Gittin 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara resolves: Indeed, even the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, that it is the witnesses to delivery who effect the divorce.

Nevertheless,

there is a difference between them—

they disagree concerning witnesses bearing

distinctive

gentile

names.

The first tanna holds that even in such a case there is concern that people will come to rely upon them and deliver the bill of divorce in their presence. Therefore, they are disqualified by rabbinic decree. Rabbi Shimon, however, holds that since Jews are not called by such names at all, this bill of divorce is not considered intrinsically forged. Everyone knows that these witnesses [who signed it] are idolaters, and they will not come to rely upon them without valid witnesses to the delivery.

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

But—

behold, the law of

retraction

is also mentioned in the beraita: “If he wished to retract in both cases, he may retract.” Yet according to Rabbi Meir, this is a disqualification

by Torah law,

for once the principal has revoked the agent’s agency, he is no longer his agent, and there is no divorce here at all.

And this is a disqualification by Torah law, for the Torah states: “And he shall place it in her hand,” whereas here he did not give it—not he and not his agent.

And

nevertheless,

does it teach this?!

And it answers:

In truth, the matter is not dependent on whether the disqualification is by Torah law or rabbinic law, as we said previously. Rather,

when it teaches—

the beraita teaches—

a matter that exists—

a matter [a law] that does not exist—

in betrothal,

but only in bills of divorce and deeds of emancipation, such as the declaration, “It was written in my presence.” Likewise, a Samaritan witness is valid. But a

matter that exists —

a matter that does exist—

in betrothal [as well], [and not only in bills of divorce and deeds of emancipation], such as “for her sake” and “attached,”

[and not only with bills of divorce and documents of release for slaves], such as the requirements that the document be written “for her sake” and that it not be attached to the ground,

it does not teach—

it does not state it.

But the Gemara also raises a difficulty concerning this:

But—

behold—

retraction itself—

the retraction taught with regard to a woman’s bill of divorce and a deed of emancipation—

exists—

also exists—

in betrothal.

For if he gave a betrothal document to his agent and afterward the principal wished to retract, he may indeed retract. This is because the agent’s acquisition of the betrothal document does not constitute a “benefit” for the woman, since as a result she becomes forbidden to marry another man. Nor does she receive sustenance from the husband through the agent; rather, she receives it only once he brings her into the bridal canopy. And the Gemara answers that nevertheless there is a difference between them:

with agency against her will

there is a difference between them.

With regard to divorce

it exists:

there is such a possibility, as the husband can send a bill of divorce to her against her will.

But with regard to betrothal it does not exist—

it does not apply.

Mishna:

Any bill of divorce—

that is, any document—

upon which there is a witness

one [of the two] who is

a Samaritan—

is invalid. Except for bills of divorce for women and deeds of emancipation,

where, if one of the witnesses who signed the bill of divorce or the deed of emancipation is a Samaritan, they are valid.

An incident was brought before Rabban Gamliel in Kfar Otnai—

which is situated in the southern Galilee, on the border of the land of the Samaritans—

a woman’s bill of divorce. And its

two

witnesses were Samaritan witnesses,

and he validated

the bill of divorce.

Gemara:

The Gemara seeks to determine who stated our Mishna.

The Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna of our Mishna?

Who is the tanna represented in our Mishna?

It is neither the first tanna,

who validates Samaritans entirely [in the beraita below],

nor Rabbi Elazar,

who disqualifies them entirely,

nor Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who distinguishes between mitzvot that the Samaritans had adopted and mitzvot that they had not adopted.

As it is taught in a beraita: Matzah of a Samaritan, [

which was baked by a Samaritan,

is permitted

to eat on Passover, and we are not concerned that it may have become leavened,

and a person fulfills his obligation with it

on the first night

of Passover [

this is the opinion of the first tanna].

Rabbi Elazar prohibits

this matzah from being eaten on Passover,

because the Samaritans are not

the Samaritans

expert in the precise details of the mitzvot,

and perhaps they did not guard it properly and it became leavened. Furthermore, there is concern that they may have deliberately caused it to become leavened.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any mitzva

that the Samaritans adopted, they are more meticulous in observing it than Jews.

Who is he -

Who is the tanna who taught our Mishna?

If -

If we say that it is

the first tanna,

then one should validate

even other documents as well,

since in his opinion the Kutim are not suspected of lying.

If it is Rabbi Elazar,

then

even a woman's get,

signed by Kutim,

also not -

it should likewise not be validated, since according to his opinion they are not expert in the fine details of the mitzvot. Moreover, they are suspected of lying.

And if it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

then according to his view this depends on whether the Kutim had established their practice in the laws of gittin and documents or not.

If they had established it -

if they had established it, then one should validate

even other documents as well,

and not only women's gittin and emancipation documents.

If they had not established it -

if they had not established themselves in these laws, then

even a woman's get as well, not

should they be permitted to sign it.

And if you would say -

if you would say that this Mishna follows the view of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and that they had established it [

meaning that they had established themselves]

in this matter -

with regard to gittin and emancipation documents,

but had not established themselves in this matter -

and had not established themselves in the laws of other documents. [Therefore, they cannot be relied upon with regard to documents.]

The following difficulty would then arise:

If so -

if that is so -

why specifically one -

why was [with regard to women's gittin and emancipation documents] only one Kutite witness validated?

Even two -

even two -

as well -

should likewise be validated?

Why, then -

and why

did Rabbi Elazar say

with regard to our Mishna:

they validated in it

with regard to a woman's get

only one Kutite witness!

The Gemara answers:

Actually,

our Mishna should be understood as following the view of

Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that the Kutim are suspected of lying. And what is the reason that one Kutite witness was validated with regard to a get? It is referring to a special case.

And for example: a Jew signed -

the Jewish witness signed

last -

below the Kutite's signature. And we validate the get on the assumption that,