Gittin 9a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Shimon says: ![](pamud.bmp "

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he is forever a free man,

whether in a case where he acquired the remainder of the property that he granted him, such as where he specified the precise location of the land that he retained. For then he acquires both himself and the property, except for that land. And whether in a case where he acquired only himself, but not the property, such as where he retained “unspecified land,” without specifying which one he intended. For then he does not acquire any of the master’s lands, since concerning each one there is a doubt: perhaps it is the one that was retained. Nevertheless, he acquires himself, since he is not land; and the master did not retain him.

until he says

the master

“All my property is given to so-and-so, my slave, except for one ten-thousandth of it.”

And he does not explain precisely what he intended by his words, for in such a case he does not go free, since it is possible to attribute that, when he said “one ten-thousandth,” he intended the slave. [Even though his actual value is greater than this amount, nevertheless, in his eyes he is worth this much].

And from the fact that we see that in all the other formulations, [apart from the last formulation], the slave goes free.

Because regarding himself, his statement is effective, whereas regarding the property, it is not effective. Rav Adda bar Mattana proves that this is because Rabbi Shimon holds palginan dibura. If so, Rava, who said, “He acquired himself; he did not acquire the property,” holds like Rabbi Shimon, that we apply palginan dibura.

And Rav Adda raises an objection about this:

How is it possible that Rava, whose ruling is the halakha, holds like Rabbi Shimon, that we apply palginan dibura and the slave goes free?

But did Rav Yosef bar Manyumi not say

that thus

Rav Nahman said: Even though Rabbi Yosei praised

—that is, praised—

Rabbi Shimon’s

words

Rabbi Shimon,

the halakha is not according to him. Rather,

the halakha is according to Rabbi Meir,

who is the first tanna in the Mishna in Peah who disputes Rabbi Shimon and holds that the slave does not go free. As brought in a beraita,

For it was taught: When these matters were stated

[the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, that we apply palginan dibura],

before Rabbi Yosei, he recited this verse concerning him: “Lips are fitting for one who returns apt words”

—that is, Rabbi Shimon is worthy of being kissed on his lips, because he returns straight words.

From here it follows that Rav Nahman holds that the halakha is according to Rabbi Meir, who does not say palginan dibura.

But the Gemara refuses the objection and rejects it with a counter-objection:

But did Rav Nahman say so

—did Rav Nahman indeed say this, that we do not say palginan dibura?

But did Rav Yosef bar Manyumi not say

that thus

Rav Nahman said: A dangerously ill person

—a seriously ill person who is inclined to die—

who wrote

in a gift document that he was giving

all his property

[including the slave himself]

to his slave.

And afterward he recovered

and rose

from his illness, and wishes to retract everything, the law is:

he retracts regarding the property but does not retract regarding the slave,

which they gave to himself. And the reason for the matter is:

he retracts regarding the property,

since

it is the gift of a dangerously ill person.

But he does not retract regarding the slave, for

already

a name of a free man had gone out concerning him,

from the moment he received the document. And from that moment it is already forbidden to enslave him according to the law of a slave. And from the fact that Rav Nahman says that he retracts regarding the property but does not retract regarding the slave, we see that he holds that we apply palginan dibura. If so, how is it possible that he ruled according to Rabbi Meir, who does not apply palginan dibura?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

Indeed, Rav Nahman’s opinion is like Rava’s, that we apply palginan dibura. And what he ruled according to Rabbi

Meir—that one who writes all his property to his slave and retains any amount of land, the slave does not go free—

there, this is the reason

—there, the reason is—

because

it is not a complete severance of the bill

—for the laws of the document of freeing are learned through a gzera shava from the bill of divorce of a woman. Just as in a bill of divorce there must be a complete severance between the man and the woman, without leaving anything that connects them, so too, in the case of a slave, the document must sever him entirely from the master. And since in the law of the Mishna in tractate Peah a certain retention was mentioned, and the master did not trouble to emphasize in the document that the slave was not included in this retention—for example, by writing, “You yourself and my property acquire for yourself”—if so, it is unclear whether he retained the slave or not, and this is not a complete severance.

But in a case where the master did not leave anything over in the giving, there is no deficiency in the severance. And as soon as the slave receives the document, he is immediately released, if the master does not retract. And since he was sanctified with the sanctity of the Name when he became Jewish, the master can no longer retract from the giving.

Therefore, in Rava’s law, where there is no reservation in the giving, the document effects its severance with regard to the slave, and he goes out to freedom. And that it is ineffective with regard to the property is not a deficiency in the laws of severance. Rather, this is a deficiency in its monetary aspect. For a document that has not been authenticated by witnesses is ineffective. But to acquire himself, it is effective, since palginan dibura.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If there are objectors against it, it must be authenticated by its signatures”:

And the Gemara asks:

“The challenge

that is intended to invalidate the divorce document, through

how many

people is it made?”

“If you say

—if it is said—

a challenge by one,

a challenge by a single person,

but Rabbi Yohanan said

in tractate Ketubot [23b

“according to everyone, a challenge is no fewer than two.”

“Rather,

perhaps it should be said,

a challenge by two”

—a challenge by two people.

But

they are two against two

—they are two against two! [The two objectors against the two who authenticate the divorce document].

And if so, it is difficult:

“What have you seen”

—what did you see—

“that you relied upon these”

—that you relied upon these [who authenticate

“Rely upon these”

—rely upon the two who invalidate the signature. And establish her as having the presumptive status of a married woman!

“doubtfully married woman.” Since she has the presumptive status of a married woman, and the divorce document is of doubtful validity, we therefore establish her as having the presumptive status of a “certainly married woman,” as she was previously. And from the language of Tosafot it appears that since she has a presumption, she is therefore certainly a married woman. However, the Mahari ben Lev explains their intention: they did not write this to say that because of this she has the status of “certain.” Rather, it was only to remove the opposing presumption that she has, namely, “a woman is exacting and marries” [that is, a woman examines matters carefully before marrying another person; there is no concern that she did not entirely sever herself from her first husband]. Without the presumption that she is a married woman, it would have been possible to say that she is permitted because of this presumption. Therefore Tosafot wrote that she has the presumption of a married woman, and because of this she remains in doubt. “Rather,”

the Mishna is speaking of a

“challenge”

made by

“the husband”

against the divorce document, claiming that this divorce document is forged. And in such a case, the divorce document must be authenticated by its signatures. the agent of the divorce document, since the divorce document has left his possession [that is, he delivered it to the woman], is no longer trusted to authenticate it. Only if he authenticated it before giving it to her would he be trusted. But afterward, he is not. And Tosafot Rid continues: although this can be challenged from the language of the Gemara later in the continuation of the folio, where it establishes the case of “an agent who cannot say” as one in which he gave it to her and did not manage to say [“in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”] before he became deaf-mute [as the Gemara already brought this above, on 5a]. This implies that specifically because he became deaf-mute he could not say it, but if he had not become deaf-mute he could have authenticated it [by saying “in my presence it was written”], even though time had already passed since he gave it. [And see what Tosafot wrote about this above, on 5b, s.v. “he should take it”]. And likewise, according to Tosafot Rid, this can be proven from the language of the beraita (above, 5b), which says concerning an agent who gave a divorce document and did not say, “What should he do? He should take it from her and give it to her again and say.” This implies that the statement is effective even after the divorce document has left his possession. But he rejects this: specifically there, as long as the husband has not come and challenged, the agent is trusted to make his statement. But here, where the husband comes to challenge, the agent is trusted only if he made the statement before the husband’s arrival. But afterward, he is not trusted. B. According to the Gemara’s answer, that it is speaking “of a challenge by” “the husband,” the Tosafot Yom Tov notes that it is not understood why the Mishna used the expression “objectors,” in the plural. Indeed, he resolves this according to Tosafot, who write in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud that the husband’s purchasers are also trusted to challenge. If so, they too are included in the expression “objectors.” And although there is a difference between their challenge and the husband’s challenge: the husband’s challenge prevents her from marrying until the divorce document is authenticated, whereas the purchasers’ challenge does not prevent her from marrying, but only prevents her from taking land from them. But she may marry despite their challenge. And so the Rosh wrote explicitly. Nevertheless, their challenge is accepted with regard to collecting the marriage settlement. And see the notes on Tosafot Tziyun (279). Furthermore, the Tosafot Yom Tov resolves that since only the husband is trusted to challenge, but a single witness is not trusted, it appears proven that this is because his challenge is considered as two. Therefore the Mishna refers to him with the expression “objectors.”

Mishna:

“One who brings a divorce document from overseas and cannot say

‘In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed,’

if there are witnesses

signed on it—

‘it must be authenticated by its signatures,’

through confirmation of the witnesses’ signatures.

that something new has newly occurred to him, which prevents him from speech.” And his intention is to what Rav Yosef established in the Gemara: that it concerns an agent who was articulate [healthy] when he delivered the divorce document to her, and became deaf-mute before saying “in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” And see the notes on the Gemara above, on 5a, note (55). “if,” according to the Tosafot Yom Tov, since the halakha is that the witnesses of delivery effect the severance. That is, the witnesses before whom the divorce document was delivered to the woman are the ones who effect the essential severance in the divorce, and not the witnesses of the signature. “One applies equally to women’s divorce documents and to documents of emancipation of slaves; they are equal

between them with regard to saying “in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed,” both

to one who takes

the divorce document from the Land of Israel to outside the Land,

and

both

to one who brings

it from outside the Land to the Land of Israel.

“And this is one

of the ways in which women’s divorce documents are equal to documents of emancipation of slaves.”

entire property of the master, and now we are taking him away from him on the basis of a single witness, nevertheless, since this taking away stems from the force of the trustworthiness that the Sages granted him with regard to “prohibitions” [as Tosafot explain, to permit him from now on to free women and to obligate him in all the mitzvot as a completely Jewish person], automatically, his monetary servitude is also removed from that moment. And although with regard to a woman, the Penei Yehoshua wrote above that the agent’s testimony is not effective to enable her to collect through it the money due to her from the marriage settlement, the reason being that we say palginan dibura, and he is trusted only with regard to her “prohibitions,” but not with regard to monetary matters, nevertheless, with a slave this is not so. For specifically in the case of a woman, who comes to collect an “additional marriage settlement,” this is like an independent claim. In this, the Sages did not grant the agent trustworthiness like that of two witnesses. But in the case of a slave, the principal matter under discussion is the prohibition involved in him [whether it has been removed or not]. And since we authenticate the document, automatically the master’s monetary right in the slave is also removed. And see Even HaEzel (Laws of Slaves, chapter 6, law 7), which adds that in the case of a slave he does not come to take out money, but he himself is the money. And since he has a document of emancipation and, according to Torah law, is in his own possession, the Sages did not institute that, because of concern that it was forged, he should become a slave. And he likewise wrote a similar rationale in the novellae of Rabbi Shmuel (Gittin, section 1, note 5), in the name of the gaon Rabbi Shimon Shkop, of blessed memory: in a case where the money is a consequence of the prohibition, it is not applicable to say palginan dibura. And in the case of a slave, the money is indeed a consequence of the prohibition. However, in the book Tiv Gittin he did not agree with the foundation of the Penei Yehoshua. For the view of several early authorities [the Ran and the Ritva in tractate Kiddushin 65a, and the novellae of the Ran in Sanhedrin 31a] is that any prohibition that involves money, where one is not trusted with regard to the money, one is also not trusted with regard to the prohibition. [See Shev Shemaata, section 6, chapter 4]. Therefore, he explains that the fact that they were lenient and did not trust him with regard to the money was not because money is more stringent, for, on the contrary, a forbidden sexual relationship is more stringent than money. Rather, the Sages had no need to trust him with regard to the money as well, since this does not relate to the essence of the testimony. Therefore, in the case of a slave, since iggun also applies to him [as Tosafot write, beginning with the words: “They are equal with regard to one who takes and one who brings”], the Sages were compelled to trust him with regard to the money as well. For it is impossible to remove the prohibition without removing the money.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

“What

—what is the meaning of

‘and cannot say’?”

“If you say

—if it is said that the agent is a

deaf-mute

[who neither hears nor speaks], it is impossible to say this!

Is it so that a

deaf-mute

such as this

is fit to bring a divorce document?

—is he fit at all to bring a divorce document?

“But we learned”

in the Mishna below [23a]:

“Everyone is fit

to be agents

to bring the divorce document, except for a deaf-mute,

an imbecile, and a minor,”

because they do not possess understanding and are not fit to be a “divorce agent”?!

“Rav Yosef said: Here, with what are we dealing?”

—what is the case here—

“for example, he gave it

“to her”

—the agent—

“when he was”

—he was—

“articulate, but did not manage to say ‘in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed’ until he suddenly became deaf-mute.”

The Gemara now discusses the second law of the Mishna:

“One applies equally to women’s divorce documents and to documents of emancipation of slaves, equal with regard to one who takes and to one who brings.”

And the Gemara brings a beraita in which three ways in which the documents of a woman and a slave are equal appear:

“The Sages taught: In three ways women’s divorce documents are equal to documents of emancipation of slaves:

A.

“They are equal with regard to one who takes

a divorce document from the Land of Israel to outside the Land,

and with regard to one who brings

it from outside the Land to the Land of Israel, for in both cases he must say, ‘In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.’

B.

“And every document

—every document—

“upon which there is a Samaritan witness

is

“invalid, except for women’s divorce documents and documents of emancipation of slaves,”

which are valid.