Gittin 10a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves: Indeed, even the first tanna holds according to the view of Rabbi Elazar, that the witnesses of delivery effect the divorce.

Nevertheless,

there is a difference between them—

they disagree concerning witnesses bearing

distinctive

non-Jewish

names.

The first tanna holds that even in such a case, there is concern that people will come to rely upon them and deliver the get in their presence. Therefore, they are disqualified by rabbinic law. Whereas Rabbi Shimon holds: Since Jews are not called by such names at all, this get is not considered intrinsically forged. For everyone knows that these witnesses [who are signed] are idolaters, and they will not come to rely upon them without valid witnesses of delivery.

And the Gemara raises another objection:

But—

yet—even the law of

retraction

is mentioned in the beraita: “If he wished to retract from both, he may retract.” But according to Rabbi Meir, this is a disqualification

by Torah law,

for after the sender nullified the agency of the agent, he is no longer his agent, and there is no divorce here at all.

And this is a disqualification by Torah law, for the Torah said, “And he shall place it in her hand,” whereas here he did not give it, neither he nor his agent.

And

nevertheless,

is it taught?!

And it answers:

In truth, it does not depend upon whether it is by Torah law or by rabbinic law, as we said earlier. Rather,

when it teaches—

the beraita teaches—

a matter that exists—

a matter [a law] that does not exist—

in betrothal,

but only in women’s bills of divorce and writs of manumission, such as the declaration, “Before me it was written.” And likewise, a Cuthean witness is valid, but

a matter that exists —

a matter that does exist—

in betrothal, [and not only in women’s bills of divorce and writs of manumission,] such as “for her sake” and “attached,”

[and not only with bills of divorce and documents of release for slaves], such as the requirements that the document be written “for her sake” and that it not be attached to the ground,

it does not teach—

it does not state it.

But it also raises an objection against this:

But—

yet—

retraction itself—

the retraction itself that was taught concerning a woman’s get and a writ of manumission—

exists—

also exists

in betrothal.

For if he gave a betrothal writ to his agent, and afterward the sender wished to retract, he may retract. For in the agent’s acquisition of the betrothal writ there is no “benefit” to the woman, since because of it she becomes forbidden to marry another man. And she does not receive sustenance from the husband through it either, but only once he brings her into the wedding canopy. And the Gemara answers that nevertheless there is a difference between them:

in agency against her will

of the woman, there is a difference between them.

In divorce

it exists,

there is [such a case], for the husband can send the get against her will.

But in betrothal it does not exist—

it does not exist.

Mishna:

Any get—

that is, any writ—

upon which there is one witness

[out of two] who is

a Cuthean—

is invalid. Except for women’s bills of divorce and writs of manumission,

where, if one of the witnesses signed upon the get or upon the writ of manumission is a Cuthean, they are valid.

An incident that they brought before Rabban Gamliel in Kefar Utnai—

which is situated in the southern Galilee, on the border of the land of the Cutheans—

a woman’s get. And

its two

witnesses were Cuthean witnesses—

and Rabban Gamliel validated

the get.

Gemara:

The Gemara attempts to clarify who stated our Mishna.

And the Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna of our Mishna—

who is the tanna in our Mishna?

Not the first tanna,

who validates Cutheans entirely [in the beraita below].

And not Rabbi Elazar,

who disqualifies them entirely.

And not Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who distinguishes between mitzvot that the Cutheans had adopted and mitzvot that they had not adopted.

For it was taught in a beraita: Cuthean matza, [which was baked by a Cuthean,]

[which was baked by a Samaritan],

is permitted

for eating on Passover, and we do not fear lest it became leavened,

and a person fulfills his obligation with it

on the first night

of Passover [this is the view of the first tanna].

[this is the view of the first tanna].

Rabbi Elazar forbids

this matza for eating on Passover

because

the Cutheans

are not expert in the fine details of the mitzvot,

and perhaps they did not guard it properly and it became leavened. And additionally, there is concern lest they deliberately caused it to become leavened.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any mitzva

that the Cutheans adopted, they are more exacting in it than Israel.

Who is it? –

Who is the tanna who taught our Mishna?

If –

if we say that it is

the first tanna,

then one should validate

even other legal documents as well,

because according to his view, the Kutim are not suspected of lying.

If it is Rabbi Elazar,

then

even a woman’s divorce document,

signed by Kutim,

also should not be valid –

it should likewise not be validated, because according to his view they are not expert in the details of the commandments. Furthermore, they are suspected of lying.

And if it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

then according to his position the matter depends on whether the Kutim had established themselves as reliable regarding the laws of divorce documents and other legal documents.

If they had established themselves as reliable –

if they had done so, then one should validate

even other legal documents as well,

and not only women’s divorce documents and documents freeing slaves.

If they had not established themselves as reliable –

if they had not established themselves as reliable regarding these laws, then

even a woman’s divorce document as well should not be valid,

and they should not be permitted to sign it.

But if you were to say –

if you were to say that this Mishna follows the view of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and that they had established themselves as reliable [

meaning that they had established themselves as reliable

in this matter

of divorce documents and documents freeing slaves],

but they had not established themselves as reliable in this matter –

and they had not established themselves as reliable regarding other legal documents [and therefore they cannot be relied upon for such documents].

If so, there is a difficulty:

If so –

if that is the case –

why specifically one –

why was only one Kutite witness validated [for women’s divorce documents and documents freeing slaves]?

Even two –

even two witnesses –

as well –

should also be validated?

Why, then, –

and why

did Rabbi Elazar say [

concerning our Mishna]:

they validated it [

in the case of a woman’s divorce document]

only with one Kutite witness!

The Gemara answers:

In fact,

our Mishna should be established as following the view of

Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that the Kutim are suspected of lying. And why was one Kutite witness validated for a divorce document? It is referring to a special case.

For example: a Jew signed –

the Jewish witness signed –

last –

below the Kutite’s signature. And we validate the divorce document on the assumption that,