Gittin 84b — the Talmud in English

And

for Abaye,

the

general principle

of Rabbi Judah ben Tema comes

to include

also the case in which she is prevented from fulfilling the condition because of a prohibition against eating, such as when he stipulated with her that she eat

swine’s flesh,

this is like a condition that it is impossible to fulfill, for the law is that the condition is void and the act stands—

And that which Rabbi Judah ben Tema said, “

such

a bill of divorce,” comes

to exclude,

to exclude the case in which he stipulated with her, “on condition that you ascend to the sky”: the condition is void and the act stands, but in the case in which he stipulated with her, “on condition that you have intercourse with

so-and-so,

since she can bribe him with money so that he will marry her permissibly, it is not a bill of divorce until she fulfills the condition.

Meitivi—

One who divorces his wife and says to her,

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you eat swine’s flesh, and

so

if

she

was a non-kohen [not a daughter of a kohein], and he stipulated with her

on condition that you eat teruma, and

so

if

she

was a nazirite

and he stipulated with her

on condition that you drink wine,”

even though in all these cases she is prevented from fulfilling the condition because of a prohibition against eating, nevertheless the condition is not void. And only if

the condition is fulfilled, this is a bill of divorce, and if not,

if she did not fulfill the condition,

it is not a bill of divorce

—

Granted,

according to

the view

of Rava,

who holds that when she is prevented from fulfilling the condition because of a prohibition against eating, this is considered a condition that can be fulfilled, and even according to Rabbi Judah ben Tema the condition stands,

it is understandable

what is stated in the beraita, that if the condition was not fulfilled, it is not a bill of divorce.

But

according to

the view

of Abaye,

who holds that when she cannot fulfill the condition because of a prohibition against eating, this too is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled,

it is difficult:

Why, if the condition was not fulfilled, is it not a bill of divorce? For according to Rabbi Judah ben Tema, every condition that cannot be fulfilled is void, and the act stands.

The Gemara answers:

Abaye could say to you: Do you hold

that the beraita

is the words of everyone?

It is not so! Rather,

whose view is this? It is the Rabbis’!

For they disagree with Rabbi Judah ben Tema and hold that even one who stipulates a matter that cannot be fulfilled, if the condition was not fulfilled, it is not a bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks about the beraita:

Even though she can fulfill the condition through a prohibition, nevertheless, why does the condition stand?

And let it emerge for him,

let him derive and teach this law because

“one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah” it is!

And

the law is that

every stipulation contrary to what is written in the Torah—the condition is void,

and the act stands.

The Gemara answers:

Rav Adda, son of Rav Ika, said—

When we say

that

a stipulation contrary to what is written in the Torah renders the condition void,

it is specifically

such as her sustenance, her clothing, and her conjugal relations,

when he says to her, “You are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim against me for sustenance [food], clothing [garments], or conjugal relations [the mitzva of conjugal relations].” And since, whenever a person betroths a woman, the Torah obligates him in these matters, his condition is void, because

he is uprooting

for he stipulated a condition that contradicts what the Torah obligates him, and it is found that he has uprooted a matter from the Torah—

But here,

he is not uprooting a matter from the Torah; rather,

she is uprooting.

She is the one who uproots what is written in the Torah by eating something that is forbidden by the Torah.

Ravina raised an objection against this—

Is it so?

For all that

she is uprooting,

that she is uprooting a matter from the Torah and eating swine’s flesh, is

only in order to fulfill his condition,

so that the condition he stipulated with her—that she is not divorced until she eats swine’s flesh—will be fulfilled. And if so,

it is found

that

he is uprooting,

for because of him a matter from the Torah is uprooted. And if so, it is still difficult: Why does the condition take effect? After all, this is one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah.

The Gemara answers: Rather, Ravina said:

When we say, “One who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—the condition is void,” it is such as her sustenance, her clothing, and her conjugal relations. For certainly he is uprooting,

for because of the condition, a matter from the Torah will certainly be uprooted.

But here,

where he stipulated with her, “on condition that you eat swine’s flesh,”

did he say to her, ‘Is it not possible for you not to eat’?

Did he say to her that she is obligated to eat swine’s flesh, and that she has no other possibility? After all, this is only a condition in a bill of divorce, and it is still possible that she

will not eat

swine’s flesh

and will not be divorced,

and the bill of divorce will be void.

And since it is not certain that a matter from the Torah will be uprooted, the condition stands, and so long as she has not eaten, she is not divorced.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who divorces his wife and leaves something over in the bill of divorce, and does not permit her to everyone, according to the Sages this is an invalid giving.

What shall he do,

what shall he do in order to rectify the invalid giving?—

He shall take it from her, and so on.

He shall take the bill of divorce from the woman, and give it to her again a second time, and say to her at the time of delivering the bill of divorce, “Behold, you are permitted to every person.”

Who is the author?

Who is the tanna who holds that it is not sufficient for him to say to her that he is divorcing her also from that particular man, but rather a new giving is required?

Hezekiah said: It is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

For it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita: One who gives a bill of divorce to his wife, and does not say to her, “This is your bill of divorce,” but rather says to her, “Take this promissory note”—

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says:

It is not a bill of divorce

until he takes it from her, gives it to her again, and says to her, ‘This is your bill of divorce.’

And Rabbi disagrees and holds that a new giving is not necessary; rather, it is sufficient for him to say to her afterward, “Here is your bill of divorce.” And the tanna of the Mishna holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar; therefore, he requires that he give it to her again and say to her, “You are permitted to every person.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say

that the tanna of the Mishna holds in accordance with the view of

Rabbi,

who says that when he says to her, “Take this promissory note,” he need not return and say to her, “Here is your bill of divorce.” Nevertheless, when he leaves over “except for so-and-so,” he must return and give her the bill of divorce, for Rav Kahana

of yours,

who was from among the Babylonians,

said—

Here it is different,

this case is different from the case in which he said to her, “Take this promissory note.” For in the case of “Take this promissory note,” she did not acquire the bill of divorce at all, and the giving has no significance; therefore, he can return and say to her, “Here is your bill of divorce.” But here,

since

she had already acquired the bill of divorce through the giving, for

she acquired it

to disqualify her through it from the priesthood

by the law of the trace of a bill of divorce, therefore it is not effective for him to return and say to her that he is divorcing her also from that particular man. Rather, he must take it from her, give it to her again, and say to her, “You are permitted to every person.”

We learned in the Mishna: If

he wrote within it

“You are permitted to every person except for so-and-so,” even though he then erased the words “except for so-and-so,” it is an invalid bill of divorce.

Rav Safra said: “We learned, ‘He wrote within it.’”

Specifically, if he wrote the condition inside the bill of divorce, there is no possibility of rectifying the bill of divorce. But if he told the witnesses before the delivery that he was divorcing her only on condition that she not marry so-and-so, the bill of divorce is not thereby disqualified, provided that he says to her at the time of the giving that he is divorcing her from everyone.

And we challenge: What did Rav Safra innovate with his statement?

It is obvious! “We learned, ‘He wrote within it.’”

It is explicitly written in the Mishna that specifically if he wrote it within the bill of divorce, the bill of divorce is invalid.

And we answer: If Rav Safra had not said his statement,

you might have said

we would have thought,

this applies

that the entire law of the Mishna, that if he did not write the condition inside the bill of divorce, the bill of divorce is not disqualified, specifically if he told the witnesses

after

the writing of

the toref,

which is the essential part of the bill of divorce; and since the essential part of the bill of divorce had already been written, the bill of divorce is not disqualified by what he said, that they should write the bill of divorce on this condition,

but

in a case where he told the witnesses

before

the writing of

the toref

that he was divorcing her on condition that she not marry so-and-so,

even

if he did not write this inside the bill of divorce, but stipulated

orally

that she not marry so-and-so,

it is also invalid,

for the bill of divorce was written on this condition.

Rav Safra teaches us

that even if he stipulated that she not marry so-and-so before the writing of the toref, the bill of divorce is not thereby disqualified; and if he says to her at the time of giving the bill of divorce, “You are permitted to every person,” the bill of divorce is valid.

And Rava said: They taught

that even if he stipulated that she not marry so-and-so, the bill of divorce is valid

only

when he said so

after

the writing of

the toref,

for since the essential part of the bill of divorce had already been written, the bill of divorce is not disqualified by what he said orally, that he was giving it to her on this condition.

But

in a case where he stipulated

before

the writing of

the toref

that she not marry so-and-so,

even

if he did not write the condition inside the bill of divorce, but stipulated

orally

that she not marry so-and-so,

it is also invalid,

for the bill of divorce was written on this condition.

And Rava followed his own reasoning.

Rava follows his own view.

For Rava said to them,

for Rava would say

to those

scribes

who write bills of divorce,

who were writing the bill of divorce,

“Be silent, silence the husband,”

rebuke the husband and silence him,

until you have written the toref of the bill of divorce,

until after the writing of the toref of the bill of divorce, so that the husband will not be able to mention any condition in the bill of divorce.

The Sages taught: Every

type of

condition

that the husband writes inside the bill of divorce

disqualifies

the conditions

in the bill of divorce,

even if the condition was fulfilled,

the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: Every

condition

that disqualifies

the bill of divorce when he stipulates with her

orally disqualifies

the bill of divorce when he stipulates with her

in writing. And every

condition

that does not disqualify

the bill of divorce when he stipulates with her

orally—

does not disqualify

the bill of divorce even when he stipulates with her in this manner

in writing.

Therefore, if he says to her, “

except

for so-and-so,” since

the reservation

reservation

disqualifies

the bill of divorce even when he leaves something over

orally,

at the time of giving the bill of divorce, therefore the reservation

disqualifies

the bill of divorce when he leaves something over

in writing.

But a condition of

“on condition,” which does not disqualify

the bill of divorce when he stipulates with her at the time of giving the bill of divorce

orally,

therefore it also

does not disqualify

the bill of divorce

in writing.

Rabbi Zeira said:

All the

dispute

whether a condition of “on condition” disqualifies the bill of divorce applies specifically when he stipulated with her

before

the writing of

the toref.

For Rabbi holds that we issue a decree

when he says to her

“on condition”

that you not marry so-and-so

lest it be confused with

when he says to her, “You are permitted to every person

except

for so-and-so,” in which case everyone agrees that it is invalid.

And the Rabbis hold

that when he stipulates “on condition that you not marry so-and-so,” the bill of divorce is valid, and

we do not issue a decree concerning ‘on condition’ lest it be confused with ‘except.’

But,

if he stipulated that she not marry so-and-so

after

the writing of

the toref,