Gittin 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says:

He is always a free man,

whether in a case in which he acquired the other property that was granted to him, such as when the precise location of the land that was retained was specified—in which case he acquires both himself and the property, except for that land—or in a case in which he acquired only himself and not the property, such as when the grantor retained “unspecified land” without indicating which land he meant. In that case, he does not acquire any of the master’s lands, since with regard to each one it is uncertain whether it is the land that was retained. Nevertheless, he acquires himself, since he is not land, and the master did not retain him.

Until he says

the master:

“All my property is given to so-and-so, my slave, except for one ten-thousandth of it.”

And he does not specify exactly what he meant by his words. In such a case, he does not go free, since it is possible to interpret his saying “one ten-thousandth” as referring to the slave. [And although his actual value is greater than this amount, nevertheless, in the master’s eyes he is worth this much].

And from the fact that we see that in all the other formulations, [apart from the last formulation,] the slave goes free.

Because his statement is effective with regard to himself, whereas it is not effective with regard to the property, Rav Adda bar Mattana proves that Rabbi Shimon maintains that we divide a statement. If so, Rava, who said, “He acquires himself but does not acquire the property,” maintains, like Rabbi Shimon, that we divide a statement.

And concerning this Rav Adda raises a difficulty:

How is it possible that Rava, whose ruling is accepted as halakha, maintains the view of Rabbi Shimon, that we divide a statement and the slave goes free?

But did Rav Yosef bar Minyomi not say

that

Rav Naḥman said: Even though Rabbi Yosei praised

—that is, he commended—

Rabbi Yosei the

words of

Rabbi Shimon,

the halakha is not in accordance with him. Rather,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who is the first tanna in the Mishna in Pe’a who disputes Rabbi Shimon and maintains that the slave does not go free. As cited in a beraita:

As it was taught: When these matters

were stated [the position of Rabbi Shimon that we divide a statement]

before Rabbi Yosei, he recited this verse concerning him: “Lips are fitting for one who responds with well-founded words”

—that is, Rabbi Shimon is worthy of being kissed on his lips for responding with straight and well-founded words.

This indicates that Rav Naḥman maintains that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who does not say that we divide a statement.

But the Gemara refuses to accept the difficulty and rejects it with a counterdifficulty:

And did Rav Naḥman say this

—did Rav Naḥman really say that we do not divide a statement?

But did Rav Yosef bar Minyomi not say

that

Rav Naḥman said: A dangerously ill person

—a terminally ill person approaching death—

who wrote

in a deed of gift granting

all his property [

including the slave himself]

to his slave,

and afterward recovered

and rose

from his illness, and wishes to retract the entire gift, the law is:

He retracts with regard to the property but cannot retract with regard to the slave,

which he gave to himself. The reason is:

He retracts with regard to the property,

since it is

a gift of a dangerously ill person.

But he cannot retract with regard to the slave, for

he has already

acquired the status of a free man,

from the moment he received the document. And from that moment it is already forbidden to use him as a slave. And from Rav Naḥman’s statement that he retracts with regard to the property but cannot retract with regard to the slave, we see that he maintains that we divide a statement. If so, how is it possible that he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who does not divide a statement?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

Indeed, Rav Naḥman agrees with Rava that we divide a statement. And what he ruled in accordance with Rabbi

Meir—that one who writes all his property to his slave and retains any amount of land does not free the slave—

there, this is the reason

—that is the reason there—

because

it is not a complete severance through the get

—the laws of a document of emancipation are derived through a gzera shava from the get of a woman. Just as a woman’s get must effect a complete severance between the man and the woman, without leaving anything that connects them, so too, with regard to a slave, the document must sever him completely from the master. Since the Mishna in tractate Pe’a mentions a certain retention, and the master did not take care to emphasize in the document that the slave is not included in that retention—for example, by writing, “You yourself and my property acquire yourselves”—it is unclear whether he retained the slave or not, and this is not a complete severance.

However, where the master did not retain anything in the giving, there is no deficiency with regard to severance. The moment the slave receives the document, he is immediately freed, provided that the master does not retract his giving. And once he has become sanctified with the sanctity of the Name by being Jewish, the master can no longer retract his giving.

Therefore, in Rava’s ruling, where there is no retention in the giving, the document effects severance with regard to the slave, and he goes free. And the fact that it is ineffective with regard to the property is not a deficiency in the laws of severance. Rather, it is a deficiency in its monetary aspect, since a document that has not been authenticated by witnesses is ineffective. But it is effective for acquiring his own freedom, since we apply palginan dibura—we divide the statement.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If there are protestors against it, it must be authenticated by its signatures”:

And the Gemara asks:

“A protest”

against the get, whose purpose is to invalidate it, is made by

“how many”

people?

If you say—

if it is said—

a protest by one,

a protest by a single person,

but Rabbi Yohanan said

in tractate Ketubot [23b]:

“According to everyone, a protest consists of no fewer than two.”

Rather,

perhaps it should be said:

a protest by two—

a protest by two people.

But

they are two against two—

there are two against two! [The two protestors against the two who authenticate the get].

And if so, this is difficult:

“What did you see”—

what did you see—

“that you relied upon these”—

that you relied upon these [who authenticate it]?

“Rely upon those”—

rely upon the two who invalidate the signature, and establish her as having the presumptive status of a married woman!

Rather,

the Mishna is speaking of

a protest

made by

the husband

against the get, claiming that this get is forged. In such a case, the get must be authenticated by its signatures.

Mishna:

One who brings a get from overseas and cannot say

“It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,”

if there are witnesses

whose signatures are on it—

it must be authenticated by its signatures,

through verification of the witnesses’ signatures.

Both women’s gittin and documents freeing slaves are equal

with regard to saying “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence,” both

when taking

the get from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael,

and

also

when bringing

it from outside Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael.

And this is one

of the ways in which women’s gittin are equal to documents freeing slaves.

complete property, and we are now removing him from the master’s ownership on the basis of one witness, nevertheless, since this removal results from the reliability that the Sages granted him with regard to matters of prohibition [as Tosafot explain, to permit him from now on to marry a free Jewish woman and to obligate him in all the commandments as a fully Jewish person], automatically, his monetary servitude is also annulled from that moment. Although, regarding a woman, the Penei Yehoshua wrote above that the agent’s testimony is not sufficient to enable her to collect the money due to her under the marriage contract, because we distinguish between different parts of a person’s statement: he is believed only with regard to her prohibitions, but not with regard to monetary matters. In the case of a slave, however, this is not so. In the case of a woman, the issue is specifically her claim to collect an additional payment under the marriage contract, which is like an independent claim. The Sages did not grant the agent reliability equivalent to that of two witnesses for this purpose. In the case of a slave, however, the principal issue concerns his status with regard to prohibition [whether it has been annulled or not]. Once we authenticate the document, the master’s monetary right in the slave is automatically annulled as well. See Even HaEzel (Laws of Slaves, chapter 6, halakha 7), which adds that in the case of a slave he is not coming to remove property, but rather he himself is the property. Since he possesses a document of emancipation and, according to Torah law, belongs to himself, the Sages did not institute that he should become a slave because of a concern that the document might be forged. He wrote similarly, based on a comparable reasoning, in the novellae of Rabbi Shmuel (Gittin, siman 1, note 5), citing Rabbi Shimon Shkop, of blessed memory: where the monetary matter is a consequence of the prohibition, the principle that we distinguish between different parts of a person’s statement does not apply. In the case of a slave, the monetary matter is a consequence of the prohibition. However, the author of Tiv Gittin did not accept the Penei Yehoshua’s fundamental premise. Several early authorities hold [the Ran and the Ritva in tractate Kiddushin 65a, and the Ran’s novellae on Sanhedrin 31a] that whenever a prohibition involves money, if a person is not trusted with regard to the money, he is not trusted with regard to the prohibition either [see Shev Shema'tata, section 6, chapter 4]. Therefore, he explains that the Sages’ failure to trust him with regard to the money was not because money is more stringent—for, on the contrary, forbidden relationships are more stringent than money. Rather, the Sages had no need to trust him with regard to the money as well, since that matter was unrelated to the testimony itself. In the case of a slave, however, since the issue of being unable to remarry also applies [as Tosafot write, beginning with the words “they are alike when carrying and bringing”], the Sages had to trust him with regard to the money as well. The prohibition could not be annulled without also annulling the monetary ownership.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

“What is

the meaning of

‘and cannot say’?”

If you say—

if it is said that the agent is

deaf-mute [

one who can neither hear nor speak], it is impossible to say this!

Is

a deaf-mute

such as this

fit to bring a get—

is he fit at all to bring a get?

But we learned

in the Mishna below [23a]:

“All are fit

to serve as agents

to bring the get, except for a deaf-mute,

an imbecile, and a minor,

because they lack the requisite understanding and are not fit to be a “divorce agent”?!

Rav Yosef said: What are we dealing with here—

what is the case here?

For example, he gave it

to her

the agent

when he was

competent,

but he did not manage to say “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence” before he suddenly became deaf.

The Gemara now discusses the second ruling of the Mishna:

“Both women’s gittin and documents freeing slaves are equal when taking and bringing.”

The Gemara cites a beraita in which three ways in which a woman’s get and a slave’s document are equal appear:

The Sages taught: In three ways, women’s gittin are equal to documents freeing slaves:

1.

They are equal when taking

a get from Eretz Yisrael to outside Eretz Yisrael,

and when bringing

it from outside Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael; in both cases one must say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

2.

And any get—

any document—

that has a Samaritan witness

is

invalid, except for women’s gittin and documents freeing slaves,

which are valid.