Gittin 84a — the Talmud in English

It is logical, both according to Rabbi Eliezer

and

according to the Rabbis,

the bill of divorce is valid,

since once he severed

her from him for today,

he severed

her from him entirely .

The Sages taught:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you marry so-and-so. She may not marry, but if she married, she need not leave.”

The Gemara asks

What is it saying?

What is the intention of the beraita in saying that she may not marry? Does it mean that she may not marry that certain man, or that she may not marry anyone?

Rav Nahman said:

This is what it is saying:

this is the intention of the beraita:

Even though he stipulated with her that she should marry that certain man, nevertheless

she may not marry him,

and the reason is

“lest people say: They give their wives as a gift!”

The matter will appear as though he is compelling her to marry that certain man, and there is no greater discredit than this.

And

therefore,

if she married another, she need not leave,

so that there should not be reinforcement for the condition of the divorcing husband.

The Gemara asks:

According to the essential law, since he stipulated with her that he divorces her only if she marries so-and-so, then the bill of divorce does not take effect until she marries that certain man. And since we prohibited her from marrying that certain man, the condition is not fulfilled, and the bill of divorce is retroactively void, and she is forbidden to marry. Why, then, if she married, need she not leave?

And

because

on account of

the

decree

lest people say that he gives his wife as a gift,

we do not remove her from him,

we do not remove her from her second husband,

and we permit a married woman to everyone,

and permit a married woman to marry outside.

Rather, Rav Nahman said: This is what it is saying:

this is the intention of the beraita: if he said to his wife, “You are divorced on condition that you marry so-and-so,”

she may not marry

th

at

certain man,

lest people say: They give their wives as a gift. And if

nevertheless

she married

th

at certain man,

after the fact,

she need not leave, for on account of the decree

of the Sages

we do not remove her,

we do not remove a woman from her husband.

Rava said to him

to Rav Nahman: From your words it follows that only

th

at

certain

man

may she not marry, but she may marry another,

for he did not prohibit her from marrying the entire world except that certain man. Rather, he stipulated with her that she should also marry that certain man, but in the meantime she can marry another person.

But she must fulfill the condition!

But in the end she is obligated to fulfill the condition, to marry that certain man. Why, then, is she permitted to marry another person? Surely there is concern that she will not fulfill the condition.

And if you would say

and if you wish to say that

perhaps she will marry today,

that she will marry another person today,

and be divorced tomorrow,

and he will divorce her tomorrow, and she will marry that certain man whom her husband stipulated with her that she marry,

and fulfill the condition.

Therefore we permit her to marry another person today, and we are not concerned that she will not fulfill the condition —

And you compare this to the matter concerning which you disagreed with Rav Yehuda,

and this reasoning—that we are not concerned that the condition will not be fulfilled—you compare to the matter concerning which you disagreed with Rav Yehuda

as it was stated

in tractate Nedarim:

One who says

“Konam, my eyes from sleep,”

who forbade sleeping upon himself by a vow

today,

but stipulated that his vow would take effect only on the condition

“if I sleep tomorrow,”

so it follows that today’s sleep is not forbidden to him unless he sleeps the next day; but if he does not sleep on the second day, today’s sleep is not forbidden to him.

Rav Yehuda said:

Even though if he does not sleep tomorrow he does not violate his vow, nevertheless

let him not sleep today,

because he must be concerned

lest he sleep

also

tomorrow,

and it will follow that retroactively he violates his vow through sleeping on the first day.

And Rav Nahman said: He may sleep today.

He is permitted to sleep today,

and we are not concerned lest he sleep tomorrow,

because if he sleeps today, he will certainly take care not to sleep the next day, so that he will not retroactively violate the prohibition “he shall not profane his word.”

And therefore also in the case where he stipulated with her that she marry so-and-so, Rav Nahman holds that she is permitted to marry another, and we are not concerned that she will not fulfill the condition; rather, she will fulfill it after her divorce.

And he challenges:

Is it so now!?

Surely there is no comparison between the cases!

There,

when he says, “Konam, my eyes from sleep today, if I sleep tomorrow,”

it depends on him,

the fulfillment of the condition depends on him.

For if he wishes,

since if he wants,

he can pierce himself,

he can pierce himself

with thorns

and

not sleep

and not sleep tomorrow. Therefore we are not concerned that he will not fulfill the condition —

But

here,

when he says, “on condition that you marry so-and-so,” is

it in her hands to become divorced?

Does she have the ability to divorce her husband and return and marry that certain man? Surely this is not in her hands. If so, there is still concern that she will be unable to fulfill the condition, and she will retroactively be a married woman .

Rather, Rava said:

This is the intention of the beraita: if he said to her, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you marry so-and-so,”

she may not marry either

th

at

certain man

or another—

Th

at

certain

man

she may not marry,

because of

“lest people say: They give their wives as a gift.”

And

to

another

she may not marry, because she must fulfill the condition,

because the bill of divorce does not take effect until she fulfills the condition and marries that certain man.

And if

nevertheless she

married

th

at

certain man, even though they decreed that she should not marry him, nevertheless, after the fact,

she need not leave, for on account of the decree

of the Sages

we do not remove her,

we do not remove a woman from her husband.

But if she married

another,

even after the fact,

she must leave. For she must fulfill the condition,

for as long as she has not fulfilled the condition, the bill of divorce has not taken effect, and she is a married woman.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rava.

And likewise we learned in a beraita in accordance with the words of Rava—

She may not marry, neither

th

at

certain man

nor another. And if she married him,

that certain man,

she need not leave.

But if she married

another, she must leave .

The Sages taught—

One who divorces his wife and says to her:

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you ascend to the sky” ,

or he said to her

“on

condition that you descend into the abyss,”

or he said to her

“on condition that you swallow a reed four cubits long,”

or he said to her

“on condition that you bring me a reed one hundred cubits long,”

or he said to her

“on condition that you cross the Great Sea on your feet”—it is not a bill of divorce.

Since it is clear to us in all these cases that she will be unable to fulfill the condition, it is therefore not a bill of divorce .

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says—

A bill of divorce

such as this,

where he stipulated with her matters impossible to fulfill,

is a bill of divorce

valid,

and why?

Because

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated a principle—

Any

person who stipulated

a condition

that we know

he cannot fulfill in the end, and

nevertheless he

stipulated it from the outset,

we assume that he

does not

intend to stipulate that if she does not do so, her bill of divorce is void; rather, his intention is that even if she does not fulfill the condition, the bill of divorce is valid. And what he said to her is

only speaking extravagantly,

his desire being to distress her with absurd words.

And

therefore, even though the condition was not fulfilled, this is a

valid bill of divorce .

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima,

that one who stipulates a condition impossible to fulfill, it is not a condition; therefore this is a valid bill of divorce.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

The Mishna also precisely indicates this.

Even from the Mishna in tractate Bava Metzia, it is precise in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima—

For it teaches—

any

condition

that it is possible for him to fulfill in the end, and he stipulated it at the outset, his condition is valid.

And it follows that specifically when it is possible to fulfill the condition, the condition is valid;

but

if

it is impossible

to fulfill the condition,

his condition is void

but the act remains valid.

Infer from this

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

They raised a question before them:

One who says to his wife

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you eat the flesh of a pig; what is the law?”

Is this considered a condition impossible to fulfill, or not?

Abaye said: It is the same, it is the same!

This is similar to one who says, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you ascend to the sky,” which was explained to mean that the condition is void and the bill of divorce is valid. The same applies when he stipulated with her that she eat the flesh of a pig: this is a condition impossible to fulfill, and the condition is void and the bill of divorce is valid.

Rava said:

One who stipulates “on condition that you eat the flesh of a pig”—it is not a bill of divorce until she fulfills the condition and eats the flesh of a pig. And this is not similar to one who stipulates with her “on condition that you ascend to the sky,” since there it is something impossible to fulfill in reality, and for that reason Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima holds that the condition is void and the act remains valid. But when he stipulated with her that she eat the flesh of a pig,

it is possible that she will eat it, and be flogged.

She can eat the flesh of a pig, and she will be flogged for the eating. Since in terms of reality it is possible to fulfill the condition, but the prohibition against eating pork prevents her from eating, this is considered a condition possible to fulfill, and it is not a bill of divorce until she fulfills the condition.

And it follows that

according

to the opinion of

Abaye,

what Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said in the language of

a principle,

implying that he came to include additional cases, comes

to include

also the case where he said to her, “on condition that you eat”

the flesh of a pig,

for this too is considered a condition impossible to fulfill, and the condition is void and the act remains valid.

And

according

to the opinion of

Rava,

what Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said,

“such

a bill of divorce,” implying specifically this and not another case, comes

to exclude

the case where he said to her, “on condition that you eat”

the flesh of a pig,

for even though if she eats the flesh of a pig she becomes liable for lashes, nevertheless, since in reality she can eat it, it is not a bill of divorce until she fulfills the condition.

They raised an objection:

One who divorces his wife and says to her

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you have intercourse with so-and-so,”

if

the condition was fulfilled,

and she had intercourse with so-and-so,

this is a bill of divorce ,

and if not, it is not a bill of divorce—

And if he said to his wife, “You are divorced”

on condition that you do not have intercourse with my father

of mine,

and

likewise, you do not have intercourse

with your father,

this is a bill of divorce, and

we are not concerned lest she had intercourse with them

in prohibition — and the Gemara infers from the beraita:

But

in the case where he said to her, “You are divorced”

on condition that you have intercourse with my father,

of mine, and you transgress the prohibition of intercourse with one’s daughter-in-law,

and

likewise one who says, “on condition that you have intercourse”

with your father,

and you transgress the prohibition of intercourse with his daughter,

it does not teach

in the beraita that she is not divorced until the condition is fulfilled; on the contrary, in this case she is divorced even though she does not fulfill the condition—

Granted,

for Abaye it is satisfactory,

for this is why when one says, “on condition that you have intercourse with my father or with your father,” the bill of divorce is valid: since she cannot fulfill the condition because of the prohibition of forbidden relations, this is considered a condition impossible to fulfill, and therefore even if the condition is not fulfilled, the bill of divorce is valid.

But

according to Rava,

who holds that one who stipulates a condition impossible to fulfill because there is a Torah prohibition in fulfilling the condition is not considered to have stipulated a condition impossible to fulfill, and even according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima the bill of divorce does not take effect until she fulfills the condition,

it is difficult:

why did the beraita not state that when he says to her, “on condition that you have intercourse with my father or with your father,” she is not divorced until she fulfills the condition?

The Gemara explains:

Rava could say:

Granted,

in a case where he stipulated with her that she eat

pork,

it is

possible that she eats it and is flogged.

It is possible that she will eat it and be flogged, and then the condition will be fulfilled.

And likewise, in a case where he stipulated with her on condition that she have intercourse with

so too

the condition can be fulfilled. For

it is possible that she bribes him with money,

for she can bribe him with money so that he will have intercourse with her —

rather, my father and your father,

in a case where he stipulated with her on condition that she have intercourse with my father and your father, and is it

in her hands

to fulfill the condition? For

even if she commits a prohibition,

even if she agrees to have intercourse in a prohibited manner for the sake of fulfilling the condition, nevertheless

would my father and your father commit a prohibition!?

For his father or her father would not agree to transgress the prohibition of a forbidden sexual relation involving his daughter-in-law or his daughter; and since the condition cannot be fulfilled, it does not take effect, and the get is valid.

And if so, it follows for us that

for Rava

the

rule

of Rabbi Judah ben Tema comes

to include,

to include that also in a case where he stipulated with her on condition that she have intercourse with

my father and

your

father,

this is considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled; the condition is void, and the act remains valid—

And what Rabbi Judah said, '

such

a get,' his intention was

to exclude,

to exclude that only in a case where he said to her, “On condition that you ascend to the firmament,” is this considered a condition that cannot be fulfilled; but in a case where he said to her, “On condition that you eat”

pork,

since in reality she can fulfill the condition, it is not a get until she eats pork.