Gittin 83b — the Talmud in English

Behold, a divorcee with him in illicit intercourse

behold, she is not forbidden except to marry him because of the condition, but she is not forbidden to him by the prohibition of a married woman, and in illicit intercourse she is permitted to him; and if so, she is considered a divorcee also with regard to that kohen, for she is permitted to live with him in marital relations

.

For even with regard to that particular man, she has no prohibition of a married woman; it is merely a condition that she may not marry him

.

Rabbi Akiva held that Rabbi Eliezer stated his words

in

the formulation

“except”

for a particular man, and concerning this he raised the difficulty: when he says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except that particular kohen,” she is considered with regard to him as a completely married woman, and nevertheless, after he dies, she is forbidden to him by the prohibition of a divorcee, for with regard to the whole world she is considered a divorcee. If so, all the more so, with regard to the prohibition of a married woman, she should be forbidden to marry him, because she bears the status of a married woman with regard to the whole world.

And the Gemara asks:

And if Rabbi Akiva holds that it was “except,”

if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer stated his words concerning “except a particular man,”

let him raise

only the second question, which is an answer to Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the case where he says, “Behold, you are permitted to every man

except

that particular man”

. And if he holds that it was “on the condition that,”

if he holds that Rabbi Eliezer stated his words concerning “on the condition that,”

let him raise

only the first question, which is an answer to Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the case where he says, “

on the condition

that you will not marry that particular man”” .

And we answer:

Rabbi Akiva heard

—he heard

that there is one who says

that there is one who holds that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disputed the case where he said to her

“except”

that particular man,

and there is one who says

that there is one who holds that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disputed the case where he said to her

“on the condition that”

she will not marry that particular man

. And this is what Rabbi Akiva raised:

For

the one who says,

for the one who holds that Rabbi Eliezer validates the bill of divorce in the case where he said to her

“except,”

his words should be answered with

this objection,

the second question [another matter].

And

for

the one who says,

for the one who holds that Rabbi Eliezer validates the bill of divorce in the case where he said to her

“on the condition that,”

his words should be answered with

this objection,

the first question.

And the Gemara asks: Rava said above that there is an objection to Rabbi Akiva’s answer

and what is the objection,

what can be raised against Rabbi Akiva’s second answer?

[The Gemara already rejected Rabbi Akiva’s first question above, but it is still difficult: what is the objection to Rabbi Akiva’s second answer]

If we should say

that the objection is that one cannot derive by means of a kal va-chomer from the prohibition applying to a kohen [and just as, with regard to the prohibition applying to a kohen, if she has an aspect of divorce she is forbidden, so too, when she has an aspect of the prohibition of a married woman, she is forbidden to the whole world], because

the prohibition applying to a kohen is different,

for since Scripture increased additional mitzvot concerning them, therefore even in a case where she does not have the status of a divorcee with regard to him, nevertheless she is forbidden. But with regard to the prohibition of a married woman, even though she is forbidden to that particular man by the prohibition of a married woman, nevertheless she is permitted to the entire world.

This is not an objection!

For

Rabbi Eliezer as well—he derives it from the prohibition applying to a kohen.

For the entire source of the halakha that Rabbi Eliezer innovated—that when he says “except a particular man,” it is a valid bill of divorce—is from the law of the trace of a bill of divorce, which renders her forbidden to a kohen [as explained above, 82b]. If so, necessarily he does not hold that the prohibition applying to a kohen is different, for if not, how is it possible to derive from the prohibition applying to a kohen to the prohibition of a married woman? Therefore, it is impossible to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s words by saying that the prohibition applying to a kohen is different.

The Gemara answers:

Rava,

who said that there is an objection to Rabbi Akiva’s answer,

was teaching it in accordance with Rabbi Yannai in the name of one elder,

for the source of Rabbi Eliezer is from what is stated in the passage concerning divorce: “and she leaves his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife.” And they expound from “another man” that even if he permitted her only to one man, she is divorced; and all the more so, if he permitted her to the entire world except one particular man, she is divorced. According to this, there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can derive from the prohibition applying to a kohen to the prohibition of a married woman; and once again it is possible to object to Akiva’s answer by saying that the prohibition applying to a kohen is different, for Scripture increased additional mitzvot concerning them.

We learned further in the beraita:

Rabbi Joshua said to them

to those four elders who answered Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

One does not answer the lion after its death.

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean

it is implied by the beraita

that Rabbi Joshua holds like him?

That Rabbi Joshua holds in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s view, and therefore he prevented them from answering Rabbi Eliezer’s words.

But he himself also,

behold, Rabbi Joshua himself as well,

raises an objection

against Rabbi Eliezer’s words?

The Gemara answers:

This is what he said to them:

I too have an objection,

I too have what to answer concerning Rabbi Eliezer’s words, but

nevertheless, both according to me,

both with regard to what I wish to answer Rabbi Eliezer, and

both according to you,

with regard to what you answer concerning his words, nevertheless,

one does not answer the lion after its death.

And what is Rabbi Joshua’s objection?

And what is Rabbi Joshua’s objection to Rabbi Eliezer’s words?

For it was taught: Rabbi Joshua said:

The Torah states: “When a man takes a woman and becomes her husband [and this is the ‘first formation’—the first formation of the betrothal] and he hates her, and he writes for her a scroll of severance, and she leaves, and she becomes another man’s wife [and this is the ‘second formation’

].”

And it

juxtaposes the

“before the second formation,”

that is, the woman’s state after her divorce, before she is betrothed a second time,

to “before the first formation,”

to her state before she was betrothed for the first time.

Just as “before the first formation,”

like before she was betrothed for the first time, her state was

that she was not attached to another person,

that she was not bound to anyone and was completely unmarried,

so too, “before the second formation,”

the same applies before she is betrothed for the second time—that is, her state after her divorce must be a state

that she is not attached to another person,

that she have no connection to anyone.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer’s words, that if he said “except a particular man” she is divorced, it follows that although she is not completely unmarried, for she is still forbidden to that particular man because of her first husband, nevertheless she is divorced; and this is not comparable to the state before the first formation.

In the substance of the matter,

we learned above in the beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer concedes

in the case of one who divorces his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except a particular man,” and she goes and marries one of the men of the marketplace, and

afterward she

becomes widowed

becomes a widow

or becomes divorced

from him,

that she is permitted to the one to whom she had been forbidden.

She may marry that particular man to whom her husband had stipulated that she not marry.

And it is written in the beraita:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar responded with an answer to Rabbi Eliezer’s words,

who said that if she married another, she is permitted to that particular man; and concerning this he raised the difficulty:

This woman had been forbidden to that particular man because of the marital bond of her first husband, and now she becomes permitted to the marketplace through marrying another,

and where do we find that one forbids and another permits?

And we raise an objection:

And

if

not

do we find that one forbids and another permits?

But

every

levirate widow, where the husband forbids,

for even though her husband died, she is still forbidden to the marketplace because of the marital bond of her first husband, except to the levir,

and

nevertheless the

levir permits

her to the marketplace through halitza, to marry any man.

And we answer:

There

the reason that she is forbidden to the marketplace before halitza is because

the levir is the one who forbids her,

for she is still subject to the levirate bond, and since her prohibition is because of the levir, he is therefore the one who permits her—and this is proof that the reason she is forbidden to the marketplace is because of the levir—

for if it were because of the husband,

if we say that she is forbidden because of the marital bond of the deceased,

behold, she is and remains permitted

immediately when her husband dies she should immediately be completely permitted; and proof of this is that if he has children, she is permitted to the marketplace. Necessarily, that which makes her forbidden to the marketplace when she has no children is because of the levir, and therefore he can permit her.

And we raise an objection:

But

we find in

vows

that one forbids and another permits—

for

the

one who vows forbids

the object through a vow,

and

nevertheless the

sage permits

the vow for him .

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: A sage does not permit anything,

for a sage does not possess the independent power to permit vows as a husband permits them,

but

he shows the one who vowed an opening: had he known what would result for him from the vow, he would not have vowed; and then the vow becomes permitted

through the regret

of the one who vowed himself. It is found that from the outset it was like a vow made in error, and there is no vow that the sage permits by his own independent power .

And we raise an objection:

But

we find that one forbids and another permits in

the husband’s annulment

for a woman vows

upon herself,

and

nevertheless the

husband

annuls

the vow for her, without regret.

And we answer:

There,

that which is within the husband’s power to annul is

in accordance with Rav Pinhas in the name of Rava—

for Rav Pinhas said in the name of Rava: Every

woman

who

vows,

she vows with the understanding

that

her husband

will agree,

she vows.

But on the assumption that her husband will not agree, she does not vow; and it is found that it is not considered that her husband annulled the vow for her, since from the outset she vowed only with the understanding of her husband, and he did not agree. It is found that from the outset there is no vow here at all; if so, we have not found that one forbids and another permits .

We learned above in the beraita:

Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah responded and said—

since the Torah says that he must divorce her with a scroll

of severance,

the bill of divorce must be

a thing that severs between him and her,

so that after the divorce she will have no connection whatsoever to her first husband. But in a case where he retains “except a particular man,” she is still not completely severed from him and is still dependent upon him, for because of him she cannot marry that particular man—

thus you have learned that this is not severance.

The Gemara asks:

And the Rabbis,

the other elders who did not answer Rabbi Eliezer’s words in this manner,

this

“severance,”

what do they do with it,

what do they expound from this verse?

They require it

they need the word “severance” for another exposition:

for that which was taught

and as we learned in a beraita:

One who says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine”

forever,

or he says to her,

“on the condition that you do not go to your father’s house forever, this is not severance” ,

for she remains bound to him all the days of her life through the prohibition against drinking wine—

But if he stipulated with her that she may not go to her father’s house for thirty days, or that she may not drink wine

for thirty days, this is severance,

for she is not dependent upon him all the days of her life; therefore the word “severance” is needed to expound that if he stipulated with her that she may not do this all the days of her life, this is not severance.

And the other one,

and from where does Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah learn this law?

From “severance, severances” it follows.

For in order to exclude the case where he says “except a particular man,” and the bill of divorce is invalid, it would suffice for “and he writes for her a scroll of severance” to be written; and from the fact that the Torah wrote “severances,” we learn an additional matter—that if he stipulated with her that she may not drink wine all the days of her life, this is not severance.

And the other one,

and what do the Rabbis, who did not answer Rabbi Eliezer’s words in this manner, expound from the Torah’s lengthier wording?

“Severance, severances”—they do not expound it.

They do not hold that the Torah’s lengthier wording is expounded:

Rava said—

One who says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine all the days of my life, this is not severance,”

for she is bound to him for the fulfillment of the condition—

but if he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you do not drink wine

all the days of the life of a particular man, this is severance.”

The Gemara asks:

What is different,

why, when he says “on the condition that you do not drink wine all the days of

the life of a particular man

this is considered severance, because

perhaps he will die,

perhaps he will die before her,

and she fulfills its condition,

and she can again drink wine, for the condition has been fulfilled, and it is found that she was not dependent upon him all the days of her life. If so, also when he says to her that she may not drink wine during

his lifetime

[as long as he is alive],

also

the bill of divorce should be valid, for

perhaps he will die, and she fulfills its condition.

It is possible that he will die before her, and she will be released from the condition.

The Gemara answers:

Rather, say

that this is how you should interpret Rava’s intention:

If he says to her, “On the condition that you do not drink wine

all the days of your life,

all the days of your life,” she is found to be bound and dependent upon him all the days of her life, and therefore

this is not severance .

But if he says to her, “On the condition that you do not drink wine

all the days of my life or the life of a particular man, this is severance,

for it is possible that the husband will die before her or that the particular man will die before her ; and since she is not bound and dependent upon her husband all the days of her life, this is a valid bill of divorce .

Rava asked Rav Nahman -

The one who gives a get to his wife and says to her at the time of giving the get: "

today you are not my wife

[his intention is that the get should take effect only for this day], but

tomorrow you are my wife,

and with regard to tomorrow he does not divorce her,

what

is the ruling? Is this considered a reservation in the body of the get, or not?

Let it be asked

the uncertainty is between

according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that when one says “except for so-and-so,” this is a valid get, and likewise

let it be asked according to

the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who hold that if he says to her “except for so-and-so,” this is an invalid get -

Let it be asked according to Rabbi Eliezer -

Rabbi Eliezer said only this there,

when he divorces her except for so-and-so, that she is divorced,

but

only in the circumstance

that for the one whom he permits, he permits forever.

To the one whom he permitted, he permitted completely.

But here,

where he reserves in the get that the divorce should take effect only for today -

no

Rabbi Eliezer did not deem the get valid, since the get does not sever her from him completely -

Or perhaps, it is no different.

Just as when one says “except for so-and-so,” this is a valid get, so too, in the case where he divorces her only for one day, this is a valid get.

Let it be asked according to the Rabbis -

The Rabbis said only this there,

when he divorces her except for so-and-so, that the get is invalid,

but because she was not severed from him entirely.

Since the bond between her and her husband was not severed, for because of him she is forbidden to that so-and-so, and therefore the get is invalid -

But here,

where he said to her, “Today you are not my wife,” she is divorced completely, and she does not return to him tomorrow except when he betroths her anew,

since she was severed

from him for today,

she was severed

from him entirely -

After raising the question, he then resolved it: