Gittin 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara explains the three matters in which Syria was equated with Eretz Yisrael:

It is obligated in tithe and in the Sabbatical year, as is Eretz Yisrael.

This is because this tanna

holds—

he maintains that a

private conquest

—that David conquered Syria for his own purposes—

is considered a conquest.

The laws of Eretz Yisrael therefore apply to it.

And the second law of the beraita:

And one who wishes to enter it in a state of ritual purity may enter,

and the Gemara asks:

But you said

at the beginning of the beraita:

Its earth is impure.

If so, how can one enter it in a state of purity? The Gemara answers: He enters it while being carried through the air

in

side a

sedan chair, chest, or tower,

and he does not walk upon its earth. And so we learned in a beraita:

A sedan chair—a carriage for women, a wagon made like a box. (Rashi, Eruvin 30b.) A tower—boards arranged one on top of another in the form of a tower. (The translator there.) As it was taught: One who enters the land of the nations in a sedan chair, chest, or tower, Rabbi deems the one who enters impure

because a suspended tent [one that is transported] is not a tent, such that it can be considered a barrier between him and the air of the land of the nations. “As is demonstrated by the conclusion that in Syria they did not decree impurity upon its air.” That is to say, from the conclusion of the Gemara here, that they did not decree impurity upon the air of Syria. It appears proven to the masters of Tosafot that they did not decree impurity upon its air under any circumstances or in any manner, even if there is nothing at all separating him from the mass of earth. And even if he forms a tent over the mass of earth, they likewise did not decree impurity. This implies that had there truly been a decree concerning one who forms a tent over the mass of earth, such a person could not have entered in purity even if he entered inside a sedan chair, chest, or tower. The only explanation that can be offered is that this is because a suspended tent is not considered a tent. For if it were considered a tent, it would constitute a barrier between him and the mass of earth. This proves that our sugya proceeds according to the view expressed in Nazir that their dispute concerns the law of a suspended tent. This is what compelled Rashi. Now, Rashi (beginning with the words “for they decreed upon its solid ground”) writes: “Contact and carrying, but not forming a tent, as, for example, if he formed a tent over it, etc.” And in the following comment he writes: “So that one entering its air becomes impure. Even if he neither touched nor shifted [moved] its solid ground.” It follows from his words that what they decreed concerning the air is intrinsic impurity, and not because of forming a tent. Therefore, he wrote earlier (beginning with the words “Rabbi deems him impure”): “Accordingly, the barrier formed by this tent, which intervenes between him and the air of the land of the nations, is not a barrier.” Thus, he was precise in his wording to explain that the barrier is between him and the air, and not between him and the ground of the land of the nations. For even without a barrier, he does not become impure by forming a tent, as he explained. Regarding the decree concerning the air, being inside a sedan chair, chest, or tower is effective. According to this, it must be said, following Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky (in Shiurei Rabbi Shmuel, letter 108), that the sedan chair, chest, and tower in question are closed on every side. Rashi’s view is that if a suspended tent is considered a tent, it is effective as a barrier even against the air. In such a case, the person is not considered to be in the air of the land of the nations at all. Rabbi Shmuel, however, points out that these words of Rashi do not correspond to the sugya in Nazir cited above. For there the Gemara wished to establish that Rabbi, who deems one who enters the air of the land of the nations [for example, in a sedan chair, chest, or tower] impure, holds that the Sages decreed impurity upon its air [and not only upon its solid ground]. If so, it is clear that if they decreed impurity upon its air, entering in a sedan chair, chest, or tower would not help—contrary to Rashi’s words here. According to Rabbi Shmuel’s understanding of Rashi, one of two possibilities must be asserted. Either the person there enters in a sedan chair, chest, or tower that are not closed on all their sides, and therefore they do not constitute a barrier. He further explains there, on the basis of the words of Rabbi Chaim (in Ḥidushei Rabbenu Chaim HaLevi, Laws of the Impurity of a Corpse, chapter 11, halakha 5), the final answer there in the Gemara, which explains the dispute between Rabbi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara says that according to everyone they decreed because of the air itself. However, according to Rabbi Yosei [that a person entering in a sedan chair, chest, or tower] this is something uncommon, and the Sages did not decree [impurity] concerning something uncommon. According to Rabbi, although it is uncommon, the Sages did decree concerning it. Rabbi Chaim explained [in order to reconcile Rambam’s words on this matter, for he wrote that the reason the person is impure is that a suspended tent is not a tent] that when the Gemara says that the Sages did not decree concerning something uncommon, this means only when there is something intervening between the person and the ground, so that he does not form a tent over the ground. Only in such a case, in which there is the protection of a tent, even against the impurity of the air they did not decree impurity. But where there is no protection—for example, in the case of a suspended tent [if it is not considered a tent]— and it is itself in the air and forms a tent over the impure ground, the Sages did decree impurity, even if it is something uncommon. Accordingly, Rashi’s words can also be reconciled. In truth, according to his view as well, the sedan chair, chest, and tower are open [not closed]. However, if a suspended tent is considered a tent, they are effective as a barrier against the air, as the Gemara says: concerning something uncommon, the Sages did not decree. Only if it is not considered a tent, in which case it is ineffective as a barrier against the impurity, did they decree that the person become impure, even though this is something uncommon. Rabbi Shmuel, however, notes that it is somewhat difficult to say this based on Rashi’s wording. For he writes that the barrier intervening between him and the air is not a barrier, implying that there is a barrier here. According to this explanation, however, there is no barrier at all. See also Shiurei Rabbi Shmuel there, at the end of his discussion, where he explains the nature of the impurity of the air of the land of the nations. According to Rabbi, when a person is in an open tent, what causes him to become impure is not that the impurity enters through the openings, for the impurity of the land of the nations is not like the impurity of a corpse, which bursts through and enters. Rather, through the opening it is considered that he is located in the open air-space of the land of the nations. Thus, the interior of the sedan chair itself is considered an air-space of the land of the nations. Therefore, when the sedan chair, chest, and tower are closed in every direction, that place is considered isolated and separate from the land of the nations, and it is not impure. The Ḥazon Ish (Even HaEzer, section 144, subsection 3), however, addressed the question of how their being sealed from the outside is effective as a barrier against impurity. He wrote there that this is by virtue of the law of a tightly sealed covering; see there.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems him pure

because, in his view, a suspended tent is considered a tent.

The Gemara explains:

And even Rabbi does not stand by the view that he is impure—

he does not deem him impure—

except in the land of the nations,

where the Sages decreed impurity

upon

one who touches

its solid ground [

of earth] or one who carries it,

and upon

one who enters

its air,

even if he did not touch its solid ground.

But in Syria, they decreed impurity upon

one who touches

its solid ground.

But

upon

one who enters

its air,

without touching or shifting [moving] it,

they did not decree impurity.

Therefore, one who enters inside a sedan chair, chest, or tower does not become impure.

And the third law:

And one who purchases a field in Syria

is considered

like one who purchases

a field

in the outskirts of Jerusalem.

And the Gemara asks: What halakhic purpose does this serve—what law did the tanna come to teach us through this statement?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Sheshet said:

This law comes

to say

that if a Jew purchases a field from a gentile in Syria, and the gentile wishes to go on his way on Shabbat,

they may write

—it is permitted to write—

for him—

concerning the field—

anono

—a bill of sale—

even on Shabbat itself,

in order to save the land from his possession.

Rather, Rava said: Both this one and that one -

whether he wrote two expressions, such as “yourself and my property,” as in the beraita, or whether he wrote a single expression, “all my property” [and included the slave himself together with the rest of the property], the law is:

he acquired himself.

But

he did not acquire the property. -

The reason is that we apply palginan dibura—that is, we divide the slave’s statement with regard to its reliability: he is believed concerning himself, but he is not believed concerning the property.

When there are two bodies - two separate persons, such as in this case, the adulterer and the woman - we divide it. [ The testimony is accepted in its entirety concerning the adulterer, whereas concerning the woman it is not accepted at all]. When there is one body - when the matter concerns a single person, such as when he testifies concerning his wife that he divorced her - we do not divide it. [ Of course, this is only according to this tanna]. It is explained that in both places, both in our sugya in Gittin and in the sugya in Bava Batra, the Gemara states explicitly that this is the law of palginan dibura. See the Ran here, who writes that Rava in our sugya, who says that we apply palginan dibura, follows his own position in Bava Batra, where he says that if one says, “So-and-so had intercourse with my wife,” he and another join together to have him executed. The Rosh writes likewise in Makkot (chapter 1, section 13). See also what Rabbi Shimon Shkop, of blessed memory, explains in Sha'arei Yosher (Gate 6, chapter 11): Whether one says, “So-and-so had intercourse with my wife,” or whether he says, “I divorced my wife,” the point is not that, because of the law of palginan dibura, we must alter the event and say that it occurred differently. [That is, in truth, so-and-so had intercourse with a married woman, but not this one] Rather, the foundation of the principle of palginan is that his statement was not effective with regard to all the laws that follow from it. Rather, it was effective only with regard to part of them. That is, although according to this testimony that we accept there emerges testimony concerning his wife, he has no reliability to have her executed, since he is related to her. He is believed only concerning the adulterer, to have him executed. Similarly, in the case of a slave who brings his bill of divorce, and in the case of one who writes, “All my property except for a certain field,” we do not assume that he is telling the truth about himself and lying about the property. Rather, the palginan applies only to the reliability of the slave’s speech: concerning himself, his statement is effective, but concerning the property, his statement is not effective. See there. And in Sanhedrin (9b), Rav Yosef said: If one testifies that so-and-so sodomized him against his will [without his consent], the one who was sodomized and another person join together to constitute two witnesses against the one who committed the act, and have him executed by a court. But if he testifies that the other person sodomized him willingly, then that person is wicked, and he cannot join in testifying against the one who committed the act, because the Torah said: “Do not place a wicked person as a witness.” But Rava maintains that even when he testifies that it was willingly, he is believed concerning the one who committed the act, although he is not believed concerning himself. The reason is that according to what he testifies about himself [that he was sodomized willingly], he is wicked. And the principle states: “A person does not render himself wicked, for a person is related to himself.” Rashi explains that in such a case we apply palginan dibura; that is, we divide his statement. Concerning himself, we do not believe him; concerning the one who committed the act, he is believed. The Gemara also brings Rava’s ruling—from the aforementioned tractate Bava Batra—concerning “so-and-so had intercourse with my wife,” etc., in which as well the foundation of the law is palginan dibura. The Gemara asks: If so, what novelty is there here in Rava’s statement? And it answers: One might have said that we apply palginan dibura only when he testifies about himself, because a person is related to himself. But with regard to his wife, he is not considered related. We would therefore accept his testimony in its entirety, and she too would be executed together with the adulterer. Rava teaches us that we apply palginan dibura even concerning his wife, and he is not believed concerning her. Clearly, here too, palginan dibura does not mean that we divide his statement. For if we do not accept his testimony concerning himself at all, then the event is nullified entirely, and there is no basis for incriminating the adulterer alone Rather, certainly the foundation of palginan lies in the reliability of his testimony. He is believed concerning the one who committed the act, to say that the event occurred in such and such a manner, whereas concerning himself he is not believed. [Although it is possible that in reality he was a participant in the act, nevertheless, he himself is not believed to testify to this.] To explain this more clearly, Rabbi Shimon, of blessed memory, writes in Sha'arei Yosher (cited above, part 2, p. 155) that the foundation of the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef concerning palginan is as follows: Rav Yosef maintains that we do not apply palginan dibura—we do not divide the statement of the testimony and say that with regard to half of his words, it is treated as though they were never said [that is, as though he had not said “willingly”]. Rather, the entire statement is considered the delivery of testimony. Therefore, if part of it is nullified, all of it is nullified. Rava, however, maintains that what he said, “willingly,” is not part of the testimony; it is merely a statement that does not pertain to the testimony itself concerning so-and-so. Since by this statement he renders himself wicked—and a person does not render himself wicked—his testimony remains only concerning so-and-so who committed the act. And since what he said about himself is not considered the delivery of testimony, it cannot detract from his testimony concerning another person. It appears explicitly in the words of the Ran, in our sugya, who explains Rava’s words in Sanhedrin: when he testifies about himself, we apply palginan because “with regard to himself, there is no status of testimony at all.” See further in Sha'arei Yosher, where he discusses this at length. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: In accordance with whom -

in accordance with whose view did you issue your ruling?

In accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who says that we apply palginan dibura -

who said that we divide the reliability of a single statement into two: he is believed concerning one matter, but not believed concerning another. And as we learned in the Mishna [in tractate Pe'a, chapter 3, mishna 8],

as we learned: One who writes all his property to his slave,

for example, he wrote in the document: “All my property is given to you.”

He emerges

as

a free man [

at the time he receives the document]. Since he too is included among all the property.

But if

the master retained

in the gift

land

of a size

however small,

or something else, such as: “All my property is given to you, except for a piece of land however small,”

he does not emerge

as

a free man.

For specifically in the first clause, where he gives him everything without indicating that he wishes to retain something, the slave becomes free. We do not say that perhaps the master intended to retain the slave for himself, since he retained nothing. But here, since he retains something for himself without specifying what it is, his intention must be interpreted as having been to retain the slave himself for himself as well. And when he wrote the comprehensive expression “all my property” in the document, he did not intend to free him, since he did not explicitly write, “Yourself and my property are acquired by you.” Rather, his intention was merely to flatter the slave in this way, so that the slave would serve him with greater devotion.