Gittin 8a — the Talmud in English

Because this is its way,

being made to flee

and move every moment to another place, and it does not remain in one place.

And therefore, it is not considered attached to the ground until it touches the ground.

But a flowerpot

that you [Rabbi Zeira] are discussing,

which is not made to flee,

and it is fixed in one place,

not

will Rabbi Judah say this. Rather, [it is possible that] he will agree that a flowerpot is considered attached to the ground.

Alternatively—

or it is also [possible to argue the opposite even according to the view of the Rabbis]. And it is:

They said only up to this point—

they did not say—

the Rabbis there—

there—in regard to their statement [that it need not be actually upon the ground in order to be considered attached]—

but

specifically

with a ship

that is resting upon the water,

, and that there does not

intervene, air—

the air—between it and the ground, but water—

which is like—

that the water

is considered like solid ground—

are considered solid ground. [And the proof: that they possess the power of causing growth, similar to ground.]

But a flowerpot,

which is placed upon stakes [in such a manner

that air intervenes

between it and the ground],

not

did the Rabbis say. And it is possible that they agree that it is not considered attached.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak returns to the question of the contradiction between the two beraitot, concerning one who brings a bill of divorce on a ship. And he resolves it in a third manner [after the explanations of Rabbi Yirmeya and Abaye]: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

these beraitot,

in the rivers of the Land of Israel, according to everyone—

according to everyone—

do not disagree—

they do not disagree. And according to both of them, the ships sailing in these rivers are considered as though they are resting upon the ground, with regard to a bill of divorce written upon them.

And even though they do not touch the ground at all. Rather, they disagree—

in what do they disagree? Regarding a bill of divorce written on a ship sailing

on the Great Sea

[the Mediterranean Sea], which borders the western side of the Land of Israel. However, concerning the sea itself there are two disputes between the tannaim. One tanna holds that the seashore is the boundary of the Land of Israel, but the sea itself is no longer part of the Land of Israel. Whereas the other holds that the sea itself is also part of the Land of Israel, and the dispute between the two beraitot concerns the sea itself: how far the boundaries of the land extend—whether into it or only up to it.

Regarding this, the Gemara brings the words of the Tosefta:

As it was taught: Which is

the precise place in the north where the boundary of the

Land

of Israel begins?

And which is

the place belonging to

outside the Land?

Is the summit of the mountain called Turei Amanon the boundary point, or its slope, which is a day’s or two days’ journey from it, in the direction of the south?

The tanna kamma says: all that slopes—

where the mountain begins to slope—

and descends from

the summit of

Turei Amanon and inward—

toward the south, on the side of the Land of Israel—is

the Land of Israel,

because the summit of the mountain is the boundary. And on its other side, the place that slopes

from

the summit of Turei Amanon and outward, toward the north, is

outside the Land. And what is the law of

the islands—

the islands—

of the sea

on the western side adjacent to the Land of Israel? [Is their law like the Land of Israel, or like outside the Land?] The answer is:

we view them

in their place

as though a cord were stretched over them

from above, whose beginning is

from Turei Amanon

in the north, and it stretches and continues

until the Brook of Egypt, which is the southwestern boundary of the land that joins the Mediterranean Sea.

And accordingly their law [the law of the islands] is determined:

from the cord and inward—

eastward, toward the Land of Israel, their law is

like the Land of Israel. From the cord and outward—

toward the west—their law is

like outside the Land.

Rabbi Judah says: All

the sea

that is opposite

the airspace of

the Land of Israel, toward the west, even as far as the Ocean, which is at the end of the world,

is considered like the Land of Israel. As it is stated [in the Book of Numbers, chapter 34]:

“And the boundary of the sea. And the Great Sea shall be for you

and a boundary. This shall be your sea boundary.”

And the islands,

which it is relevant to discuss [whether they are within the territory of the land or not], are not those located on the western side of the Land of Israel, but rather those

on the sides

—on the northern side and on the southern side—some of which extend northward or southward, outside the territory of the land. And in order to determine their law,

we view them

in their place

as though a cord were stretched over them

from above,

from Kaflarya

—the city situated at the summit of Turei Amanon [and it is the northern boundary!]—westward

and as far as the Ocean. And the second cord is stretched

from the Brook of Egypt,

which is in the south of the Land of Israel, westward

as far as the Ocean. And according to this the law is determined:

from the cord and inward—

toward the second cord [that is, between the two cords]—it is considered

the Land of Israel. But from the cord

and outward—north of Kaflarya and south of the Brook of Egypt—it is

outside the Land.

, in the south of the Land of Israel, westward

And the Gemara asks:

And the Rabbis—for this “and a boundary”—

this word that appears superfluous in the verse [from which Rabbi Judah learned his law]—

what do they do with it—

what do they expound from it?

And the Gemara answers:

They require it—

they need this in order

to

learn—that also the islands

located in the sea on the eastern side of the cord are considered like the Land of Israel [with regard to tithes, the Sabbatical year, and the like].

And we do not say thereby that the territory of the Land of Israel extends only as far as the seashore.

And it explains the view of Rabbi Judah:

And Rabbi Judah

holds:

Islands do not require verses—

they do not require a special verse, because since they are located within the territory, certainly their law is like the Land of Israel! The Gemara discusses another matter from the words of the Mishna:

We learned in our Mishna:

“Rabbi Meir says: Acco,

its law is

like the Land of Israel with regard to

bills of divorce.”

They asked him—

the students asked him—

from Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba. What is the law of

one who sells his slave

to Syria? Is it considered

like one who sells

in outside the Land

and the slave goes free, as the Mishna says below [folio 43b], that we penalize the purchaser for having removed him from the Land of Israel, since a slave is subject to mitzvot

and is forbidden to leave the land?

Or not

does he go free, since King David conquered it and added it to the area of the Land of Israel, and the conquest of an individual is called a conquest?

They asked

the questioners

of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba:

What is the status of one who

sells his slave

to Syria?

Is he considered

like one who sells

in outside the Land, so that the slave goes free, as the Mishna states below (43b), that the purchaser is penalized for taking him out of the Land of Israel, since a slave is subject to the

mitzvot and is forbidden to leave the land?

Or not

—does he not go free, since King David conquered Syria and added it to the territory of the Land of Israel, and the conquest of an individual is called a conquest?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba answered them:

He said to them: You have learned it -

we have learned this in the words of the Mishna:

“Rabbi Meir says: Akko is like the Land of Israel with regard to gittin.”

It follows:

With regard to gittin, yes.

Specifically, only with regard to gittin is Akko considered like the Land of Israel, because they are expert there in [writing] it for its sake, or because witnesses are readily found there to validate it. But

with regard

to

slaves

who were sold there,

no,

it is not considered [like the Land of Israel], for it is not part of the Land of Israel. And if so,

all the more so, Syria,

which is not considered like the Land of Israel with regard to slaves,

for it is much farther away -

for it is farther away [than Akko].

And now the Gemara brings a baraita concerning Syria:

The Sages taught: In three ways Syria is equal to the Land of Israel, and in three ways

it is equal

to outside the Land:

The Gemara gives a

sign

for the six matters by means of letters

ayin-bet bet-resh resh-kuf:

.

And the Gemara specifies the six matters:

In three ways it is equal to outside the Land:

Its soil is impure like outside the Land.

Because the Sages decreed concerning it, in order to reduce the departure of Jews there.

And one who sells his slave to Syria is like one who sells [him] in outside the Land. And one who brings a bill of divorce from Syria

to the Land of Israel

is like one who brings [it] from outside the Land.

And since caravans are not regularly found, the agent must say: “Before me it was written, and before me it was signed.”

And in three ways it is equal to the Land of Israel:

It is obligated in tithes and in the Sabbatical year like the Land of Israel. And one who wishes to enter it

it

in purity

without becoming impure with the impurity of “the lands of the nations,”

enters. And one who purchases a field in Syria

is considered

like one who purchases

in the outskirts of Jerusalem.