Gittin 89b (פט:) — the Talmud in English

There was a certain woman concerning whom a rumor circulated that she had been betrothed

in the presence of witnesses ")

to

a

certain one of the sons of

a place called

Plonia, and the people did not say to whom. And the witnesses came from overseas and said: We never testified that this woman had been betrothed.

but people did not say to whom. The witnesses then came from overseas and said: We never testified that this woman had been betrothed.

Rava said: Even according to the one who says that

in general

we do not nullify

a rumor, because of the suspicion that perhaps she is still betrothed, in this case

we do nullify the rumor,

because

people will say,

certainly

the Sages examined her betrothal,

and it became clear to them

that it was the betrothal of a minor,

and that is why they permitted her to marry another without a bill of divorce.

There was a certain

woman

concerning whom a rumor circulated that she had been betrothed to a certain man who was a minor,

who had not yet reached majority,

but appeared

physically

to be an adult.

And the question was raised: If witnesses should come and say, “She was not betrothed in our presence,” do we nullify the rumor, because people will say: He was a minor, and there was no valid betrothal? Or perhaps we do not nullify the rumor, since he appeared to be an adult, and people did not know that he was a minor; and they would come to suspect that she is still a married woman?

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: There was an incident of this

sort,

and

the Sages said that we nullify the rumor and do not be concerned about suspicion, because people also realize concerning one who appears to be an adult

that he is still

a minor, since he

had not reached “

the divisions of Reuben,”

as it is stated

concerning them: “

For the divisions of Reuben there were great resolves of heart.”

And this means that adults possess wisdom and profound understanding, whereas concerning a minor it can be seen that he does not possess the understanding of an adult. We are not concerned that people might say he is an adult; rather, we nullify the rumor, since people will say that the Sages examined this betrothal and established that it was the betrothal of a minor.

We learned in the Mishna:

Provided that there is no plausible explanation.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: The plausible explanation that they said

which nullifies the rumor,

even

if the rumor emerged now and the rumor of the plausible explanation did not emerge

from now until

after

ten days,

the rumor is nullified on account of the plausible explanation.

Rav Zevid said: In a case

where there could be

a plausible explanation, we are concerned about the plausible explanation,

even if the plausible explanation did not emerge together with the rumor.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rav Zevid:

We learned in the Mishna:

Provided that there is no plausible explanation.

This implies that if the plausible explanation did not emerge together with the rumor, we are not concerned about a plausible explanation, even though there could be one.

He said to him,

Rav Zevid: In our Mishna as well,

in a case

where there could be

a plausible explanation, it is stated

that we nullify the rumor.

Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: And

if

you do not accept

Rav Zevid’s view, that where there is a plausible explanation we nullify the rumor?

But we learned: A woman whose husband went overseas, and one witness came and said, “Your husband died,” the Sages instituted that he is to be believed. They were lenient and permitted belief even in the testimony of a single witness, although a matter involving marital status cannot be established by fewer than two witnesses, so that the woman would not remain an aguna [as explained at the beginning of the chapter HaIsha Rabba, in tractate Yevamot, on what basis the Sages permitted this]. If the woman then went and married, and afterward her first husband returned, she must leave the first husband, because a married woman who had relations with another man is forbidden to her husband [and does not have the dispensation of one who was coerced, for the reason explained there in tractate Yevamot], and she requires a bill of divorce from him. And even from her second husband, although it has now become clear that his betrothal never took effect, the Sages required her to receive a bill of divorce from him, so that people would not say: The first husband divorced her, she married the second, and then returned to the first without a bill of divorce—thus a married woman would be leaving a marriage without a bill of divorce.

But if she did not marry the second man, but only

But if she did not marry the second man, but only

became betrothed

to him,

and afterward her husband came,

we say [Yevamot 88b] that she is

permitted to return

to her first husband. And she does not require a bill of divorce from the second.

And why did they not require her to receive a bill of divorce from the second?

Is it not because

people

say

that the second man

betrothed her conditionally,

stipulating that if her first husband came, his betrothal would not take effect? Therefore she leaves him without a bill of divorce, and there is no concern that people might say that a woman is leaving a marriage without a bill of divorce.

And it follows that we attribute the matter to a plausible explanation, that she was betrothed conditionally, even though the plausible explanation did not emerge and we never heard that he betrothed her conditionally; this is in accordance with Rav Zevid, who said that where there is a plausible explanation, we are concerned about the plausible explanation.

Rav Pappa said to him:

That case is different, because the first husband came

and

protested,

saying that he had never divorced her and that the second man’s betrothal never took effect; therefore she does not require a bill of divorce from the second.

And we challenge this:

If so, even if she married,

she should not require a bill of divorce from the second, because the first husband claims that he never divorced her; and people would not come to suspect that the first husband divorced her, the second married her, and she is leaving him without a bill of divorce.

And Rav Pappa concludes: Rather,

if she married, she committed a transgression, and the Sages penalized

the Sages

by requiring her to receive a bill of divorce from the second.

If she became betrothed, since she did not commit a transgression, the Sages did not penalize her.

But we are not concerned that people might say that a woman is leaving a marriage without a bill of divorce.

Rav Ashi said: Any rumor that was not established in the court,

meaning that the court did not say that one must be concerned about this rumor,

is not a rumor,

and we are not concerned about it.

And Rav Ashi said: Any rumor that emerged after the marriage,

if, after she married, a rumor emerged that she had previously been betrothed to another man,

we are not concerned about it

to require her to receive a bill of divorce from the first. For if you are concerned about the rumor, we would have to remove her from her husband, since the accepted principle is that just as she is forbidden to her husband, so too she is forbidden to the man with whom she committed adultery. Therefore, they instituted that we should not be concerned about the rumor, and she should remain with her husband.

And the Gemara infers from Rav Ashi’s words:

This

rumor

that

emerges

after betrothal, we are concerned about it,

and she must receive a bill of divorce from the first so that she may remain with her second husband.

Rav Haviva said: Even

a rumor

that emerged after betrothal, we are likewise not concerned about it

to require her to receive a bill of divorce from the first, so that she will not become repugnant to her husband.

And

so

is the halakha,

that

we are not concerned about it.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: They sent word from the study hall

of

Rav to Shmuel:

Let our master teach us: A woman

concerning whom a rumor emerged

that she had received

betrothal

from the first man, and another man came and betrothed her with a Torah-sanctioned betrothal

in the presence of witnesses,

what is the ruling?

He sent them

Shmuel:

She must leave

the second man,

and establish the matter conclusively!

Investigate the source of the rumor, whether it is true or not, and inform me.

And we ask:

Why

did Shmuel need to investigate the source of the rumor?

If you say

it was

because if it became clear that

the rumor was false, and consequently

the first man’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal,

then we would nullify the rumor and permit her to remain with her husband.

But Nehardea is the place

the locality

of Shmuel,

and earlier we said that the scholars of Nehardea do not nullify a rumor!?

Rather,

the reason he had to investigate the source of the rumor must be

that if it became clear that the first man’s betrothal

was genuinely a

valid betrothal, and the rumor was true, then

once again

she does not require a bill of divorce from the second,

because her betrothal to him never took effect in the first place.

And this disagrees

with the ruling

of Rav Huna.

For Rav Huna said: With regard to a married woman who extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man,

even though she has the presumptive status of a married woman, we are concerned that she may have been divorced by her first husband,

and she is betrothed

to the second and requires a bill of divorce from him.

And the source of Rav Huna’s statement is

from Rav Hamnuna.

For Rav Hamnuna said: A woman who says to her husband, “You divorced me,” is believed.

This is

because of the presumption that “a woman does not brazenly make such a claim in her husband’s presence.”

Here too, if she extended her hand and accepted betrothal from another man, we are concerned about the validity of his betrothal, since a woman would not brazenly become betrothed to another man while she was still married.

But the other—

Shmuel said:

When Rav Hamnuna’s statement was stated,

that she does not brazenly make such a claim before her husband, this applies specifically

in his presence.

But

when not in his presence, she is entirely brazen.

And here, the case concerns her becoming betrothed to another man when the first husband was not present; we attribute the matter to her still being married to the first, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce from the second.

And now the Gemara returns to explain Shmuel’s statement that one should establish the matter conclusively.

If they did not establish the matter conclusively,

meaning that they did not ascertain the source of the rumor,

what is the ruling?

Rav Huna said: The first man divorces,

the

first,

concerning whom the rumor emerged that he had betrothed her,

and the second marries,

if he wishes.

And we infer:

But

to say that

the second divorces

and

the first marries

her,

we do not

say this.

What is the reason?—

People will come to say that the first man betrothed her and divorced her, and the second betrothed her and divorced her, and now

that the first man betrothed her and divorced her, and the second man betrothed her and divorced her, and now

the first is taking back

his

divorced wife from betrothal,

and it is an established ruling that this is forbidden.

Rav Shinnana, son of Rav Idi, said:

When we say that the first divorces and the second marries, this is not specifically so;

even if the second divorces and the first marries,

we are not concerned that people might say that he is taking back his divorced wife from betrothal,

because people will say,

that

the Sages examined her betrothal

to the second man

and

saw

that it was an erroneous betrothal,

and that is why she returned to the first man, so they would not suspect him.

A rumor emerged concerning her

that she had become betrothed

to this man, and

afterward

to that man—what is the ruling?

Rav Pappa said: This case too: the one

concerning whom the rumor emerged that he betrothed her

first divorces, and

the

second marries

her, and not the reverse, because here too we are concerned that people might say: The first divorced her, the second married her and divorced her, and now she is returning to the first, so it would emerge that he is taking back his divorced wife from betrothal.

But

Ameimar said: She is permitted to both—

either the first marries her and the second divorces her, or the first divorces her and the second marries her.