Gittin 83b (פג:) — the Talmud in English

Behold, she is divorced with regard to him for licentious relations

she is not forbidden except to marry him, because of the condition; but she is not forbidden to him under the prohibition of a married woman, and through licentious relations she is permitted to him. Consequently, she is considered divorced even with regard to that kohen, since she is permitted to live with him as husband and wife —

And if so, it is impossible to derive from here by means of a kal va-chomer that when he says, “On the condition that you do not marry so-and-so,” she is forbidden to everyone under the prohibition of a married woman, because she bears the status of a married woman with regard to so-and-so.

For even with regard to that so-and-so, she is not subject to the prohibition of a married woman; it is merely an ordinary condition that she not marry him.

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva understood that Rabbi Eliezer stated his position

in

the formulation

“except”

“except for so-and-so.” And concerning this he raised the following difficulty: When he says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except for so-and-so the kohen,” she is considered with regard to him as a completely married woman, and nevertheless, after her husband dies, she is forbidden to him under the prohibition of a divorced woman, since with regard to everyone else she is considered divorced. If so, all the more so, with regard to the prohibition of a married woman, she should be forbidden to marry him, because she bears the status of a married woman with regard to everyone else.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Akiva, if he holds that the formulation is “except,”

if he maintains that Rabbi Eliezer stated his position with regard to “except for so-and-so,”

let him raise

only the second question, which is an answer to Rabbi Eliezer’s position when he says, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

except

for so-and-so”—

And if he holds that the formulation is “on the condition,”

if he maintains that Rabbi Eliezer stated his position with regard to “on the condition,”

let him raise

only the first question, which is an answer to Rabbi Eliezer’s position when he says, “

On the condition

that you do not marry so-and-so.”

And we answer:

Rabbi Akiva had heard

that he had heard

that there is one who says

that there are those who hold that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagreed in the case where he said to her

“except”

for so-and-so,

and there is one who says

that there are those who hold that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagreed in the case where he said to her

“on the condition”

that you do not marry so-and-so—

And this is what Rabbi Akiva challenged:

To

the one who says

that Rabbi Eliezer validates the bill of divorce when he says to her

“except,”

one should respond to his position with

this refutation,

the second question [alternatively].

And

to

the one who says

that Rabbi Eliezer validates the bill of divorce when he says to her

“on the condition,”

one should respond to his position with

this refutation,

the first question.

And the Gemara asks: Rava said above that there is a refutation of Rabbi Akiva’s answer.

And what is the refutation,

what can be raised against Rabbi Akiva’s second answer?

The Gemara already rejected Rabbi Akiva’s first question above, but it is still difficult: What is the refutation of Rabbi Akiva’s second answer?

Shall we say

that the refutation is that it is impossible to derive by means of a kal va-chomer from the prohibition applicable to a kohen—[just as, with regard to the prohibition applicable to a kohen, if she has an aspect of divorce she is forbidden, so too, when she has an aspect of the prohibition of a married woman, she is forbidden to everyone]—because

the prohibition applicable to a kohen is different,

since the Torah imposed additional mitzvot upon them, and therefore even when she does not bear the status of a divorced woman with regard to him, she is nevertheless forbidden. But with regard to the prohibition of a married woman, even though she is forbidden to that so-and-so under the prohibition of a married woman, she is nevertheless permitted to everyone else.

This is not a refutation!

For

Rabbi Eliezer, too, derives it from the prohibition applicable to a kohen.

The entire source of the halakha innovated by Rabbi Eliezer—that when he says “except for so-and-so,” it is a valid bill of divorce—is the law of the faint trace of a bill of divorce, which renders her forbidden to a kohen, [as explained above, on page 82b]. If so, necessarily he does not hold that the prohibition applicable to a kohen is different. For if not, how could one derive the law of a married woman from the prohibition applicable to a kohen? Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer’s position cannot be explained by saying that the prohibition applicable to a kohen is different.

The Gemara answers:

Rava,

who said that there is a refutation of Rabbi Akiva’s answer,

was teaching it in accordance with Rabbi Yannai in the name of a certain elder,

that the source of Rabbi Eliezer’s position is the verse stated in the passage concerning divorce: “And she departed from his house, and went and became another man.” They expound “another man” to mean that even if he permitted her only to one man, she is divorced; all the more so, if he permitted her to everyone except for so-and-so, she is divorced. Accordingly, there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may derive the law of a married woman from the prohibition applicable to a kohen. Consequently, it is again possible to refute Akiva’s answer by saying that the prohibition applicable to a kohen is different, since the Torah imposed additional mitzvot upon them.

We learned further in the beraita:

Rabbi Yehoshua said to them

to those four elders who responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s position:

One does not respond to the lion after its death.

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean

that it is inferred from the beraita

that Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with his position?

That Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s view, and therefore he prevented them from responding to Rabbi Eliezer’s position.

But he himself, too,

Rabbi Yehoshua himself,

is raising a refutation

against Rabbi Eliezer’s position?

The Gemara answers:

This is what he said to them:

I, too, have a refutation,

I also have a response to Rabbi Eliezer’s position; however,

both with regard to me,

both with regard to what I wish to respond to Rabbi Eliezer, and

both with regard to you,

with regard to what you respond to his position, nevertheless,

one does not respond to the lion after its death.

And what is Rabbi Yehoshua’s refutation?

What is Rabbi Yehoshua’s refutation of Rabbi Eliezer’s position?

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehoshua said:

The Torah states: “When a man takes a wife and marries her, and it comes to pass that she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found in her a matter of indecency, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it into her hand, and sends her out of his house, and she departs from his house, and goes and becomes another man” [this is the “first state”—the first formation of the marriage], “and becomes another man” [this is the “second state”]—

And

it juxtaposes the

written expression

“before the second state,”

that is, the woman’s status after her divorce, before she enters a second marriage,

to “before the first state,”

to her status before she entered her first marriage.

Just as “before the first state,”

before she entered her first marriage, her status was

that she was not attached to another person,

that she was attached to no one and was completely unmarried,

so too, “before the second state,”

the same applies before she enters a second marriage—that is, her status after her divorce must be a status

that she is not attached to another person,

that she have no connection whatsoever to anyone.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer’s position, that if he said “except for so-and-so” she is divorced, it follows that although she is not completely unmarried—for she is still forbidden to so-and-so because of her first husband—she is nevertheless divorced. This is not comparable to the status before the first state.

The essential matter:

We learned above in the beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

in the case of one who divorces his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except for so-and-so,” and she went and married one of the men of the marketplace, and

afterward she

was widowed

became a widow

or was divorced

by him,

that she is permitted to the one to whom she had been forbidden.

She may marry that so-and-so whom her husband had stipulated that she not marry.

And it is written in the beraita:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar responded to Rabbi Eliezer’s position,

who said that if she married another, she is permitted to that so-and-so; and concerning this he raised the following difficulty:

This woman was forbidden to that so-and-so because of the marital bond with her first husband, and now she becomes permitted to the marketplace by marrying another, and

where do we find that one forbids and another permits?

And we challenge this:

And

if

not

have we found that one forbids and another permits?

But

every

levirate widow, where the husband forbids her,

for even though her husband has died, she remains forbidden to the marketplace because of the marital bond with her first husband, except with regard to the levir,

and

nevertheless the

levir permits

her to the marketplace through halitza, enabling her to marry anyone.

And we answer:

There,

the reason she is forbidden to the marketplace before halitza is that

the levir is the one who forbids her,

for she is still bound to the levir. Since her prohibition is due to the levir, he is therefore the one who permits her—and proof that the reason she is forbidden to the marketplace is due to the levir is:

For if it were due to the husband,

if we were to say that she is forbidden because of the marital bond with the deceased,

she would already be permitted,

immediately upon her husband’s death she would be completely permitted. Proof of this is that if he has children, she is permitted to the marketplace. Necessarily, the reason she is forbidden to the marketplace when she has no children is the levir; therefore, he can permit her.

And we challenge this:

But

we find in

vows

that one forbids and another permits—

for

the

one who vows forbids

the object through his vow,

and

nevertheless the

sage permits

the vow to him.

And we answer:

But Rabbi Yohanan said: A sage does not permit anything,

for a sage does not, by his own power, permit vows in the manner that a husband annuls them,

rather

he shows the one who made the vow an opening: had he known what would result from the vow, he would not have made it. The vow is then released

through the regret

of the one who made the vow himself. It is thus found to have been like a mistaken vow from the outset, and there is no vow that a sage releases through his own power.

And we challenge this:

But

we find that one forbids and another permits in

the husband’s annulment—

for a woman makes a vow

upon herself,

and

nevertheless the

husband

annuls

the vow for her, without regret.

And we answer:

There,

what the husband has the power to annul is

in accordance with the statement of Rav Pinhas in the name of Rava—

For Rav Pinhas said in the name of Rava: Every

wo

man

who

makes a vow, with the understanding

that

her husband

will agree,

makes the vow.

But insofar as her husband will not agree, she does not make the vow. It follows that it is not considered that her husband annulled her vow: Since from the outset she vowed only with her husband’s approval, and he did not agree, there was no vow here from the outset at all. If so, we have not found that one forbids and another permits.

We learned above in the beraita:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded and said—

Since the Torah says that she must be divorced by means of a scroll of

severance,

the bill of divorce must be

something that severs between him and her,

so that after the divorce she has no connection whatsoever to her first husband. But when he retains “except for so-and-so,” she has not yet been completely severed from him and remains dependent upon him, since because of him she cannot marry that so-and-so—

you have therefore learned that this is not severance.

The Gemara asks:

And the Sages,

the other elders who did not respond in this manner to Rabbi Eliezer’s position,

this “

severance,”

what do they derive from it?

What do they expound from this verse?

They need it

for another exposition:

As it was taught in a beraita,

as we learned in a beraita—

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine”

forever,

or he says to her,

“on the condition that you do not go to your father’s house forever, this is not severance”

for she remains bound to him throughout her life by the prohibition against drinking wine—

But if he stipulated with her that she not go to her father’s house for thirty days, or that she not drink wine

for thirty days, this is severance,

since she is not dependent upon him throughout her life. Therefore, the word “severance” is needed to expound that if he stipulated with her that she not do this throughout her life, this is not severance.

And the other one,

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya—from where does he derive this law?

He derives it from “a severance.”

In order to exclude the case where he says “except for so-and-so,” and the bill of divorce is invalid, it would suffice for the verse to say, “and he writes her a scroll of severance.” Since the Torah wrote the extended form “severance,” we derive an additional matter: If he stipulated with her that she not drink wine throughout her life, this is not severance.

And the other one

the Sages, who did not respond in this manner to Rabbi Eliezer’s position—what do they derive from the Torah’s extended wording?

They do not expound “severance” from “severance.”

They do not hold that the Torah’s extended wording is expounded.

Rava said:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine all the days of my life”

for she remains bound to him in order to fulfill the condition—

But if he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine

all the days of the life of so-and-so, this is severance.”

The Gemara asks:

What is different,

why, when he says “on the condition that you do not drink wine throughout the

life of so-and-so,”

is this considered severance? Because

perhaps he will die,

perhaps he will die before her,

and she will fulfill the condition,

and she will then be able to drink wine, since the condition will have been fulfilled, and it follows that she was not dependent upon him throughout her life. If so, also when he says to her that she may not drink wine during

his lifetime [

all the time that he is alive],

also

the bill of divorce should be valid, since

perhaps he will die, and she will fulfill the condition.

It is possible that he will die before her, and she will be released from the condition.

The Gemara answers:

Rather, say

that this is how Rava’s statement should be understood:

If he says to her, “On the condition that you do not drink wine

all the days of your life,”

throughout your life, she is found to be bound and dependent upon him throughout her life, and therefore

this is not severance .

But if he says to her, “On the condition that you do not drink wine

throughout my life or the life of so-and-so, this is severance,”

since it is possible that the husband will die before her or that so-and-so will die before her , and since she is not bound and dependent upon her husband throughout her life, this is a valid bill of divorce.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman -

One who gives a get to his wife and says to her at the time of giving the get, "

Today you are not my wife"

[his intention is that the get should take effect only for this day], but

tomorrow you are my wife,

and with regard to the following day he does not divorce her,

what is the halakha?

Is this considered a reservation in the body of the get, or not?

Let the question be raised

whether it is according

to

the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that if one says, “Except for so-and-so,” it is a valid get; and likewise,

let the question be raised according to

the view of

the Rabbis,

who maintain that if he says to her, “Except for so-and-so,” the get is invalid -

Let the question be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer -

Rabbi Eliezer said so only there,

when he divorces her except for so-and-so, in which case she is divorced,

but

only in a case

wherever he permits her, he permits her forever.

To the one to whom he permits her, he permits her completely.

But here,

where he reserves in the get that the divorce should take effect only for today -

no,

Rabbi Eliezer did not validate the get, since the get does not sever her from him completely -

Or perhaps, there is no difference.

Just as when he says, “Except for so-and-so,” it is a valid get, so too, when he divorces her for only one day, it is a valid get.

Let the question be raised according to the Rabbis -

The Rabbis said so only there,

when he divorces her except for so-and-so, in which case the get is invalid,

but because she is not completely severed from him.

Since the bond between her and her husband has not been severed, for because of him she is forbidden to that particular man, the get is therefore invalid -

But here,

when he says to her, “Today you are not my wife,” she is completely divorced, and she does not return to him the following day unless he betroths her again, for

since she is severed

from him for today,

she is severed

from him completely -

After raising the question, he then resolved it: