Gittin 8b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains the three matters in which Syria was equated with the Land of Israel:

It is obligated in tithe and in the Sabbatical year, like the Land of Israel.

This is because this tanna

holds

—he maintains:

a private conquest,

which David conquered Syria for his own needs,

is called a conquest.

And the laws of the Land of Israel apply to it.

And the second law of the beraita:

And one who wishes to enter it in purity may enter,

and the Gemara asks:

But you said

at the beginning of the beraita:

its dust is impure.

If so, entering in purity is not applicable?! The Gemara answers: He enters it when he is carried through the air

in

the midst of

a litter, a chest, or a cabinet,

and he did not tread upon its dust. And so we learned in a beraita.

For it was taught: One who enters the land of the nations in a litter, chest, or cabinet, Rabbi declares the one entering impure

because a thrown tent [one that is carried] is not a tent, to be considered a separation between him and the air of the land of the nations.

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda declares him pure

because according to him, a thrown tent is called a tent.

And the Gemara explains:

And even Rabbi does not stand by declaring him impure

—he does not declare him impure—

except in the land of the nations,

where the Sages decreed impurity

upon

one who touches

its solid ground [

of the earth] or one who carries it,

and upon

one who enters

its air,

even if he did not touch its solid ground.

But in Syria, concerning

one who touches

its solid ground they decreed.

But

concerning

one who enters

its air,

who did not touch or move [shift] it,

they did not decree.

Therefore, one who enters inside a litter, chest, or cabinet does not become impure.

And the third law:

And one who purchases a field in Syria

is considered

as one who purchases

a field

in the environs of Jerusalem.

And the Gemara asks: lemai hilkheta—for what halakhic purpose did the tanna come to inform us of this [law]?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Sheshet said:

[This law] came

to say

that if a Jew purchases a field from a gentile in Syria, and the gentile wishes to go on his way on Shabbat,

they may write

—it is permitted to write—

upon it

—upon the field—

a deed

—a deed of sale—

even on Shabbat itself,

in order to save the land from his possession.

But the Gemara is astonished:

“On Shabbat—is it conceivable”—

do you actually entertain the thought that it is permitted for a Jew to write on Shabbat, which is a labor of Torah origin?

And it answers:

“As said”—

as Rava said—

Rava

in tractate Shabbat, concerning a sick person who is not in danger:

“He says”

the Jew

“to a gentile, and he performs”

the labor.

“Here too”—

the law is likewise:

“He says”

the Jew

“to a gentile, and he performs.”

That is, the gentile writes the document at the Jew’s request.

And the Gemara continues to clarify:

“And although telling a gentile”

on Shabbat to perform a labor is prohibited because of

“shevut,”

here,

“because of”

the mitzva of

“settling the Land of Israel,”

to drive the gentiles out of it and settle Jews there,

“the Sages did not decree”—

the Sages did not prohibit it.

The Gemara now discusses the nature of the reliability of a slave who brought his get [a document of emancipation] and says, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.” And the Gemara brings a beraita:

“The Sages taught: A slave who brought his document of emancipation”

from overseas, who must say “Before me it was written and before me it was signed,” like a woman who brings her get.

“And it was written in it”

in the get

“yourself”

you, and all the rest of

“my property is acquired by you”

by this document. The law is:

“He acquires himself”

since he is trusted concerning his emancipation, to say “Before me it was written,” and witnesses are not required to validate the document. But

The

“property he did not acquire”

until he validates the document through witnesses, like the validation of other documents.

“They raised a dilemma”—

a question was raised in the study hall: A document in which it was written

“all my property is acquired by you—what is”

the law? Is it also in such wording, in which the master included the entire transfer in one statement, necessary to distinguish between himself and the property, as the beraita distinguishes? Or perhaps, since everything was given to him in one statement, there is no division of testimony. And since he is reliable concerning himself, he is also reliable concerning the property.

“Abaye said: Since he acquired”

the slave

“himself, he acquired”

also the

“property.”

“Rava said to him: Granted”—

[granted; that is, concerning this matter, your words are acceptable to me]—

“that he should acquire himself”—

he acquires it—

“as is the case”—

since this is like the law of—

“a woman’s get.”

She is believed to testify concerning the get she brought from overseas, and to say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed,” and she is divorced through it.

“But”—

however—

“the property he should not acquire”—

he cannot acquire it through a document that has not been validated by witnesses—

“as is the case”—

as is the law of—

“the validation of ordinary documents”—

the validation of other documents.

And therefore Abaye retracts:

“Abaye then said”—

Abaye retracted his words and said [the opposite]:

“Since he did not acquire the property”

through the document [since it is not validated],

“he did not acquire”

even

“himself.”

For according to Abaye, the reliability of the document cannot be divided. Rather, either it is effective for everything [both to acquire himself and to acquire the property], or it is effective for nothing.

But Rava also raises an objection to this ruling:

“Rava said to him: Granted”

concerning

“the property he should not acquire” \-

he does not acquire it.

“As is the case”—

because this is like—

“the validation of ordinary documents”—

the validation of other documents, which is ineffective without validation by witnesses.

“But”

concerning

“himself, he should acquire”—

that he should acquire him,

“as is the case”—

because this is like—

“a woman’s get.”

She is believed to testify concerning her get without validation by others. So too, why should the slave not be believed to testify concerning his document, in order to become emancipated?

Rather, Rava said: in both this case and that case -

whether he wrote to him two expressions, such as “yourself and my property,” and as the beraita says, or whether he wrote one expression, “all my property,” [and included himself, the slave, together with the rest of the property], the law is:

he acquired himself.

But

he did not acquire the property. -

And the reason is: because we divide the statement—that is, we divide the slave’s words with regard to credibility. He is credible concerning himself, but he is not credible concerning the property.

in two bodies - in two separate bodies, such as here, the man who had relations with her and the woman - we divide [the statement]. [ Concerning the man who had relations with her, the testimony is accepted in its entirety; and concerning the woman, it is not accepted at all]. In one body - when one body is involved, such as when he testifies concerning his wife that he divorced her - we do not divide [the statement]. [ Of course, only according to this authority]. And it is explained that in both places, both in our sugya in Gittin and in the sugya in Bava Batra, the Gemara says explicitly that this is the law of dividing the statement. And see the Ran here, who wrote that Rava in our sugya, who says that we divide the statement, follows his position in Bava Batra, where one who says, “So-and-so had relations with my wife,” he and another join together to have him executed. And so too the Rosh wrote in Makkot (chapter 1, section 13). And see what the gaon Rabbi Shimon Shkop wrote to explain this in Shaarei Yosher (gate 6, chapter 11): that both when one says, “So-and-so had relations with my wife,” and when one says, “I divorced my wife,” the intention is not that because of the law of dividing the statement we must change the event and say that it occurred in another manner. [That is, in truth, so-and-so had relations with a married woman, but not this one]. Rather, the foundation of dividing the statement is that his statement was not effective for all the laws that result from it. Rather, only for part of them. That is, although according to this testimony that we accept, testimony concerning his wife emerges, he has no credibility to have her executed, since he is related to her. And only concerning the man who had relations with her is he credible to have him executed. And likewise, in the case of a slave who brought his bill of divorce, and likewise in the case of one who writes all his property except for a certain field, we do not maintain that concerning himself he is speaking the truth and concerning the property he is lying. Rather, the dividing is only with regard to the credibility and force of the slave’s statement: concerning himself, his statement is effective; but concerning the property, his statement is not effective. See there. And in Sanhedrin (9b), Rav Yosef said: if one testifies that so-and-so had relations with him, another man, in a male sexual act against his will [against his will], the one with whom the act was performed and another person join together to become two witnesses against the one who performed the act, and have him executed by a court. But if he testifies that he performed the act with him, another man, willingly, then that person is wicked, and he cannot join to testify against the one who performed the act, because the Torah said, “Do not place a wicked person as a witness.” But Rava maintains that even when he testifies that it was willingly, he is credible concerning the one who performed the act, although concerning himself he is not credible. And the reason is that according to what he testifies concerning himself [that the act was performed willingly], he is wicked. And the principle says, “A person does not render himself wicked, for a person is related to himself.” And Rashi explains that in such a case we divide the statement, that is, we divide his words: concerning himself, we do not believe him; and concerning the one who performed the act, he is credible. And the Gemara also brings Rava’s law (from the aforementioned tractate Bava Batra) concerning “so-and-so had relations with my wife,” and so on, in which too the foundation of the law is dividing the statement. And if so, it challenges: what is the novelty here in Rava’s words? And it answers: it might have been said that only when he testifies concerning himself do we say that we divide the statement, because a person is related to himself. But concerning his wife, he is not considered related. And we would accept his testimony in its entirety, and she too would be executed together with the man who had relations with her. It teaches us that concerning his wife too we say that we divide the statement, and concerning her he is not credible. And it is clear that here too, the meaning of dividing the statement is not that we divide his words. For if we do not accept his testimony concerning himself at all, then the event is nullified entirely, and it is not possible to incriminate the man who had relations with her alone Rather, certainly the foundation of dividing [the statement] is within the credibility of his testimony. Concerning the one who performed the act, he is credible to say that such and such was the event, whereas concerning himself he is not credible. [Even though it is possible that in reality he was the partner in the act, in any event, he himself is not credible to testify to this]. In greater explanation, the gaon Rabbi Shimon writes (in the aforementioned Shaarei Yosher, part 2, p. 155) that the foundation of the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef concerning the law of dividing is this: Rav Yosef maintains that we do not divide the statement, to divide the statement of the testimony and say that concerning half of his words we treat it as though it had not been said at all [that is, as though he had not said “willingly”]. Rather, we calculate the entire statement as testimony of a witness. Therefore, if part of it is nullified, all of it is nullified. And Rava maintains that what he said, “willingly,” is not part of the testimony; rather, it is merely speech, which does not belong to the essence of the testimony concerning so-and-so. And since through this speech he renders himself wicked, and a person does not render himself wicked, therefore his testimony remains only concerning so-and-so, that he performed the act with him. And since what he said concerning himself is not in the category of testimony, it therefore does not have the power to detract from the testimony concerning so-and-so. And what he wrote in explanation of Rava’s words—that the speech concerning himself is not part of the testimony, and therefore that concerning which he is not credible does not detract from testimony concerning another—appears explicitly in the words of the Ran in our sugya, who explains Rava’s words in Sanhedrin: when he testifies concerning himself, we divide [the statement], because “concerning himself there is no category of testimony at all.” And see there further in Shaarei Yosher, where he elaborated on this. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: According to whom -

according to whose view did you issue your ruling?

According to Rabbi Shimon,

who says that we divide the statement -

who said that we divide the credibility of one statement into two: concerning one matter he is credible, and concerning another matter he is not credible. And as we learned in the Mishna [in tractate Peah, chapter 3, Mishna 8]],

for we learned: One who writes all his property to his slave,

such as when he wrote in a document, “All my property is given to you.”

he goes out

the slave, to be

a free man [

at the time that he received the document], since he too is included in “all my property.”

But if

the master reserved

in the gift

land

of the size of

any amount,

or another thing, such as: “All my property is given to you, except for any amount of land,”

he does not go out

the slave, to be

a free man.

For specifically in the first clause, where he gives him everything, without revealing his intention that he wishes to reserve something, the slave goes out to freedom. And we do not say that perhaps the master intended to reserve the slave for himself, since he reserved nothing. But here, where he reserves something for himself and does not specify what it is, his intention must be interpreted as including that he intended to reserve the slave himself for himself. And when he wrote in the document the inclusive expression “all my property,” he did not intend to free him. For he did not write explicitly, “Yourself and my property are acquired by you.” Rather, his intention was only to flatter the slave by this, so that he would serve him with greater devotion.