Gittin 90a — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

and the halakha is: she is permitted to both of them.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: A man may not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety, as it is stated: “

and it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes,

because he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety.”

And Beit Hillel say: Even

if

she spoiled

and burned

his dish,

he may divorce her,

for

it is already stated in that verse

“because he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety,”

and since it did not write “a matter of sexual impropriety,” it is implied that he found in her either a matter of sexual impropriety or another matter, such as her spoiling his dish.

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he found another woman who is more beautiful than she,

he may divorce her,

as it is stated, “and it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes

and he sends her away from his house.”

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai,

who hold that it is permitted to divorce only if he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety:

But it has already been stated “

sexual impropriety

matter,”

and it is implied that the verse came to teach about an additional matter that he found in her, besides a matter of sexual impropriety.

Beit Shammai said to them: But it has already been stated “sexual impropriety,”

whereas according to your words, a matter of sexual impropriety is not specifically required; so why did the Torah use the expression “sexual impropriety”?

Beit Hillel said to them: If

it had

been stated “sexual impropriety” but

it had not

been stated “matter,” I would say

specifically

because of

a

matter of sexual impropriety she may leave,

but

because of another matter she may not leave; therefore it was stated “matter.”

But if it had been stated

only

“matter” and “sexual impropriety” had not been stated, I would say

that indeed she may leave because of any matter; but here the verse says that there is a restriction concerning her permission to marry another man: only if she left

because of “a matter” may she marry another man,

but if she left because of “sexual impropriety,” she may not marry another man, because the continuation of the verse is, “and he sends her away from his house, and she leaves, and she goes to another man.”

And if the verse were speaking only about other matters besides sexual impropriety, I would say that if she left because of sexual impropriety, she is forbidden to marry another man.

Therefore it was stated

also

“sexual impropriety”

and also “matter,” to teach that in every manner in which she leaves, she is permitted to marry another man.

And

we challenge:

For Beit Shammai, what do they make of this “matter”?

For according to their words, it should have written, “because he found in her sexual impropriety”?

And we answer:

It is stated here,

with regard to divorce,

“matter,” and it is stated elsewhere,

in the passage concerning testimony,

“matter,” “by the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established,” and we learn by a gzera shava:

“By the testimony of two witnesses shall a matter be established.” And we learn by means of a gzera shava:

Just as there, by two witnesses, so here

she does not become forbidden to him because of a matter of sexual impropriety [adultery] except

by two witnesses.

And Beit Hillel

say:

Does it say “sexual impropriety in a matter,”

the meaning of which would be that he found sexual impropriety in a clearly established matter, through witnesses? And since the verse did not say this, necessarily “a matter of sexual impropriety” comes to say: either sexual impropriety or a matter.

And Beit Shammai

hold that it is impossible to interpret it according to Beit Hillel. For

does it say

in the verse

“either sexual impropriety or a matter”?

Therefore, it is preferable to interpret “a matter of sexual impropriety” as referring to witnesses.

And Beit Hillel

hold that

for this reason it is written “a matter of sexual impropriety,”

so that we can derive both the words of Beit Shammai—that witnesses must come and testify that she committed adultery—and also say that any matter permits him to divorce her. Therefore it did not write “either sexual impropriety or a matter,” but rather “a matter of sexual impropriety,”

which implies this—

either sexual impropriety or a matter,

and it implies this,

that knowledge through witnesses is required.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he found another woman more beautiful than she.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Over what do they disagree?—

In

the words of

Reish Lakish.

For Reish Lakish said:

Everywhere that the Torah writes

“because,”

it

serves as

one of

four expressions:

a.

“If”—

that is, if and when.

b.

“Perhaps”—lest, maybe.

c.

“Rather”—when the verse comes to retract what it said previously.

d.

“For”—a proof or a reason.

Beit Shammai hold,

that this which the verse says

[

“and it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes

because he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety,”

the interpretation of “because” stated here is:

“for,”

that is,

because

he found in her

a matter of sexual impropriety.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: “because he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety,”

that is: if she does not find favor in his eyes.

Alternatively, if he found in her a matter of sexual impropriety.

Rav Pappa said to Rava:

According to Beit Hillel, who require a reason in order that he may divorce her, if

he found in her neither sexual impropriety nor

any

matter

other, and he divorced her,

what is the law?

Is he obligated to take her back, or not?

He said

to him, Rava:

Since the Merciful One revealed with regard to the ravished

virgin, whom he is obligated to marry, and it says

“He may not send her away all his days,”

and we derive from the superfluous expression

“all his days”

that if he divorced her at any time during his life,

he stands at “arise and restore,”

it is clear that only

there did the Merciful One reveal

that he is obligated to take her back after he divorced her,

but here,

when he divorces his wife without a reason,

whatever he did, he did,

and he need not take her back.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava: If

he has in

his heart to divorce her, and she sits under his authority and serves him, what is the law?

He applied to him the verse, “Do not plow

on the back of evil, while he sits securely behind you.”

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir would say: Just as opinions

are divided

with regard to food,

as there is a fastidious person who is particular about a minor matter, and there is one who is not particular,

so

there are

opinions

divided among people

with regard to women,

as to how to relate to their actions. And he compared this to the difference between people regarding a cup into which a fly fell:

There is a person whose fly falls into his cup, and he throws it out and does not drink from it.

That is, there is a person who is particular regarding his wife, that she should not converse with people, and if she spoke, he would divorce her.

And this is the trait of Pappos ben Yehuda, who would lock the door in front of his wife

so that she would not speak with anyone,

and go out [

and it is an improper trait, for as a result of this she does not remain between them and commits adultery under his authority—Rashi’s wording].

And there is a person whose fly falls into his cup, and he throws it out

the fly,

and drinks it.

And this is the trait of every person,

who does not care that his wife

speaks with her brothers and relatives, and he lets it pass.

And there is a person whose fly falls into a serving dish —

his cooked dish, and he goes

and sucks it out and eats it.

And this is the trait of an evil person, who sees his wife going out

to the marketplace

with her head uncovered, and spinning in the marketplace

[90b],