Gittin 90a (צ.) — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

And the halakha is: She is permitted to both of them.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: A man may not divorce his wife unless he has found in her a matter of sexual impropriety, as it is stated: “

And it shall be that if she does not find favor in his eyes,

because he has found in her an indecent matter.”

And Beit Hillel say: Even

if

she spoiled

and burned

his dish,

he may divorce her,

for

it is written in that very verse:

“because he has found in her an indecent matter,”

and since it does not say “a matter of indecency,” this indicates that he found in her either a matter of indecency or some other matter, such as her having spoiled his dish.

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he found another woman who is more attractive than she,

he may divorce her,

as it is stated: “And it shall be that if she does not find favor in his eyes

and he sends her from his house.”

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai,

who maintain that it is permitted to divorce her only if he has found in her a matter of indecency:

But is it not already stated “

indecent

matter”?

This indicates that the verse comes to teach about an additional matter that he found in her, besides a matter of indecency.

Beit Shammai said to them: But is it not already stated “indecent,”

whereas according to your view, a matter of indecency is not specifically intended? Why, then, did the Torah use the expression “indecent”?

Beit Hillel said to them: If

it

had said “indecent” and had not

it

said “matter,” I would say

specifically

because of

a matter of

indecency she may leave him,

but

because of another matter she may not leave him; therefore it says “matter.”

And if it had said

only

“matter” and had not said “indecent,” I would say

that indeed she may leave him for any matter. But here the verse states that there is a restriction concerning her permission to marry another man: only if she left him

because of a “matter” may she marry another man,

but if she left him because of “indecency,” she may not marry another man, because the continuation of the verse is: “and he sends her from his house, and she leaves, and she goes to another man.”

And if the verse spoke only of other matters besides indecency, I would say that if she left him because of indecency, she is prohibited from marrying another man.

Therefore it says

both

“indecent”

and “matter,” to teach that in every circumstance in which she leaves him, she is permitted to marry another man.

And

we challenge this:

According to Beit Shammai, what do they do with this “matter”?

For according to their view, it should have written: “because he has found indecency in her”?

And we answer:

It says here,

with regard to divorce,

“matter,” and it says elsewhere,

in the passage concerning testimony,

“matter,”

“By the testimony of two witnesses shall a matter be established.” And we learn by means of a gzera shava:

Just as there, it requires two witnesses, so here

she is not rendered prohibited to him because of a matter of indecency [adultery] אלא

with two witnesses.

And Beit Hillel

say:

Does it say “indecency in a matter,”

which would mean that he found indecency in a clearly established matter, through witnesses? Since the verse did not say this, it necessarily follows that “an indecent matter” comes to say: either indecency or another matter.

And Beit Shammai

maintain that it is impossible to interpret the verse according to Beit Hillel. For

does it say

in the verse: “

either indecency or a matter”?

Therefore, it is preferable to interpret “an indecent matter” as referring to a matter established through witnesses.

And Beit Hillel

maintain that

this is why it is written “an indecent matter,”

so that we can derive both the position of Beit Shammai—that witnesses must come and testify that she committed adultery—and also say that any matter permits him to divorce her. Therefore, it does not say “either indecency or a matter,” but rather “an indecent matter,”

which indicates this—

either indecency or another matter,

and indicates this,

that knowledge through witnesses is required.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he found another woman who is more attractive than she.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

With regard to what do they disagree?—

With regard to

the statement of

Reish Lakish.

For Reish Lakish said:

Everywhere that the Torah writes

“ki,”

it

serves as

one of

four meanings:

a.

“Im”—

that is, if and when.

b.

“Delma”—

lest, perhaps.

c.

“Ela”—

when the verse comes to retract what it said previously.

d.

“Deha”—

a proof or a reason.

Beit Shammai maintain

that the verse says

“And it shall be that if she does not find favor in his eyes”

“because he has found in her an indecent matter,”

and the meaning of “because” here is:

“deha,”

for

he has found in her an indecent matter.

And Rabbi Akiva maintains: “because he has found in her an indecent matter,”

means: if she does not find favor in his eyes.

Alternatively, if he has found in her an indecent matter.

Rav Pappa said to Rava:

According to Beit Hillel, who require a reason in order for him to be able to divorce her, if he

found in her neither indecency nor

any

other matter

and divorced her,

what is the halakha?

Must he take her back, or not?

He said

to him, Rava:

Since the Merciful One specifies with regard to a raped

virgin, whom he is obligated to marry, and it says:

“He may not send her away all his days,”

and we derive from the superfluous expression

“all his days”

that if he divorces her at any time during his life, he

must comply with “arise and take her back,”

it is evident that only

there does the Merciful One specify

that he must take her back after divorcing her,

but here,

when he divorces his wife without a reason,

what he did, he did,

and he need not take her back.

Rav Mesharsheya said to Rava: If

he has

in his heart to divorce her, yet she remains under his authority and serves him, what is the halakha?

He applied to him the verse: “Do not plow

on the back of an evil matter while he sits securely behind.”

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir would say: Just as opinions

are divided

with regard to food,

as there is an individual who is delicate and particular even about a minor matter, while another is not particular,

so

there are

opinions

divided among people

with regard to women,

as to how they should regard their actions. He compared this to the difference between people concerning a cup into which a fly had fallen:

There is a person whose fly falls into his cup, and he throws it away and does not drink from it.

That is, there is a person who is particular about his wife and does not allow her to converse with other people; if she were to speak with them, he would divorce her.

And this is the trait of Pappos ben Yehuda, who would lock the door in front of his wife

so that she would not speak with anyone,

and go out [

this is an improper practice, for as a result she does not remain between them and commits adultery under his authority—Rashi’s wording].

And there is a person whose fly falls into his cup, and he throws it away

the fly,

and drinks from it.

And this is the trait of an ordinary person,

who does not care if his wife

speaks with her brothers and relatives, and he lets it pass.

And there is a person whose fly falls into a serving dish —

his cooked dish—and he goes

and sucks it out and eats it.

And this is the trait of a wicked person, who sees his wife going out

to the marketplace

with her head uncovered and spinning in the marketplace [

folio 90b],