Gittin 84a (פד.) — the Talmud in English

It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer

and

according to the Rabbis,

the bill of divorce is valid, because

since he severed

her connection to him for today,

he severed

her connection to him entirely.

The Sages taught:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so. She may not marry, but if she married, she need not leave him.”

The Gemara asks:

What is he saying?

What does the beraita mean by saying that she may not marry? Does it mean that she may not marry that particular man, or that she may not marry anyone?

Rav Naḥman said:

This is what it means:

this is the intention of the beraita:

Even though he stipulated with her that she marry that particular man, nevertheless

she may not marry him,

and the reason is

“lest people say: They give their wives as gifts!”

It would appear as though he is compelling her to marry that particular man, and there is no greater discredit to the bill of divorce than this.

And

therefore,

if she married another man, she need not leave him,

so that this would not lend force to the condition imposed by the divorcing husband.

The Gemara asks:

According to the fundamental law, since he stipulated with her that he was divorcing her only if she married so-and-so, the bill of divorce does not take effect until she marries that particular man. And since we have prohibited her from marrying him, the condition is not fulfilled, and the bill of divorce is retroactively void; she is forbidden to marry. Why, then, if she married, does she not have to leave him?

And

because

of

the

decree

lest people say that he gives his wife as a gift,

we do not remove her from him,

we do not remove her from her second husband,

and we permit a married woman to everyone,

and permit a married woman to marry outside.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said: This is what it means:

This is the intention of the beraita: If he said to his wife, “You are divorced on the condition that you marry so-and-so,”

she may not marry

that

man,

so-and-so,

lest people say: They give their wives as gifts. And if

nevertheless

she married

that

man,

after the fact,

she need not leave him, because of the rabbinic decree

—

we do not remove her

from her husband.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

It follows from your words that only

that

man,

that

particular man,

she may not marry, but she may marry another,

for he did not prohibit her from marrying everyone except that particular man; rather, he stipulated with her that she also marry that man, but in the meantime she may marry someone else.

But she must fulfill the condition!

Ultimately, she is obligated to fulfill the condition and marry that particular man. Why, then, is she permitted to marry someone else? Should we not be concerned that she will fail to fulfill the condition?

And if you would say

that one might say:

Perhaps she can marry today

someone else

and be divorced tomorrow,

and on the following day he will divorce her, whereupon she will marry that particular man whom her first husband stipulated that she marry,

and she will fulfill the condition.

Therefore, we permit her to marry someone else today and are not concerned that she will fail to fulfill the condition—

And you compare this to the matter over which you disagreed with Rav Yehuda,

you compare this reasoning—that we are not concerned that the condition will fail to be fulfilled—to the matter over which you disagreed with Rav Yehuda—

as it was stated

in tractate Nedarim:

One who says:

“Konam, my eyes are forbidden sleep

—he prohibited himself by a vow from sleeping

today,

but stipulated that his vow should take effect only on the condition

that I sleep tomorrow,”

with the result that today’s sleep is forbidden to him only if he sleeps the following day; but if he does not sleep on the second day, his sleep on the first day is not forbidden.

Rav Yehuda said:

Although if he does not sleep tomorrow he will not violate his vow, nevertheless

he should not sleep today,

because he must be concerned

that he will sleep

also

tomorrow,

with the result that he retroactively violates his vow by having slept on the first day.

And Rav Naḥman said: He may sleep today.

He is permitted to sleep today,

and we are not concerned that he will sleep tomorrow,

because if he sleeps today, he will certainly take care not to sleep the following day, so as not to retroactively violate the prohibition against failing to fulfill his word.

Therefore, in the case as well where he stipulated that she marry so-and-so, Rav Naḥman holds that she is permitted to marry another man, and we are not concerned that she will fail to fulfill the condition; rather, she will fulfill it after her divorce.

The Gemara challenges this:

Is that so!?

The cases are not comparable.

There,

when he says, “Konam, my eyes are forbidden sleep today if I sleep tomorrow,”

it is in his power,

as fulfillment of the condition depends on him.

For if he wishes,

since if he wants,

he can injure himself

by pricking himself

with thorns

and

not sleep

tomorrow. Therefore, we are not concerned that he will fail to fulfill the condition—

But

here,

when he says, “on the condition that you marry so-and-so,” is

it in her power to get divorced?

Can she divorce herself from her husband and then marry that particular man? This is not in her power. If so, there remains concern that she will be unable to fulfill the condition, and she will retroactively be a married woman.

Rather, Rava said:

This is the intention of the beraita: If he said to her, “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so,”

she may not marry either

that

man

so-and-so

or another man—

That

man

that

particular man

she may not marry,

because

“lest people say: They give their wives as gifts.”

And

to

another

she may not marry, because she must fulfill the condition,

because the bill of divorce does not take effect until she fulfills the condition and marries that particular man.

And if

she nevertheless

married

that

man

so-and-so, even though they decreed that she may not marry him, nevertheless, after the fact,

she need not leave him, because of the decree

of the Sages

we do not remove her,

as a woman is not removed from her husband.

But if she

married another man,

even after the fact,

she must leave him, because she must fulfill the condition,

for as long as she has not fulfilled the condition, the bill of divorce has not taken effect, and she is a married woman.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rava’s opinion.

And so we also learned in a beraita, in accordance with the words of Rava—

“She may not marry either

that

man

so-and-so

or another man. And if she married him,”

that particular man,

she need not leave him.

But if she married

another man, she must leave him.

The Sages taught—

One who divorces his wife and says to her:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the heavens”,

or he said to her,

“on

the condition that you descend into the abyss,”

or he said to her,

“on the condition that you swallow a reed four cubits long,”

or he said to her,

“on the condition that you bring me a reed one hundred cubits long,”

or he said to her,

“on the condition that you cross the Great Sea on foot, it is not a bill of divorce.”

Since it is clear to us in all these cases that she will be unable to fulfill the condition, the bill of divorce is invalid.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says—

A bill of divorce

such as this,

where he stipulated with her a condition that cannot be fulfilled,

is a valid bill of divorce

and it is valid,

but why?

Because

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated a principle—

Anyone

who stipulates

a condition

that we know

he cannot ultimately fulfill, and

nevertheless he

stipulated it from the outset,

we presume that he

does not

intend to stipulate that if she fails to do so her bill of divorce will be void; rather, he intends that even if she does not fulfill the condition, the bill of divorce will be valid. His statement is

nothing more than exaggeration,

as he wishes to distress her with absurd words.

And

therefore, even though the condition was not fulfilled, this is a

valid bill of divorce.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima,

who holds that one who stipulates a condition that cannot be fulfilled has not made a valid condition; therefore, this is a valid bill of divorce.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The Mishna also indicates this.

Even the Mishna in tractate Bava Metzia can be precisely interpreted as supporting Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima’s view—

As it teaches—

any

condition

that he can ultimately fulfill, and he stipulated it from the outset, his condition is valid.

It follows that specifically when the condition can be fulfilled, the condition is valid;

but

if

it cannot

be fulfilled,

his condition is void

and the act remains valid.

Learn from this

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

They raised a dilemma:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pork; what is the law?”

Is this considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled, or not?

Abaye said: It is the same!

This is comparable to one who says, “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the heavens,” concerning which it was explained that the condition is void and the bill of divorce is valid. The same applies when he stipulates with her that she eat pork: this is a condition that cannot be fulfilled, so the condition is void and the bill of divorce is valid.

Rava said:

One who stipulates, “on the condition that you eat pork,” does not have a valid bill of divorce until she fulfills the condition and eats pork. This is not comparable to one who stipulates that she ascend to the heavens, since that is something that cannot be done in reality, and therefore Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima holds that the condition is void and the act remains valid. In the case where he stipulates that she eat pork, however,

it is possible for her to eat it and be flogged.

She can eat the pork and receive lashes for eating it. Since in reality it is possible to fulfill the condition, and it is only the prohibition against eating pork that prevents her from eating it, this is considered a condition that can be fulfilled, and the bill of divorce is not valid until she fulfills the condition.

It follows that

according to

the opinion of

Abaye,

the fact that Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his words in the language of a

principle,

implying that he intended to include additional cases, comes

to include

the case in which he said to her, “on the condition that you eat

pork,”

which too is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled, so the condition is void and the act remains valid.

And

according to

the opinion of

Rava,

the fact that Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said,

“such

a bill of divorce,” implying specifically this case and no other, comes

to exclude

the case in which he said to her, “on the condition that you eat

pork.”

Although if she eats the pork she will become liable for lashes, nevertheless, since in reality she can eat it, the bill of divorce is not valid until she fulfills the condition.

They raised an objection:

One who divorces his wife and says to her:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in intercourse with so-and-so,”

if

the condition is fulfilled

and she engages in intercourse with so-and-so,

it is a bill of divorce,

but if not, it is not a bill of divorce—

And if he said to his wife, “You are divorced

on the condition that you do not engage in intercourse with my father

”—

and

likewise, that you do not engage in intercourse

with your father—

it is a bill of divorce, and

we are not concerned that she may have engaged in intercourse with them

prohibitedly. The Gemara infers from the beraita:

But

in the case where he said to her, “You are divorced

on the condition that you engage in intercourse with my father,

and thereby violate the prohibition against intercourse with one’s daughter-in-law,”

and

likewise, one who says, “on the condition that you engage in intercourse

with your father,

and thereby violate the prohibition against intercourse with one’s daughter,”

it does not teach

in the beraita that she is not divorced until the condition is fulfilled. On the contrary, in this case she is divorced even though she does not fulfill the condition—

Granted,

it is understandable according to Abaye,

for this is why, when he says, “on the condition that you engage in intercourse with my father or your father,” the bill of divorce is valid: She cannot fulfill the condition because of the prohibition against incest, and this is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, even if the condition is not fulfilled, the bill of divorce is valid.

But

according to Rava,

who holds that when one stipulates a condition that cannot be fulfilled because fulfilling it would involve a Torah prohibition, it is not considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled, and even according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima the bill of divorce does not take effect until she fulfills the condition,

it is difficult:

Why did the beraita not state that when he says to her, “on the condition that you engage in intercourse with my father or your father,” she is not divorced until she fulfills the condition?

The Gemara explains:

Rava could have said:

Granted,

in a case where he stipulated with her that she eat

pork,

it is

possible that she will eat it and be flogged.

It is possible that she will eat it and be flogged, and then the condition will be fulfilled.

Likewise, in a case where he stipulated with her on the condition that she have relations with

a certain man, as well,

the condition can be fulfilled. For

it is possible that she will bribe him with money,

meaning that she can bribe him with money so that he will have relations with her —

but her father and your father,

in a case where he stipulated with her on the condition that she have relations with her father and your father, is it

within her power

to fulfill the condition? After all,

even if she commits a transgression,

even if she agrees to have relations in violation of a prohibition in order to fulfill the condition, but

would her father and your father commit a transgression?!

After all, her father or his father would not agree to violate the prohibition of a forbidden sexual relation with his daughter-in-law or daughter. Since the condition cannot be fulfilled, it does not take effect, and the get is valid.

And so we conclude that

according to Rava

the

principle

of Rabbi Judah ben Tema comes

to include,

including the case in which he stipulated with her on the condition that she have relations with

her father and

your

father:

this is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled, so the condition is void, while the act remains in force—

And when Rabbi Judah said that

“such”

a get, he meant

to exclude,

excluding the case in which he said to her, “On the condition that you ascend to the sky”; that is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled. But if he said to her, “On the condition that you eat”

pork,

since in reality she can fulfill the condition, it is not a get until she eats pork.