason is that they hold that it is a benefit for the slave in that he goes out to freedom from under his master’s hand.

it is beneficial for the slave in that he leaves free from the authority of his master .

And since one may acquire a benefit for a person not in his presence, as soon as the agent receives the document of emancipation, the slave goes out to freedom.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Granted, according to the Rabbis

it is convenient and understandable according to the view of the Rabbis, that which the Mishna stated

a count,

the number of ways—three—in order

to exclude

to exclude

this,

his view,

that of Rabbi Meir

that is, specifically three and not four!

But according to Rabbi Meir,

it is difficult:

“A count, to exclude what?”

What does the count come to exclude? [For what purpose is it necessary to state the number of ways?]

And the Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Meir, the count comes

to exclude that which was taught

that which we learned in a beraita:

“Witnesses who do not know how to sign, one makes incisions for them,”

one scratches and makes marks with a knife

on blank paper,

and they mark their names.

And

afterward they

fill the incisions

the grooves

with ink.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: “In what matter are these words

these

said,”

that this advice is effective,

with regard to bills of divorce for women,

for the Sages were lenient with them, validating them with these signatures, because they wished to save the women from remaining agunot. For example, where the divorcing husband is hurrying to sail on the sea and is unwilling to wait for other witnesses, or where he is about to die and has no sons, and they save her from needing yibbum. But documents of emancipation of slaves and all other documents, if

the witnesses know

the witnesses

how to read and sign, they sign. And if not, they do not sign.

And if so, according to Rabbi Meir, the count comes to exclude this leniency of the Sages, which applies only to bills of divorce for women, but not to documents of emancipation of slaves.

And the Gemara examines the conclusion of the wording of the beraita:

“Reading”

reading,

“Who mentioned it?”

Who mentioned it earlier, before Rabban Gamliel needed to mention it?!

And the Gemara answers:

“The text is incomplete”

the wording of the beraita is missing something

“and this is what it teaches”

and this is how it should be taught:

“Witnesses who do not know how to read—

one reads before them, and they sign. And those who do not know how to sign—

one makes incisions

scratches

for them

on the paper, and they fill the hollow of the paper with ink:

And the Gemara raises an objection against the beraita:

“And is there no more?”

Are there not additional ways in which bills of divorce for women and documents of emancipation of slaves are equal?

“But there is”

surely there is the law that we learned in the Mishna [below, page 13a]:

“One who says: ‘Give this bill of divorce to my wife’

or

‘this document of emancipation to my slave,’ and he died,”

before the bill reached the woman’s hand or before the document reached the slave’s hand, the law is that

“they shall not give”

them

“after death,”

because there is no bill of divorce after death. But if he said:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so, and he died,”

the law is:

“They shall give after death,”

because

For the statements of a person who is dangerously ill [dying] are considered as though written in a document and delivered to the recipient. And the Gemara answers:

“When it teaches”

the beraita teaches only

a matter,

a matter [a law]

that is not

that is not

in other documents. But

But

a matter

a matter

that is

that exists

in

other

documents,

it does not teach

it does not state it. As we find

that Ravin sent

a letter

in the name of

in the name of

Rabbi Abbahu: “Know that Rabbi Eleazar sent to the Diaspora

a ruling

in the name of

in the name of

our teacher: A person who is dangerously ill who said, ‘Write

a document,

and give a maneh

from my property

to so-and-so,’ and he died,”

before they wrote the document, the law is:

“They do not write

a document for him

and they do not give

the maneh, because there is concern

that perhaps he did not firmly decide

the dangerously ill person in his mind

to transfer it only through a document

and not orally.

And there is no document after death,

because at that point the donor’s authority has already ceased, and his property has passed to his heirs.

And the Gemara again raises an objection:

But is there not

another matter in which the law of a woman’s get and that of a document of emancipation are equal, namely the law of

“lishmah,”

for just as in the case of a woman the get must be written for her sake, so too in the case of a slave, the document of emancipation must be written for his sake.

Granted, according to Rabba

[above, folio 2b], who holds that the reason for the enactment that the agent must make the declaration is because of “lishmah,” this is not difficult, because that is the first matter mentioned in the beraita, in which they equated

the one who brings and the one who takes.

But according to Rava

, whose reason is that witnesses are not commonly available to validate it,

it is difficult

: why does the beraita not mention that they are equal with regard to “lishmah”?

And there is an additional difficulty, according to both of them:

And furthermore

—and additionally—

both according to Rabba and according to Rava, there is

after all the disqualification of writing the get or the document on something

attached

, which is equal in both cases.

And the Gemara answers:

When it teaches

—what we learned in the beraita—these are only matters in which there is

a rabbinic disqualification,

a disqualification

by rabbinic enactment,

such as the one who takes and the one who brings, whom the Sages required to say “it was written in my presence.” And likewise, a Samaritan witness is not disqualified in other documents except by rabbinic enactment, because they are presumed to lie in this matter. But matters in which the disqualification is

by Torah law

—from the Torah—

it does not teach.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

But

after all,

non-Jewish courts, whose disqualification

—that they are disqualified—

is by Torah law

and

and it teaches

—and nevertheless the beraita taught them!

And the Gemara answers: This beraita, which validates the signature of non-Jews on other documents and disqualifies them on women’s gittin and documents of emancipation for slaves, is speaking

in

a situation in which there are

Jewish witnesses of delivery

who saw the delivery of the get into the woman’s hand and of the document into the slave’s hand.

And this is

the method of

Rabbi Elazar, who says: witnesses of delivery effect the severance,

and according to his view there is no need for witnesses to sign on the get.

But the Gemara returns and raises an objection:

But

after all,

from the fact that the final clause teaches

—from the fact that the beraita teaches at its end—

“Rabbi Shimon says: These too

[women’s gittin]

are valid.” And

concerning this

Rabbi Zeira said: Rabbi Shimon descended

into this matter

to the position of Rabbi Elazar, who says: witnesses of delivery effect the severance,

and he validated the gittin with witnesses of delivery when a Jewish scribe wrote them.

By implication

—it follows—

that the first tanna holds

that witnesses of delivery

do not

effect the severance, but only witnesses of signature do. And if so, these gittin are disqualified by Torah law!